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ABSTRACT
ASSESSMENT OF ECCS EFFECTIVENESS FOR LIGHT WATER NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
The effectiveness of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) for 
light water nuclear power reactors was the subject of lengthy, controver­
sial and technically complex hearings conducted by the AEC over the two 
years from 1971 through 1973. An independent, objective review and 
assessment of the technical issues associated with ECCS effectiveness 
was conducted in a study performed at the Environmental Quality Laboratory 
of the California Institute of Technology. The review was based upon 
the testimonies and supporting technical documentation of the principal 
participants in the hearings: the AEC, utilities, reactor manufacturers, 
and intervenors.
From the review, the critical technical parameters influencing ECCS 
performance, which were at issue, are identified. Of fifteen parameters 
cited by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety in the hearings as 
being of unproved conservatism, essentially all are reviewed in detail, 
including, for example, the initial stored fuel energy, fuel rod gas gap 
conductance, fluid flow rates through broken pipes, metal-water reaction 
energy release and fuel rod embrittlement, reflood/core-spray heat 
transfer, and reflooding rates, as well as the adequacy of ECCS analyti­
cal models and numerical methods. The relative influence of uncertain­
ties in the performance criteria associated with these parameters is 
assessed. Based upon the relative importance of these parameters, 
alternative responses to resolution of the ECCS problem are analyzed.
The importance of the core reflooding rate in resolving the technical 
issues of the problem is emphasized. The conservatism of the proposed 
criteria (current and past) is reviewed. Recommendations are made for 
improvements in criteria conservatism, especially in the establishment 
of minimum reflood heat transfer rates (or alternatively, reflooding 
rates). Several new and/or accelerated research programs and addi­
tional large scale testing programs are also recommended. Suggestions 
are also made for areas in which design improvements would help to 
achieve greater ECCS reliability.
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FOREWORD
The siting of nuclear power plants in California is one of the 
problems which the Environmental Quality Laboratory has addressed. 
Previously published work dealt only with the siting issue, and not 
with the question of the desirability of nuclear power plants or their 
problems. But at the outset it was recognized that at least two major 
technical problems pervaded all public discussion of nuclear power.
One was the question of disposal of high-level radioactive waste; the 
other was the adequacy of plant safety systems and particularly the 
emergency core cooling system (ECCS). While one can study the siting 
of power plants without reference to the former problem, the latter 
problem can enter into consideration of specific site locations.
Because EQL studies, as well as those performed by other groups, 
have shown that many sources of energy will be needed to meet society's 
perceived needs, it has been our view that nuclear power plant siting 
and safety problems are in urgent need of resolution. The Laboratory 
staff would have preferred not to address the safety question, but we 
found that we could not consider siting without facing the public's 
questions on safety. We also recognize that the nature of EQL would 
preclude our adding to the massive body of theoretical and empirical 
knowledge concerning reactor engineering. It was felt, however, that 
we should understand the nature of the controversy in order that we 
could at least communicate the facts to those interested.
It is our intention to consider the problem of radioactive waste 
disposal in future studies. The present study, carried out by Dr. 
Finlayson, addresses one key element of the power plant safety problem. 
In the recently completed study of reactor safety sponsored by the AEC1 
(termed the Rasmussen Study after the principal investigator), analysis 
was made of the probability of accidents of various types, and estimates
1 WASH 1400 Reactor Safety Study (Draft), USAEC, August 1974.
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were made of the likely consequences of such accidents. That study did 
not analyze the physical events occurring during the "maximum credible 
accident," or loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The Rasmussen study con­
cluded that the probability of accident was very low, and that the expected 
consequences were far less than previous "worst case" analysis would suggest.
Previously, the issue of the physical events transpiring during a LOCA 
was the subject of extensive hearings on the Interim Acceptance Criteria for 
Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Subsequent to the hearings, revised Accep­
tance Criteria were issued by the AEC and are in force. The continued 
public debate over the safety of nuclear power plants centers on the 
adequacy of the Acceptance Criteria.
This study by Dr. Finlayson (which was carried out while the hearings 
were being completed and afterwards) centers upon the physical events of a 
LOCA and the adequacy of the Acceptance Criteria for insuring successful 
design of the ECCS. (This is different from the Rasmussen analysis, which 
investigated the probability of the equipment working as it should.) The 
purpose of this study is informational.
The technical facts, as reported in the literature and reviewed in 
the AFC hearings, are summarized and highlighted. From this, Finalyson 
has been able to differentiate alternative courses of action for reducing 
perceived hazards associated with ECCS operation. Comments have been pro­
vided on the results that might be expected from following one route or 
another. Among the alternatives are those which would be painful or unac­
ceptable to one or another point of view. There are paths, however, which
may more closely approach acceptability to all. It is hoped that by pub­
lishing this document the participation of an informed public in the process
of decision-making will be helped.
The importance of "stopping the argument" is sometimes lost to parti­
sans of both sides in the controversy over nuclear power. It is instructive 
to reflect on the arguments that have raged over the appropriate levels to
vi
be required for limits on radioactive emissions from power plants during 
normal operation. The controversy was effectively stilled when the pro­
posal was made by the AEC to reduce allowable limits to the point where 
the acrimonious, detailed technical arguments were no longer pertinent, 
yet the cost factors involved with the rules were (hopefully) not too 
onerous to the operators. The question of routine emissions is no longer 
much of an issue.
In the same way Finlayson has sought technical solutions which avoid 
many of the detailed arguments yet hopefully can be implemented at a cost 
within reason. It is in this spirit that the study has been published.
Martin Goldsmith 
Deputy Director
Environmental Quality Laboratory
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1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS
Basic to an understanding of the controversies 
which have surrounded some nuclear plants is the reali­
zation that from the inception of the nuclear power 
program, the [Atomic Energy] Commission has been concerned 
with safety. For many years that was practically the 
only issue considered at the public hearings held in local 
communities on individual plants. Many persons within 
the nuclear industry have commented that the AEC talked 
about safety so much and is supporting so much safety- 
related work that it is not surprising that the average 
citizen may have some apprehensions.
The jargon of the nuclear industry has not offered 
much comfort. Terms such as "design basis accident," 
"maximum credible accident" and "reasonable assurance" 
may be perfectly acceptable to the scientist and engineer, 
but are not reassuring to the public. On the other hand, 
some persons who willingly accept everyday risks such as 
highway traffic, walking across streets, using electricity 
and fire, often use another yardstick with respect to 
nuclear power, insisting on absolutes which will never 
be attainable (U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Dec. 1972, 
(1, p. III-l)*
We now approach the key issues. The reactor con­
structors claim that they have devoted more effort to 
safety problems than any other technologists have. This 
is true. From the beginning they have paid much attention 
to safety and they have been remarkably clever in devising 
safety precautions. This is perhaps pathetic, but it is 
not relevant. If a problem is too difficult to solve, 
one cannot claim that it is solved by pointing to all the 
efforts made to solve it (Hannes Alfven, May 1972, 2) .
It is generally conceded that the nuclear power industry has 
expended more effort to insure the safety and reliability of operating 
reactors than has ever been expended by any other industry in safety 
related activities. However, in spite of their efforts, substantial 
controversy has recently developed over nuclear plant safety. Members 
of the nuclear community have suggested that the probability of a
* Underscored numbers refer to references. See reference list at end 
of report. (Appendix 11)
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major accident involving the potential release of large quantities of 
radioactive fission products is extremely small, the probability being 
of the order of one accident in 100,000 to 1,000,000 reactor years of 
operation (3)• Although the quantitative value associated with the prob­
ability of a major reactor accident is a subject of controversy, it is 
generally conceded that the probability is very small. However, even 
accepting the low accident probability there are a sufficient number 
of people, as represented by Alfven, who feel that unresolved safety 
issues still exist, in spite of the good efforts of the reactor engi­
neers and scientists, to make reactor safety a significant current 
national problem.
It is the goal of this paper to try to put into perspective 
one aspect of the safety of light water power reactors (LWR), the 
functional effectiveness of the so-called Emergency Core Cooling 
System (ECCS). The ECCS is the element of a nuclear power plant which 
is designed to cool the reactor in the event of one of the most serious 
possible accidents considered credible by the U. S. Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) —  the so-called Design Basis Accident (DBA) —  the Loss 
of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
This report represents the results of an investigation of the 
problem areas associated with the ECCS reliability issue. An attempt 
has been made to present an objective evaluation of the principal 
areas associated with the ECCS controversy, and to provide an evalua­
tion of the options available to produce at least partial resolution 
of some of the apparently unresolved issues. In order to do this, a 
brief review is given in this chapter of the philosophy and practice 
in the design of nuclear power reactors, as promulgated by the AEC.
The principal technical issues associated with the ECCS 
controversy have been raised and discussed in advisory hearings con­
ducted by the AEC. This report presents the results of an attempt
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to weigh the technical evidence presented directly or indirectly in 
connection with the hearings. The principal protagonists in the 
adversary hearings and their primary presentation of technical material 
were: the AEC regulatory staff, who presented (as a partial listing) 
an initial statement of Testimony (8), a Supplemental Testimony (4), 
a concluding Statement (/S), and an Environmental Statement (61); the 
reactor manufacturers, each of whom submitted a similar number of 
testimonial elements into the record (e.g. _21, 27); the electrical power 
utilities (22); and a combined group of intervenors, the Consolidated 
National Intervenors, whose principal technical spokesmen were repre­
sentatives of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Daniel Ford and 
Henry Kendall (5, 7_, 9). In the course of this review, the testimonies 
and statements of these organizations were reviewed in depth and 
supplemented by evaluation of many other supporting documents, most 
of which have been noted in the reference list.
1.1 Reactor Safety in Perspective
In attempting to assure the safety of nuclear power generation 
the AEC has promulgated a design philosophy of multiple barriers 
against the escape of radioactivity from nuclear facilities.* The AEC 
describes this as the "defense-in-depth" design philosophy embodying 
"three levels of safety." These three levels of safety are described 
by the AEC as:
The First Level of Safety
Precept: Design for unquestionable safety in normal
operations and maximum tolerance for system malfunctions.
Use design features inherently favorable to safe operation; 
emphasize quality, redundancy, inspectability, and testability 
prior to acceptance for sustained commercial operation over 
the plant lifetime.
* Basic principles of light water reactor and emergency core cooling 
system operation and design are presented in appendix 1.
1-3
The Second Level of Safety
Precept: Assume accidents will occur in spite of care in
design, construction and operation. Provide safety systems 
to protect operators and to prevent or minimize damage when 
such accidents occur.
The Third Level of Safety
Precept: Evaluate effects of hypothetical accidents, where
protective systems are assumed to fail simultaneously with 
the accident they are intended to control. Provide additional 
safety systems as appropriate (1, pp. 2.2 to 2.5).
The first level of safety embodies the concept of selecting 
fuel, coolant and structural materials whose properties are well known 
and incorporating them into designs which have inherent stability and 
safety characteristics. The philosophy calls for safety margins 
(i.e., conservatism in thermal, hydraulic and structural member design) 
to be incorporated into designs at all critical stages. Instrumenta­
tion and controls are to be provided to assure that operators know the 
operating conditions of the plants at all times and have control over 
them. Redundancy is a recommended characteristic of design in all 
crucial safety related areas —  including instrumentation —  to assure 
that the failure of one component will not compromise the safety of the 
entire system or deprive the operators of needed information to ensure 
its safe operation.
The second level of safety represents a recognition that in 
spite of all efforts to insure a totally safe design, failures, design 
errors, construction oversights and operating errors will occur in 
the course of the lifetime of the plant. This level is designed to 
provide safety systems to accommodate a spectrum of possible mistakes 
or oversights before they become accidents in which the risk of public 
radioactive contamination is experienced. As an example, redundant 
offsite power sources needed to energize emergency equipment in the
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event of loss of the plant’s own power are backed up by redundant 
on-site power sources. A fast-acting reactor shutdown (SCRAM) system 
is provided. The SCRAM system is designed to terminate the nuclear 
fission process in the event of emergency conditions. It is activated 
by redundant and independent instrument channels which monitor plant 
parameters. Engineered rate-limiting mechanisms are built into the 
system to prevent excessive rates of power increase which might result 
from abnormal motion of the control rods or their accidental ejection 
from the core.
The third level of safety supplements the first two by pro­
viding additional safety systems to cover the consequences of potential, 
although highly improbable, combinations of failures of protective systems 
of the first and second safety levels. The margin of safety provided 
in this third level is evaluated by analyzing the system response to 
the so-called design basis accident, the most severe accident which is 
considered conceivable for design purposes. The DBA is an accident 
which is postulated to occur at a time when a single element of the 
safety system is also temporarily (or permanently) unavailable (the 
so-called single-failure criterion). The failed element of the system 
has been determined to be the one which results in the most serious 
system consequences. For light water reactors, the design basis 
accident is the so-called Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).*
1.1.1 LOCA consequences in the event of ECCS failure
The LOCA is assumed to occur as a result of the rupture of 
one of the main coolant pipes for the system and to result in a sudden 
loss of reactor coolant water with accompanying rapid nuclear steam 
system depressurization as the fluid is exhausted into the contain­
ment vessel. This period is referred to as the "blowdown" phase of 
the accident. In a LWR, the cooling water is an integral part of the
* A detailed presentation of the physical processes occurring during 
a LOCA is presented in appendix 2.
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nuclear reaction process, acting as a moderator which slows the 
fissioned neutrons to velocities such that the potential for further 
fission in the enriched uranium fuel is enhanced. The loss of the 
coolant in the reactor core will stop the nuclear reaction, which is 
the source of energy for power generation. Consequently, uncontrolled 
nuclear excursions or bomblike explosions are not possible conse­
quences of a LOCA.
However, the nuclear reactions of normal operations produce 
long-lived radioactive fission products within the fuel rods (the 
nuclear equivalent of ashes from fossil fuels) which continue to release 
substantial quantities of highly energetic radiation by radioactive 
decay even after the nuclear fission process has been stopped. The 
fission product inventory of a typical reactor is described in more 
detail in appendix 1. Exposure to many of the fission products is 
extremely hazardous. The AEC's "three levels of safety" concept was 
developed basically to prevent fission products from being released 
into the environment. The potentially hazardous result of a LOCA is 
that it may result in all safety barriers between man and fission 
products being broken down.
To prevent the escape of fission products into the environ­
ment, the ECCS must be able to cope with the energy released. Immedi­
ately after plant shutdown, following a period of sustained operation, 
the radioactive decay of the fission products will release energy 
equivalent to about 7 percent of the rated thermal output of the plant. 
For a nuclear power plant producing 1000 megawatts of electrical power
(ME ), approximately 3300 megawatts of thermal energy (MW ) are e t
produced under normal operating conditions by the reactor, assuming a 
typical efficiency of approximately 33 percent. For such a reactor, 
immediately after shutdown 225 MW^ _ of heat would be produced as a result 
of the radioactive energy of the fission products. The energy output 
of the fission products decays rather rapidly to 5 percent at 10 seconds
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after shutdown, 2 percent after about 10 minutes, 1 percent after 
2.25 hours, until within a day after shutdown only approximately 0.5 
percent or about 15 MW , of the rated power is produced (61, p. 20). 
Because this energy results from radioactive disintegration (or decay) 
of the fission product nuclides, this heat source of the reactor is 
commonly called "decay heat."
Although the relative magnitude of the decay heat is small 
when compared to the rated output of the plant, its absolute magnitude 
is sufficiently large that it requires active cooling for long periods 
to prevent meltdown with subsequent catastrophic results. In the 
event of a LOCA, unless supplementary cooling water is supplied 
quickly to the fuel rods they will rapidly increase in temperature 
with consequent swelling and rupture. The function of the Emergency 
Core Cooling System is to supply this needed cooling water to the 
reactor core to prevent excessive fuel rod damage. However, in the 
event of a design basis LOCA, even with adequate ECCS performance, 
some fuel rod rupture would probably take place. In the words of the 
AEC Commissioners, as stated in their Opinion to final ECCS Acceptance 
Criteria (AC),
...it is obvious that, when the course of the LOCA is 
calculated according to the conservative prescriptions 
of an approved evaluation model, swelling and bursting 
of the cladding will be estimated to occur in abundance 
(60, p. 1105).
The ruptured rods would release the majority of their gaseous and 
volatile fission products to the reactor containment and possibly 
(even assuming no major failures of reactor containment vessels) 
to the environment thereafter at a low leak rate. Fuel rod rupture 
alone would not be considered catastrophic, if it were to occur.
But if the ECCS should fail to function, the absence of 
coolant would cause the rod temperatures to increase rapidly.
Without cooling, the redistribution of the internal energy of the 
fuel rods alone would cause the surface temperature of the hottest
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rod in the reactor to increase to about 2300°F. In the continued 
absence of coolant, due to the coolant pipe rupture, and the ECCS 
failure, the most highly irradiated rod in the core would increase 
in temperature at a rate of about 20°F per second. At rod temperatures 
on the order of 2000°F (and higher), exothermic reaction would take 
place between the remaining steam vapors in the core and the fuel rod 
cladding material itself (commonly a zirconium alloy, zircaloy). In 
addition to adding energy to that of the decaying fission products, 
these reactions produce hydrogen which may induce a potentially explos­
ive environment when mixed with air in the containment vessel into which 
the coolant, hydrogen from the reaction, and gaseous and volatile 
fission products are discharged from the ruptured pipes. Moreover, 
this metal-water reaction produces oxidation of the fuel rod cladding 
which may induce its embrittlement. In the event of excessive oxi­
dation, the cladding may become so brittle that the loads developed 
during cooling could cause them to disintegrate with subsequent dis­
persal of fission products to the containment vessel and potential 
blockage of coolant paths within the reactor core.
As the uncooled LOCA thermal excursion continues, at tempera­
tures on the order of 3400°F, melting would occur. After a reasonably 
short period of time (estimated to be from 10 minutes to one hour,
11, p. 141), the molten fuel could be expected to have collapsed 
into a heap in the bottom of the pressure vessel and then through the 
bottom of the containment vessel into the earth with resultant great 
increases in the subsequent potential for dispersal of large quanti­
ties of radioactive fission products in the biosphere. The molten 
mass of core material could then proceed to melt its way into the 
earth transferring energy to the earth and decaying in energy itself 
with time, as it slowly progressed downward. Its downward progress 
would ultimately be limited by achievement of a stable condition in 
which the rate of energy production of the molten mass matched the
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heat transfer capacity of the surrounding rock. The concern over 
the downward migration of the core material into the earth has 
sometimes been referred to as the "China syndrome," indicative 
(in an exaggerated fashion) of the uncertainty concerning the termi­
nal depth of the molten core material. In point of fact, such progres­
sion would probably stop within some hundreds of feet.
The disastrous potential of the sequence of events which 
might occur in the event of ECCS failure, as outlined above, is clear. 
The release of a small fraction of the gaseous and volatilized fission 
products of a large power reactor to the environment surrounding the 
plant could have several effects in the vicinity of the plant. The 
wind-blown radioactivity might be expected to produce, depending upon 
exposure levels and the magnitude of the release, prompt deaths 
(within 30 days) from acute downwind radiation exposure, long-term 
health effects (both somatic and genetic) from lower levels of radiation 
exposure downwind, and property damage, perhaps most importantly denial 
of the agricultural and other kinds of land use for long periods.
1.1.2 LOCA probability
Although the probability of an accident occurring leading to 
the loss of coolant is considered extremely remote, Emergency Core 
Cooling Systems (ECCS) have been designed and built into existing 
power plants to preclude the problems that would be associated with 
a LOCA in which no cooling water was delivered to the core. If the 
ECCS performs in accordance with design, coolant will be supplied to 
the core by spraying or flooding so that excessive fuel rod tempera­
ture increases, along with consequent gross deformation of the core, 
are prevented. The system is also designed to assure that the long­
term decay heat associated with the core will be adequately removed 
to prevent subsequent failure occurring through the previously described 
series of events.
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It has been stated by the AEC that the probability of the 
design basis accident LOCA occurring at all is remote (i.e., on the 
order of one accident in 100,000 to 1,000,000 reactor years, as pre­
viously noted). However, even if the validity of such assertions is 
accepted, the probability of a LOCA occurring is still finite, and 
the consequences of failure of the ECCS to function are so severe 
that it is necessary to require that reliable ECCS performance be a 
high probability event.
It is essentially impossible to develop a statistical data 
base for such low probability events as the LOCA. Consequently the 
public, and much of the scientific community at large, is inclined 
to mistrust the use of probabilistic estimates as a basis for con­
clusions with respect to ECCS performance, in connection with the 
broader questions of nuclear reactor safety. However, LOCA probability 
is generally conceded to be very low by the technical community, even 
though estimates of its quantitative value may be uncertain.
There is sometimes a tendency to allow the apparent low 
probability of the DBA to influence the evaluation of the importance 
of the ECCS. For example, Stephen Hanauer, chief technical advisor 
to the AEC's regulatory staff, has stated, "In principle, it should 
be possible to reduce the probability of a LOCA to so low a value 
that protection against its consequences - the ECCS - would not be 
required" (12.). However, it is the opinion of many, the AEC regulatory 
staff included, that the inability to guarantee a zero probability for 
the LOCA and the magnitude of its consequences without emergency cooling 
make it essential that the ECCS must exist and perform reliably.
Consequently, and importantly, the probability of successful 
performance of the ECCS should be considered as a separate issue from 
the probability of the LOCA itself. Otherwise, the two events tend to
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become confused. As much weight then begins to be given to the unlike­
lihood of the LOCA occurring as is given to evaluation of the technical 
and scientific phenomena behind the design of the ECCS itself.
That this concept is recognized and followed is demonstrated 
in statements by Milton Shaw, the AEC's former director of Reactor 
Development and Technology (RDT) and Andrew J. Pressesky, the Assistant 
Director for Nuclear Safety in the RDT at the time of the ECCS hearings. 
"Our job is to work out these problems," Pressesky says, "and that's 
what we're trying to do. For our purposes, the probability of an 
accident is one" (emphasis added). Shaw adds that he thinks "serious 
reactor accidents will inevitably occur - but that safety systems will 
protect public life and property" (13). Because of the non-zero proba­
bility of serious accidents, as acknowledged by Shaw and Pressesky, our 
study has been conducted under the implicit assumption that a LOCA 
can occur. As was the case in the hearings, only the reliability of 
ECCS' performance is the subject of evaluation.
1.2 Historical Assessment of the Bases for the Interim Acceptance
Criteria
The preliminary set of performance standards —  or Interim 
Acceptance Criteria (IAC) —  against which ECCS were to be designed 
were the subject of lengthy (125 days from Jan. 27, 1972 to July 25, 
1973) hearings before the AEC. The expectations for the hearings were 
summarized in the words of Alvin M. Weinberg, then Director of the 
AEC's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Dr. Weinberg stated:
"Faced with questions of this weight, which in a most basic sense are 
not fully susceptible to a yes or no scientific answer, the AEC has 
invoked the adjudicatory process .... The record of the hearings is 
expected to contain all that is known about emergency core cooling 
systems and to provide the basis for setting the criteria for design 
of such systems" (14, emphasis added).
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Perhaps the judicial concept of adversary proceedings selected 
by the AEC for the hearing, pitting the regulatory staff against the 
Consolidated National Intervenors, as well as the reactor manufacturers 
and electrical utilities, may not have been the most practical means 
of producing the result hoped for by Weinberg and the public at large. 
The hearings required 125 days of testimony and cross-examination over 
an 18 month period. The results are contained in 22,380 pages of 
recorded transcript of oral testimony in which more than 1000 documents 
were referenced, of which about 250 were admitted to the record as 
exhibits.
Why were the hearings required and what was the basis for 
issuance of the controversial IAC? The IAC represented a major mile­
stone in over five years of continuing activity by the AEC concerning 
ECCS. Around 1966, the AEC's regulatory staff became concerned about 
problems associated with extrapolation of the design and analysis 
procedures for the small nuclear power reactors of that period 
(generally of less than 100 MW^ capacity) to today's very large plants 
with capacities frequently greater than 1000 MWg, which were then in 
the planning and initial construction phases. Research was especially 
sought on information related to the emergency core cooling problem.
A task force of 12 engineers and scientists (seven from industry and 
five from AEC supported labs), headed by the late William K. Ergen 
of ORNL, was appointed in October 1966 to investigate the problem.
In 1967, the Ergen report, "Emergency Core Cooling" (11) , was published 
with a limited distribution. The report pointed out some serious 
issues demonstrating the need for effective ECCS operation and outlined 
a recommended major research program to resolve the uncertainties 
highlighted by the investigation.
It does not appear that all of the programs recommended by 
the Ergen task force were ever implemented. But several major changes 
in the LWR safety research program did occur as a result. As a
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particular example, in 1967 the AEC reoriented a major research reactor 
program then under construction in recognition of the importance of 
investigating ECCS operational phenomena. The project, called the 
Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facility, had originally been conceived to 
investigate the effects of the meltdown of a reactor following a LOCA, 
when no ECCS was in operation. Shaw redirected the emphasis of the 
program to the more difficult problem of answering questions associated 
with the physical processes of the ECCS cooling of a reactor which has 
undergone a LOCA. Unfortunately LOFT ran into prodigious cost overrun 
problems and delays as a result of this change in design concept and 
the program's being made a showcase for demonstration of the AEC's 
then newly emphasized quality control program. As a result, the LOFT 
facility is still under construction and test schedules are uncertain. 
System tests under nuclear power are not scheduled until 1976.
In spite of the urgent need for accelerated research on 
reactor emergency cooling, the AEC's safety budget remained essentially 
constant from 1967 to 1972 at approximately $35 million per year.
To compound the painful aspect of budgetary restraints, it should be 
noted that within this period of constant budgets, where inflation 
meant reduced research activity at best, the fast breeder's share of 
this safety budget rose from $4 million in 1969 to more than $11 million
in 1972. Though Shaw fought to maintain or increase the safety budget, 
it was the opinion of Congress and the budgetary elements of the execu­
tive branch that LWRs had matured sufficiently to permit industry to 
handle the bulk of their own safety related R&D.
The AEC's limited safety research funds resulted in discontin­
uance of important programs related to several aspects of ECCS problems
which were nowhere near completion. As an example, in February 1971, 
an ORNL program felt by many to be the lab's single most important 
piece of nuclear safety research, a study of how reactor fuel rods 
might behave during a major LOCA, was cancelled, though it had run 
only two of its scheduled four years.
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In the midst of these painful budget exercises, two addi­
tional storm warnings were raised for the AEC. In 1969, an AEC Inter­
nal Study Group provided results of their work calling for greater 
emphasis on quality control in reactor design and construction and con­
firming the use of the LOCA as a design basis accident. This study was 
followed in a letter from the ACRS, of 12 Novenber 1969, which reempha­
sized to Glenn Seaborg, then Chairman of the AEC, the ACRS' concern over 
the neglect of research on emergency core cooling and fuel failure 
mechanisms for LWRs. The letter stated in part:
The committee has strongly recommended safety research 
of this kind several times during the past three years; the 
regulatory staff has also strongly supported such work. 
However, only small or modest efforts have been initiated 
thus far (13).
So, it became increasingly evident to the AEC that a need 
existed to perform more LOCA research. Thus after over two years of 
review, in February 1970, the AEC published their "Water Reactor Safe­
ty Program Plan" (WASH-1146) (15). The plan outlined 139 unsettled 
safety questions and designated 44 of them (including many related to 
the ECCS) as "very urgent, key problem areas, the solution of which 
would clearly have great impact, either directly or indirectly, on a 
major critical aspect of reactor safety" (15).
In November 1971, WASH-1146 was followed up by a supplemen­
tal "Water Reactor Safety Program Augmentation Plan" (16). This docu­
ment emphasized:
Emergency core cooling has been described in the overall 
Program Plan, WASH-1146, as 'generally considered to be 
the most urgent problem areas in the safety program today.'
A major loss-of-coolant accident is extremely unlikely, 
and present ECC systems, as designed, are expected to 
mitigate the consequences of such an accident should one 
occur. However, present experimental data and analysis 
techniques are not now sufficient to provide the degree 
of ECC assurance deemed necessary by the AEC [emphasis 
added] (16, p. 7).
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In the midst of this environment, late in 1970, a "senior 
task force" of four executive members of the AEC's regulatory staff, 
under the direction of Stephen H. Hanauer, was appointed to evaluate 
the ECCS problem. Perhaps it is no coincidence that almost at the 
same time the task force was appointed some dramatic experimental 
results were obtained which appear to have had an important impact 
on development of the IAC. From November 1970 to March 1971, a series 
of experiments were conducted at the AEC's National Reactor Testing 
Station (NRTS), Idaho Falls, Idaho. These experiments, designated the 
"Semiscale Blowdown and Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) Project" were 
conducted on a highly idealized model of a Pressurized Water Reactor 
(PWR) as part of the research program supporting and leading to the 
LOFT program. The "Semiscale" tests were conducted using a 9-inch 
mock up of a reactor pressure vessel containing electrically heated 
simulated fuel elements cooled by water circulating through a single­
loop heat exchanger circuit.
In a series of tests with the apparatus described above, 
it was discovered that in simulated LOCAs essentially all of the 
emergency core coolant injected following initiation of the break 
was swept out of the reactor mock up (along with the original coolant 
water) during the rapid decompression —  or blowdown —  phase of the 
simulated accident. The complete and total expulsion of the emer­
gency coolant apparently came as a most unpleasant surprise to the 
researchers and AEC. Since critics of nuclear power have tried to 
use the "Semiscale" test results to "demonstrate" that adequate ECCS 
performance is unlikely, it should be reemphasized that the test 
equipment was substantially different from an actual operation nuclear 
steam supply system (see appendix 1). One of the principal differences 
was the use of a single loop for the primary reactor heat transfer 
system for the test apparatus. Operational nuclear power plants all 
use multiple loop heat exchange paths between the reactor and two to 
four steam generators —  as opposed to the single-loop of the "Semiscale"
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equipment. Thus, among other things, the coolant flow path redundancy 
helps to reduce the probability that all of the emergency coolant 
would be expelled during blowdown. Direct extrapolation of the results 
to operational reactors are clearly invalid. Nonetheless, the results 
were unpleasant because they were unexpected. Analytical methods 
applied by those conducting the experiments to the experimental appa- 
ratus had not predicted the outcome as it took place •
Apparently in response to the "Semiscale" results, George M. 
Kavanaugh, the AEC assistant general manager for reactors, appeared 
before the Joint Committee for Atomic Energy on 13 May 1971 to request 
supplemental funding for several "significant technical issues" —  
including $2 million for water reactor safety. In the course of his 
presentation, Kavanaugh was questioned about a statement he made 
implying that the "Semiscale" results had not "resolved some of the 
areas of major uncertainty raised by differences among the analyses 
(furnished by reactor manufacturers) particularly with regard to 
their evaluation of the operating effectiveness of the emergency 
core cooling" (18). When asked by Senator Howard Baker (R. Tenn.) to 
explain what he meant by "differences," the following dialogue took place
Kavanaugh: ". . . . [The experiments] have had results
which have not been confirmatory of what the people doing 
those experiments thought might happen. Now they are not 
conclusive. . . . "
Baker: ". . . . meaning that it was worse than you
thought?"
Kavanaugh: "Yes, worse. If it were better we might
not have been allowed to come up here asking for money.
But they [the results] are not conslusive. In other words, *
* Analytical evaluations by reactor manufacturers, subsequent to 
the experiments, did show that vendor codes were able to predict 
the "Semiscale" results with "reasonable accuracy" (17, p. 37).
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the experiment was done on something far from a 
reactor . . . .  It is difficult to draw conclusions 
from those experiments . . . .  What we want to do are 
more of these experiments (18).
In spite of the limitations of applicability of extrapola­
tions of the experiments, the results were evidently significant 
enough to spur the investigation being conducted concurrently by 
Hanauer's task force to climactic activity levels. On June 29, 1971, 
the task force issued the so-called Interim Acceptance Criteria (see 
appendix 3). The regulations were considered so urgent that they were 
put into force without the customary 30 to 60 day comment period.
The hastened enforcement precipitated a showdown with environmental 
intervenors who were already introducing ECCS problems at several 
licensing hearings. James Schlesinger, then chairman of the AEC, 
ordered the IAC hearings in an effort to settle the issue once and 
for all in a single generic rule-making hearing. The importance of 
the hearings was highlighted by a letter to Schlesinger from the ACRS, 
dated 10 Feb 1972. It stated in part:
In several previous reports the Advisory Committee 
on Reactor Safeguards has emphasized the need for high 
priority for safety research work aimed at gaining a 
better understanding of the phenomena important to the 
course of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA).
In connection with its review of the Interim Acceptance 
Criteria, the Committee has stated its belief that more 
work is required on code development, on improved 
emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), and on safety 
research oriented to LOCA-ECCS.
The Committee has recently reviewed the general 
plans of the AEC and the nuclear industry for water 
reactor safety research. In this review, the Committee 
had the benefit of a Subcommittee meeting held on 
December 7-8, 1971, with representatives of the 
Division of Reactor Development and Technology, the 
AEC Regulatory Staff, and the nuclear industry.
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In this report, the Committee confines its attention 
primarily to safety research pertinent to LOCA-ECCS. 
Continuing progress must be made in improving our know­
ledge in these areas of the increased number of reactors 
soon to be operating and because some of these reactors 
are to operate at higher power densities.
After first commenting on the increased ECCS-related 
research by the vendors, the ACRS letter expressed concern 
regarding the relative roles of utilities, vendors, and 
the AEC in this matter. The ACRS proceeded to identify 
and discuss five areas relating to ECCS performance which 
needed special emphasis. The five areas are: (1) flow 
coolant injection; (2 ) reflooding rates as affected by 
steam binding; (3) flow and heat during blowdown; (4) im­
proved ECCS computer codes; and (5) fuel-rod failure 
(62_, p. 37).
The hearings were impressive in both quantity of testimony 
produced and duration. They have produced a number of changes in 
the criteria (see appendix 3). However, readers may be intimidated 
by the sheer bulk of the hearings' testimony, as well as the complex­
ity of the technical problems associated with the ECCS. As a result, 
readers may well be understandably uncertain about whether the results 
have demonstrated that a "final solution" to the problem has been 
achieved. The apparent lack of resolution to the problem even within 
the technical community itself, and the critical needs of decision­
makers trying to evolve rational energy strategies for a balanced 
assessment of the ECCS problem, led EQL to attempt an independent and 
objective evaluation of the ECCS' problem. This report presents the 
results of that study.
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2 INTERIM ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
In essence, the Interim Acceptance Criteria (IAC) developed 
by a task force headed by Hanauer did two things. First they prescribed 
a set of general rules, applicable to all reactors, which established 
design limits for peak fuel temperatures and overall reactor oxidation, 
as well as requirements that prescribed that core geometry be maintained 
in a coolable condition during the LOCA transient,* and required that 
heat removal from the core be assured. Secondly, the IAC specified 
instructions for utilization of numerical analysis methods for ECCS 
design and evaluation for each of the principal manufacturers: Westing- 
house (W), General Electric (GE), Babcock and Wilcox (B & W), and 
Combustion Engineering (CE).
A. Criteria for all light-water power reactors
The performance of the emergency core cooling system is judged 
to be acceptable if the calculated course of the loss-of-coolant acci­
dent is limited as follows:
1. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature 
does not exceed 2300°F. This limit has been chosen on the 
basis of available data on embrittlement and possible subse­
quent shattering of the cladding. The results of further 
detailed experiments could be the basis for future revision 
of this limit.
2. The amount of fuel element cladding that reacts chemically 
with water or steam does not exceed 1 percent of the total 
amount of cladding in the reactor.
* Transient: An event which takes place in a brief period of time.
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3. The clad temperature transient is terminated at a time 
when the core geometry is still amenable to cooling, and 
before cladding is so embrittled as to fail during or after 
quenching.
4. The core temperature is reduced and decay heat is removed 
for an extended period of time, as required by the long-lived 
radioactivity remaining in the core.
B. Criteria for specific reactors
Each reactor shall be evaluated in accordance with the general 
criteria above, and using a suitable evaluation model. (Examples of 
acceptable evaluation models are described.)
The IAC excerpts presented demonstrate the division of the 
criteria into general and specific elements. Under the general criteria 
of part A, the first two numbered items were specified in order to pro­
tect the reactor against fuel rod cladding embrittlement. Excessive 
oxidation of the cladding material produces embrittlement as a result 
of metal-water reactions of the zircaloy with the reactor cooling water, 
which becomes important at high temperatures, on the order of 2000°F. 
Limiting the peak temperature experienced by the cladding and the amount 
of clad oxidation, as specified in the first two criteria, was also 
apparently designed to limit the additional energy which would be avail­
able through the exothermic metal-water reaction to exacerbate the rod 
temperature excursion, as well as to limit the amount of hydrogen pro­
duced in the reaction. Excessive hydrogen production could lead to 
explosive conditions in the containment vessel. Criticisms (9) of these 
two criteria were largely directed at the adequacy of simply specifying 
a maximum fuel rod temperature alone (2300°F), independent of time; 
the conservatism of the peak temperature limit chosen, if a maximum 
value alone (without time at temperature criteria) were to be chosen; 
and the adequacy of the 1 percent overall oxidation limit established
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to preclude clad embrittlement or the development of unstable energy 
input conditions which might exceed the controllability limits of the 
ECCS.
The third criterion —  preservation of the core geometry in 
a condition which will permit it to be cooled by the application of the 
emergency coolant —  was criticized by the Consolidated National Inter­
venors (CNI) in terms of its inadequacy to even satisfy the definition of 
a criterion. The principal objection raised was that the language of the 
criterion was too general to provide adequate direction to a designer 
to guide his analysis. The CNI called the language "operationally vague" 
and devoid of sufficient specificity to qualify as an acceptable criterion 
(9, p. 33).
There has been little debate over the fourth of the listed 
general criteria. This is because the criterion implies that under 
applicable conditions the critical thermal transient associated with 
the LOCA has been controlled and that only long term, relatively low 
level decay heat removal remains as a problem. Apparently most critics 
have been willing to accept this aspect of the heat removal problem 
as being amenable to relatively straightforward engineering solutions.
Specific (but remarkably brief) criteria identifying the 
"suitable" evaluation models for each reactor manufacturer's designs 
were given in the IAC (as shown in appendix 3). These models were 
presented with detail apparently felt to be commensurate with initial 
AEC concepts of requirements for sepcification of acceptable assumptions 
to be made in performance of the ECCS analysis. Specific codes and 
certain ranges of variables to be used in the analysis were designated 
in the criteria. The evaluation models were the source of the majority 
of the criticisms raised by intervenors.
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Figure 2.1 PWR LOCA Analysis 
Calculated Temperature vs Time Plot
(After Figure 1 , 1 6 , by permission.)
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2.1 IAC Problem Areas
In general, the criteria were faulted for specification of 
methods and assumptions whose conservatism could not be adequately 
defended, in the opinion of the intervenors. To illustrate the magni­
tude of the unresolved problems which were recognized to be associated 
with the ECCS (at approximately the time the IAC were published), 
figure 2.1 has been abstracted from the AEC's Water Reactor Safety 
Program Augmentation Plan (16).
In figure 2.1, the major problem areas of LOCA/ECCS analysis 
were identified by the AEC as they occur chronologically in a LOCA in 
a pressurized water reactor (PWR). The figure indicates, as a function 
of the various distinguishing periods of the accident, the specific areas 
within each regime where needed improvements were recognized and called 
for in methods of analysis. The temperature history shown is only a 
schematic representation of a LOCA thermal excursion. However, the 
general pattern shown of the temperature-time-thermodynamic process 
scenario provides a basic description of LOCA events in a PWR.
Detailed discussions of the specific problem areas, as they 
are related to the various thermodynamic regimes shown in figure 2 .1 , 
are given in subsequent portions of the report. However, a "general 
observation" given by the AEC in connection with this figure should be 
included here.
...As was stated previously, the end product of 
the safety program must generally result in the 
development of improved analysis methods. To 
date, the evolution of codes has not kept pace 
with the development of ECCS systems.
As reactor designs and their operating characteristics 
changed, the analysis methods were "patched up," 
rather than redeveloped, with the net result that, 
overall, existing methods are inefficient, inflexible, 
and do not adequately represent the physical phenomena 
intended (16).
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To further illustrate the problem and indicate the extent 
of the disputed areas of uncertainty in analysis of thermodynamic 
response, figure 2.2 has been reproduced (9, p. 1.13A) from a document 
of the Aerojet Nuclear Corporation (ANC), the operators of the National 
Reactor Testing Station (NRTS) facilities of the AEC at Idaho Falls. 
Again, as in figure 2.1, the various events of the LOCA are shown in 
the framework of a time history of the response of major reactor system 
elements. The numerous problem areas for which incomplete understanding 
existed at the time are clearly shown in this figure.
The problems which will be addressed in most detail in this 
report dealing with the unknowns of ECCS are concerned primarily with 
evaluation of system responses of the lower half of the figure: the 
primary system response, the core mechanical and thermal response, and 
the ECC action. Although the problems of containment response and the 
engineered safety system are not unimportant to reactor safety, most 
are felt to be relatively well understood. It is mostly in connection 
with their interaction with other elements of the system that responses 
are uncertain. Within this framework, some reference to their effects 
will be made in subsequent discussion.
These problems have been a subject of continuing review on 
the part of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The 
United States Congress, in setting up the AEC, established the ACRS.
The Committee is composed of experts in various aspects of reactor 
safety whose function is to advise the Commission with respect to 
"hazards of proposed or existing reactor facilities and the adequacy 
of proposed reactor safety standards" along with other responsibilities.
In response to direct questions submitted to the ACRS by the 
intervenors in the ECCS hearings, a written statement of reply was 
formulated by the Committee related to uncertainties in analysis 
methods utilized in ECCS evaluation. The ACRS stated:
2-6
ANC Outline of LOCA Problem Areas
Figure 2.2
(After Figure 15, 9_, p. 1.13A, by permission)
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The ACRS takes the view that items in the approved 
evaluation models are proven to be conservative when 
fully confirmed by experimental evidence and supporting 
analytical studies. On this basis, the following 
representative items are considered not proven to be 
conservative, and are undergoing investigation:
° Analytical models and numerical methods.
° Amount of initial stored energy in the fuel.
° Treatment of phase separation and nonequilibrium 
effects.
° Treatment of loop resistances.
0 Treatment of hot channel flow, including flow 
blockage and flow redistribution.
0 Treatment of break flows.
° Treatment of decay heat.
° Transient critical heat flux and heat transfer.
° Treatment of clad ductility.
° PWRs —  Distribution of injected water —
Reflooding rates, reflood heat transfer, and 
carryover.
0 BWRs* —  Level swell —  Spray heat transfer.
While the above aspects are considered not proven to be 
conservative, the ACRS nevertheless believes that they 
can be handled in such a manner that there is reasonable 
assurance that, with appropriate use of the Interim Accept­
ance Criteria and other applicable design and evaluation 
criteria, water reactors of current design can be oper­
ated without undue risk to the health and safety of the 
public (19).
The fifteen items of uncertain conservatism specified by the 
ACRS provide a succinct list of the problem areas associated with the 
IAC which were addressed in the hearings. A brief evaluation of some 
of the critical items for which the ACRS felt that conservatism had 
not been adequately established is presented in the following chapter
* BWR: Boiling Water Reactor (see appendix 1).
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of this report. Detailed analyses of the items reviewed are given 
in appendixes 5 to 10.
The final Acceptance Criteria (AC) issued by the AEC on 
December 28, 1973, contains a number of substantial changes, when 
compared to the original IAC. The complete text of the AC is pre­
sented in appendix 3, along with the text of the IAC. A detailed 
discussion of the important changes in the AC and their implications 
is presented in the subsequent chapters.
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3.0 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF HEARINGS RESULTS
Although the vast [IAC Hearing] record thus far 
developed in this proceeding has been marred by excessive 
focus on peripheral matters and seemingly interminable 
arguments among counsel and between counsel and the Board 
in an atmosphere too closely 'akin to a criminal trial 
portrayed in the popular media', there is nevertheless, 
a substantial amount of testimonial and documentary evi­
dence on the central technical issues in the proceeding.
Each of the principal participants, including the staff, 
presented evidence in support of its views. In addition, 
the staff presented for the evidentiary record certain 
divergent technical viewpoints on particular technical 
subject areas. The open inquiry directed by the Commis­
sion in the rulemaking proceeding has adduced evidence 
from the various participants —  of diverse qualitative 
weight —  which is designed to support points of view 
running across the entire decision spectrum (from support 
for a peak clad temperature of 2700° at one end to a call 
for a virtual moratorium on power-reactor licensing at the 
other). Nevertheless, it is the staff's view that a 
critical evaluation of all of the evidence in the record 
of this proceeding as it has developed thus far will 
show that the reliable, probative and substantial evi­
dence provides full and firm support for the improvements 
to the Interim Criteria proposed by the staff.
AEC Concluding Statement(6 , P. 20)
This quote acknowledges the AEC's recognition of the bulk and complex­
ity of the IAC Hearing Record. Evaluations of the hearings' results 
by the various participants were as diverse as the evidence presented 
in the hearings' record, ranging from claims of excessive conservatism 
to non-conservatism. This chapter will present an overview of the 
hearings. The hearings' results are reviewed in terms of the adequacy 
of the IAC, changes to the IAC which were recommended in the staff's 
"Concluding Statement" with its Proposed Rule (PR) and finally the ulti­
mate changes made in the AC, with specific (but concise) problem analyses 
(presented in greater detail in the appendices). A general evaluation 
of the criticality of ECCS parameters will also be presented.
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3.1 ECCS Hearings Results
The. results of the hearings must be evaluated around two 
questions. The first question is: What did the hearings contribute 
to the evaluation of the adequacy of the IAC? The second question is: 
What changes occurred in the ECCS' criteria as a result of the hearings 
and how did they affect the criteria conservatism?
3.1.1 Adequacy of the IAC
The question of evidence for the adequacy of the IAC was 
indirectly answered in the testimony of Rosen and Colmar. Dr. Morris 
Rosen and Mr. Robert Colmar were two members of the AEC regulatory staff 
who made outspoken criticisms of the IAC. Dr. Rosen was the Technical 
Advisor to the Director of Reactor Licensing and headed the branch of 
the staff that served as a focal point for ECCS performance evaluations 
from 1967 until January 1972. Colmar, a senior nuclear engineer on the 
regulatory staff under Rosen, was the principal investigator assigned 
by the ECCS Task Force to study flow blockage and its effects. The two 
men were dissenting members of the regulatory staff and presented testi­
mony concerning their objections at the hearings. At one time during 
their testimony, Board Member John H. Buck questioned them about the 
differences between their observations and evaluations of data and those 
of the staff panel. Buck drew from Rosen and Colmar the acknowledgement 
that both they and the panel had been working with the same data and the 
same consultants. As reported in a Nuclear Industry editorial, Buck 
observed:
But it seems to us, as may be natural in a situation 
like this, there is some difference in philosophy and some 
differences in judgment that results from that data and 
from the people to whom you listen and perhaps the philo­
sophies that you have as to where you want to go.
When the two [Rosen and Colmar] indicated they still 
feel insufficient experimental information exists on which 
to develop adequately the Interim Acceptance Criteria,
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Buck asked them if they feel the regulatory staff thinks 
it has enough experimental data. Rosen replied:
'I would have to say that if the results of this 
hearing lead to a reevaluation of the...criteria, I 
would have to assume that somehow the staff felt they 
did not have sufficient information to make their 
earlier recommendations or that new information has 
been produced in the last several months to make them 
reevaluate' (20, p. 33).
With these words, Rosen provided a reasonable means for evalu­
ating the adequacy of the IAC. If changes were made, then the material 
presented at the hearings, or produced during them, must have illuminated 
inadequacies in the original criteria.
Though changes did occur between formulation of the IAC and the 
AC, the staff panel mumbers never conceded that the IAC were not entirely 
adequate. Near the conclusion of the hearings, Dr. Stephen Hanauer, the 
staff panel chairman, was cross-examined by Ford of CNI with respect to 
his evaluation of the IAC. The testimony is recorded as:
Q. [by Mr. Ford]: In retrospect, Dr. Hanauer, is it 
your present view that the criteria [and evaluation 
models] promulgated in June of 1971 are not overall 
suitably conservative, but there is in fact a need 
for additional conservatism in several cases?...
A. [Dr. Hanauer]: Well it is certainly true that the
Regulatory Staff has recommended that certain changes 
be made in the criteria [and models] which make them 
more conservative...That does not make them necessarily 
unsuitable. The target is moving, and the information 
being obtained changes some of our information from 
time to time.
Q. [by Mr. Cherry]: Now, Dr. Hanauer,....[d]o you still 
believe that the [original] evaluation models are 
suitably conservative over-all in effect...?
A. [Dr. Hanauer]:...Well, frankly, I don't know the
answer today. It's not a question I have addressed 
myself to. I have gone past that and recommended 
some changes...! suspect, though I have not considered 
the question in some time, that the old, unimproved
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evaluation models might still be found by me to be 
found suitably conservative although I have proposed 
changes (Tr. 19792-94)** (22, p. 19-20) (emphasis added).
In spite of possible claims for IAC conservatism, the staff 
did recognize the PR changes as improvements. In the words of their 
"Concluding Statement":
The proposed new regulations are believed by the staff 
to constitute an improvement over the Interim Policy State­
ment. The only significant change in the acceptance criteria 
themselves is the replacement of a single temperature limit 
by a combination of temperature and oxidation limits - a 
change foreseen in the Interim Policy Statement itself.
The changes in the evaluation models require various aspects 
of the calculation to be done better, define better the pro­
cedures and parameters used, and take better account of the 
various physical phenomena now known to occur during postu­
lated LOCA's (6).
Though the significance of PR changes were minimized by the staff, the 
changes were extensive and substantial. In the environmental impact 
statement prepared in connection with the PR changes, the costs of the 
changes were acknowledged, as follows:
As will be seen in the following sections, the costs of the 
Proposed Rule, with its conservatisms, are not unsubstantial. 
In the Staff's view, however, conservatisms are warranted 
for the protection of health and safety given the present 
state of knowledge, and it does not appear to the staff 
that the attendant costs are in imbalance with the desired 
safety objective (61, p. 9 9) (emphasis added).
In the sense of Rosen's testimony, that changes made in the IAC implied 
staff recognition of the validity of pertinent criticisms, the Proposed 
Rule (21) did itself make a statement about IAC adequacy, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.
Generally speaking, the new AC incorporated most of the 
recommendations of the PR. However, there are some differences of 
substance between the sets of specification. No serious attempt will be 
made to detail the differences between AC and PR. Principal emphasis
** References to pages in the official Hearings Transcript.
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will be placed upon evaluation of the AC and comparison of its changes 
with respect to the IAC.
3.1.2 The Acceptance Criteria - revisions to the IAC
In brief, the AEC has identified the principal changes in the 
AC, as compared with the IAC, in the following words:
The Interim Policy Statement includes: (1) general criteria 
for emergency core cooling systems applicable to all light- 
water power reactors (the Interim Acceptance Criteria, or IAC),
(2) requirements for analysis using a suitable evaluation model,
(3) provisions for application to various classes of reactors 
by specified dates, (4) provision for variance under stated 
conditions, and (5 ) a listing of acceptable evaluation models. 
The new regulation has sections serving the same purpose as 
(1), (2), (3), and (4) above. No complete listings of accept­
able evaluation models accompany this decision. The required 
and acceptable features of evaluation models, however, will 
provide the basis for the Regulatory Staff to determine the 
acceptability of such models as may be furnished.
The principal changes from the Interim Policy Statement 
are as follows. The old criterion number one, specifying that 
the temperature of the zircaloy cladding should not exceed 
2300°F is replaced by two criteria, lowering the allowed peak 
zircaloy temperature to 2200°F and providing a limit on the 
maximum allowed local oxidation. The other three criteria of 
the IAC are retained, with some modification of the wording. 
These three criteria limit the hydrogen generation from metal- 
water reactions, require maintenance of a coolable core geom­
etry, and provide for long-term cooling of the quenched core.
The most important effect of the changes in the required 
features of the evaluation models is that swelling and burst­
ing of the cladding must now be taken into consideration when 
they are calculated to occur, and that the maximum temperature 
and oxidation criteria must be applied to the region of clad 
swelling or bursting when the maximum temperature and oxida­
tion are calculated to occur there. Another important change 
is the requirement that, in the steady state operation just 
before the accident, the thermal conductance of the gap be­
tween the fuel pellets and the cladding should be calculated 
taking into consideration any increase in gap dimensions re­
sulting from such phenomena as fuel densification and should 
also consider the effects of the presence of fission gases.
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When these effects are taken into consideration a higher stored 
energy may be calculated. Other changes in the evaluation 
models are mostly in the direction of replacing previous broad 
conservative assumptions with more detailed calculations where 
new experimental information is available or where better cal- 
culational methods have been developed.
The wording of the definition of a loss-of-coolant acci­
dent has been modified to conform to its long-accepted usage, 
limiting it to breaks in pipes. Justification for the exclu­
sion of consideration of pressure vessel failures from the LOCA 
is extensively discussed throughout Volume 39 of the transcript 
(April 11, 1972), and we have referred to it earlier (pp. 6^8 ).
The new regulations also require a more complete documenta­
tion of the evaluation models that are used (60, p. 1093) 
(emphasis added).
In essence, the AC is much more complete in detail and encom­
passes many more specific problem areas than the IAC. In particular, 
its treatment of the problems cited in the hearings is a great deal more 
detailed than in the IAC. The sections of the AC seem to address them­
selves very closely to the items listed by the ACRS as being of uncertain 
conservatism (listed in sec. 2 .1 ).
3.2 Analysis of IAC Problem Areas Within the Context of the
New Acceptance Criteria
This section summarizes material (presented in detail in 
several appendices) analyzing the ACRS' list of items "considered not 
proven to be conservative" in context with the changes implied in the 
new Acceptance Criteria.
3.2.1 Metal-Water reactions, energy release and rod embrittlement
In the areas of energy release and rod embrittlement from 
metal-water reactions, the AC shows the most evident changes. The re­
duction in the peak cladding temperature criterion (from 2300°F to 2200°F) 
and the imposition of a new local oxidation limit for the cladding (17 per­
cent equivalent conversion to ZrC^ based upon the Baker-Just oxidation 
model) have been described as the most significant changes in the AC.
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In their Opinion Statement for the new Acceptance Criteria 
the AEC Commissioners stated:
It should be remembered that the calculations that are 
made of the effectiveness of the ECCS center on maintaining 
the integrity of the zircaloy cladding, since if it remains 
intact we can be sure that the uranium dioxide fuel pellets 
will be kept separate and coolable. To keep the zircaloy 
intact requires controlling its maximum temperature and 
oxidation (60, p. 1091),
and
Our selection of the 2200°F limit results primarily from 
our belief that retention of ductility in the zircaloy is the 
best guarantee of its remaining intact during the hypothetical 
LOCA (60, p. 1098).
In addition, the AC requires the inclusion of oxidation on the 
inside of swollen and ruptured cladding as well as the outside, a feature 
neglected in the IAC. The AC requires that calculation of the internal 
rod oxidation begin at the calculated time of rupture, with the use of 
Baker-Just oxidation model required in the calculation. Moreover, the 
calculated 17 percent limit must include in a specified manner both in­
ternal and external oxidation, as described above, as well as the thin­
ning of the clad during the swelling and rupture process.
Though the new criteria are greatly improved over the elemental 
2300°F temperature limit of the IAC, in the opinion of the author they 
do not appear to have achieved assured conservatism in all respects.
As discussed in appendix 7, the AEC has consistently deempha- 
sized the potential importance of the energy release rates from the 
zirconium-steam reaction. The AEC Concluding Statement dismisses the 
energy release problem with a single sentence. It states:
Melting and energy release from zirconium-steam reaction 
are not the basis for specifying a 2200°F limit; in fact, 
a 2300°F limit would be sufficient in this regard (6 ,^ p. 75).
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Adequate evidence that energy release rates can be dismissed in this 
manner has not been (and in fact cannot be) presented. In appendix 7, 
figure A7.3 and the accompanying explanation show that at 2200°F the 
17 percent equivalent ZrO^ oxidation limit does not proscribe the allow­
able time duration for exposure to the 2200°F peak temperatures suffi­
ciently to preclude energy release rates which may be of the same order 
of magnitude as, or greater than, the. decay heat release. The Commission 
has given more adequate recognition to this energy source in its opinion 
to the AC where it stated:
In addition to the primary heat transfer effects of 
taking into consideration the swelling and rupture of the 
cladding, there would be important secondary effects 
arising from the steam oxidation of the cladding by the 
steam. Higher temperatures would lead to increased oxi­
dation, which would contribute to a further increase in 
temperature, and the opening in the cladding would allow 
oxidation on the inside, again increasing the calculated 
temperature (60, p. 1106).
Though the potential importance of the energy release from the 
zirconium-steam reaction has been poorly acknowledged by the AEC staff, 
the method for evaluating it has been conservatively prescribed in all 
of the criteria documentation. The required use of the Baker-Just oxi­
dation model gives conservative estimates of metal-water reaction energy 
release for temperatures above 1900°F. When combined with the AC require­
ment that the "reaction shall be assumed not to be steam limited" (60, 
p. 1134), the energy release estimates should be adequately conservative.
From the standpoint of limiting rod embrittlement, the 17 per­
cent equivalent ZrO^ oxidation criterion is of borderline conservatism.
As discussed in connection with figure A7.6 (appendix 7), this amount of 
oxidation would probably put the rod in a "partially ductile" condition, 
for which brittle failure in the course of the LOCA could not be posi­
tively discounted. At the 17 percent oxidation limit, the rod is left 
with a zero ductility temperature (ZDT) of approximately 900°F, below
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which the rod has no ductility and the probability of brittle failure 
is increased. A ZDT of 900°F is uncomfortably high, since maximum 
LOCA quenching stresses are induced as rod wetting occurs at tempera­
tures from approximately 700 to 1000°F (25, p. 3-15). It appears that 
the Combustion Engineering recommendation for embrittlement oxidation
limits of F >.65 (see table A7-2, appendix 7), which corresponds to anw
equivalent ZrC^ oxidation of about 10 percent to 14 percent and a ZDT 
of approximately 400°F, would be a more acceptably conservative limit.
The Consolidated Utilities Group has also recognized the conservatism 
of a lower oxidation limit. They have stated:
....a limit on the calculated.... equivalent oxidation 
of 12 mole percent would prevent clad embrittlement 
and failure and should conservatively bound conditions 
which could be experienced during a design basis LOCA 
(22, p. 39).
In conclusion, the AC metal-water reaction criteria limits 
of 2200°F and 17 percent equivalent ZrC^ oxidation, though improved over 
the IAC criterion, are still of borderline conservatism. The combined 
criteria do not eliminate the potential for metal-water reaction energy 
release rates of the same order of magnitude as those from decay heat 
nor do they preclude excessive embrittlement. Lower equivalent oxidation 
limits (12-14 percent) would give increased conservatism. However, the 
use of the Baker-Just oxidation model, especially with the AC's exclusion 
of the assumption of steam limitation for the reaction, does give conser­
vative estimates of total oxidation and energy release. Consequently, 
when used in the evaluation models, the current oxidation rate relations 
are apparently suitably conservative in prescribing the magnitude of the 
oxidation produced and energy release, though the 17 percent oxidation 
limit does not guarantee prevention of brittle rod failure. Assuming 
nominal power peaking factors (local power distribution) within the core, 
rods which might reach the 2200°F criteria limit are likely to be local­
ized to a relatively small region of the core —  from 5 to 15 percent
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of the total area of the core. If clad exposure is limited to criteria 
levels of less than 17 percent equivalent zircaloy oxidation, then 
massive melting and core geometry changes resulting from brittle failure 
of fuel rods appears unlikely. Fuel elements are likely to be relatively 
cool at the time brittle failure might occur (on the order of 1000°F), 
and relatively small amounts of material would be likely to be dispersed 
when cladding failure occurred. Consequently, additional mechanical 
damage resulting from melting in the core induced by brittle failures of 
the fuel rods should be relatively light and coolability would probably 
not be seriously perturbed. Thus, the uncertain conservatism of the 17 
percent oxidation limit on prevention of brittle failure of the fuel rods 
has probably a second-order effect on large scale distortion and/or melt­
ing of the core. Under these circumstances, the consequences of possible 
brittle failures of the fuel rods are not expected to be of major signi­
ficance in the LOCA sequence of events, even if such failures should occur.
3.2.2 Initial stored fuel energy and related thermal parameters
Information pertinent to initial stored fuel energy is found 
in sections IA1 and IB of appendix K of the AC (cf appendix 3), repro­
duced below.
Section IA1.
The Initial Stored Energy in the Fuel. The steady-state 
temperature distribution and stored energy in the fuel be­
fore the hypothetical accident shall be calculated for the 
burn-up that yields the highest calculated cladding tempera­
ture (or, optionally, the highest calculated stored energy). 
To accomplish this, the thermal conductivity of the UC^ shall 
be evaluated as a function of burn-up and temperature, taking 
into consideration differences in initial density, and the 
thermal conductance of the gap between the UO and the 
cladding shall be evaluated as a function of the burn-up, 
taking into consideration fuel densification and expansion, 
the composition and pressure of the gases within the fuel 
rod, the initial cold gap dimension with its tolerances, 
and cladding creep.
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Section IB.
Swelling and Rupture of the Cladding and Fuel Rod 
Thermal Parameters
Each evaluation model shall include a provision for 
predicting cladding swelling and rupture from consideration 
of the axial temperature distribution of the cladding and 
from the difference in pressure between the inside and 
outside of the cladding, both as functions of time.
To be acceptable the swelling and rupture calculations 
shall be based on applicable data in such a way that the 
degree of swelling and incidence of rupture are not under­
estimated. The degree of swelling and rupture shall be 
taken into account in calculations of gap conductance, 
cladding oxidation and embrittlement, and hydrogen 
generation.
The calculations of fuel and cladding temperatures 
as a function of time shall use values for gap conductance 
and other thermal parameters as functions of temperature 
and other applicable time-dependent variables. The gap 
conductance shall be varied in accordance with changes 
in gap dimensions and any other applicable variables 
(from appendix 3).
The PR prescribed that steady state gap coefficients be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis for each vendor's reactor designs, 
since "substantial differences" exist in the fuel cladding designs be­
tween vendors and even with a given vendor's product lines. In formu­
lating the AC, the Commission retained this case-by-case analysis re­
quirement (60, p. 1 1 0 1).
The IAC treatment of initial stored fuel energy was notable 
for its brevity. It stated, for example, "peak cladding temperature has 
been shown to be relatively insensitive to changes in gap conductance 
during an accident" (8 ,^ p. 4-26). Relatively large values of gap con­
ductance were prescribed (1000-2400 B/hr-ft^-°F), apparently without 
substantial evaluation, as they had been recommended by the vendors.
With such relatively high gap conductances, fuel rod heat transfer pro­
cesses were dominated by the low convective film heat transfer coefficients
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between rod and coolant (generally less than 100 B/hr-ft ) during blow­
down and reflood, so that the significance of the gap conductance for 
heat transfer of the initial stored energy was minimized. (This is dis­
cussed more fully in appendix 6 .)
The AEC appeared to progressively reevaluate the importance 
of gap conductance and initial stored fuel energy as the hearings pro­
ceeded. The AEC Supplemental Testimony reported the results of a para­
metric investigation of the influence of gap conductance on initial 
stored fuel energy release during the LOCA (4_, pp. 10-16 to 10-23) (also 
appendix 10). In this investigation, the important effect of clad swell­
ing and rupture during the LOCA on gap conductance with its consequent 
impact on the transfer of stored fuel energy was demonstrated. The study
showed that substantially lower gap conductance values were calculated
2(between limits of approximately 5-100 B/hr-ft -°F) than were prescribed 
in the IAC (1000-2400 B/hr-ft^-°F). At low values such as these, fre­
quently less than concurrent convective film heat transfer coefficients, 
gap conductance became very important. It was observed that when swell­
ing occurred during blowdown, a reduction in gap conductance from steady
9state values of about 800-1000 B/hr-ft‘’-°F to approximately 5-100 B/hr- 
2ft -°F resulted in frequent corresponding increases in peak temperatures 
as high as 100°F to 200°F, and sometimes resulted in uncoolable condi­
tions. (Additional observations on this AEC parametric study are pre­
sented in sec. 3.3.1 and appendix 10.)
Between the publication of the Supplemental and Concluding 
Statements, the AEC moved to correct the IAC deficiencies with respect 
to the stored fuel energy. The Commission Opinion in presenting the AC 
strengthens and clarifies the PR recommendations. The AC now provides 
criteria for initial stored fuel energy which approach "assured" con­
servatism. The influence of clad swelling and rupture on the "hot rod" 
calculations for DBA and the requirement to select parameters influencing 
the initial stored fuel energy so that it is maximized are definite steps 
in the direction of assured conservatism.
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(1) There are noIf there are faults with the AC, they are: 
quantitative specifications (or limits) given for important thermal para­
meters and (2) case-by-case evaluation of gap conductance is required. 
Though the effect of (2) would appear to at least partially compensate 
for the potential problems with (1), the AC approach implies some con­
tinuing uncertainty on the part of the AEC over how to deal with the 
initial stored fuel energy.
3.2.3 Fission product decay heat
Though the AC goes into more detail about required assumptions 
of reactor operating power levels and in-core power distribution (peaking 
factors) prior to LOCA and presents a more complete description of how 
reactor kinetics at shutdown must be handled, the basic IAC criterion 
for fission product decay heat (i.e., utilization of the proposed ANS 5.1 
Standard + 20 percent) has been retained without modification.
During the early stages of the hearings, a substantial contro­
versy was provoked by the CNI over the adequacy of the proposed ANS 5.1 
Standard to correctly predict the decay heat rate in the critical LOCA 
time period of approximately 1000 sec after break initiation. The tech­
nical basis for questioning the ANS 5.1 Standard + 20 percent criterion 
(see appendix 5) centered around recent decay heat investigations of 
England (23). When the CNI first introduced England's analysis into the 
hearing record, serious questions were raised about the adequacy of pre­
dictions of the magnitudes of early decay heat release rates and the 
asymptotic decay heat limit prescribed by ANS Standard 5.1 for fuel ex­
posed to irradiation for large integrated flux-time values. England's 
doctoral dissertation developed a method for improving on existing 
neutron capture analysis techniques through incorporation of a more 
complete physical model of the coupling of short half-life nuclides in 
the fission product chain. England's dissertation results gave an indi­
cation that fuel exposed to large neutron flux-time histories would ex­
perience significant increases (as much as a factor of 2 or more) in
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decay heat release at shutdown. Following publication, England's initial 
thesis (23) analysis was found to have errors in numerical programming 
and input data. Although a corrected study (24) showed agreement in 
principle with the original thesis (note appendix 5, figure A5.3), the 
magnitude of predicted increases was significantly reduced to less than 
10 percent for a relatively low flux-time irradiation history case.
Comparison of results of England's code (CINDER) with other 
sophisticated numerical summation analysis methods (when appropriate 
corrections for coding and input data errors have been made) shows the 
need for an upward correction to the ANS Standard 5.1 of approximately 
6 percent for the low flux-time irradiation cases. When appropriate 
flux levels and irradiation periods are considered for the AC require­
ments of "hot rod" calculations, a need for a total net upward correction 
to the ANS Standard 5.1 of about 10-15 percent is required, at shutdown 
times of approximately 1000 sec.
When empirical results are considered as a basis for evaluation 
of summation calculations, we observe that there is good general agree­
ment between CINDER calculations and the empirical data for shutdown 
times greater than 100 seconds. The "best estimates" of such experimen­
tal data (65) give direct quantitative support to an upward deviation 
from the ANS Standard 5.1 of 6 percent or better at shutdown time of the 
order of 1000 seconds. Moreover, Perry et al. have estimated a one- 
standard deviation uncertainty of the order of + 15 percent in the em­
pirical results.
Therefore, it appears that in the critical LOCA shutdown period 
of about 1000 seconds ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent will correspond to 
an equivalent deviation uncertainty of about one standard deviation from 
the expected mean decay heat values. It is legitimate to ask whether 
confidence limits are adequately and conservatively bounded at one 
standard deviation. ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent appears to be equiva­
lent to a one standard deviation uncertainty, and the probability that
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higher decay energies will be experienced above the AC prescribed limits 
is above 30 percent. Increasing the decay energy limits to ANS Standard
5.1 +3 0  percent would reduce the probability of experiencing decay 
heats above the criteria limits to about 11 percent, but if the criteria 
limits were raised to ANS Standard 5.1 + 35 percent, the probability is 
less than 5 percent that the criteria limits would be exceeded. A 30 per­
cent probability of exceeding the AC (ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent) 
limits seems inadequately conservative. Consequently, it would seem de­
sirable to increase the bounding criteria values to either ANS Standard
5.1 + 30 percent, or ANS 5.1 + 35 percent.
3.2.4 Break flows
Break flows are a major determinant of the blowdown rate and 
duration. Consequently, their potential impact on the thermal history 
of the reactor is evident. Break flows greater than anticipated could 
induce shorter blowdown periods with potentially increased containment 
pressures and probable increases in fuel rod temperatures prior to emer­
gency coolant injection.
The AEC has prescribed the use of the Moody fluid discharge 
model (55) both in their Concluding Statement (6 ,^ p. 105) and the final 
AC (60, p. 1108) as well as in their initial Direct Testimony ( 8 , pp. 2-41 
& 4-15), and in the IAC themselves. Moody's analysis method was developed 
for flow of a two-phase (liquid-steam) mixture through pipes based upon 
an idealized isentropic equilibrium model of the flow. CNI attempted to 
show that for relatively short pipes, where the length-to-diameter ratio 
was short (less than 1 0), two-phase equilibrium would not exist and meta­
stable liquid flow (flow of pure liquid at temperatures and pressures 
where vaporization would be expected under equilibrium conditions) would 
take place (9^, chapter 8 ). Based upon experimental results of Fauske (56), 
under these conditions greatly increased break flow rates could be obtained 
("1.7 times greater than the rate predicted by the designers for two- 
phase flow")(_9, p. 8.1).
3-15
Examination of experimental results, including Fauske's (ap­
pendix 9_, figure A9.1) shows that significant differences exist between 
initial metastable flow (in pipes of very short length and small diameters) 
and equilibrium flow rates.
The highest metastable flow rates are approximately a factor of 
three greater than the equilibrium choked-flow conditions for relatively 
long pipes. It is apparently this potential for flow rates truly sub­
stantially different than those predicted for equilibrium flow that caused 
concern of the ACRS and CNI.
The reactor manufacturers have challenged the validity of a 
break flow model based upon metastability concepts. They have suggested, 
alternatively, that metastable flow is a function of pipe length only. 
Consequently, it would only be observed for very short distances (of less 
than one foot) compared to typical break lengths of approximately three 
feet or more.
The intervenors have argued that Fauske, and the majority of the 
experimental evidence, supports the concept that metastability is better 
related to the ratio of break length to pipe diameter than to break length 
alone. For the large pipes of interest in reactors, frequently as large 
as two feet in diameter, the length-to-diameter ratios are well within the 
critical values associated with experimentally observed metastable flow 
for the small pipes (for which experimental data exists) (figure A9.2, 
appendix 9).
Examination of the experimental data appears to support the 
intervenor claim that break flows, as predicted by the Moody model, could 
be substantially underestimated. The regulatory staff tried to overcome 
this problem in their Concluding Statement by calling for more than one 
model of blowdown break flow to be used in analyzing critical flow in 
accordance with the revised criteria of their Proposed Rule (6 ,^ pp. 105- 
108). Thus the staff concluded that,
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The critical flow model of Moody is appropriate for 
use in break spectrum analyses of blowdown transients in 
BWRs and PWRs on the basis that it overpredicts blowdown 
flow...whenever the break exit plane quality is greater 
than about two percent...However, for the blowdown period 
during which subcooled liquid, saturated liquid or low 
quality two-phase fluid exists at the break exit plane, 
the Moody model underpredicts experimental discharge data... 
Therefore, the Proposed Rule requires the use of a model 
which is more appropriate to these fluid conditions.
One such model contained in the evidence of this proceed­
ing is the modified Zaloudek model of Westinghouse (Exhibit 
1151, [_57_] Section III). The Moody model may also be 
applicable for early times during blowdown before the 
exit plane quality reaches two percent if it is used with 
a Moody multiplier of greater than unity...The staff con­
cludes on the basis of this evidence that models appro­
priate to these flow regimes do exist (65 P* 108) (empha­
sis added).
In its revised AC, the Commission has downgraded the importance 
of the early blowdown stages where the need for a Moody multiplier of 
greater than unity had been recognized. The AC now require that,
For all times after the discharging fluid has been calcu­
lated to be two-phase in composition, the discharge rate shall
be calculated by use of the Moody model--- the calculation
shall be conducted with at least three values of a discharge 
coefficient applied to the postulated break area, these 
values spanning the range from 0.6 to 1.0 (60, p. 1108).
Though the Commission acknowledged that recommendations for 
discharge coefficients greater than one were widespread, their discus­
sion of the AC implies that the Moody model is always conservative and 
that the metastable flow period (if any) is adequately covered by Moody 
model results. They acknowledge that
There was widespread agreement that a variable discharge 
coefficient provides a better fit to the data than a 
constant one....Ybarrando (Transcript p. 6362) reported 
the result of an ANC calculation with a discharge coef­
ficient initially 2.0 and later in blowdown 0 .6 , where 
the first peak in the clad temperature exceeded by about 
100°F the value obtained with a fixed discharge coeffi­
cient of 1.0 (60, pp. 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 2) (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, the Commission concluded
We agree with the Staff position as to correctness of use 
of the model based on critical flow, since the length of time 
available during the blowdown far exceeds the amount needed 
for nucleation and build-up of two-phase discharge. Further­
more, the evidence is strong that use of the Moody correlation 
does not underestimate observed experimental discharge rates, 
as would be the case if discharge were really metastable, 
but in fact it definitely overestimates the discharge rates
(60, p. 1112).
The question of the adequacy of the experimental data was not 
addressed in any significant manner in the AC discussion. However, it 
should be noted that little or no experimental data exists for realistic 
break flow from large pipes.
In summary, it appears that the Moody break flow model may under­
predict nonequilibrium metastable flow by nearly a factor of two (at least 
for a brief period), as indicated by the CNI. To account for this possi­
bility, the regulatory staff suggested in the PR that a different model, 
although not entirely explicitly specified, be used for estimating flow 
rates at the beginning of the blowdown period. Use of this model would 
have predicted flow rates greater than those estimated with the Moody 
model. In the final AC, the Commission eliminated the staff recommenda­
tion, concluding that the Moody model (with discharge coefficients less 
than or equal to one) was always conservative.
In view of the limited experimental basis for models which may 
be applied to the large diameter pipes associated with a DBA for large 
operational reactors, it would appear desirable to perform additional 
break flow tests with more representatively sized equipment. In the 
absence of experimental data which clearly supports the Moody model or, 
alternatively, demonstrates the validity of a nonequilibrium model of 
break flow metastability, more conservative and definitive specifications 
should be given in the criteria. Specifically quantified values of Moody
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multipliers (greater than one) should be prescribed, along with their 
period of application, in order to assure that conservatism is attained 
for break flow specifications.
3.2.5 Transient critical heat flux and blowdown heat transfer
At the beginning of the LOCA transient, heat is transferred 
from the fuel rods to the coolant water in a continuation of the highly 
efficient nucleate boiling heat transfer mode of normal (steady state) 
reactor operation. Heat transfer coefficients under nucleate boiling 
conditions are immensely higher (approximately a factor of 10,000) than 
those which occur during the core spray or initial reflood portions of 
the cooling process. During the rapid system decompression accompanying 
blowdown, a transition in the boiling process takes place from pinpoint 
nucleate boiling to film boiling and two-phase (liquid-vapor) convective 
cooling, which greatly reduces the system cooling capability.
In describing the LOCA transient, analysis methods depend upon 
the development of the concept of time periods during which a given boil­
ing transitional condition occurs (e.g. , time to critical heat flux, time 
to departure from nucleate boiling, or duration of the period of stable 
film boiling) . The blowdown process induces the first important depar­
ture from nucleate boiling. This transition achieves its importance be­
cause the rapid rod cladding dryout accompanying blowdown makes re­
establishment of the nucleate boiling, high heat transfer conditions for 
the rod very difficult. Moreover, the conditions required for such re­
establishment (rewetting) are uncertain. As a result of this uncertainty, 
the revised criterion conservatively requires that rewetting be neglected 
during blowdown, immediately after critical heat flux (CHF) is first 
predicted. The new AC state:
After CHF is first predicted at an axial fuel rod location 
during blowdown, the calculation shall not use nucleate boil­
ing heat transfer correlations at that location subsequently 
during the blowdown even if the calculated local fluid and
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surface conditions would apparently justify the reestablishment 
of nucleate boiling. Heat transfer assumptions characteristic 
of return to nucleate boiling (rewetting) shall be permitted 
when justified by the calculated local fluid and surface con­
ditions during the reflood portion of a LOCA (60, p. 1109) 
(emphasis added).
Neglect of rewetting during blowdown, after departure from nucleate boil­
ing (DNB), was apparently also practiced under the IAC and precludes the 
assumption of redevelopment of nucleate boiling conditions.
The importance of the heat transfer occurring after CHF or DNB 
has been recognized by all those who have investigated the LOCA. In its 
discussion of the AC, the Commission stated:
The rate at which heat is transferred from the clad to the 
water after departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) is vital 
to estimation of the course of a hypothetical loss-of-coolant 
accident for a PWR. DNB is calculated to occur within about 
a tenth of a second after a postulated instantaneous double- 
ended break of a large pipe, or a large split. The heat 
transfer after this time would primarily determine the tem­
perature history of the clad during blowdown and the possi­
bility that clad damage would occur during this phase. It 
would also determine the effectiveness of removal of heat 
from the oxide fuel itself and thus the stored energy in 
the fuel at the time refill of the plenum by ECCS fluid 
starts (60, p. 1117) (emphasis added).
For example, if the DNB transition can be avoided, the high heat transfer 
rates associated with nucleate boiling will cause a reduction in the 
stored energy of the fuel (and hence the potential for heating the clad­
ding) corresponding to an average temperature decline of about 150°F/sec. 
Each additional second of nucleate boiling during depressurization can 
permit a delay of about 10 sec in core coolant (ECC) injection (34).
Since the DNB/CHF transition from nucleate boiling to stable 
film boiling is so important to heat transfer during blowdown, reactor 
manufacturers have attempted to develop transition models which numeri­
cally describe the physical processes taking place. These models have
been the origin of most of the controversy associated with heat transfer 
estimates during the blowdown period. The models have generally tried to 
make the transition process resemble nucleate boiling as long as possible, 
for obvious reasons. Such models have also attempted to incorporate 
hysteresis-like effects which permitted rewetting with a return to nucleate 
boiling conditions if appropriate CHF values were reobtained for relatively 
short periods (on the order of milliseconds). The general effect of most 
of the vendor models proposed to date would be to retain essentially full 
nucleate boiling heat transfer during most of the blowdown phase of the 
LOCA (60), p. 1118).
After reviewing the basis for the models, the Commission chose, 
perhaps as a result of apparent inconsistencies in the arguments of both 
the vendors and the regulatory staff, to preclude rewetting following 
DNB during blowdown, and to require the use of stable film boiling models 
during the post-CHF period. They stated:
We note the inconsistency of vendor positions that would 
rely on hysteresis-like effects as the basis for switching 
criteria such as those above, as compared to other positions 
calling for instantaneous rewet. We note also the inconsis­
tency of Staff positions to the contrary in both cases.
The point remains that there is not adequate understanding 
of either rewet after CHF or of hysteresis-like effects 
during flow reversal in a fast transient^ The Staff's 
position has been to approve use of only stable film boil­
ing once DNB has been calculated to occur, even when fluid 
and clad temperature conditions appropriate to rewet exist.
This course is conservative. No less conservative position 
is justified by the record of the hearing. We concur with 
the Staff's proposal that the nucleate boiling term of the 
Westinghouse correlations not be used after DNB is calculated 
to occur, and that other models incorporate the equivalent 
assumption of stable film boiling throughout the period 
after DNB (60, p. 1118) (emphasis added).
The uncertainty associated with CHF and post-CHF heat transfer 
results from basic inadequacies in the transient and steady-state CHF 
experimental data (as noted above). No data exists, either steady-state
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or transient, for large arrays of 7 x 7 or greater and full length rod 
bundles with PWR rod diameters. In addition, a principal problem with 
the available, data seems to be related to the lack of adequate correla­
tion between theoretical and numerical analyses, and the experimental 
programs which have been conducted. Weaknesses of this type have left 
the scalability of test results an open question and, consequently, the 
conservatism of correlation models uncertain. More test programs with 
solid analytical bases, such as the program outlined in reference 34, 
are needed before the adequacy of AEC or vendor models can apparently 
be assured in the analysis of this important aspect of the LOCA. However, 
it should be reemphasized that in the absence of such programs, the AEC 
appears to have made adequately conservative assumptions in the AC.
Data obtained from the recommended test programs would be expected to 
lead to requirements for heat transfer coefficients which are generally 
less conservative in the important post-CHF period.
3.2.6 Reflooding rates and the treatment of loop resistance
Reflooding rates are a very critical element in the effective­
ness of the LWR-ECCS. As discussed in greater detail in appendices 8 and 
9, and the following section of this chapter, the reflood rate is a domi­
nating factor in post-blowdown heat transfer. For the PWR it is the sole 
method of emergency cooling. In the case of the BWR, reflooding provides 
the dominant means of ultimately achieving temperature turnaround, and 
resolution of the LOCA thermal excursion. Thus, it is vitally important 
that the reflood rate be maintained at as high a value as possible to 
assure ECCS adequacy.
The reflooding rate is critically affected by the resistance of 
the primary loop of the reactor through the mechanism of steam binding.
As stated in the Commission's Opinion to the AC,
The reflooding rate for pressurized water reactors
would be controlled to a large extent by steam binding,
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the phenomenon by which the resistance to flow through 
the reactor system (steam generators, pumps, etc.) of the 
effluent from the reactor core limits the rate of reflood 
and, indirectly, the rate of heat removal from the fuel 
rods. The pumps in their locked rotor condition would 
typically provide more than half of this resistance to 
flow so that the stipulation of their being locked is a 
serious limitation. If the pump rotors were not locked, 
their resistance to flow would be reduced by 60% (Exhibit 
1113, p. 14-10) . In their Concluding Statement, Combus­
tion Engineering states that if the pumps were free running 
during reflood the calculated maximum temperature of the . 
zircaloy cladding would be reduced by 75°F (CE Concluding 
Statement, p. 3-61) (60, p. 1122).
The factors affecting steam binding and reflooding rates were 
analyzed as one part of a fault tree investigation of ECCS performance 
by Brockett, et al. of ANC (10). With respect to reflooding rates they 
stated:
In calculations of the core reflooding rate, the pressure 
drop from the core inlet to the core outlet plus the pressure 
drop from the core outlet back to the downcomer is equated 
to the head of water in the downcomer. This near balance 
of water head in the downcomer with backpressure from steam 
escaping the system has been referred to as the steam binding 
problem. A 17% error in reflooding rate calculations would 
be necessary to cause a 10% error in heat transfer coeffi­
cients. The three diamonds on the right relate to the supply 
of water to the downcomer which is a key factor in the re­
flooding rate calculations. In order for a fault to occur, 
the predicted downcomer water height would have to be about 
40% higher than the actual height (10, p. 319).
Brockett, et al. summarized the three aspects of ECCS perfor­
mance which could cause the predicted pressure drop to be lower than the 
actual values (and consequently lead to overestimated, or unconservatively 
generous, predictions of reflooding rates). They considered the following 
faults to dominate:
(1) Analysis Underpredicts Effect of Plugging by ECC Water in Pipes. 
For plant design in which ECC is injected into the piping, the 
actual pressure drops will be complex functions of momentum and 
energy exchanges between the ECC and the steam flowing in the 
lines. Two-phase pressure drops of real significance in terms 
of core reflooding rates are most likely to occur during accumu­
lator injection when ECC flow rates are high. The author's
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opinion is that if the angle of the ECC injection line is 
such that the ECC momentum is directed down the pipe the 
plugging problem would be less than for an ECC line with 
a 90 degree angle to the inlet piping. Although perhaps 
not significant, the assumption that one of the two LPIS 
systems fails to operate, which is customarily assumed in 
safety analysis, would not be conservative in calculating 
core reflooding rates provided the downcomer is filled 
by the accumulator; that is, the additional LPIS flow 
with both systems operating would not increase the core 
flooding rate, which is controlled by steam binding, and 
would contribute to increasing the system pressure drop 
to the break by additional water plugging.
(2) Analysis Underpredicts Energy or Mass Transfer from Steam 
Generator Secondary System to Primary Loop. During core 
reflooding the fluid from the secondary side of the steam 
generator has the potential to transfer energy, and in the 
event of a tube leakage also mass, to the primary system. 
Transfer of either mass or energy can add significantly
to the pressure drop from the upper plenum to the downcomer 
annulus. Unless the secondary side has depressurized before 
reflooding is initiated, significant errors in reflooding 
rates would occur if energy transfer processes are not 
properly taken into account. Current predictions, which 
are based on the secondary side of the steam generator 
being at normal operating temperatures at reflooding 
initiation, are considered to account for all energy trans­
fer processes. If only a few tubes leak, mass transfer 
processes can also significantly add to the error in the 
calculated reflooding rates. To provide a 17% reduction 
in reflooding rates (at 1.5 in/sec), a tube break area of 
about 0.003 ft^ would be required. Present predictions 
are based on the assumption that none of the tubes fail.
(3) Analysis Underpredicts Pump Resistance. During the reflooding 
phase of the accident the pump is subjected to a superheated 
steam flow at a rate which considerably exceeds the pump 
capacity. In this situation the pump is simply a resistance. 
It is, however, the component with the highest resistance
in the operating loop and would cause unacceptable reflood- 
ing rates if actual values of pump resistance exceed pre­
dicted values by about 50%. Potential sources of errors in 
evaluating pump resistance include:
(1) Error in calculating pump speed
(2) Application of an inappropriate pump characteristic 
curve
(3) Compressibility effect not taken into account.
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Current licensing criteria require the assumption of a 
rotor resistance for the pump when ECC performance is being 
evaluated. This assumption provides a resistance about 
twice as high as would be obtained on the basis of the pre­
dicted pump speed (10, pp. 319-320) (emphasis added).
The revised evaluation modeling criteria of the AC require that plug­
ging of the unbroken reactor coolant pipes be considered complete (i.e., 
no steam flow is permitted) during the time the accumulators are discharg­
ing water into the pipes. The pump condition to be modeled must result 
in the greatest cladding temperature, considering both cases of either 
a locked impeller or free running rotor. Coolant core exit flow for PWRs 
is to be determined on the basis of PWR-FLECHT data relating the fraction­
al flow (carryover fraction) at the core exit plane to the total liquid 
flow at the core inlet plane. No specification is given for analyzing 
the very important contribution of steam generator tube leakage to ECCS 
steam binding, because this subject was ruled to be outside of the scope 
of the ECCS Hearings (60, pp. 1121-1123).
The CNI have expressed their concern over low reflooding rates, as 
follows:
The extremely degraded cooling effectiveness expected in 
modern PWRs is one of the most crucial flaws in the assurances 
of PWR safety. CNI does not believe the safety problems thus 
posed can be resolved with the present body of experimental 
information and with the analytical tools now available for 
PWRs operating at their design power rating (_7, p. 5.23).
In the opinion of CNI:
It is now established that core flooding rates [once] con­
sidered as extremely degraded are now very close to the expected 
conditions for a double-ended PWR inlet line break. There is a 
widespread feeling in the community of reactor safety engineers 
that there is presently a relatively small and likely non-existent 
margin between cooling and non-cooling (7, p. 5.20) (emphasis added).
The AEC denies this allegation, stating:
...the evidence shows that because of the conservatisms 
listed above (maximized stored fuel energy at the beginning of
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reflood and treatment of "accumulator bypass" to minimize water 
remaining in the vessel at the end of blowdown) and because the 
reactor reflooding rates predicted by current reflood codes are 
for average, not oscillatory, system thermal-hydraulic response, 
the calculated reflooding rates are lower than would be expected 
to occur in reality (6^, p. 204).
It is significant to note, however, that a substantial decrease has 
taken place in AEC estimates of flooding rates from their "intended" rates 
of 6 to 11 inches per second (60, p. 1092), even in the brief period 
since the IAC was published. The AEC Supplemental Testimony (4_) compares 
calculations of nominal flooding rates for typical PWR designs from each 
vendor. These current estimates range (for average flood rates) from 
less than 1 in/sec for a Westinghouse 4-loop system with an ice condenser 
type containment (4_, p. 14-7) to values as high as 2 in/sec for B & W 
vent-valve pl.ants (4^, p. 14-9). "Nominal" estimates, for a Westinghouse
4-loop system with a dry containment, predict average flood rates of about
1.3 in/sec.
The current flooding rate estimates, ranging from slightly less than 
1 in/sec to a high of 2 in/sec, should be compared with earlier statements 
presented in the AEC initial Direct Testimony (8). At that time, vent 
valve reactors were predicted to have "high" flooding rates of "about six 
inches/second" while flooding rates of "about 1 inch/second" were consid­
ered "low" (8, p. 2-21). Thus, it appears that even in the short period 
(approximately 10 months) between publications of the AEC initial Direct 
Testimony and their Supplemental Testimony there was a marked narrowing 
of the range of "realistic" estimates of reflood rates towards the "low" 
estimate of about 1 in/sec.
As observed in section A9.4, flooding rates of 1 in/sec are critically 
low. The PWR-FLECHT test results showed that it was difficult to control 
fuel rod thermal excursions at 1 in/sec. At 0.6 in/sec, even when the 
temperature at the end of blowdown was relatively low (i.e., 1600°F), tem­
perature turnaround could not be achieved for rods with an initial linear
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power density of 1.24 Kw/ft (comparable to steady-state operational 
values of 18 Kw/ft). Thus at estimated values of flooding rates of 1 in/ 
sec, there is an uncomfortably small margin of coolability remaining.
The margin is made even more uncomfortable when it is recognized 
that there is essentially no valid experimental data against which to 
compare the calculational results obtained for system flooding rates. 
However, there are test programs underway to examine specific limited 
elements of the loop resistance/reflood rate prediction problem. Tests 
currently being conducted at ANC, Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse, 
according to an informed AEC Regulatory Staff member*, are investigating 
the counter-current flow of water-steam mixtures. It has been reported* 
that the tests will show the excessive conservatism of the assumption of 
no steam flow (plugging) of the broken cold leg during ECC injection and 
the requirement for total "accumulator bypass" (i.e., loss of all ECC 
fluid injected during blowdown). If these assumptions can be shown to be 
excessively conservative, the magnitude of the reflood rate minimum in 
its time history (i.e., the 1/2 in/sec portion of the "nominal" reflood 
rate predictions) and the duration of the dryout period (the period be­
tween the calculated time of exhaustion of the core coolant and the time 
at which the bottom of the core recovers) would be less critical. Though 
these changes would certainly improve post-blowdown heat transfer prior 
to reflood, the tests are not relevant to resolving the dominant questions 
associated with the magnitude of flooding rates during the reflood period, 
which are now uncomfortably close to values bordering on the limits of 
thermal excursion controllability.
C. George Lawson, a heat transfer expert from ORNL and the author of 
the 1968 ORNL critical review of the ECCS (27), was reported as having 
stated his concern over the reflood rate problem in the following manner:
As an experimentalist, a clear demonstration of coolability
by wide margins would be necessary to satisfy his uncertainties
* Mattson, Roger J., personal communication, 8 August 1973.
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regarding ECCS capability. In other words, cooling by narrow 
margins would have to be regarded by Lawson as an essentially 
uncoolable situation (29, p. 19).
The Commission, in its Opinion to the AC, supported Lawson's con­
clusions. They presented their opinion in their description of the LOCA 
physical processes, as follows:
The temperature excursion would eventually be terminated as 
the ECCS begins to reflood the core. Both PWR's and BWR's have 
ECC systems in which water would reflood the reactor. In BWR's 
the reflood would be provided by accumulation of water from the 
low pressure injection system and the core spray system. Direct 
core spray is discussed below. To accomplish reflood in a reason­
able time, the rate at which the emergency cooling water would 
encroach on the core (the reflood rate) must be high enough to 
provide a heat transfer rate from the core that would be suffi­
cient to counter the heat input rate from decay heat and from 
zircaloy oxidation. The Commission believes that the calculated 
reflood rate should have a substantial margin over the rate that 
is just sufficient to turn the temperature excursion around in 
a short time.
As the cooling water reaches the hot core much of it would 
be converted to steam, and it is this steam together with entrained 
water droplets that would provide the initial cooling of the hotter 
regions of the core. For the reflood water to continue entering 
the core it must displace the steam, which would have to escape 
from the reactor vessel and find its way into the containment 
atmosphere. In the pressurized water reactors the steam would 
have to flow through the steam generator and pump to escape 
through a cold leg break; the reduction of reflood rate by the 
relatively high resistance to flow of this path is called "steam 
binding". Steam binding would severely limit the rate of re­
flooding the core, reducing it from an intended 6 to 11 inches 
per second to from 1.0 to 2.5 inches per second, depending on the
reactor design. The rule we announce considers all the evidence 
in the record on this important subject of steam binding and pro­
vides art acceptable overall assurance of ECCS effectiveness. The 
inquiry,, however, should not end there. Thus the Commission urges 
the pressurized water reactor manufacturers to seek out design 
changes that would overcome steam binding. This same point of view 
is reflected in the September 10, 1973, letter of the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
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Boiling water reactors would not be subject to steam binding, 
because their system design provides a more direct path for the 
steam to escape, but the same requirement for rapid reflood would 
have to be met if excessive clad damage were to be avoided. Boil­
ing water reactors do have a core spray system that would start 
about 30 seconds after occurrence of the break, but its cooling 
effect on the central rods of a fuel bundle might be insufficient 
in itself to prevent exceeding the temperature limits we have set.
The occurrence of reflooding within three minutes after a postu­
lated break of the recirculation line would terminate the excur­
sion (60, p. 1092) (emphasis added).
At flood rates less than 2-4 in/sec, the PWR-FLECHT results indicate 
a dramatic reduction in fuel rod cooling occurs (see appendix 9, sec. A9.4, 
for detailed analysis). To allow margins of coolability which would be 
sufficient to cover reflood heat transfer uncertainties with greater 
confidence, it would appear that reflood rates of 6 in/sec or more would 
be necessary. In view of the added uncertainties over the possibility of 
reflood rate reduction through steam generator tube rupture, an unevalu­
ated hazard in the ECCS hearings (reviewed briefly in appendix 9, sec.
A9.4), it seems desirable to establish specific criterion related to re­
flood rates (or perhaps more generally a specific, demonstrable reflood 
heat transfer coefficients criterion), which is probably the most critical 
element of PWR coolability in the event of a LOCA. Thus, the author 
would support the Commission's recommendation urging PWR manufacturers 
to "seek out design changes that would overcome steam binding" (60, p. 1092).
3.2.7 Reflood/core spray heat transfer
The ultimate function of the ECCS is post-blowdown heat removal, 
accomplished through the reflood mechanism for PWRs or the combined core 
spray reflood mechanisms for BWRs. Thus it is extremely important that 
the reflood/core spray heat transfer mechanisms be well understood and 
conservatively modeled to insure that successful ECCS performance will 
be provided.
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To successfully reverse the LOCA thermal transient, emergency cooling 
water must be supplied to the reactor core at a rate (referred to as the 
reflood/core spray rate) which is large enough to counter the heat input 
from decay heat, zircaloy oxidation, and the remaining initial stored 
energy in the fuel. It is intuitively obvious that increasing the re­
flooding rate will improve the heat transfer in the reflooding process. 
Previous sections have dealt with problems associated with mechanisms 
which tend to reduce or limit reflooding rates. This section will ana­
lyze the state-of-knowledge of the reflood/core spray heat transfer 
mechanisms themselves.
Because the physical processes occuring during ECC are quite complex, 
the principal means of developing modeling tools for their evaluation has 
been through empirical methods. Attempts have been made to isolate and 
examine the elements of the phenomena of reflooding and core spray through 
a series of experiments, the Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat Transfer 
(FLECHT) test programs. The FLECHT programs have formed the basis for 
the post-blowdown heat transfer models prescribed in all of the AEC cri­
teria to date. Though there have been some modifications in interpreta­
tion of the program results over the course of the hearings, the basic 
evaluation model methodology is still fundamentally dependent upon the 
validity and adequacy of the FLECHT data.
Two separate test programs were conducted, one for boiling water 
reactors (BWR-FLECHT) and another for pressurized water reactors (PWR- 
FLECHT) . The two test programs, conducted by GE and Westinghouse re­
spectively under subcontract to the Idaho Nuclear Corporation, though 
different in procedural detail were similar in many general ways. In the 
tests electrically heated, full length fuel rods were tested in bundle 
configurations simulating reactor fuel rod bundles for BWRs and PWRs which 
were contemporary to the test period. The fuel rod cladding material was 
fabricated of either stainless steel or zircaloy. The rods were heated 
by electrical resistance heaters designed to mock up operational rod axial
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power distribution (a chopped cosine power distribution along the axial 
length of the rod).
The time history for the electrical power supplied to the rod bundles 
was programmed to simulate bundle decay heat in an operating reactor with 
the reactor operating at full power at the time of the LOCA shutdown.
The tests were conducted in a parametric fashion. Analyses of the 
calculated values of coolant application rates, initial temperatures, 
peak operating power, and time sequences of coolant application were the 
basis for the determination of the ranges for each of these parameters.
The test series for both BWRs and PWRs included several hundred tests 
over the full range of parameters, various rod cladding materials, and 
several heater designs.
As discussed in detail in appendix 8, both the BWR and PWR-FLECHT 
programs had many problems and weaknesses. Critical tests in the programs 
were too often poorly designed, marred by malfunctioning test equipment 
or poorly analyzed. Consequently, critical data were frequently indeter­
minate in form and suffered from poor evaluation. As a result, the pain­
ful conclusion must be drawn that some of the critical FLECHT results 
upon which post-blowdown heat transfer models depend heavily are a source 
of unending controversy.
On the positive side, the FLECHT tests did demonstrate that simulated 
LOCA thermal transients could be terminated under very severe conditions. 
For the BWRs, temperature turnaround was demonstrated for tests with rod 
powers in excess of limiting IAC conditions (probably induced by heater 
failures) (Test Zr2K). For the PWRs, limiting values of reflood rates 
of the order of 1 in/sec were demonstrated, below which the ECCS may not 
function successfully. For BWR core spray tests, and for PWR reflood 
rates above limiting values, however, no readily identifiable evidence 
of "run-away" metal-water energy release was observed, even though peak 
temperatures exceeded the IAC limit of 2300°F.
3-31
Though it would appear that conservative core spray and reflood heat 
transfer analysis methods may be derived from FLECHT test results, the 
evidence is weak that current models will give completely conservative 
results. In fact, the Commission's AC opinion states that:
The accuracy of the FLECHT-determined heat transfer coef­
ficients has been examined several times. (Cf. the review in 
the Babcock and Wilcox Concluding Statement, pp. 202-204.) 
Westinghouse estimated a possible uncertainty of 12% in the 
coefficients (Trans, page 6878). The Aerojet Nuclear Com­
pany concluded "that the FLECHT data currently represent a best 
estimate of the heat transfer that will occur in a large un­
distorted core." They also concluded that an allowance of up 
to 20% may be needed "to bound the data due to experimental and 
inferential errors." (Exhibit 1113, p. 17-14) The Commission 
approves of the use of the FLECHT data for calculating PWR re­
flood heat transfer, but notes that these will be more nearly 
"best estimate" calculations than bounding calculations (60, 
p. 1124) (emphasis added).
Thus questionable conservatism associated with calculated reflood heat 
transfer based upon PWR-FLECHT results is acknowledged. Similar diffi­
culties are acknowledged with BWR-FLECHT heat transfer coefficients.
The Commission's AC opinion states:
The BWR-FLECHT convective heat transfer coefficients were 
determined from the residue of a thermal balance after all of 
the known inputs and outputs were calculated. The factors con­
sidered were the electrical heat input, the rate of change of 
the heat content of the rods as calculated from their tempera­
ture history, and the calculated radiation from the rods to 
each other and to the channel walls. The residue from these 
inputs and outputs was ascribed to convective heat transfer.
The convective heat transfer coefficients so determined could 
not be very accurate because their calculation involved taking 
the difference between two large numbers. The coefficients 
so obtained are small and are about what one would expect from 
the mechanisms of natural convection and radiation to steam 
(Exhibit 1113, p. 16-14).
There has been a great deal of critisism of the BWR-FLECHT 
tests, particularly by the Consolidated National Intervenors 
(Exhibit 1041, Chapter 5), and both General Electric and Regula­
tory Staff have defended them (Closing Statements). However, for
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the purpose of calculating the maximum cladding temperature, 
only the derived heat transfer coefficients are of any great 
importance. The values obtained have always been known to 
have a high statistical error; furthermore the values are low 
and reasonable, and there seems little to be gained by renew­
ing the controversy over the manner of conducting and inter­
preting all features of the tests.
The high but inevitable statistical error of the coefficients 
for the inner rods (1.5 + 1.0 BTU/hr-ft^-°F) is bothersome and 
leads to an estimated error band of as much as ±200°F in the 
calculated peak temperature in some circumstances (Exhibit 1113, 
p. 16-36) (60, pp. 1125, 1126) (emphasis added).
A large degree of uncertainty is therefore acknowledged to be asso­
ciated with the use of FLECHT derived heat transfer parameters in esti­
mating LOCA temperature histories. Some additional work on the analysis 
of the FLECHT data with respect to the application of the data to the 
evaluation models would appear to be appropriate in order to achieve 
greater conservatism. Additionally, FLECHT tests to date have been con­
ducted at power levels lower than AC specification. Some additional 
testing of current bundle designs for design power level temperature excur­
sions would be desirable as well as more tests utilizing zircaloy rods 
(see appendix 8, section A8.1) and improved blockage simulation. With 
these additional tests, it should be possible to demonstrate the conser­
vatism of the core spray/reflood heat transfer evaluation models suffi­
ciently to satisfy the requirements of "reasonable men."
However, with the currently acknowledged uncertainties in the FLECHT 
data, the desirability of a conservatively high reflooding rate is clearly 
apparent. As discussed in the previous section, reflooding rates of 
current PWR reactor designs average from less than 1 in/sec up to approxi­
mately 2 in/sec. These flooding rates are critically low. As discussed 
in greater detail in appendix 9, section A9.4, at flooding rates less 
than 2 to 4 in/sec, the PWR-FLECHT results indicate a dramatic reduction 
in fuel rod cooling capacity occurs. Current design flooding rates are 
uncomfortably lower than these transition rates. To be conservative, 
higher flooding rates, about 6 in/sec, would be desirable.
3-33
BWR flooding rates are relatively high, typically about 4 in/sec.
Moreover, the heat transfer coefficients (HTCs) accredited to these re-
2flood rates (25 B/hr-ft -°F) appear to be conservatively specified. 
Nevertheless, reflooding rates on the order of 6 in/sec would be desir­
able even for the BWRs, as well as PWRs. Again, we note our support for 
the Commission's position of urging manufacturers to "seek out design 
changes" which would result in higher reflooding rates (60, p. 1092).
3.2.8 Analytical models and numerical methods
The Acceptance Criteria prescribe only the conditions associated 
with the calculated reactor system response to a LOCA. Consequently, the 
major part of the AC specifications are directed at prescription of 
"Required and Acceptable Features of Evaluation Models" for evaluation 
of the ECCS performance. We have dealt with the conservatism of indivi­
dual elements of the more significant parts of the AC specifications for 
evaluation models previously in this section. In this portion we will 
consider the integration of the individual parts into numerical codes 
for overall system evaluation.
The scope of this study did not permit an extensive investigation of 
the specific details of the various codes available for calculation of 
ECCS performance. It is sufficient to observe that the codes themselves 
are very elaborate, lengthy, complex and long running. In this regard, 
the observation of Alvin Weinberg when he was Director of ORNL are well 
taken:
With respect to the criteria themselves, I have only 
one point to make. As an old-timer who grew up in this 
business before the computing machine dominated it so com­
pletely, I have a basic distrust of very elaborate calcula­
tions of complex situations, especially where the calcula­
tions have not been checked by full-scale experiments. As 
you know, much of our trust in the ECCS depends on the relia­
bility of complex codes. It seems to me— when the conse­
quences of failure are serious— then the ability of the codes 
to arrive at a conservative prediction must be verified in 
experiments of complexity and scale approaching those of the
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system being calculated. I therefore believe that serious 
consideration should be given first to cross-checking differ­
ent codes and then to verifying ECCS computations by experi­
ments on a large scale and, if necessary, on full scale.
This is expensive, but there is precedent for such experi­
mentation— for example in the full scale tests on COMET and 
nuclear weapons (29). (Discussed more fully in section A9.1 
of appendix 9.)
The author's personal experience with large complex codes of this 
type leads him to agree with Weinberg that there is a critical need for 
large scale testing against which to validate and mature the ECCS per­
formance codes. The test program which currently comes closest to satis­
fying the need for large scale ECCS testing is the long delayed LOFT 
experiment, a test of ECCS operation for a 55 MW multi-loop PWR nuclear 
steam supply.* (System testing of LOFT with nuclear fuel is not expected 
to begin until about 1976.) LOFT will be the first significant simulation 
of a PWR ECCS to be conducted with a reasonable test configuration and 
scale. Though at 55 MW^ _ the reactor is only 1/60 of the scale of a 
current 1000 MW^ nuclear power plant (3300 MW^), LOFT is still a vitally 
important test. Whether 1/60 scaling is wholly adequate for full scale 
ECCS simulation is uncertain. The AEC has stated:
For lack of full-scale LOCA experience —  a fortunate 
deficiency —  and because of the impracticability and hazard 
. of full-scale experiments, scaled experiments will have to 
be used. This means that the scaling laws have to be in­
vestigated (8^, p. 1-27).
From this and other related AEC statements it appears that no signi­
ficant study of scale effects for ECC syystem tests has been made (or at 
least none has been published). Consequently, the required scaling for 
adequate system simulation cannot be specified with confidence. But it 
is a truism that for a system of the complexity of a nuclear reactor 
undergoing a LOCA, the closer the test is to full scale the more believ­
able the results will be.
* A listing of ECCS related experimental programs on a world-wide 
basis is given in appendix 4.
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Though large or full scale testing is expensive, there is ample 
precedent for it. In fact, nearly all recent large complex systems where 
survivability has been important, from ballistic missiles to jet airliners, 
have been tested extensively in full scale (and frequently to destruction) 
to demonstrate their overall design conservatism. On the basis of such 
precedents, large scale tests, though admittedly expensive, would certain­
ly appear to be cost effective for the nuclear power industry. It has 
been estimated that in the next 30 years more than 500 nuclear power 
plants, of approximately 1000 MW capacity each, will be in operation.
To argue over the practicability of ECCS testing for a large scale nuclear 
system on the basis of expense under these circumstances seems absurd.
If, on the other hand, the principal drawback to large or full scale 
testing is associated with the hazards of the experiment, then the argu­
ment becomes unsettling. It seems unlikely that an adequate location 
cannot be found within existing AEC test sites in the U.S. for which the 
hazards to the public of large scale ECCS testing could not be reduced 
to acceptable levels. If this cannot be done, then it appears that a 
double standard is being applied with respect to public exposure to risks 
from operating reactors: existing reactors represent potential sources 
of LOCA experience at sites far less remote than test sites where the 
AEC is reluctant to conduct full scale tests.
Therefore, it seems that the constraints of the practicability and 
hazards of testing, on a sufficiently large scale to overcome major scal­
ing uncertainties, must be overcome. Testing at a larger scale than LOFT 
seems practical, desirable, and urgently needed. Consequently, a larger 
scale test program should be planned and conducted by the AEC as expedi­
tiously as possible.
The AC specifies the requirement for documentation of the complete 
evaluation models for the ECCS for all vendors. This is a very commend­
able and important requirement. The CNI made a very strong criticism of 
the BWR LOCA model on the basis that there were no independent models of
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similar scope, available to the AEC, against which to check the General 
Electric codes. As Weinberg implies, this is a very legitimate criticism. 
It casts no aspersions on GE to suggest that cross-checking of the BWR 
model should be performed by comparison with another independent code of 
equal stature. Anyone who has had experience with large complicated 
numerical models of systems must be aware that it is essentially impossi­
ble to construct one without programming errors. No doubt a great many 
cross-checks of individual code sub-routines have been made by GE, where 
such checks are possible. Nevertheless subsystem verification, though 
important, is no substitute for full scale exercising of the overall model. 
It can be stated unequivocally that large codes the size of the BWR-LOCA 
model need multiple cross-checking.
The above comments should not be taken as being applicable exclu­
sively to GE. Thorough cross-checking of all of the PWR codes is also 
extremely important. Aerojet Nuclear Corporation (ANC) is currently con­
ducting and coordinating a program of comparative calculations of several 
"standard" problems in which each of the PWR vendors is participating.
This program has the potential of providing a very significant service 
—  i_f adequate analysis of the results is made. Consideration should be 
given to providing supplemental funding for vendor calculations to assure 
that adequate cross-checking is permitted and supported.
In the author's opinion, one more important observation needs to be 
made with respect to ECCS evaluation model documentation. The AC require­
ment for documentation is unassailable in its desirability and value. 
However, when the vendor documentation is furnished to the AEC, the use 
of proprietary documentation for ECCS models by any vendor should not 
be allowed. For system elements as critical to public safety as the 
ECCS, all supporting documentation should be in the public domain.
Public evaluation of the conservatism of ECCS designs is essential to 
the continued growth of nuclear power in the U.S. The public's evalua­
tion must remain incomplete if proprietary documentation of the model is
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accepted by the AEC. Proprietary documentation of ECCS models is 
counter-productive to all concerned with the growth of nuclear power 
and should be considered unacceptable as evidence of model adequacy.
3.3 Relative Importance of Parameters Affecting Thermal Response
In the preceding discussion of the relative conservatism of the PR 
specification of LOCA parameters, no attempt was made to rank the para­
meters in terms of their relative importance to system thermal response. 
Estimates of parameter ranking have been made on the basis of parametric 
analyses which have been conducted by the vendors and the AEC. As a re­
sult of their convictions that the IAC was "excessively" conservative, 
the vendors have conducted "best estimate" analyses in which LOCA thermal 
response was evaluated using values of critical parameters which were less 
pessimistic than those required by the IAC. The results achieved in the 
vendor studies may not be considered truly "best estimate" in a statisti­
cal sense, since, as observed by the AEC, they do not account for the 
entire range of uncertainties in input parameters, nor do they "account 
for propagation of uncertainties" or "provide confidence bands for the 
final calculated results" (4, p. 2.1). However, the results give at 
least qualitative indications of the relative importance of the para­
meters investigated and have been extrapolated, for this report, to pro­
vide quantitative estimates of thermal response for more conservative 
values of the parameters.
3.3.1 Results of parametric analyses
Results of several parametric analyses have been reviewed (e.g., 
Westinghouse, _31; GE, _32_ and 27 [Sec. G] ; ANC, JU); AEC, 4^, Chap. 10) 
and some of the more significant results are reproduced and discussed 
below.* Table 3.1 lists the results of a GE study. An analysis of 12 
parameters showed that the four listed (duration of nucleate boiling, 
heat transfer during lower plenum flashing, critical flow rate for liquid
* A detailed analysis of the results is presented in appendix 10.
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Table 3.1
Sensitivity of Peak Clad Temperature During 
Core Spray Operation to Specified Variables
(3) Duration of Approx. 120
Nucleate Boiling
(3) Heat Transfer During Approx. 800
Lower Plenum Flashing
(5) Critical Flow Rate Approx. 300
for Liquid
(6) Cooling Systems Approx. 150
Operable
A previous sensitivity study on this item showed 
that the peak clad temperature decreased 40 F for 
each second of delay of CHF. It is more important 
to note that for the expected duration of nucleate 
boiling the rods will rewet.
Rewetting of the rods would decrease the cladding 
temperature to nearly saturation temperature by the 
time the fuel uncovers. The peak cladding tempera­
ture during core spray operation in this case is 
merely the heatup during the time of fuel uncovery.* 
This item renders insignificant all items that per­
tain to the portion of the accident prior to unco­
very.
The sensitivity of this item has been investigated 
using the models of NEDO-10329. Changing the criti­
cal flow rate essentially changes the time-scale of 
blowdown without affecting the decay power signifi­
cantly. Essentially the same rate of energy removal 
results with a decreased lower plenum flashing in­
ventory loss.
Analyses have been made using the models of NEDO- 
10329 for the case in which all cooling systems 
are operable, as well as for cases with single 
failure of an active component. ^ oThe peak clad temperature over the entire transient for this case is about 1300 F, and occurs at the start
of lower plenum flashing. Since core heatup after lower plenum flashing begins at only about 500 F, the 
clad temperature at core reflood will be only about 1100 F. It is this latter figure— the peak clad tempera­
ture during core spray operation— that is compared with the base case in the above table.
Sensitivity Analysis of Critical G.E. LOCA Assumptions for "Realistic" Evaluations of Parameters (Ref. 27)
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PWR-ECC Performance Map
Figure 3.1
Cladding Temperature at Time of Flooding (*F)
ANC -A - 8 6 I - K
Fig. 12 PWR-ECC performance map obtained through uae of PWR-FLECHT data.
Reprinted, by permission, from Brockett, G.F., R.W. Griebe, 
R.W. Shumway, and J.O. Zane, "Loss of coolant: Control of 
Consequences by Emergency Core Cooling", Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Nuclear Solutions to World Energy 
Problems, Joint ANS/AIF Conference, November 13-17, 1972, 
Washington, D.C.
(10 and the American Nuclear Society)
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Figure 3.2 
BWR Performance Map
Reprinted by permission, from 10 and the American Nuclear Society
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(break flow), and maintaining cooling system operatibility without the 
time lag required by the AEC "worst single failure" criterion) were the 
most significant for the LOCA thermal response. In addition to the 
listed variables the analysis considered parameters such as: axial and 
radial power factors, local power distribution, and decay heat generation 
rate.
Analysis of the results indicates that the majority of the refer­
enced parameters of table . 3.1 are functionally related to the heat transfer 
mechanism of nucleate boiling for their effects. On the basis of extrapo­
lation of the results to more conservative values of the parameters 
investigated, an increase in peak temperatures on the order of 100°F 
might be expected from application of the more pessimistic parameters 
discussed previously in this chapter. That is, if the time to departure 
from nucleate boiling (DNB) was decreased by several seconds, as a more 
conservative analysis with AC prescribed parameters would indicate might 
be possible, an increase in temperature above IAC predictions on the 
order of 100°F might be expected, based upon extrapolation of the results 
of table 3.1.
Results of an analysis conducted independently by the Aerojet 
Nuclear Corporation (ANC) (10) are shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2 for PWRs 
and BWRs respectively. Results are given in terms of calculated maximum 
temperatures as a function of the cladding temperature at the time ECC 
application is initiated (i.e., at the time of reflooding for PWRs or 
core spray initiation for BWRs) for various values of flooding rate for 
PWRs or delay between spray initiation and time to core reflooding for 
BWRs.
The results for PWRs imply that as long as temperatures at the end 
of blowdown are less than the 2200°F criteria limits, and flooding rates 
are in excess of 2 in/sec, maintaining peak temperatures below criteria 
limits should not be a serious problem. However, for flooding rates less 
than 1 in/sec and temperatures in excess of 1600°F at the end of blowdown,
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peak temperatures will exceed criteria limits. Moreover, at these 
flooding rates, if temperatures exceed 1800°F at flooding initiation, the 
results may not be controllable. Thus, the importance and inter-relationship 
of flooding rate and blowdown parameters are shown.
Similar results are shown for BWRs in figure 3.2. For a reasonable 
range of temperatures at the time of initiation of core spray (clad tem­
peratures less than 1800°F), delay times before core reflooding on the 
order of 2 minutes are possible before temperatures in excess of criteria 
standards are developed. The importance of minimizing the time between 
core spray initiation and reflooding is shown, for a given initial clad 
temperature, in the nonlinear increase in peak temperatures with increas­
ing delay time between the two ECC operations.
The influence of other parameters investigated in the ANC study is 
shown, for PWRs, in the results of table 3.2. In the words of the ANC 
authors, the implications of the table are described as:
As an aid in estimating the effect of several other 
parameters, results from other sensitivity studies are presented 
in Table 1. [Table 3.2] This table shows the percent change 
in the cladding temperature rise and embrittlement for two 
points on Figure 12 [Figure 3.1]. These points are for 2000 
and 1600°F initial temperatures for a flooding rate of 6 in/sec 
for 4 seconds followed by a flooding rate of 1 in/sec. By 
utilizing the information in Table I [Table 3.2] and the curves 
of Figure 12, new performance maps could be constructed.
The largest changes occur in the 2000°F column because 
the metal-water reaction energy is more significant at this 
temperature than for the 1600°F temperature at reflood initia­
tion. The parameter which caused the greatest effect was the 
initial power. Next, in the order of Importance, are: (a) 
metal-water reaction energy multiplying factor; (b) the time 
at which reflooding begins; and (c) ZrO? thickness.
Another important parameter affecting the relationship be­
tween the temperature at the time of reflooding initiation and 
the maximum temperature for a given reflooding rate is contain­
ment pressure. The containment pressure affects the flooding 
rate as well as the heat transfer for a specific flooding rate.
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Table 3.2 ANS Sensitivity Study 
TABLE I
SENSITIVITY STUDY SHOWING EFFECT OF PARAMETER CHANGES ON RESULTS IN FIGURE 12
Temperature of 2000°F Temperature of 1600°F
at time of reflooding at time of reflooding
Parameter Value Temperature Cladding Temperature Cladding
Rise Embrittlement Rise Emb r i 111ement
(% Change) (% Change) (% Change) (% Change)
Baker-Just multiplication factor
= 0.5 -21 -21 - 6 - 9
= 1.0 55 75 9 12
Initial power (kw/ft) = 1.0 -56 -50 -45 -61
= 1.4 106 170 53 101
Zr02 thickness (in.) = 0.001 -13 - 9 - 9 - 8
= 0.00001 1 2 2 2
7-sec delay in time to initiate 
reflooding(a) -16 -16 -10 -15
{a} Delays in flooding initiation result in a reduced temperature rise at any given temperature at reflooding
initiation because the decay power is decreased.
Reprinted by permission from Brockett, G.F., R.W. Griebe, R. W. Shumway, and J.O. Zane, "Loss of Coolant: 
Control of Consequences by Emergency Core Cooling," Proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear 
Solutions to World Energy Problems, Joint ANS/AIF Conference, November 13-17, 1972, Washington, D.C. ,(10 
and the American Nuclear Society.)
Table 3.3 AEC Sensitivity Study
Table 10.6 
Study No. 2
Peak Cladding Temperature
fhr* - Reflood Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only 
after rupture.
fhb** - Blowdown Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only 
after rupture.
fkh*** - Helium Conductivity Multiplier, applies to calculation only after rupture. 
**** - Means Clad Temperature reached melting.
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fhr* fhb** fkh***
.6 .5 .125 1577.1 1925.7 2012.0 **** -
.6 .5 .25 1587.8 1913.4 1975.7 - - - -
.6 .5 .5 1605.0 1894.6 1931.9 - - - - - -
.6 .5 1.0 1628.5 1869.7 1886.1 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .125 1577.1 1857.7 1912.5 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .25 1587.8 1838.1 1878.2 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .5 1605.0 1807.8 1831.8 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 1.0 1628.5 1766.0 1775.8 - - - - - -
.8 .5 .125 1362.2 1664.3 1699.2 1631.1 -
.8 .5 .25 1381.1 1664.2 1693.3 1698.1 -
.8 .5 .5 1409.2 1662.2 1682.8 1725.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 1.0 1443.8 1657.1 1668.4 1765.2 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .125 1362.2 1625.6 1657.4 1681.1 -
.8 1.0 .25 1381.1 1617.7 1664.0 1698.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .5 1409.2 1602.4 1620.5 1725.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 1.0 1443.8 1576.2 1584.3 1762.0 2039.1 2074.8 - - -
1.0 .5 .125 1262.9 1574.6 1593.4 1522.4 2091.4 - 1925.0
1.0 .5 .25 1283.0 1572.7 1593.5 1541.1 2051.5 2355.3 1950.2
1.0 .5 .5 1316.3 1563.7 1584.3 1570.3 2004.2 2083.2 1993.7 -
1.0 .5 1.0 1356.4 1563.8 1556.8 1609.1 1955.9 1986.8 2060.2
1.0 1.0 .125 1262.9 1531.2 1540.8 1522.4 1919.5 2008.8 1925.0
1.0 1.0 .25 1282.9 1522.4 1535.1 1541.1 1889.0 1949.6 1950.2
1.0 1.0 .5 1316.3 1502.4 1514.9 1570.3 1844.8 1879.0 1993.7
1.0 1.0 1.0 1356.4 1489.4 1466.9 1609.1 1788.2 1801.6 2060.2
1.2 .5 .125 1262.91559.61593.41430.31874.31962.61722.2
1.2 .5 .25 1270.6 1565.3 1593.5 1442.7 1858.2 1924.6 1743.6
1.2 .5 .5 1282.6 1564.0 1584.3 1476.7 1836.3 1879.0 1778.2
1.2 .5 1.0 1297.7 1546.1 1556.8 1519.8 1815.6 1836.7 1826.4
1.2 1.0 .125 1262.9 1513.0 1540.8 1430.3 1775.3 1831.9 1722.2
1.2 1.0 .25 1270.6 1507.9 1535.1 1442.7 1752.9 1796.6 1743.6
1.2 1.0 .5 1282.6 1495.7 1514.9 1476.7 1721.4 1748.6 1778.2
1.2 1.0 1.0 1297.7 1457.5 1466.9 1519.8 1681.6 1692.9 1826.4 2256.4 2423.9
11.1 11.1 11.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 17.1 17.1 17.1Linear Power 
Density (kw/ft)
Rupture Time 
Seconds 22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0
As an example of this effect, if the core pressure is 25 psia 
instead pf 60 psia and the reflooding rate is 1 in/sec, a 1500°F 
temperature at reflood initiation would result in a maximum 
temperature 500°F above the value obtained from Figure 12 [Fig­
ure 3.1] (emphasis added)(10, pp. 325,326).
Results of an AEC study of LOCA parameters for a PWR study (discussed 
in greater detail in appendix 10) are presented in table 3.3 (reproduced 
from _4, table 10.6-revised). The AEC study investigated effects of linear 
rod power density, time of swelling and rupture for the rod, reflood heat 
transfer coefficients (HTC), blowdown HTC, and gas gap conductivity 
(through the helium conductivity multiplier for the gas in the fuel­
cladding gap). Several significant observations can be made from the 
results presented.
For example, the AEC parametric study shows that at low power levels 
(11.1 Kw/ft), relatively minor perturbations in any of the parameters were 
shown to be tolerable —  producing about 50-100°F changes in the peak 
temperature. However, large perturbations in parameters, such as major 
reductions in gap conductance through early rupture time or changes in 
linear rod power levels, produced important changes in peak temperatures 
(from 100 to 500°F). Such changes are barely tolerable under the most 
ideal conditions, and were basically intolerable under essentially all 
conditions investigated which were off-normal (or were otherwise non­
ideal). At rod linear power density levels greater than 11.1 Kw/ft 
(considerably below current design peak linear rod power densities of 
18 - 19 Kw/ft) meltdown occurred at essentially all off-normal operating 
conditions investigated, shown in table 3.3 by elements marked with a 
dash. Moreover, the results presented indicate that the thermal response 
of the rods is a strongly non-linear function of temperature. As peak 
temperatures approach 2000°F, normally minor perturbations in heat trans­
fer related variables induce temperature excursions which are increasingly 
difficult to control. This appears to be directly related to energy input 
to the system from metal-water reactions at about 2000°F and above.
3-46
Under such circumstances, the nominal (one inch per second) reflood heat 
transfer rates are stressed to their limits. In fact, the results indi­
cate that under design basis accident power conditions (18 - 19 Kw/ft), 
currently anticipated flood rates will be inadequate to assure that melt­
down will not occur over a relatively large fraction of the core —  assum­
ing the basic accuracy of the AEC's parametric study.
The results give a strong indication that metal-water reactions can 
produce serious (and undesirable) synergistic effects on LOCA thermal 
excursions if rod temperatures exceed about 2000°F, in the absence of 
higher reflood HTCs. This temperature is below the AC limit. It would 
appear that the application of the revised criteria for modeling gap 
conductance and rod swelling and rupture to reactors of current design 
might show that operational power limits reductions may be required to 
prevent similar uncontrollable temperature excursions.
Vendors have criticized the results of this AEC parametric analysis, 
as shown in figure 3.3, as being unrepresentative of overall core response 
to the LOCA. While it is true that swelling and rupture are localized 
phenomena on a rod and also that rods with linear power ratings as high 
as 18 - 19 Kw/ft represent a small fraction of the total rods in the core 
(average linear power density is about 7 Kw/ft), no statistical model of 
the distribution of swelling and rupture in the core is currently accept­
able to AEC. Consequently, the AEC requires that the effects of the tem­
perature excursion be calculated for this singular (but probably not 
unique) core element (a swollen, ruptured rod with a high peaking factor) 
as though it applied for the entire core, in an explicitly conservative 
fashion.
Since the determination of how extensive melting might be throughout 
the core is uncertain under these circumstances, the results of table 3.3 
are a source of concern. It should be emphasized that in this instance, 
the concern is centered around two areas; the relatively low rod linear 
power density at which melting becomes a problem, and the relatively low
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temperature (on the order of 2000°F) at which the thermal excursion 
appears to approach uncontrollability. In addition, the results indicate 
the relative magnitude of temperature changes resulting from changes in 
the parameters of gap conductance and blowdown and reflood heat transfer 
coefficients (within the limits of temperature excursion controllability). 
The significance of these parameters will be analyzed in more detail sub­
sequently .
3.3.2 Influence of parameter variations on the relative thermal
response of the system
As discussed briefly in the previous section, there are some problems 
in making quantitative extrapolations from the vendor analyses in the 
direction of more conservative application of elements of ECCS evaluation 
models. However, on the assumption that such extrapolations can legit­
imately be made, and with the support of the AEC parametric analyses as 
discussed above, the following observations on parameter influence on 
LOCA thermal response have been drawn.
The parameters reviewed above are listed in table 3.4 with the 
relative uncertainties in their magnitudes and an estimate of the incre­
mental temperature increase associated with the uncertainty (assuming no 
parameter interdependence and that resulting peak rod temperatures are 
within coolability limits for the system). To properly evaluate the 
effects to be discussed ("worst case" application of the uncertainties 
to the LOCA induced thermal excursion), we should first review current 
estimates of temperature histories for power reactors. Typical examples 
of temperature-time histories of PWRs and BWRs are shown in figures 
A10.1 and A10.2 of appendix 10 as they have been calculated in accordance 
with IAC procedures. They show that peak temperatures during blowdown 
of 1700°F and 1300°F are predicted for PWRs and BWRs respectively. The 
maximum peak temperatures for the thermal excursion are predicted to 
occur during the core spray/reflood period and are estimated to be ap­
proximately 2300°F and 1800°F for the PWR and BWR respectively.
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Table 3.4
Relative Influence of Selected LOCA/ECCS Parameters
Estimated
Energy Input 
Embrittlement
OK 100% Baker-Just
12% - 17% equiv. ZrO^ vs none (IAC)
Parameter Comments Temp. Increment Reference
1 . Initial Stored Fuel 
Energy/Gap Conductance
PR reduced gap coefficients 
h(AC) 100; h(IAC) = 500-2400
100-500°F+ (12, Table 10.6)
2. Break Flow/Transient 
Critical Heat Flux
BWR; -3 sec to DNB 
PWR; Transition Boiling 
period uncertainty
100°F (12,
(12,
pp. 5-5,6) 
Table 10.6)
3. Blowdown Heat 
Transfer Coefficients
Uncertainty in
magnitude (factor of 2)
50-400°F (12, Table 10.6)
4. Decay Heat Uncertainty in 
magnitude (5-10%) 100°F (12, pp. 22-15,16)
5. Core Blockage 
(swelling & rupture)
BWR - Bundle interior blockage 
PWR - Varying estimates
60-520°F
26-5C0°F
(12,
(12,
p. 20-24)
p. 20-18)
6. Reflood/Core Spray 
Heat Transfer
BWR - Analysis Model Conservation 200°F 
PWR - + 20% Data Uncertainty 100°F
(33,
(12,
pp. 73-75) 
p. 17-14)
7. Metal-Water Reactions
8. Reflood Rate BWR
PWR
Not rate limited 
Delay time critical 
Transitional Flood Rate:
2-4 in/sec
Typical rates: 1 - 1 %  in/sec
Go (21, p. 4-34)No Go
Go (31, p. 3-27)
No Go (12» p. 14-12)
The first parameters listed in table 3.4, the initial stored fuel 
energy and the related gas gap conductance, are parameters which appear 
to have been conservatively treated under the AC revisions. However, the 
changes incorporated in the decreasing gas gap conductance by approximately 
an order of magnitude will necessitate revised temperature predictions, 
with anticipated increases in estimated peak temperatures of approximately 
100-500°F depending upon initial power density and the exact size of gap 
conductance changes (assuming meltdown can be avoided). When combined 
with uncertainties in blowdown heat transfer coefficients, which can in­
duce temperature increases of approximately 50-400°F by themselves, the 
resulting combined effect may induce temperature increments of 200-800°F, 
which might produce serious controllability problems in the thermal excur­
sion.
The second item in table 3.4, the time to departure from nucleate 
boiling and related transition boiling relationships, bridging the tran­
sition from nucleate boiling to film boiling, have strong influences on
heat transfer, especially during blowdown. The uncertainty in critical 
coolant flow from the break could lead to underestimation of the break 
flow and consequent overestimation of the duration of blowdown. For the 
BWRs, a conservative estimate of the influence of underestimated break 
flow is a decrease in the time to DNB of approximately three seconds, 
with a resulting increase in temperature of approximately 100°F. Though 
DNB for a PWR is estimated to take place in about 0.1 sec, similar un­
certainties exist in PWR blowdown related heat transfer phenomena.
Combining worst case effects for the three blowdown related para­
meters could induce peak blowdown temperature increases of approximately 
200-600°F. Thus PWR blowdown temperatures might be substantially raised 
above 2000°F, with consequent severe controllability problems. BWR tem­
peratures could increase to 1500-1900°F.
Comparing the temperature increases which might accrue to the fuel 
rod as a result of the later time reflood/core spray heat transfer period,
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it appears that additional temperature increases of 200-300°F added to 
peak values might be predicted as a result of combined uncertainties in 
decay heat, estimates of the effect of core blockage, and uncertainties 
in reflood core spray heat transfer mechanisms. If PWR blowdown tempera­
tures were as high as 2000°F, from figure 3.1, reflood rates of nearly 
2 in/sec would be required under normal circumstances to assure that peak 
temperatures would not exceed the 2200°F AC limits. With the listed addi­
tional uncertainties in energy sources and heat transfer mechanisms incur­
red during the reflood period, the results of table 3.3 strongly imply 
that the temperature turnaround might not be achievable with current ECCS 
designs. With substantially higher reflood rates (greater than 4 in/sec) 
it might be possible to override uncertainties in FLECHT heat transfer 
results and decay heat. As shown in figure A9.5 of appendix 9, a signi­
ficant increase in initial HTC occurs in going from reflood rates of 1 in/
2sec to 4 to 6 in/sec. The nominal HTC at 1 in/sec is about 10 B/hr-ft -°F
2and at 6 in/sec is about 40 B/hr-ft -°F. Table 3.3 shows the benefit of 
increasing nominal reflood/HTC by 20 percent. A substantial improvement 
in controllability is achieved through this means. Increasing reflood 
HTCs by a factor of 4 would appear to introduce sufficient conservatism 
into the heat transfer processes to override many uncertainties.
It is the consummate message of many calculations of LOCA thermal
2excursions for both BWRs and PWRs that HTCs of less than 10 B/hr-ft -°F 
are not adequate to achieve temperature turnaround. Such HTCs help to 
control temperature increases, fighting a holding action, but are gener­
ally not large enough to reverse the LOCA temperature gradients. The
PWR-FLECHT results, figure A9.7 of appendix 9, indicate that temperature
2turnaround at high power levels require HTCs of at least 15-20 B/hr-ft -°F, 
and that quenching of the fuel rods (the real termination of the trans­
ient associated with reestablishment of film boiling) generally occurred
2when HTCs reached approximately 40-50 B/hr-ft -°F. When HTCs of this 
magnitude are attained, the rate of cooling is great enough that the 
transition to nucleate boiling takes place rapidly.
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With possible PWR temperatures at the end of blowdown of the order 
of 2000°F (or greater) it is most important to achieve control as rapidly 
as possible to reduce the potential effects of metal-water reactions.
Thus reflooding rates much higher than current nominal values are needed. 
Though the effects of core blockage are uncertain and potentially signi­
ficant as shown in table 3.4, higher reflood rates will certainly aid in 
controlling this type of problem also. The open core of PWR permits flow 
diversion from local, swollen hot spots (not simulated adequately in PWR- 
FLECHT) which may exacerbate the thermal excursion during blowdown and 
the early stages of reflood. However, the same openness of the core may 
allow fluid to recirculate beneficially to the hot spot as the core fil­
ling process progresses —  especially given high flood rates.
Consequently, it appears that the uncertainties in LOCA parameters 
for PWRs make high flooding rates, of at least 4-6 in/sec, seem essen­
tial. Equivalently, heat transfer coefficients of at least 30-40 B/hr- 
2ft -°F are needed to assure adequate LOCA temperature control. Presently, 
high reflooding rates seem to be the only mechanisms by which such high 
HTCs can be obtained.
If BWR temperatures at blowdowns were as high as 2100°F, delay times 
of only about twenty seconds could be allowed between spray initiation 
and core reflooding to ensure that temperatures below 2200°F would be 
maintained, as indicated in figure 3.2. Typical delay times between core 
spray initiations and reflooding for current BWRs are estimated at about 
two and one-half minutes (60, p. 1125). A delay of two and one-half 
minutes implies that blowdown temperatures must be kept below 1400°F, as 
indicated in figure 3.2. Thus the uncertainties in BWR heat transfer 
mechanisms provide a basis for serious concern over the adequacy of 
current ECCS designs. However, reflooding rates for BWRs appear to de­
pend only upon the capacity of the pumps provided for ECC fluid injection. 
There are no recognized LOCA induced flow perturbation mechanisms which 
might restrict desired increases in BWR reflood rates (60, p. 1092).
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Since reflood delay times could be shortened by increasing the BWR 
flooding rates, it would appear desirable to do this to provide a clear 
margin of safety.
Incorporating the additional conservatisms suggested here, as par­
tially required by the AC, would appear to necessitate increasing current 
BWR flood rates by approximately a factor of two in order to attain ade­
quate safety margins. In view of the apparent uncertainties in critical 
parameters as listed, it would seem essential to make such an increase 
in flooding rate to assure conservatism.
The core flooding mechanism is obviously the most important heat 
transfer process in LOCA thermal excursion control for both PWRs and BWRs. 
When reflooding rates are sufficiently high, greater than 4 to 6 in/sec, 
heat transfer coefficients are apparently adequate to achieve thermal 
control for plants of current designs. As long as PWR blowdown tempera­
tures can be kept below approximately 2000°F (possible with reflood rates 
of the order of 4-6 in/sec), it appears that it should be possible to 
control LOCA thermal excursions within acceptable limits. Under such 
conditions, costly damage to the reactor fuel rods through swelling and 
rupture might be expected. However, with the containment vessel presum­
ably intact, the radiation hazard to the public would be minimal and the 
case for the "China syndrome" weak.
On the other hand, with current nominal PWR flood rates on the order 
of 1 to 1 1/2 in/sec, the ability to control the thermal excursions ap­
pears uncertain (under either IAC or AC restrictions). The results 
shown in table 3.3, coupled with the uncertainties listed in table 3.4, 
lead to this uncomfortable conclusion, under conservatively estimated 
conditions. The estimated two and one-half minute delay time between 
BWR core spray initiation and reflooding appears to be of less than ade­
quate conservatism. Doubling the reflood rates, to approximately 6 in/sec, 
would help BWR margins of safety substantially. It appears that increased
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flooding rates are needed for both PWRs and BWRs to assure an adequate 
margin of safety for LOCA thermal control. Increasing flood rates may 
require major redesign of current PWR ECC fluid injection methods. In 
view of the reduction in risks to the public to be achieved, such changes 
would appear to be cost effective. In the absence of flooding rates of 
4-6 in/sec, essentially the only alternative for guaranteeing control­
lability is through reduced reactor operating power levels. In the words 
of the Commission:
Without redesign and backfitting, the only measures available 
to the operator in relation to limiting the design basis accident 
within the given design framework are to limit power and the power 
density of the reactor (60, p. 1093) (emphasis added).
Severe reductions (on the order of 40 percent) of current nuclear reactor 
operating power levels could be necessary to achieve unarguable levels 
of conservatism. The cost effectiveness of such long term power plant 
restrictions could be traded off against the cost of ECCS redesign for 
higher flood rates, but the answer seems likely to favor redesign.
3.4 Alternatives to the AC and Cost/Benefits of Their Implementation
In an environmental impact statement (EIS) (61) on the effects of 
the proposed AC requirements, the regulatory staff evaluated the costs 
and benefits of several alternatives to adoption of the AC. They find 
it easier to evaluate costs than benefits for the proposed action. Con­
sequently, only costs have been estimated quantitatively to any substan­
tial degree. The results of the study are summarized below.
3.4.1 EIS options considered
The EIS investigated six options, as follows:
1. Reaffirm the Interim Policy Statement.
2. Adopt the Proposed Rule recommended by the regulatory staff.
3. Adopt more stringent requirements and a derating of nuclear 
power plants beyond that recommended by the regulatory staff's 
Proposed Rule.
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4. Adopt the recommendations of industry participants.
5. Adopt the recommendations of the Consolidated National Intervenors 
and the Lloyd Harbor Study Group.
6. Do not adopt any criteria; instead, evaluate each nuclear power 
plant on a case-by-case basis.
Each of these options, with the exception of a moratorium, would' permit 
nuclear power reactors to be designed, built, and operated in many dif­
ferent modes.
To quantify the options, the staff asked the ECCS hearings partici­
pants to investigate a further subset of problems. The participants were 
asked to estimate the degree of plant derating required to accommodate a 
set of alternative conditions, which were ultimately related to tempera­
ture. The requested evaluation was for the following alternatives:
1. Criteria modified to take account of the technical conclusions 
set forth in the Staff Supplemental Testimony (i.e., a peak 
temperature of 2200°F).
2. Criteria embodying recommendations in the participant's 
Direct or Redirect-Rebuttal Testimony, which led in each 
case to temperatures greater than 2300°F.
3. Criteria limiting maximum clad temperature to 1800°F 
calculated with evaluation models of existing Interim 
Acceptance Criteria.
4. Criteria with maximum clad temperature limits so as to 
prevent clad swelling, with analysis done according to 
existing Interim Acceptance Criteria. This was dramatized 
by a peak LOCA temperature of 1200°F.
Responses to the regulatory staff's request were submitted by the 
Utilities group and Combustion Engineering. To supplement the partici­
pant results, the staff asked ANC to conduct a series of six PWR and 
three BWR power level sensitivity studies. The studies were parameter­
ized in terms of linear power density and peak LOCA temperatures. Typi­
cal full power linear power densities were selected for PWRs as 17.5 Kw/ft
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(on the basis of a peaking factor of 2.5); and 14.7 Kw/ft (approximately a 
peaking factor of 2.1). The values were selected with current regulatory 
requirements on reactor controllability. A peaking factor of 2.5 is the 
lowest value permitted for PWRs without special surveillance instrumenta­
tion. The peaking value of 2.1 is the lowest value proposed by any manu­
facturer. For BWRs, a peak linear power density of 18.5 Kw/ft was pre­
scribed, corresponding to the design peaking factor for all BWRs of 2.6. 
For each of the specified full power levels, ANC was asked to perform 
LOCA analyses, and identify peak temperatures for cases where the reactors 
were being operated at 100, 75, and 50 percent of full power levels. The 
results are presented in table 3.5, as reproduced from the EIS (61).
On the basis of the results of alternative 1, the AEC concluded that 
the new AC specifications would cause a 5 to 10 percent derating of power 
plants. This they deduced could be accomplished by operating plants with 
normally high peaking factors, at lower values. They felt that operation 
of these lower, more demanding, peaking factors could be accomplished 
with no greater impact than "increased surveillance of existing reactor 
instrumentation" (61, p. 108).
The results indicated in table 3.5 indicate that if more stringent 
requirements (i.e., peak LOCA temperatures of 1800°F or 1200°F —  alter­
natives 3 or 4 respectively) are imposed, substantial reductions in plant 
power output would be required.
0 / 0
J' * Estimates of "costs" of alternatives
The staff assumed that utility response to the required regulations
would be to regain full power operation by replacing fuel with redesigned
elements in new bundles which would have lower peak linear power ratings,
but essentially equivalent volumetric power densities. That is, the
3volumetric power density of the reactor (Kw/ft ) would be maintained 
by increasing the number of fuel rods (operating at lower linear power
3-56
Table 3.5
SELECTED CALCULATIONS CONCERNING DERATING OF 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FOR ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA
PERCENT DERATING3
ALTERNATIVE bUtilities CE° Reg: PWR, 2.5d Reg:PWR,2.I6 Reg:BWR^
1 10 20 20 3 2
2 — 0 0 0 0
3 25-3" 20 35 15 10
4 50-70 55 65 55 40
Derating is for a certain period of time followed by design changes permit­
ting full power operation (see Section 3 of this chapter).
^The ECCS Utility Group did not differentiate between PWR's and BWR's in 
stating their estimates.
cCE estimates correspond to CE-designed PWR's.
^Peaking factor of 2.5 corresponds to peak linear power density of 17.5 
kw/ft at full power for the design analyzed.
ePeaking factor of 2.1 corresponds to peak linear power density of 14.7 
kw/ft at full power for the design analyzed.
^Peaking factor of 2.6 corresponds to peak linear power density of 18.5 
kw/ft at full power for the design analyzed.
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levels, Kw/ft) in a given cross-sectional area of the core. Evidence 
that this is a probable response can already be seen on the part of 
reactor manufacturers who have proposed such actions (i.e., Westinghouse 
and General Electric).
Redesigning of fuel elements to accomplish this goal would require 
some time to achieve implementation. An assumed schedule for implementa­
tion was set by the staff as:
(1) The effective date of imposition of new operating limits • 
for those plants affected by the Proposed Rule will be January 1, 
1974; (2) the amount of time necessary to order and begin installing 
new fuel assemblies permitting full capacity operation will be 18 
months (i.e., conversions beginning July 1, 1975); (3) the conver­
sion rate to new fuel designs for those plants operating by July 1, 
1975, will be linear over time and will be consummated for all 
plants by July 1, 1976; and (4) all new plants coming on-line after 
July 1, 1975, will use the new fuel technology at the outset (6^, p. 
109) .
In order to estimate the quantitative effect of derating of the power 
plants to various levels, it was necessary to project the electrical 
generating capacity for the U.S. and the relative fraction associated 
with nuclear power, during the time period of interest. This was done 
as indicated in table 3.6 and figure 3.3.
It can be seen from table 3.6 that the impact of nuclear plant de­
rating would not be uniformly felt across the country. The hardest hit 
section of the country would be the North Central: Illinois, Wisconsin, 
etc., where nuclear power is already a major contributor (nearly 20 per­
cent over the period of interest) to the total electrical generating 
capacity for the region. The Northeast, Southeast, and the West Central 
are also heavily committed to nuclear power, where it will represent 
nearly 15 percent of the total capacity by 1975. The remainder of the 
country has a relatively small commitment to nuclear power of the order 
of 5 percent or less over most of the 21/2 year period of interest 
(1974-1976).
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Table 3.6
PRESENT AND PROJECTED NUCLEAR AND TOTAL ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY
FOR 8 U. S. REGIONS, 1972-19752
EEI
REGION
1972 1973 1974 1975
TOTAL NUCLEAR TOTAL NUCLEAR TOTAL NUCLEAR TOTAL NUCLEAR
MWe MWe % MWe MWe % MWe MWe % MWe MWe %
NORTHEAST 75,347 4,107 5.3 87,032 8,226 9.4 97,223 11,813 12.1 102,980 15,691 15.2
EAST CENTRAL 65,853 1,041 1.6 71,500 1,041 1.5 77,769 3,043 3.9 83,163 5,021 16.0
SOUTHEAST 77,063 2,274 2.9 87,824 6,707 7.6 101,492 12,293 12.1 111,766 17,213 15.4
NORTH CENTRAL 41,700 5,019 12.0 48,254 8,304 17.2 49,776 9,428 18.9 52,731 9,428 17.9
SOUTH CENTRAL 57,343 0 0 63,990 850 1.3 68,842 850 1.2 74,667 850 1.1
WEST CENTRAL 8,995 0 0 10,735 1,565 14.6 11,379 1,565 13.7 12,017 1,565 13.0
NORTHWEST 24,772 800 3.2 26,350 800 3.0 27,540 1,930 7.0 31,044 1,930 6.2
SOUTHWEST 40,518 499 1.2 42,472 1,412 3.3 46,419 1,412 3.0 49,022 2,543 5.2
TOTALS 394,191 13,740 3.5 438,157 28,905 6.6 480,440 42,334 8.8 517,390 54,241 10.5
SOURCES: 52nd Semi-Annual Electric Power Survey, October 1972, Edison Electric Institute, pages 5-8.
Nuclear Power 1973-2000, USAEC, Wash-1139(72), December 1, 1972, pages 33-36.
For definition of the 8 Regions, see Figure 3.3.2
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Figure 3.3 Edison Electric Institute Regions 
(see Table 3.6)
Based upon a variety of assumptions (61, pp. 110-129), the "costs" 
of nuclear plant derating were estimated. Results are shown in tables
3.7 and 3.8.
The results shown indicate that the imposition of the Proposed Rule 
(equivalent to the AC for this study) has only about a 1 percent effect 
on electrical capacity and energy for the nation. However, replacement 
of the capacity will cost the U.S. from 200 to 400 million dollars.
While the derating associated with AC imposition would have little effect 
on the electrical reserve margin for the country, it would cause substan­
tial additional discharge of air pollutants. These would be the result 
of additional coal and oil burning to substitute for the unavailable 
nuclear power.
However, the impact of the AC is relatively light compared with the 
alternatives considered. In the extreme case of a nuclear moratorium, 
approximately 9 percent of the U.S. electrical capacity would be lost 
along with a loss of as much as 14 percent of the total energy. Replace­
ment costs for the lost capacity and energy would be a factor of 10 
greater than costs for imposition of the AC. In the case of a moratorium, 
the electrical reserve margin could be reduced to an unpleasantly small 
value of nearly 10 percent, while air pollutants would be increased by 
a factor of 10 above the case for AC imposition. The costs of other 
concepts are proportionally distributed in accordance with relative 
changes in derating requirements.
In addition to the costs of temporary replacement of electrical 
energy and capacity with fossil fueled power plants, modifications to 
the nuclear reactors to permit them to regain their original power levels 
would require substantial capital investments. On an individual reactor 
basis, each 1000 MW^ reactor would require from 3.5 to 10 million dollars 
of additional capitalization to modify and replace reactor fuel elements 
with acceptable designs.
3-61
3-62
Table 3.7 (from 61)
REPLACEMENT CAPACITY AND ENERGY REQUIRED BY RULE MAKING ALTERNATIVES
I
Interim Policy 
Statement
II
Proposed Rule
III
Further Deratings
IV
Moratorium
Effect of Derating
1.1 Derating (Percent) 0 5-10 25-30 50-70 100
1.2 Reduction in 
Capacity 
(thousand MWe)
1974 0 2.11-4.23 10.6-12.7 21.2-29.6 42.3
1975 0 2.37-4.75 11.9-14.2 23.7-35.0 47.5
1976 0 0.33-0.68 1.8- 2.1 3.9- 5.7 6.8
1.3 Percent of Total 
Capacity Affected
1974 0 0.4 -0.9 2.2- 2.6 4.4- 6.2 8.8
1975 0 0.4 -0.9 2.3- 2.7 4.5- 6.7 9.2
1976 0 0.05-0.1 0.3- 0.4 0.7- 1.0 1.2
1.4 Energy Affected 
(billion KITH)
1974 0 13.3 -26.7 66.8-80 133-187 267
1975 0 15.0 -30.0 74.8-89.2 150-210 299
1976 0 2.1 - 4.3 11.2-13.4 24- 34 43
TOTAL 0 30.4 -61.0 153-183 307-431 609
1.5 Percent of Total 
Energy Affected
1974 0 0.6 - 1.3 3.3- 4.0 6.6- 9.3 13.2
1975 0 0.7 - 1.4 3.4- 4.1 6.9- 9.7 13.8
1976 0 0.1 - 0.2 0.5- 0.6 1.0- 1.5 1.8
Recommendation of CNI and Lloyd Harbor Study Group
Table 3.8
Cost Comparison of ECCS Rule Making Alternatives
RULE MAKING ALTERNATIVES
I II III IV
Interim Policy Proposed Rule Further Deratings Moratorium0
Statement of 1971
1 . Assumed Derating (Percent) 0 5-10% 25-30% 50-70% > 100%
2. Capacity & Energy Penalty 
(millions of dollars/year)
a 1974 Base $ 84-169 $422- 507 $850-1,180 $1,690
b 1975 Base 95-190 474- 570 950-1,330 1,900
c 1976 Base 14- 27 71- 85 150- 230 270
d Total Base $193-386 $967-1,162 $1,950-2,740 $3,860
3. Reliability of Electrical
System
a National Reserve 
Margin, 1975 (in % ) 25.0 24.3-23.7 21.0-21.7
CO1vC 11.6
4. Chemical Discharges to
Ambient Air (thousands 
of tons)
a Particulates Base 16-32 84- 100 180- 260 320
b Sulfur Dioxide Base 170-340 900-1,070 1,940-2,730 3,400
c Nitrogen Oxides Base 90-180 480- 570 1,030-1,450 1,800
5. Modifications to Fuel and.
Reactor (100 MWe Unit)
a Capitalized Cost of 
Modifications Nil $13.3/kW $13.3/kW $13.3/kW
b Capital Investment 
(million dollars) Nil $ 3.5-10 $ 3.5-10 $ 3.5-10 —
c Increase Fuel Costs 
(thousand dollars/yr) Nil $ 215-520 $215-520 215-520 __
d F.ffectiveness of Modi­
fications (Final Power 
Output in v) Vil 100 «5 60
e Replacement Power Costs 
(million dollars/yr) Nil 0 $6 $16 -
aTo the extent that corrective «n t.t} th new fue1 Hesi^ns has alreadv been initiated as a '-esult of the 
Staff's Supplemental Testimony filed in October 1972, and also as a result of the Concluding Statement being filed 
in advance of the effective date of the Proposed Role, the delay in achieving conformance with the Proposed Rule 
might be shortened and these costs thereby modified. These figures would also be modified if the Implementation 
period were longer than presently proposed.
^This represents the equivalent capitalized cost including both capital investment (5b) and fuel cost increases (5c) 
associated with fuel modifications.
CRecommendation of CNI and Lloyd Harbor Study Group
^This data on modifications to fuel and reactor was provided by the ECCS Utility Group and has not been independently 
verified by the AEC Regulatory staff (see text).
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3.4.3 Estimated "benefits" from alternatives
Though the regulatory staff was willing to make a sufficient number 
of assumptions in the EIS to quantify "costs," they were unwilling (or 
unable) to make similar decisions regarding relationships affecting the 
benefits of various alternatives. Consequently, benefits were described 
only in qualitative terms. In the words of the staff:
Lacking accurate numerical values for the probabilites asso­
ciated with various amounts of derating, we cannot quantify the 
"benefits" and hence compare them to the costs. Instead, we must 
use the technical judgment exemplified by the staff Concluding 
Statement and the technical portions of the record of the rule 
making proceedings (61, p. 142) (emphasis added).
This led to presentation of largely visceral statements about "con­
servatisms," as benefits, associated with various alternatives. The 
relative benefits of adoption of the AC (essentially equivalent to the 
referenced "Proposed Rule") are described as follows:
The significant difference between the Proposed Rule and the 
requirements of the Interim Policy Statement are given in Section 
I.C. of the staff Concluding Statement. In general, the changes 
have been in the direction of increased realism in the calculation, 
by taking into account phenomena that were neglected or approxi­
mated in the earlier evaluation models. The criteria changes are 
in the direction of increased conservatism. This combination of 
increased conservatism results, in the staff's opinion, in an im­
provement in the new criteria and models over the old. That is 
why the staff has recommended orderly implementation of the Pro­
posed Rule.
The implication is clear that the improvement in the Proposed 
Rule (AC) over the Interim Policy Statement (IAC) gives rise to a 
larger margin of conservatism and a higher probability, in the 
sense previously discussed, that the criteria and models are ade­
quate. The staff believes this to be true. For the reasons dis­
cussed previously, no numerical value can presently be placed 
accurately on this improvement in probability and margins. It 
seems evident to the staff, however, that it is significant in the 
present state of our knowledge. If this is true, then the Interim 
Policy Statement rules necessarily have a lower probability than 
the Proposed Rule that the criteria and models are adequate —  
thus a lower margin of conservatism (61, pp. 140-141) (emphasis 
added).
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The benefits of derating nuclear plants beyond AC requirements were 
belittled, as bringing negligible benefits, as follows:
Further derating of nuclear power plants beyond that inherent in 
the Proposed Rule would result in more conservative plant operation 
and thus, in principle, greater margins and higher values of the 
probability that the criteria and evaluation models (if such there 
are) have been correctly chosen.
But this is illusory; any possible increase in the margins and the 
probability over and above the Proposed Rule is believed by the 
staff to be negligible. Therefore, the increased cost of such 
derating [see section 5 of this chapter] would be compensated 
in this case by a negligible benefit (61, p. 142).
On the other hand, the vendor recommendations for no derating were 
implied to probably be basically correct (but unjustified on the basis of 
present knowledge), as follows:
The recommendations of the Industry Participants are in every 
case less conservative than the Proposed Rule and, in addition, all 
industry recommendations except GE's are less conservative than the 
Interim Policy Statement.
In fact, to make up for gaps in present knowledge, the staff 
has chosen in the Proposed Rule an alternative that is very 
likely more conservative than would be justified if knowledge 
were more complete. Thus, the unanimous recommendation of the 
four reactor vendors and the Consolidated Utilities —  that the 
Interim Policy Statement is at least conservative enough —  may 
be true. However, in the present state of knowledge, the staff 
believes that the enhancement of public health and safety 
justifies implementation, in an orderly way, of the improvements 
and increased conservatism of the Proposed Rule. To go further, 
in the staff's opinion, would only be to increase a probability 
already adequate and to decrease a risk already negligible (61, 
p. 143) (emphasis added).
The benefits of the moratorium were described as:
A moratorium on nuclear power plant licensing would reduce 
the risk from nuclear power plants essentially to zero. This
risk....is already very low. Therefore, the moratorium, while
it would theoretically minimize this risk and maximize the "benefits" 
of the ECCS rule making, it even less necessary and vastly more 
costly than extensive derating as discussed....above.
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The need for such a choice could only be justified if presently 
available experimental and analytical information were not suf­
ficient to support the conclusion that the Proposed Rule or one
of the more restrictive alternatives....were adequate to protect
the public health and safety and the environment. If such were 
the case, a moratorium would have to remain in effect for the 
period of time necessary for ongoing research programs to confirm 
certain engineering assumptions and numerical values used by the 
Regulatory Staff in evaluating ECCS performance. The Regulatory 
Staff does not agree that there is insufficient information avail­
able upon which to judge the effectiveness of ECCS performance 
and believes that the ECCS hearing record supports it in this 
regard. Apart from the lack of technical justification for a 
moratorium, such a course would impose severe health, economic, 
and environmental penalties (as discussed elsewhere in this 
chapter) out of proportion with the supposed risk which a mora­
torium would be designed to avoid (61, p. 144) (emphasis added).
Finally, the concept of having no general criteria was dismissed 
as being of no real influence on the real world. In the opinion of the 
regulatory staff, the hearings results would influence case-by-case 
decisions made even if there were no specifically written criteria. 
Judgements would still be based upon the same information and results 
would eventually be identical —  although the regulatory plant reviews 
would probably be more painful in the absence of a set of definitive 
criteria.
In summary, the cost of imposition of the AC was given as a 5-10 per­
cent derating of nuclear power plants. This derating would cost utilities 
(and ultimately the public) about 200 to 400 million dollars in replace­
ment capacity and energy costs. The costs of modifications to the nuclear 
fuel assemblies were estimated to cost 3.5 to 10 million dollars per 
1000 MW^ of nuclear power. [This would be in addition to the 200-400 
million dollars required for the temporary replacement of lost energy 
and capacity.] Costs of other alternatives were as much as a factor of 
10 higher, as in the case of a complete moratorium. In addition, there 
are other "costs," social and economic, which vary from region to region
3-66
within the U. S., resulting from increased probabilities of power outages 
and higher air pollution caused by increased use of coal and oil burning 
power plants.
Because no good statistical basis exists for quantitatively evaluating 
the margins of safety associated with any of the alternatives, benefits 
were presented in a purely qualitative fashion. This is a serious short­
coming of the EIS. Without a quantitative presentation of benefits, it 
is difficult to adequately compare costs and benefits for the various 
alternatives. This problem will continue to plague the nuclear industry 
until a good statistical base is obtained for such analyses.
An initial study of the probability and consequences of nuclear 
accidents has been completed by Professor Rasmussen of MIT, for the AEC 
(67). It represents a valuable source of quantification of problems of 
this sort. However, it must be recognized that the statistical base for 
LOCA analyses is essentially nonexistent. Consequently, though of real 
interest and benefit to everyone (from AEC to intervenors) the Rasmussen 
study depends heavily upon technical judgement and must not be expected 
to be the final answer to "benefit" quantification.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS
An interesting summary of the ECCS hearings has been published 
by Cottrell, as follows:
Review of the ECCS Rule-Making Hearing and its ramifications 
leads the author to the conclusion that much good has resulted 
from this unique experience. This "good" falls into several 
categories:
1. The recommended modifications to the ECCS criteria 
have enhanced the safety of nuclear power reactors to a level 
that satisfies most technical experts.
2. The hearing forced a new look at reactor safety 
research, i.e., what was being done and by whom.
3. Organizational changes have been induced in both 
the AEC and contract organizations which are intended to ex­
pedite the conduct and evaluation of needed research.
4. Several administrative problems were brought to light.
Some of these have been resolved, while others are still under 
study (e.g., the availability of information on government- 
sponsored work, questions of proprietary safety information, 
and procedures for the promulgation of criteria).
However, the price paid for these gains was high. Not only 
was the hearing itself a traumatic experience for all concerned 
(organizationally as well as individually), it was also very 
expensive. Additional costs will be reflected in the deratings 
and/or changes in existing plants, as well as costs for new designs 
that the vendors are now developing. But these are transient 
costs and, in the final analysis, are the costs for developing 
safe nuclear power reactors. It is fortunate, considering the 
energy demands of our technological society, that these additional 
costs will not have a major impact on the costs of nuclear energy, 
so that it remains a viable option for the near future (i.e., 25 
to 50 years).
Measured by almost any criterion, the ECCS intervenors have 
won a major victory. They have been instrumental in causing the 
AEC Regulatory Staff to recommend ECCS criteria that are signifi­
cantly more conservative (i.e., safer) than the June 1971 criteria. 
In fact, in backing off to these new criteria, the AEC has accom­
modated the reservation of most of those in the nuclear community 
who previously expressed concerns about the adequacy of the 1971 
criteria. Despite this accommodation, the principal intervenors, 
CNI, continue to oppose the Commission, as indicated most recently 
by their collaboration with the Friends of the Earth and Ralph 
Nader in the suit against the AEC. However, with the majority
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of the scientists and engineers in our technical community 
concurring regarding the adequacy of the conservatism of the 
Regulatory Staff's concluding statement, it seems unlikely that 
the intervenors can effect any further significant change at 
this time.
In the final analysis, the hearing was a rough way to go, 
but it was a viable route and one which produced many beneficial 
results (62, p. 53).
4.1 Results of ECCS Hearings
Adversary hearings are indeed a "rough way to go"! The ECCS adver­
sary hearings seemed to place intervenors, who had essentially no actual 
reactor design experience, at diametric odds with the much more experienced
AEC and vendor representatives. Since each side saw the other in the 
role of an adversary, neither seemed willing to freely and openly discuss 
the technical issues. As a result, the hearings were unable to completely 
bridge the gulf of differences between the two parties. As Cottrell noted, 
the principal intervenors, the CNI, continue to express their concern over 
reactor safety in spite of the accommodation of many of their original 
reservations within the AC.
It is interesting to analyze the dimensions of the gulf separating 
the two camps in terms of the self-images of the opponents and the argu­
ments which they have presented. The vendors and the AEC expressed the 
feeling that the ECCS design, based upon sound engineering practice 
(which has been applied for generations in related non-nuclear problems 
of heat transfer, pressure vessel and piping design) had assured relia­
bility for operation in the event of a LOCA. As evidence of this, they 
pointed to the multiple safety barriers built into the system, the 
"defense-in-depth" concept of three levels of defense: (1) quality assur­
ance in design, fabrication, and operation; (2) redundant systems elements, 
periodic in-service testing, etc; and (3) the installed engineered safety 
systems such as the ECCS. (These last are designed to "mitigate the con­
sequences of postulated serious accidents" no matter how small the proba­
bility of such accidents might be.)
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The vendors acknowledged that they do not understand the LOCA/ECCS 
problem completely. But they feel that uncertainty with respect to some 
aspects of systems response is common to the engineering design of most 
large systems, independent of whether the system deals with nuclear power 
plants or aircraft or automobiles. The engineer is pragmatic. Recog­
nizing that he rarely has absolute and complete knowledge and understanding 
of all aspects of a problem, he feels it is only necessary to have bounded 
the response of the system within reasonable conservative limits by his 
design. With a system as complex as the ECCS, he feels that the supply 
of physically interesting, challenging, and unresolved problems is 
essentially unbounded —  and their investigation could go on forever.
Thus the vendor feels that total understanding of all LOCA/ECCS problems 
is not necessary as long as system performance is reasonable and conser­
vatively assured.
In this environment, the intervenors were at a great disadvantage.
They were generally not completely familiar with ECCS engineering design 
details and specifically not totally familiar with all the systems studies 
which have been performed for the ECCS, many of which may never have been 
openly published by the vendors, some of the latter having been considered 
as inconsequential or perhaps having negative results. Consequently, to 
lend support to their position, the intervenors amassed as great a col­
lection of "expert" opinion showing dissent over the engineering practice 
of the vendors as possible. The intervenors have argued that the exis­
tence of such dissent demonstrates the unreliability of the system. Their 
principal goal appears to have been to find a sufficient number of acknow­
ledged problems, where experts had expressed differences of opinion, to 
make the balance of evidence appear uncertain to "reasonable men." The 
intervenors have felt it necessary only to establish reasonable doubt 
about ECCS reliability. They argue that since clearly the responsibility 
for proven conservatism, in the face of uncertainty, lies with the AEC 
and the vendors, the ECCS must be considered basically ineffectual until
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proven reliable. Moreover, in the intervenors' opinion, the magnitude 
of the consequence of a LOCA in which the ECCS did not perform adequately, 
no matter how small the probability of the LOCA, makes it imperative that 
all problems and areas of uncertainty in ECCS design should be resolved 
before nuclear reactors can be considered "safe" and worthy of extensive 
utilization.
In the final analysis, both sides have been guilty of allowing exter­
nal parameters of the problem to influence their judgment. In fact it is 
the opposing views of the ECCS externalities which have established the 
dimensions of the gulf separating the adversaries and served to maintain 
the division in spite of the evidence presented by both sides at the 
hearings. On the part of the AEC and the vendors, their view of the low 
probability of a LOCA has reduced their concern over the uncertainties in 
the physics of the ECCS design. On the other hand, the intervenors' per­
ception of the magnitude of the consequences of ECCS failure in event of 
a LOCA clouds their ability to objectively evaluate the issues which they 
have raised. To the public, finding the common ground —  or solution —  
between the two extreme positions, seems like the classical problem of the 
product of zero and infinity, an indeterminate form for which the solution 
is uncertain.
4.2 Evaluation of Criteria "Uncertainties"
Whatever final conclusion is reached about the ultimate adequacy of 
the AC, it must be acknowledged that it is substantially more specific 
and conservative than the IAC. The AC is much more complete in its speci­
fication of the details of the ECCS. A serious attempt was apparently 
made to provide specifications which satisfied a consensus of technical 
opinion and eliminated several areas of ambiguous or non-existent treat­
ment of elements of the ECCS design.
In the AC preparation, the Commission seems to have given serious 
consideration to the issues raised in the hearings. In their discussion 
of the specific elements of the AC, the Commission treated in varying
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degrees most of the questions and comments raised by all participants: 
intervenors, vendors, and consultants. They appear, in particular, to 
have been influenced by the ACRS response to the intervenor interroga­
tories. The AC elements have dealt (in varying detail) with essentially 
all the ACRS list of uncertain conservatisms, plus some ECCS design issues 
which were not included in the list.
As described by the Commission:
The principal changes from the Interim Policy Statement are 
as follows. The old criterion number one, specifying that the 
temperature of the zircaloy cladding should not exceed 2300°F, 
is replaced by two criteria, lowering the allowed peak zircaloy 
temperature to 2200°F and providing a limit on the maximum 
allowed local oxidation. The other three criteria of the IAC 
are retained, with some modification of the wording. These 
three criteria limit the hydrogen generation from metal-water 
reactions, require maintenance of a coolable core geometry, 
and provide for long-term cooling of the quenched core.
The most important effect of the changes in the required 
features of the evaluation models is that swelling and burst­
ing of the cladding must now be taken into consideration when 
they are calculated to occur, and that the maximum temperature 
and oxidation criteria must be applied to the region of clad 
swelling or bursting when the maximum temperature and oxida­
tion are calculated to occur there. Another important change 
is the requirement that, in the steady state operation just 
before the accident, the thermal conductance of the gap between 
the fuel pellets and the cladding should be calculated taking 
into consideration any increase in gap dimensions resulting 
from such phenomena as fuel densification, and should also 
consider the effects of the presence of fission gases. When 
these effects are taken into consideration a higher stored 
energy may be calculated. Other changes in the evaluation 
models are mostly in the direction of replacing previous 
broad conservative assumptions with more detailed calculations 
where new experimental information is available or where better 
calculational methods have been developed (60, p. 1093) (empha­
sis added) .
Some of the responses in the AC to the ACRS listed problems seem to 
have been adequate to have achieved the desired conservatism sought by
4-5
the ACRS. For example, in their treatment of the initial stored energy 
of the fuel, the Commission has considered the influence of clad swelling 
and rupture on gas gap conductance in what can be a satisfactorily con­
servative manner, assuming the "case-by-case" follow-up required during 
licensing procedures is adequate.
What, then, are the most serious remaining problems with ECCS design 
and criteria? A more detailed discussion of the parameters and their 
relative importance has been given in chapter 3, especially section 3.3 
(supported by several appendices). The single most important ECCS para­
meter for both PWRs and BWRs appears to be the reflood rate. Current 
estimates of PWR reflood rates range from less than one inch per second 
to two inches per second. At these reflood rates, using adequately con­
servative values of critical thermal parameters (table 3.4), predicted 
LOCA thermal excursion controllability is uncertain for PWRs of current 
design. Although predicted BWR flooding rates are substantially higher 
than PWR rates (nearly 4 in/sec), the long delay time (nearly 3 minutes) 
between core dryout and the beginning of reflooding (when the ECC fluid 
first refills the pressure vessel to the bottom of the core) is very 
hazardous. Again, using adequately conservative values of critical 
thermal parameters (table 3.4), delay times prior to reflooding should 
be restricted to a period of from one to two minutes (at the longest). 
Consequently, one might conclude that for BWRs, as well as for PWRs, 
thermal excursion controllability is uncertain at current design oper­
ating conditions and flooding rates.
The problem with current ECCS design can be resolved into three 
main categories: (1) uncertainties in LOCA energy sources; (2) blowdown- 
related uncertainties; and (3) core reflooding related uncertainties.
A succinct list of individual parameters at issue within these categories 
is given in table 3.4, including measures of the relative importance of 
each parameter. The reader is referred to this table and its supporting 
discussion, for more detailed discussions of the parameters.
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With respect to energy source uncertainties, the AC has specified 
criteria which appear adequately conservative with respect to the initial 
stored fuel energy of the rod. It should be observed that the AC specifi­
cations are more conservative than those of the IAC. Consequently, the 
revised criteria will result in increases in estimated peak fuel rod tem­
peratures of about 100-500°F above those previously calculated under the 
IAC guidelines. On the other hand, an uncertainty of 10-15 percent exists 
in the conservatism of the specification of decay heat for the fuel rod. 
This uncertainty might contribute an increase in peak temperatures esti­
mates of about 100°F above current IAC predictions. With respect to 
specification of energy release from metal-water reactions (zirconium - 
steam), the use of the full Baker-Just relationship, as prescribed in 
both the IAC and AC, appears to be adequately conservative. Though this 
energy source may be critically important to LOCA thermal excursions, it 
should not contribute an unanticipated source of temperature increase 
above earlier IAC predictions.
In the area of blowdown-related uncertainties, problems exist from 
several parameters; specifically: the specification of magnitude and 
duration of critical flow from broken pipes; critical heat flux related 
parameters; and the magnitude of blowdown heat transfer coefficients, as 
well as the effects of core blockage due to swelling and rupture of the 
fuel rods which (for PWRs) would most probably take place during blowdown 
(if it occurs at all). The combined effect of these parameters, including 
the increased conservatisms in treatment of initial stored fuel energy 
of the AC, might induce as much as a 200-600°F increase (over the IAC 
predictions) in the fuel cladding temperature during blowdown.
Core reflooding-related uncertainties include problems in the areas 
of: the adequacy of treatment of reflood/core spray heat transfer experi­
mental data; the effects of core blockage from swollen and ruptured rods 
during the reflood period; and the conservatism of AC prescriptions of
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metal-water induced clad embrittlement. Though the embrittlement problem 
does not contribute to a specific peak clad temperature differential, it 
does raise concern over brittle failure of rods during quenching. Such 
failures could result in exacerbation of local blockage with resulting 
impairment of hot spot cooling. Aside from the embrittlement phenomena, 
the net temperature increase expected from reflood-related uncertainties 
(including the effect of decay heat uncertainties) might be as high as 
200-500°F above predictions from the IAC. In evaluating the credibility 
associated with the author's estimates of the uncertainty in blowdown 
and reflood temperature increments, as given above, it is well to bear 
in mind that they are the result of the technical judgement of the author 
(who accepts responsibility for them). As previously discussed (section 
4.4) "technical judgement" admits a wide variety of conclusions with 
respect to margins of safety —  which can, after appropriate liberties 
are taken, be translated into temperature increments (or other quantita­
tive measures, as desired). It may be well to reemphasize this point 
with the words of Cottrell:
The whole purpose of the hearing was to determine the 
adequacy of the June 1971 IAC as the basis for licensing 
reactors. No one, neither the Commission, the vendors, nor 
the intervenors, has a good quantitative basis for determin- 
ing whether any given reactor is safe or unsafe. All parties 
depend on the judgment of their experts in arriving at this 
decision. Since the AEC Regulatory Staff has been working 
most closely with the vendors over the years, it is perhaps 
reasonable to expect a greater understanding of this elusive 
judgment between these groups than between any others. How­
ever, considering the magnitude of the commitment to nuclear 
power, the importance of safety, and the need for public 
understanding, it is unfortunate that there has been so little 
effort expended in attempting to elevate nuclear risk assess­
ment to a more exact science. However, in August 1972 the 
AEC embarked upon a major project toward this end. The 
Reactor Safety Study, also known as the Rasmussen Study (for 
Dr. N. C. Rasmussen of MIT who heads this project), is now 
in full swing, and a report is scheduled for 1974. Although 
this report is unlikely to be a panacea for the safety-evaluation 
business, it will be the first step down a long road (62, pp.
51,52) (emphasis added).
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Though this is not intended as an apology by the author for exercising 
his own judgement, it is indeed unfortunate that no "good quantitative 
basis" exists to permit adequate definition of the margin of safety.
With these provisos on technical judgements in mind, we need to put 
the potential temperature increases (as suggested above) into the proper 
perspective. The following estimates of critical reactor temperatures 
have been made by the vendors for their own reactors on the basis of IAC 
requirements (see figures A10.1 and A10.2 of appendix 10). Typical esti­
mates of blowdown temperatures for PWRs are approximately 1700°F, while 
predicted BWR temperatures reach only about 1300°F during blowdown.
Maximum temperatures for both PWRs and BWRs occur during reflood/core 
spray periods and are estimated respectively as 2300°F and 1900°F. It 
should be noted that estimated peak temperatures for PWRs using the IAC 
may already frequently exceed the AC limit of 2200°F, while the BWR had 
a cushion of about 300°F under the less conservative requirements of the 
IAC. Simply applying the AC requirements (without modification) would 
make ECCS performance margins for both PWRs and BWRs uncertain. The ef­
fects of the increases in conservatism described above, which sometimes 
exceed AC specifications, will be considered below.
The critical question is: what are the implications of the uncertain­
ties in the conservatism of IAC and AC specification of the critical para­
meters? From the blowdown-related uncertainties with potential temperature 
increments of 200-600°F, it can be inferred that maximum blowdown tempera­
tures for PWRs might be predicted to reach (or exceed) 2000°F. At these 
temperatures, immediate post-blowdown control is critical.
With current PWR design practice, for which nominal reflood rates 
are approximately 1-1/2 in/sec and peak linear rod power density is about 
19 Kw/ft, controllability of the thermal excursion is uncertain if peak 
blowdown temperatures reach 2000°F. (Compare results of figure 3.1 and 
table 3.3.) The question can be legitimately raised as to whether or not
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it is possible to assure controllability under these conditions. The 
PWR-FLECHT results (see fig. A9.5) provide an important input to the 
answer to the question! The results show that for fuel rod initial con­
ditions of 2000°F and an equivalent linear power density of about 18 Kw/ft, 
if flooding rates are 6 in/sec or greater, clad temperature increases are 
limited to 100°F (or less). In the tests, temperature turnaround times 
were of the order of 10 seconds or less and typical quench times (when 
nucleate boiling was regained for the rod) were approximately 75 seconds.
Thus it appears that the key to PWR thermal excursion controllability 
in a LOCA is obtainable through sufficiently high flooding rates. In fact, 
it appears that if flooding rates equal to or greater than 6 in/sec can 
be assured for the reactor, sufficient coolability would be provided to 
overcome the uncertainties associated with the specifications of the re­
flood period parameters.
A flooding rate of 6 in/sec produces an initial nominal reflood heat
2transfer coefficient (HTC) of approximately 40 B/hr-ft -°F, for about
4 times the magnitude of the nominal HTC at 1 in/sec (approximately 10 B/
2hr-ft -°F). This factor clearly dwarfs a 20 percent uncertainty in the 
specification of the 1 in/sec reflood HTC. Similarly the factor of four 
increase in the HTC associated with the 6 in/sec reflood rates overrides 
the 10-15 percent uncertainty in definition of decay heat for the fuel 
rod, while the rapid quenching assures dissipation of the fuel rod heat 
without significant problems. Additionally, the rapid temperature turn­
around time and short time to quenching substantially reduce the probabil­
ity that the more conservative limits recommended for rod oxidation, to 
prevent embrittlement, would be exceeded. Moreover, though the effect 
of core blockage from swollen and ruptured rods on flow diversion from 
local hot spots is highly uncertain (PWR-FLECHT tests of this problem 
simulated actual PWR core conditions very poorly), higher flooding rates 
must surely improve heat transfer, even under these uncertain conditions.
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In analyzing BWR performance in a LOCA, it appears that they have 
two significant advantages over a PWR. First, the nucleate boiling 
period during blowdown is substantially extended in a BWR, compared to 
the equivalent period in a PWR. The estimated time to departure from 
nucleate boiling in a BWR is about from 5 to 10 seconds, compared to an 
equivalent estimate of about 0.1 second in a PWR (60, p. 1116). For 
every second that the departure from nucleate boiling can be postponed 
in a reactor, the initial stored energy can be dissipated at the equiva­
lent rate of from 40 to 150°F/sec. This effect is one of the principal 
sources of the large difference in maximum blowdown temperatures for the 
two types of reactors (1300°F for BWRs instead of 1700°F predicted for 
PWRs under IAC rules).
The second beneficial aspect of BWR design is that there are no 
recognized mechanisms leading to flow restrictions which would limit re­
flood rates through steam binding. Consequently, BWR reflood rates appar 
ently depend simply upon the capacity of the reflood subsystem pumps. 
Thus, there is no apparent inherent reason why BWR flood rates could not 
be increased, as needed.
In balance, because of the inherent differences in operational 
characteristics and reactor dimensions of BWRs and PWRs, approximately 
four times as much water must be added to the BWR, as compared to an 
equivalent PWR, to initiate reflooding. The effect of this is apparent 
in the BWR delay time of approximately 2-1/2 min between the beginning 
of the core heatup period and reflood (60, p. 1125). Thus the inertia 
of a BWR to reversal of the LOCA thermal excursion would be greater than 
that of PWR under equivalent fluid input conditions. Therefore, since 
time delays might be expected to be greater for BWRs than PWR, for equiva 
lent reflooding rates, it is fortunate that the steam binding and CHF 
problems are simpler for the BWR.
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Considering the BWR LOCA thermal excursion, the additional uncertain­
ties previously discussed with respect to blowdown-related parameters
might increase maximum temperatures during this period to as high as 1900°F.
2With core spray HTC specified as ranging from 1.5 to 3.5 B/hr-ft -°F (AC, 
Sec. I.D.6) the core spray is generally inadequate to reverse the tempera­
ture transient (though it provides important temporary control prior to
reflood) (60, p. 1125). The AC specifies reflood HTC values of 25 B/hr- 
2ft -°F (AC, Sec. I.D.6), which is reported to be associated with reflood­
ing rate of 3.7 in/sec (60, p. 1125). From the PWR-FLECHT reflood data,
2a reflooding HTC of 25 B/hr-ft -°F corresponds to a nominal HRC for flood­
ing rates of about 2-3 in/sec. Since the PWR-FLECHT data (figure A9.7)
indicates that reflooding rates of the order of 4 in/sec would have some-
2what higher HTC values (on the order of 30 B/hr-ft -°F), it appears that
AC prescribed BWR reflooding HTCs are somewhat conservative. On the basis
of LOCA parameters specified by the IAC, reflooding, with the specified 
225 B/hr-ft -C’F HTC, has been calculated to achieve temperature turnaround 
promptly for all cases bounded by IAC limits. Peak temperatures attained 
during the transient are directly related to the time between spray initi­
ation and core reflooding (figure 3.2).
For maximum blowdown temperatures of 1300°F (as calculated under 
IAC specifications), approximately a three minute delay between core spray 
initiation arid core reflooding would be allowable before peak temperatures 
would reach the 2300°F IAC limit (figure 3.2). As previously noted, for 
current BWR design reflood rates, core reflooding is predicted to occur 
approximately two and one-half munutes after spray initiation, allowing 
a relatively comfortable margin of safety within IAC specifications. A 
maximum temperature of about 1500°F at the end of blowdown would be 
tolerable (figure 3.2). However, using the conservative LOCA parameter 
estimates of this review, revised estimates of blowdown temperatures are 
obtained of as high as 1900°F. At these temperatures, a delay time margin 
of only about 60 seconds exists before temperatures reach critical AC
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limiting values of approximately 2200°F. With the additional parameter 
conservatisms estimated to be required during the reflood period (under 
the assumptions of this review), the delay time must be kept to an abso­
lute minimum to keep temperatures within bounds of controllability.
If the same margin of reflooding rate safety were to be maintained 
under the more conservative parameter assumptions discussed previously, 
an increase in the current BWR flooding rate of approximately a factor 
of two would be required. Reducing the spray initiation-to-core reflood­
ing delay time to approximately one minute would be equivalent to increas­
ing the flooding rate to about 9-10 in/sec, with a corresponding increase
2in HTC to approximately 50 B/hr-ft -°F. Thus, increasing the flooding rate 
decreases the delay time and has an extra compensation of increasing the 
flooding heat transfer coefficient as well. These complementary changes 
would apparently provide acceptable safety margins even within the more 
conservative assumptions reviewed here.
4.3 Alternative Courses of Action
As observed earlier in the section, substantial and apparently 
irreducible differences of opinion exist with respect to ECCS operational 
reliability, even among experts in the field. Though certain observa­
tions have been made in this report in connection with criteria conserva­
tisms, it has been impossible to resolve in absolute terms which parties 
have the balance of "truth" upon their side. Consequently, a number of 
alternate methods of resolving the issues of uncertainties suggest them­
selves .
Though a spectrum of alternatives are possible, ranging from accept­
ance of current procedures and designs to a total ban on the use of LWRs, 
certain steps seem more reasonable than others. The intervenors have 
essentially recommended foreclosure of current and future light water 
power plant operation and construction —  a course which would result 
in substantial local hardship through power shortages in certain portions
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of the U.S., especially in this period of general weakness in the availa­
bility of energy supplies. Derating operational power plants to peak 
linear rod power densities substantially below current limits (reductions 
of as much as 40 percent) have also been suggested. In this regard, the 
Commission has suggested:
Without redesign and back-fitting, the only measures available 
to the operator in relation to limiting the design basis accident 
within the given design framework are to limit the power and the 
power density of the reactor. The power density can be manipula­
ted somewhat independently of the total reactor power by adjust­
ments of fuel enrichment and control rod action to provide more 
uniform power generation throughout the core. The Commission 
notes that there has been a tendency to reduce the maximum 
allowed peaking factor (ratio of the highest power density to 
the average throughout the core) to satisfy ECCS criteria.
These lower allowed peaking factors leave less margin above 
the normal operating range for maneuvering; thus greater care 
in reactor operation is required to ensure that these factors 
are not exceeded (60, p. 1093) (emphasis added).
Thus even the concept of power density limitation is not without certain 
attendant operating problems. Even if such problems are minimized, 
however, this approach would probably also produce local power shortages. 
Another course might be to delay licensing of new LWR construction while 
results of a substantially increased and accelerated research program 
were obtained, analyzed, and incorporated into subsequently revised 
criteria. Alternatively, the AEC might attempt to develop design criteria 
which were accepted by all parties as clearly conservative which could 
be imposed as engineering standards. This might lead to redesign of the 
ECCS to assure that its reliability is adequate to satisfy the concerns 
of all parties. Of course, the AEC could attempt to continue operation 
using their current criteria, with the strong probability that future 
construction may be delayed by intervenor-induced court proceedings.
The possibility of locally legislated moratoriums on nuclear power plant 
construction is not unlikely. (Activity is underway to introduce such 
a referendum for submission to the voters of California.)
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Combinations of the above steps could also be considered. For example, 
restricted or delayed licensing of nuclear construction, combined with 
some plant derating, might be considered for individual utility power 
networks. A risk-benefit analysis of such steps could be conducted for 
the local and regional areas affected by the actions under consideration. 
Decisions on whether to accept the risks of continued operation or the 
potential costs/benefits of the restrictions could then conceivably be 
decided upon a case-by-case basis.
The ECCS Environmental Impact Statement presented an evaluation, of 
sorts, of the costs and benefits for several alternative methods of re­
solving the ECCS problem. Though no quantitative relationships for bene­
fits were given, and currently no reliable estimates could be given,
*
estimates of the costs of several alternatives were presented. For exam­
ple, imposition of the AC was estimated to require derating of currently 
operational nuclear power plants by 5-10 percent for a period of up to 
2-1/2 years (through 1976). Replacement electrical capacity and energy 
was estimated to cost 200 to 400 million dollars, plus the capital in­
vestment for retrofitting the reactor with redesigned fuel elements (3.5- 
10 million dollars/1000 MWe plant) to remove the requirement for plant 
derating. Derating would also cause additional social and economic cost 
penalties, directly and indirectly, as a result of increased probabilities 
of power outages and higher air pollution (caused by increased use of coal 
and oil burning plants). Several alternatives were considered, including 
a complete moratorium on nuclear power. The costs of implementation for 
these more conservative actions (whose benefits could not be, or at least 
were not, quantitatively estimated) were essentially linearly proportional 
to the required degree of plant derating. Thus the "costs" of a morato­
rium were a factor of 10 greater than the highest costs of imposition of 
the AC. A more detailed discussion of the ECCS-EIS alternatives is pre­
sented in section 3.4.
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Whatever steps, or combinations thereof, are decided upon, it would 
seem desirable to give serious consideration to taking action that would 
essentially eliminate the ECCS problem as a public issue. Such a step 
could be as effective as those taken by the AEC in essentially eliminating 
the issue of radiation emissions from nuclear power plants under normal 
operating conditions. Faced with the alternative of continuing interven­
tion on this subject, and given the evident engineering capability to 
design the plants to meet more rigorous standards, the AEC took the posi­
tive step of recommending the imposition of "as low as practicable" 
standards upon the industry. Utilization of these standards results in 
radiation emissions from power plants under normal operating conditions 
being at least a factor of 10 lower than backgound radiation. As a 
result of the proposed radiation standards, the issue has practically 
disappeared as a cause for intervention in power plant licensing.
A similar step for the ECCS reliability issue would be very desirable, 
if it is possible. Perhaps the most obvious step to be taken in this 
direction would be ECCS redesign. As previously observed, increased re­
flooding rates of at least 6 in/sec would result in substantially improved 
LOCA response for both PWRs and BWRs. At reflooding rates of this magni­
tude, reactor damage would be minimized and the potential hazards of sub­
stantial radiation release to the public would appear to be essentially 
eliminated.
To achieve flooding rates of 6 in/sec in a PWR, or equivalently heat
2transfer coefficients of 40 B/hr-ft -°F or greater, would probably require 
redesign of the ECC fluid injection mode. Steam binding and other physi­
cal problems restrict current PWR designs to their current low predicted 
flooding rates. Though redesign may be expensive, it does not appear to 
be impossible and the resulting safety margins (with associated reduction 
in public risk) would appear to make the task cost effective. Even with 
the proposed design modifications, it is probable that a severe "design 
basis" LOCA would result in considerable damage to PWR reactor fuel rods,
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if all the more conservative values of the critical parameters discussed 
above were experienced at once (though the probability of all worst case 
events occurring during the same LOCA is remote - see figure A10.6 of 
appendix 10). Even if the peak temperatures of the excursion were limited 
to 2200°F, blowdown temperatures of 2000°F would induce fuel rod swelling 
and rupture "in abundance" (60, p. 1105). Release of the gaseous and vola­
tile fission products, normally contained within the gas gaps and rod 
plenums of the ruptured rods, to the reactor containment vessel would be 
expected. However, assuming adequate reflood rates, the LOCA scenario 
described does not lead to massive core melting, as envisioned in a "China 
syndrome" scenario. With adequate reflooding rates assured, it is not 
likely that damage to the containment structure would take place. Conse­
quently, it appears that resulting radiation hazards to the general public 
could be kept within currently permissable standards.
With respect to BWRs, as previously discussed, there do not appear 
to be the same physical limitations to increasing flood rates to accept­
able standards that trouble the PWRs (60, p. 1092). Simplistically speak­
ing, increasing reflood pumping capacity appears to be a satisfactory 
method of resolving the problem. Review of a high reflooding rate LOCA 
scenario, even with the additional conservatisms previously discussed, 
suggests that the BWRs would probably experience less damage than would 
be predicted for the PWRs. In fact, a reasonable probability exists that 
no fuel rod ruptures would occur during the LOCA, assuming the availabil­
ity of the increased reflood rates (4^  p. 20-19). If this were the case, 
reactor damage would be minimal; and the radiation hazard to the public 
would not be expected to exceed normal operational limits.
Consequently, performing ECCS redesign to achieve higher reflooding 
rates appears to have the same potential for eliminating the ECCS relia­
bility problem as an issue as adopting the "as low as practicable" radia­
tion emission standards did for the issue of normal operating radiation 
hazards. Taking action which would eliminate this restriction to develop­
ment of nuclear power seems very desirable.
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If this action is found to be unacceptable by the AEC or the vendors, 
it may be possible to quell the argument by imposing still more conserva­
tive design criteria (as compared to the AC), and to conduct accelerated 
research that would provide a quantitative basis for assessment of the 
margin of safety.
4.3.1 Increased criteria conservatism
As discussed in the body of the text and reviewed in detail in the 
relevant appendices, the following changes to the AC might be con­
sidered to increase its conservatism:
(1) Decay heat uncertainty limits increased to ANS Standard 5.1 
plus 30-35 percent.
(2) Permissible local clad oxidation limits for embrittlement 
lowered. An equivalent (Baker-Just) total oxidation of 
12-14 percent of the total cladding thickness should be 
considered as a limit to increase confidence in clad 
ductility following quench.
(3) The Critical Break Flow Model(s) should be specified.
More definitive specifications of acceptable low quality 
fluid break flow models should be provided to assure 
conservative treatment of potential metastable fluid 
flows in excess of those predicted by the Moody model.
(4) Minimum reflooding rates of 6 in/sec could be specified.
Reactor vendors could be required to demonstrate that
initial nominal reflood heat transfer coefficients of
2no less than 40 B/hr-ft -°F (or alternatively reflooding 
rates of no less than 6 in/sec) are attainable with 
their ECCS designs in the event of a double-ended pipe 
break DBA.
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4.3.2 Accelerated research and development programs*
(1) Programs for large scale system testing (e.g., LOFT) 
should be expanded and accelerated, and planning for 
near full-scale testing initiated. Current programs 
are too limited in scope and operating on too relaxed
a schedule for acceptability under current LWR licensing 
demands. Large scale programs should be tightly coupled 
with a complete analytical investigation of phenomena 
being studied, to assure an adequate basis for transfer 
of test results to revised design criteria.
(2) Fission product decay heat investigations should be 
conducted, including well correlated experimental and 
analytical studies of fuel rods with high integrated 
flux-time irradiation histories.
(3) Large scale critical break flow investigations should
be made of pipe flow under conditions simulating typical 
LWR-DBA characteristics including adequate linear dimen­
sions and time scaling.
(4) Additional FLECHT tests should be conducted. Tests with 
zircaloy clad rods at power levels associated with maxi­
mum peaking factors (in accordance with AC prescriptions) 
would be especially valuable.
(5) Determination of a statistically adequate probability 
distribution of reactor thermal response as a function 
of critical LOCA-ECCS parameters should be undertaken.
(6) Independent development of BWR-LOCA numerical analysis 
methods should be accelerated. A thorough cross-checking 
of existing BWR codes as systems, and in terms of appropri­
ate subroutines, should be initiated as soon as possible.
* An outline of current, world-wide LOCA-ECCS R & D programs (reproduced 
from 10) is given in appendix 4.
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4.3.3 Design concepts for improved LWR stability
During the IAC hearings, both Westinghouse and General Electric 
announced plans for revisions in their reactor core designs which would 
increase stability in the event of a LOCA. GE proposed a revised fuel 
bundle design as part of a larger BWR-6 system design revision. The new 
bundle incorporates more rods, each operating at lower linear power ratings, 
(64 rods vs 49, each operating at 13.4 Kw/ft vs. 18.5 Kw/ft for BWR-5) in 
a fuel bundle of the same basic size as previous designs.
In a similar move, Westinghouse proposed changing to a 17 x 17 rod 
array, designed to have the same overall dimensional envelope as their 
previous standard 15 x 15 array. The new fuel array "being offered for 
operation in 1976 or later," according to Westinghouse, is said to contain 
thinner fuel rods with thicker cladding. It is estimated that peak linear 
power density may be cut by some 20 percent by the new design.
The desirable result of such design changes are lower normal opera­
ting power (or heat) output per rod with a consequent reduction in indi­
vidual rod decay heat release at reactor shutdown. Thicker cladding for 
PWRs, bringing them more in line with current BWR design practice, also 
helps to reduce the probability of embrittlement for a given oxidation 
exposure cycle. Thus, greater stability is achieved by the design in the 
event of a reactor LOCA.
To insure greater stability in all operating reactors, it is recom­
mended that all LWR designs be investigated (including retrofits) for 
incorporation of such changes. Recommended, in the spirit of the GE and 
Westinghouse changes, are:
(1) Reduced linear fuel rod power ratings,
(2) Thicker rod cladding —  especially for PWRs, and addition­
ally:
(3) Pre-operational oxidation of fuel rod cladding,
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(4) Revised ECC fluid insertion methods to assure increased 
reflood rates of 6 in/sec, or more,
(5) Design changes to reduce the effect of steam binding 
in PWR primary loops on ECCS performance.
4.3.4 Increased public involvement in nuclear power risk-benefit 
evaluations
It has been fairly observed, that "nuclear power technology is now 
at a point of crisis" (39). In fact, as Green has stated further:
Given the present national obsession with environmental 
values, the rise of (the) public-interest lawyer, public skepti­
cism of authority, and the current judicial attitudes, nuclear 
power is locked in a death struggle which it cannot win, except 
in a Pyrrhic sense, under the present ground rules (39, p. 77).
Green's skepticism seems well founded, under the circumstances. The crisis 
appears to have developed on the basis of the public's perception of a 
breakdown in the AEC's "full, free, and frank discussion" of the hazards 
associated with nuclear power.
It is not the purpose of this paper to present, or defend, the causes 
of this perceived breakdown in the credibility of nuclear power informa­
tion dissemination. However, in the development of nuclear power, as in 
several other areas of environmental sensitivity, it appears to be highly 
beneficial for all parties concerned to increase public involvement and 
enhance participation in decision making processes as much as possible.
The concept of cooperative public/industry "open planning" of important 
utility decisions has been discussed at length in several EQL publications 
(e.g., Lees, et al., People, Power, and Pollution) (40). Demonstrated success 
has been shown in achieving goals of public benefit through operation of 
concepts involving substantial public participation in decision making 
such as "open planning."
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Again in the words of Green:
The starting point must be a policy of "full, free, frank 
discussion in public" of the benefits and risks of nuclear power.
The present policy of avoiding explicit discussion of risks so 
as to avoid "unduly alarming" the public should be abandoned.
The public should be told, as a matter of course and in language 
that can be readily understood, what the risks are, what has 
been done to minimize them and what risks nevertheless remain.
The public should also be told in accurate and realistic form 
what the benefits are.
I would like to see the nuclear safety community develop 
a forensic spirit. It is to everyone's advantage and in the 
public interest that opposition to nuclear power be channeled 
along constructive and responsible lines. I would hope that 
people working in nuclear safety would recognize a public re­
sponsibility to work with intervenors and other opponents of 
nuclear power— not to try to educate them as to the error of 
their ways, but rather to understand and accept their concerns 
as valid, and to help them articulate these concerns effect­
ively, accurately, and responsibly. This, I believe, would 
contribute more than anything else to strengthen and promote 
the vitality of nuclear power and enhance nuclear safety (39, 
pp. 77, 78).
It is of great importance that the opportunity for meaningful public 
involvement in nuclear power risk-benefit decisions be increased. To 
achieve such involvement would be mutually beneficial for all concerned 
in the development of nuclear power. Open planning may not represent an 
instant panacea for utility company problems. In fact, it may temporar­
ily appear to enhance problems. However, it is our belief that the 
American public, confronted with the decisions to be made and in posses­
sion, with understanding, of all the critical facts, will reach the right 
conclusions.
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Appendix 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF LIGHT WATER REACTOR AND EMERGENCY 
CORE COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION AND DESIGN
There are two basic types of light water reactors in common 
use in the United States today: pressurized water reactors (PWR) and 
boiling water reactors (BWR). Figures Al.l and A1.2 show, in schematic 
form, the elemental components of BWR and PWR power generating systems.
As indicated in the figures, the principal difference between the two 
reactor systems is related to the isolation of the radioactively 
contaminated working fluid of the reactor from the turbine-generator 
steam supply in the PWR. As shown for PWRs in figure A1.2, steam for 
the turbines is produced in a "steam generator" secondary heat exchange 
loop isolated from the reactor fluid. High pressure and temperature 
water circulates through the reactor core and steam generator primary 
loop, while relatively lower temperature and pressure steam, developed 
for the turbines, circulates in the isolated secondary loop of the 
steam generator.
Typical operating characteristics for PWRs and BWRs are shown 
in table Al.l. As indicated, in order for PWRs to operate with effi­
ciencies approximately equivalent to those of BWRs, it is necessary to 
operate with reactor pressures of approximately 2000 psi, nearly 
twice the typical 1000 psi BWR operating pressures. At these pressures, 
the water in the reactor portion of the PWR loop remains a liquid 
throughout the entire cycle. In the PWR, steam is generated only in 
the lower pressure (secondary) side of the steam generator loop to 
drive the turbine generators.
In a BWR, as indicated by its name, water passing through the 
core is boiled within the reactor core itself. Steam produced within 
the reactor is piped directly to the turbine without the added complexity
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Figure AI.2Schematic Idealization of Pressurized Wafer 
Reactor Power System Components
A l - 2
TABLE Al.l
Typical Operational Parameters for 1000 MW Light Water Reactorse
PARAMETERS
REACTOR
System Pressure (psi)
Inlet Temperature ( F)
Outlet Temperature
TURBINE
Inlet Pressure (psi^
Inlet Temperature ( F)
THERMAL POWER RATING (MW^
Electrical Power Output (MW^)
HEAT TRANSFER AT RATED POWER
2Active Surface Area (ft„)
Avg. Heat Flux (B/hr-ft )
Max Heat Flux (B/hr-ft )
Avg. Linear Heat Rate (KW/ft) 
Max. Linear Heat Rate (KW/ft)
INITIAL CORE LOADING
Initial Charge (Metric tons of 
uranium)
Assemblies/Oore
Rods/Assembly
ANNUAL DISCHARGE
Fuel (Metric Tons of Uranium)
Assemblies
Fuel Rods
FUEL RODS
Number
Outside Diam (in) 
Cladding Thickness (in) 
Fuel Pellet Diam (in) 
Diametral Gap (in) 
Active Length (in)
PWR BWR
2200 1000
550 420
600 550
800 1000
500 550
3400 3300
1100 1100
53,000 66,000
210,000 160,000
560,000 420,000
7 7
19 18
87 149
193 764
204 49
1/3 Core 1/4 Core
29 37
64 190
13,000 9,300
39,000 37,000
0.43 0.56
0.025 0.03
0.37 0.49
0.01 0.01
144 144
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of the intermediate heat transfer loop of the PWR steam generator.
In the event of a break in the BWR hot leg steam line outside the contain­
ment enclosure for the reactor, radioactively contaminated steam would 
be released to the biosphere. In the PWR, on the other hand, radio­
actively contaminated releases from a break in the reactor hot leg 
would be retained within the containment enclosure. In order to 
minimize radiation hazards to the public from external hot leg breaks, 
a critical BWR design feature is the main stream isolation valve which 
is provided to limit or prevent the escape of steam and radioactive 
trace elements from the reactor in the event of an accident.
More detailed (albeit still schematic) views of the nuclear 
steam supply systems for BWRs and PWRs are shown in figures A1.3 and 
A1.4. These figures show the elements of the emergency core cooling 
systems as well as a more accurate depiction of the working elements 
of the reactor and fluid flow portions of the cycle.
Al.1 BWR Steam Supply and ECCS Systems
In the BWR (figure A1.3) circulation of the water in the 
reactor vessel is maintained by 20 jet pumps located around the circum­
ference of the reactor core, as shown by the two typical pumps in the 
cross-sectional view. Water is boiled as it flows through the core 
and the wet steam is separated from the entrained water droplets by 
steam separators. Liquid from the steam separators and the baffled 
steam dryers is returned to the remainder of the water in the reactor, 
where, combined with make-up water and condensate feed water returning 
from the turbines, it is recirculated through the reactor core.
A break in the recirculation loop to the jet pumps has been 
calculated to be the accident placing the most serious demands on the 
ECCS for a BWR reactor. Consequently a break in these lines has been 
designated the DBA for the BWR. The resulting system depressurization 
(blowdown) and subsequent "dryout" prior to delivery of the emergency 
coolant is assumed to eliminate all of the water from the reactor
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SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF BWR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM SHOWING EMERGENCY CORE COOLING
COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) ELEMENTS
Figure A1.3 
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pressure vessel. Following blowdown, the emergency core coolant is 
delivered to the core through the circumferential ducts of the high 
and low pressure core spray spargers and the low pressure injection 
system, as shown. These three coolant injection sources are the 
principal means of supplying emergency coolant for the BWR-ECCS.
As water from the ECCS accumulates in the reactor core, 
levels as high as the tops of the jet pumps can be maintained for 
long term reactor cooling. Fluid lost from the recirculation loop 
break is collected in a fluid reservoir "pressure suppression chamber" 
within the containment vessel for the reactor. The pressure suppres­
sion chamber reservoir acts as a sink for condensation of steam from 
the break as well as a source for long term recirculation of coolant to 
maintain the core temperatures in a safe steady state condition.
Al.2 PWR Steam Supply and ECCS Systems
In the PWR, a break in the "cold leg" main inlet line from 
one of the steam generator loops has been calculated to produce the most 
severe fluid loss conditions for the reactor and is consequently used 
as the DBA. As indicated in figure A1.4, all primary system components 
and inlet and outlet pipes are located above the reactor core. This 
design increases the potential for emergency coolant to refill the 
reactor vessel above the core. Furthermore, penetrations in the vessel 
below the core are avoided in the design of PWRs in order to limit the 
possibility of breaks occurring in the vessel which could result in 
serious coolant losses.
Immediately following the LOCA the principal sources of coolant 
for the PWR-ECCS are the gas pressurized accumulators as shown in 
figure A1.4. An accumulator tank is provided for each of the steam 
generator loops for the reactor (from two to four individual loops 
depending upon manufacturer's designs). The accumulator tanks are 
typically designed to operate automatically, through check valves, when
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SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF PWR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM SHOWING EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) ELEMENTS
Figure A1.4
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the reactor pressure falls below 600 psi. Without losses, the tanks 
are designed to refill the core with borated water (to "poison" further 
nuclear reactions) to a level of one-half the length of the fuel rods, 
within one-half minute after a large pipe break.
The residual heat removal system of the ECCS for a PWR operates 
after the accumulator tanks have begun their delivery when the system 
is essentially depressurized. As indicated in figure A1.4, this part 
of the system supplies fluid from the refueling water supply and/or the 
containment sump through the low pressure injection system (LPIS) and 
high pressure injection system (HPIS) pumps. Pressure suppression 
chambers are not a characteristic of PWR design as they are for the BWR.
PWR fluid losses during blowdown following DBA are, however, collected 
in the containment vessel and recirculated from the sump heat exchanger 
system for long term, steady state cooling of the reactor following a 
LOCA. Thus steady state cooling methods are quite similar for both 
BWRs and PWRs.
The portion of the PWR primary steam system labelled "Pressurizer" 
in figure A1.4 is not an integral part of the ECCS. In a PWR, a single 
"Pressurizer" is provided for normal operating conditions to act as a 
fluid oscillation damping-energy absorbing reservoir, in order to compen­
sate for electrical load following demands on the steam generators 
which may require changes in the steam supply which would be too rapid 
for normal reactor load following capability. The fluid in the pres­
surizer is considered a part of the operating system, all of which is 
assumed to be lost during blowdown. Consequently no beneficial delivery 
from the pressurizer is assumed for the ECCS although, practically 
speaking, some benefit might be expected to be gained in an actual LOCA.
Al.3 Radioactivity*
The total amount of radioactivity in an operating nuclear power 
plant depends on the reactor's power level and time in operation. When a
* Abstracted from (1) pp. 4-6 to 4-8.
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light water nuclear plant (LWR) in the 1000 MWg size range is first 
placed into operation, for example, it is loaded with unirradiated, 
but naturally-radioactive uranium fuel (enriched to about 3 percent U-235) 
having an aggregate activity of about 150 curies in a typical PWR loading 
and about 300 curies in a BWR loading. (Table Al-1 lists some typical 
PWR and BWR fuel loading and discharge data for reference.) With nuclear 
operation at power, the quantity of radioactivity increases to the order 
of 1.7 x 10^ curies between refueling operations, which occur about once
a year (see table A1.0). Since only a fraction of the core is replaced
during refueling, a large inventory of radioactive material is retained
in the core after initial power operation. The quantity would be greater
or smaller for the same kind of plant with larger or smaller power level, 
respectively.
When the reactor is shut down, the generation of radioactivity 
ceases and the quantity of radioactivity in the spent fuel decreases, 
initially at a very rapid rate due mostly to the decay of short-lived 
fission products to longer-lived or non-radioactive nuclides. At the 
same time, substantial quantities of heat continue to be generated in 
the spent fuel due to the interaction of the intense radiation of the 
decaying radionuclides with atoms and molecules in the spent fuel and 
surrounding media. The amount of heat generated decreases with time 
as radioactive decay progresses; this heat is called "decay heat" (see 
appendix 5).
Table A1.2 provides some calculated values for the quantities 
of radioactivity and heat associated with the entire core of a 1100 MWg 
PWR after a sustained period of operation. The values indicate how 
these quantities would decrease with time after reactor shutdown. To a 
good approximation, these values would also apply to a comparable BWR 
core under the same circumstances. The values in table A1.2 are based 
on the assumption that the whole core loading of fuel is allowed to decay.
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Table A1.2
Calculated Radioactivity of 1100 MW£ PWR* at Shutdown and 
as a Function of Decay Time
Decay
Time
(days)
Radioactive (megacuries) Total
Thermal Power 
(kW)
Iodine and 
Bromine Isotopes
Noble
Gases
All Fission 
Products Actinides
Activation
Products Total
0 1,435 1,240 13,800 3,450 10.6 17,250 225,000
1 265 221 2,890 1,330 9.19 4,230 17,400
5 101 105 1,870 432 8.42 2,310 9,720
15 28.7 29.0 1,280 39.7 7.50 1,330 5,600
30 6.74 4.77 947 9.35 6.40 963 4,060
60 0.494 0.784 656 6.32 4.76 666 2,350
; 120 0.00282 0.659 401 5.90 2.76 410 1,740
; 210 0.00000309 0.648 244 5.56 1.36 250 1,100
365 0.00000218 0.630 146 5.17 0.614 152 659
1,097 0.00000218 0.553 47.3 4.45 0.324 52.0 204
3,653 0.00000218 0.353 17.9 3.27 0.132 21.3 67
Reactor is assumed to be shut down just before refueling after a sustained (293-day) period at a specific 
power of 37.5 MW/metric ton. The time average specific power over the previous 1100 days is 30 MW/metric 
ton. The reactor is fueled with 3.3% enriched uranium totaling 82 metric tons of enriched uranium fuel.
Actually, as shown in table Al.l, generally only one-third of the fuel 
in a PWR (one-fourth in a BWR) is removed and replaced with fresh fuel 
each year, so that most of the fuel remains in the reactor from three 
to four years.
The portion of irradiated fuel discharged annually from LWRs 
is stored in water pools in the reactor plants. These storage pools pro­
vide cooling for the decay heat and shielding for plant operators against 
the intense radiation of the spent fuel. After about 150 days storage, 
the radioactive rate of decay in the spent fuel has slowed considerably. 
By this time, many of the shorter-lived radionuclides have decayed to 
non-radioactive species and the continuing decay is paced by the longer- 
lived radionuclides in the fuel. Longer storage of 30 to 60 additional 
days does not result in substantial further reduction in total radio­
activity. Consequently, the spent fuel is loaded into heavily-shielded 
shipping casks for transfer to a fuel reprocessing plant after about a 
150 day cooling period.
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Appendix 2 GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF LOSS OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT FOR PWR’s AND BWR’s
The events and processes of an LOCA are developed to illustrate the system behavior and phenomena which must be 
accounted for by the calculational methods in order to prescribe the design and performance requirements for ECC systems.
PWR-LOCA BEHAVIOR
Figure B-l depicts the generalized LOCA behavior for a postulated large break in one loop of a multiloop PWR primary 
coolant circuit. This characterization o f the accident is derived from many calculations carried out for different pipe break 
locations for current PWR designs. The numbers on the figure are indexed to the following description of the course of the 
loss-of-coolant process.
Figure A2.1 Generalized Loss-of-Coolant Behavior fo r Large Pipe Breaks 1n a PWR.
A2-1
Immediately following the pipe break, as the primary coolant is expelled from the rupture, the system experiences a rapid 
subcoolcd depressurization (1) causing the flow within the reactor core to accelerate for an outlet break (2) or decelerate for an 
inlet break (3). As the system depressurization continues (4) the local fluid saturation pressure is reached and fluid flashing, with 
an attendant fluid density decrease, occurs in the core as steam bubble growth is initiated. Within the core region the decreasing 
fluid density (moderator loss) causes the core power generation to decline within a few hundred milliseconds to the fission product 
decay heat power level (approximately 6% of the operating power).
For the inlet break conditions the reduced core flow commensurate with coolant voiding in the core can cause a large abrupt 
decrease in heat transfer from the fuel to the coolant and initiate the critical heat flux (CHF), or departure from nucleate boiling 
(DNB) (5). For the outlet break condition the core flow increase (2) tends to offset the density decrease and high heat transfer is 
preserved for an extended period until the local fluid conditions within the core are degraded sufficiently that CHF (6) ultimately 
is reached. For cither break, the abrupt decrease in heat transfer (5) (6) allows the large amount of stored energy within the fuel to 
redistribute with a resultant rapid increase in fuel cladding temperatures (7 )  (0 ).
For the inlet break condition, at several seconds into the depressurization process the core mass flow rate (9) is significantly 
reduced because of nearly balanced fluid resistance paths to the break. For the outlet break condition, the fluid resistance to the 
break from the core region is markedly lower and results in a continued significant upward core flow (10). These differences in the 
core flow histories (9) (10) respectively influence the cladding temperature histories for the inlet and outlet break conditions.
As the stored thermal energy within the fuel becomes redistributed the cladding temperature rise may terminate or the 
temperature may decline slightly (11) (12) as the competitive effects of continued fission product decay heating and some limited 
amount of heat transfer exist for a few seconds. As the coolant conditions within the core continue to deteriorate the cladding 
temperature rises (13) (14) commensurate with adiabatic conditions dictated by the local fission product decay heat rate.
When the cladding temperature exceeds ~  1200°F for either break condition, structural distortion, such as ballooning of the 
cladding, may develop. Ballooning is postulated to result from a combination of the decreased strength of the cladding (as the 
temperature increases) and the increasing differential pressure between the internal fuel rod pressure and the decreasing external 
system pressure.
As the coolant is expelled into the containment structure surrounding the reactor, the primary system continues to 
depressurize with an accompanying decrease of liquid level within the reactor vessel (15). When the system pressure decreases ; 
below the gas dome pressure within the ECC accumulators (or core flooding tanks), relatively cold auxiliary coolant is injected 
into the appropriate inlet piping (or upper core barrel region) in an attempt to replenish the liquid inventory in the bottom plenum 
of the reactor vessel.
For an outlet break condition, soon after accumulator injection begins, the liquid inventory in the bottom plenum is 
replenished to the bottom of the core (16). Core flooding is maintained by the low pressure coolant injection systems when the 
accumulator inventory is spent.
For an inlet break, some backflow from the core and continued boiloff of the liquid in the lower plenum cause steam flow 
up the downcomer which tends to inhibit the entry of auxiliary coolant to the lower plenum. In addition, the steam flow in the 
inlet pipes of the unbroken loops tends to entrain some of the injected coolant and this entrained coolant is then carried around 
the downcomer annulus to the break. These conditions lead to the postulated “accumulator ECC bypass” situation. As 
decompression continues and the system steam flow rates decrease, the influence of gravity overcomes the entrainment forces and 
the lower plenum begins to fill (17).
As the lower plenum fills and coolant reaches the bottom of the core, steam begins to be generated. The steam, entraining 
some liquid, rises in the core and cools the cladding. For the inlet break, the steam must escape from the system by passing 
through the steam generators and pumps in order to reach the system vent, or pipe break (Figure A-l of Appendix A). The steam, 
in passing through the various system components and particularly the steam generator where additional energy is added from the 
secondary system, is impeded by friction. The frictional pressure drop can reach a value of several pounds per square inch causing a 
backpressure on the rcflooding process which competes against the head of water in the downcomer attempting to drive coolant 
into the core. The downcomer head in most current reactor designs can develop to a maximum head of ~7-l/2  psi if the flooding 
process is relatively steady-state. If oscillatory effects occur as a result of the coupling between the inertance and the force of 
gravity on the liquid in the downcomer and the coupling between the inertance of the liquid in the downcomer and the 
compliance of the compressible steam volume above the flooding front, the average driving head could be less than the steady-state 
driving head, thus lowering still further the time-averaged flooding rate within the core. The oscillatory flooding front could, 
however, provide improved heat transfer in the early part of the flooding process.
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The competing effects of the limited driving head for flooding and the backpressure from the exiting steam give rise to the 
postulated steam binding problem. The limited flooding rate for the inlet break, resulting from steam binding, causes decreased 
heat transfer in the core relative to that which would exist for higher flooding rates for an outlet break. Where these competing 
effects are involved for the inlet break, additional subtleties, such as the effects of containment backpressure on entrainment and 
on heat transfer and such as the compressible-flow acceleration-pressure drops due to energy being transferred from the secondary 
side of the steam generator to escaping steam from the primary system, become important.
The temperature that the fuel cladding can attain without loss of structural integrity is determined, for zirconium-clad fuels, 
by the amount of oxygen taken up by the cladding during metal-water reactions which become significant at temperatures above 
I800°F. At 1800°F the reaction rate is low but as the temperature increases to 2000°F and above, the reaction rate increases 
rapidly. At 2300°F, for example, the oxygen uptake is such that reaction durations exceeding several tens of seconds cause 
sufficient embrittlement that upon quenching of the fuel cladding by ECC, the structural integrity of the cladding is insufficient to 
assure a definable heat trangfer geom etry within the hotter regions o f  the core.
The foregoing, intended to depict the general system behavior during an LOCA for a PWR, has emphasized the DBA 
conditions which are expected to establish the ultimate requirements for ECC system design. The magnitude of the calculated 
effect of break size and location on the DBA is shown in Figure B-2. The calculations for developing the figure include those by 
the reactor manufacturers and those performed independently by Aerojet Nuclear Company in conjunction with the design and 
program planning for the Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT). Apparent from the figure is the dominant influence of the large inlet break in 
determining the requirements of ECC designs for PWR’s. However, the very largest break should not be concluded to be the most 
demanding on ECC design for all PWR’s.
BWR LOCA BEHAVIOR
Figure B-3 depicts the generalized loss-of-coolant accident behavior for a postulated break in either the liquid recirculation 
lines or the steam outlet lines of a contemporary boiling water reactor system. The numbers on the figures are indexed to the 
following description of the course of the loss-of-coolant process.
Immediately following a steam line or recirculation line break of a BWR the system experiences a very limited subcooled 
depressurization because a significant amount of the fluid in the system during operation is at saturation conditions, with the 
remainder being slightly subcooled. The loss of one recirculating loop causes the core mass flow to drop rapidly to about one-half 
the initial value (1) as the other systems continue to provide coolant supply to the lower plenum, since a large volume of the vessel 
contains steam, at the outset, the depressurization process is relatively slow (2), and at several seconds into the transient, the steam 
isolation valves in the outlet line close requiring that all system coolant exit from the pipe break region. Since the contemporary 
version of the BWR incorporates the internal jet pump design, all pipe breaks, including recirculation and steam line breaks, in 
general, produce the effect of an outlet break in a PWR; that is, the depressurizing coolant flows in the normal upward direction 
through the core as illustrated in the figure.
At the approximate time the liquid level within the reactor drops to an elevation at which the jet pumps become uncovered, 
the mechanical pumps in the recirculation line are coasting down and shortly cavitate dropping the core mass flow to nearly zero. 
These conditions promote coolant starvation within the reactor core and initiate CHF in the hotter regions of the core (3). As the 
liquid level in the outer annulus around the core barrel drops to the elevation of the recirculation line outlet, the flow out the 
break becomes steam and the depressurization rate is increased (4). Simultaneously, the saturation pressure of fluid in the lower 
plenum of the reactor vessel is reached and a process called lower plenum flashing is initiated (5). During this process the fluid 
tends to flash violently and surges into the core region. The potential for significant cooling exists such that the cladding 
temperature rise may be terminated (6) and the cladding temperature may be restored to the fluid saturation temperature. As the 
coolant inventory in the lower plenum is spent from flashing, the system pressure continues to decline and the cladding 
temperature again rises in the hotter zones of the core and experiences DNB a second time (7). The cladding temperature rises 
rapidly until the energy redistribution within the fuel pin is complete at which time decay heat limits the rate of the temperature 
rise (8). Shown in the figure for completeness is the continued temperature rise from the early event of CHF (3) on through to the 
temperature limit (9') assuming no cooling due to lower plenum flashing. As the system pressure continues to drop, a high pressure 
spray system above the reactor is initiated and top spray flow is developed at about 260 psia. The spray tends to wet the fuel 
canister walls providing a radiation sink for heat removal from the fuel pins. The resulting steam from canister wetting also 
provides some convective heat removal from the cladding surface. This cooling process tends to slow the heatup rate until the 
lower reactor vessel plenum is filled by the accumulated spray and LPCI system coolant inventories and a core reflooding process 
similar to that for the PWR is initiated.
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Figure A2.2 Generalized Comparison of Maximum Cladding Temperature for Various Primary System Pipe 
Break Conditions in a PWR.
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Figure A2.3 Generalized Loss-of-Coolant Behavior fo r Large Pipe Breaks in a BWR.
For the lower cladding temperature history (8), the cladding temperature turnaround (9) results from the initiation of 
flooding at the bottom of the core. For the upper cladding temperature history (8'), the effects of metal-water reaction energy are 
seen to cause a significantly increased rate of temperature rise prior to the event of flooding (9').
For the steam line break, the various events are depicted by dashed lines in Figure B-3. The pressure is seen to decrease 
considerably more rapidly (10) than for the recirculation line break. Since steam venting is taking place at a higher region of the 
reactor vessel the liquid fraction in the system remains high and all recirculation line systems continue to operate. Significant core 
flow is thus seen to continue (11); however, the flow eventually decreases as the pressure decay causes the recirculating mechanical 
pumps to cavitate. The flashing process continues to provide reasonable core flow and at least sufficient steam cooling to the core. 
The attendant cladding temperature indicates that nearly all the stored energy within the fuel is removed until, at the worst case, 
the coolant conditions can no longer support the heat transfer required to keep the cladding temperatures near the coolant 
saturation temperature (12). At this point the cladding temperature begins to rise as a result of the small amount of remaining 
stored energy and decay heat energy. Up to  this time most of the fluid lost from the system as a result of a steam line break has 
been steam and some two-phase mixture; that fraction of liquid having insufficient enthalpy to flash remains in the lower plenum. 
The additional inventory necessary to fill the lower plenum to the bottom of the core and effect early turnover of the cladding 
temperature rise (13) is, therefore, considerably less than for the recirculation line break. The general behavior of the fuel cladding, 
effect of metal-water reaction, and em b rittlem ent are suffic ien tly  similar to those o f  a PWR that additional discussion is 
unw arranted.
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Unlike the process for the PWR, the effect of steam binding does not appear to inhibit the rate of flooding because the steam 
need pass only through relatively small frictional pressure drop paths (Figure A-4 of Appendix A) on its way to the break.
Figure B-4 presents the calculated peak cladding temperature as a function of break area for steam line and recirculation line 
breaks for two separate single failure conditions in a contemporary BWRB-I. One case considers failure of the HPCS; the other 
considers failure of a diesel generator. These graphs are considered representative of a 6inglc-failure criterion approach to maximum 
cladding temperature and should not be considered to be restrictive in defining the capability of a system or combination of 
systems. As would be expected, a general trend toward higher peak cladding temperatures occurs as break areas increase. For the 
smallest breaks, no core heatup occurs. The exact shapes and magnitudes of the temperature curves for this type of representation 
depend to a large extent on such factors as the analytical techniques used in the calculations, assumptions on heat transfer 
correlations, and the particular single failure condition considered.
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Interim Policy Statement
T h e  A to m ic  E n e rg y  C o m m iss io n  h a s  
a d o p te d  th e  in te r im  s t a te m e n t  o f  p o lic y  
s e t  f o r th  below  p ro v id in g  in te r im  a c c e p t ­
a n c e  c r i t e r i a  fo r  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  
s y s te m s  fo r  l ig h t - w a te r  p o w e r  r e a c to r s .
I n te r im  A cceptance C riteria  for E m er­
gency  C ore C ooling  S yste m s  for
L ig h t -W ater P ow er  R eactors
i . CENERAL
T h e  A to m ic  E n e rg y  C o m m iss io n  h a s  
re c e n tly  b e e n  re e v a lu a t in g  th e  t h e o r e t ­
ic a l a n d  e x p e r im e n ta l  b a se s  fo r  p r e d ic t ­
in g  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  of e m e rg e n c y  c o re  
c o o lin g  sy s te m s . In c lu d in g  n e w  in f o r m a ­
t io n  o b ta in e d  f ro m  in d u s t r y  a n d  A EC 
re s e a r c h  p ro g ra m s  in  th is  fie ld . A s a  r e ­
s u l t  o f th is  r e e v a lu a t io n ,  th e  in te r im  
c r i t e r i a  o f s e c tio n  IV  of th is  p o lic y  s t a t e ­
m e n t  h a v e  b e e n  a d o p te d  by  th e  C o m m is ­
s io n  fo r  u se  in  t h e  lic e n s in g  o f  l ig h t - w a te r  
p o w e r  r e a c to r s .
II . BACKGROUND
P r o te c t io n  a g a in s t  a  h ig h ly  u n lik e ly  
lo s s -o f - c o o la n t  a c c id e n t  h a s  lo n g  b e e n  
a n  e s s e n t ia l  p a r t  o f  th e  d e f e n s e - in - d e p th  
c o n c e p t  u se d  b y  th e  n u c le a r  p o w e r  i n ­
d u s t r y  a n d  th e  A EC  to  a s s u re  th e  s a f e ty  
o f  n u c le a r  p o w e r p la n ts .  I n  th is  c o n c e p t,  
t h e  p r im a r y  a s s u ra n c e  o f s a f e ty  is  a c c i ­
d e n t  p r e v e n t io n  b y  c o r re c tly  d e s ig n in g , 
c o n s t ru c t in g ,  a n d  o p e ra t in g  th e  r e a c to r .  
E x te n s iv e  a n d  s y s te m a tic  q u a li ty  a s s u r ­
a n c e  p r a c t ic e s  a r e  re q u ire d  a n d  a p p lie d  
a t  ev e ry  s te p  to  a c h ie v e  th is  p r im a r y  a s ­
s u r a n c e  o f s a f e ty .  N e v e r th e le s s , d e v ia ­
t io n s  f ro m  e x p e c te d  b e h a v io r  n re  p o s tu ­
la te d  to  o c c u r , a n d  p ro te c tiv e  sy s te m s  a r e  
in s ta l le d  to  ta k e  c o r re c tiv e  a c t io n  a s  r e ­
q u ire d  in  s u c h  e v e n ts . N o tw i th s ta n d in g  
a ll  th is ,  th e  o c c u rre n c e  o f  s e r io u s  a c c i­
d e n ts  is  p o s tu la te d ,  in  s p i te  o f th e  f a c t  
t h a t  th e y  a r e  h ig h ly  u n lik e ly , a n d  e n g i­
n e e re d  s a f e ty  f e a tu r e s  a r e  in s ta l le d  to  
m it ig a te  th e  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  th e s e  u n ­
lik e ly  e v e n ts .  T h e  lo s s -o f -c o o la n t  a c c i­
d e n t  is  s u c h  a  p o s tu la te d  im p ro b a b le  
a c c id e n t ;  t h e  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  
s y s te m  is o n e  o f  th e  e n g in e e re d  s a f e ty  
f e a tu r e s  in s ta l le d  to  m it ig a te  i ts  
c o n se q u e n c e s .
E m e rg e n c y  c o re  co o lin g  sy s te m  d e s ig n  
c o n s id e ra tio n s  w ere  rev iew ed  in  a  19G7 
r e p o r t  to  th e  A EC  by  a n  a d  h o c  A d v iso ry  
T a s k  F o rc e  on P o w e r  R e a c to r  E m e rg e n c y  
C o re  C o o lin g . T h e  T a s k  F o rc e  re c o m ­
m e n d e d  that a d d it io n a l  assurance could 
and should be obtained that substantial 
fuel melting can be prevented by emer­
gency core cooling systems. Improve­
m e n ts  in  p r im a r y  s y s te m  in te g r i ty ,  d e v e l­
o p m e n t  o f  Im p ro v ed  a n a ly t ic a l  m e th o d s  
fo r  p r e d ic t in g  c o re  c o o lin g  p e r fo rm a n c e ,  
a n d  p e r fo rm a n c e  of c o n f i rm a to ry  e x p e r i ­
m e n ts  w e re  re c o m m e n d e d .
E x te n s iv e  d e s ig n , a n a ly s is ,  a n d  r e ­
s e a r c h  p ro g ra m s  w e re  in i t i a t e d  by  th e  
A E C  a n d  th e  n u c le a r  i n d u s t r y  in  th e s e  
a re a s ,  a n d  m u c h  n e w  in f o r m a t io n  h a s  
b e en  d e v e lo p ed . A d d it io n a lly , p r a c t ic e s  
in  th e  d e s ig n , m a n u f a c tu r e ,  in s ta l la t io n ,  
a n d  in s p e c t io n  o f  p o w e r  r e a c to r  p r im a r y  
sy s te m s  h a v e  b e e n  m a rk e d ly  im p ro v e d .
L a te r ,  in  19G9, a n  A E C  I n t e r n a l  S tu d y  
G ro u p  re c o m m e n d e d  g r e a te r  e m p h a s is  on  
q u a l i ty  a s s u ra n c e ,  a n d  c o n f irm e d  th e  use  
o f  p o s tu la te d  u n lik e ly  a c c id e n ts  ( s u c h  a s  
th e  lo s s -o f - c o o la n t  a c c id e n t )  a s  d e ­
s ig n  b a se s  fo r  r e a c to r  s a fe ty .
T h e  o n g o in g  in d u s t r y  a n d  A E C  p r o ­
g ra m s  h a v e  p ro d u c e d  a  la rg e  a m o u n t  o f  
i n f o r m a t io n  n o t  a v a i la b le  a t  t h e  t im e  of 
t h e  e a r l ie r  re v ie w s. T h is  n e w  in f o r m a t io n  
h a s  le d  to  c h a n g e s  in  th e  v a r io u s  e m e r ­
g e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  s y s te m  d e s ig n s  f o r  
p o w e r  r e a c to r s ,  a n d  a lso  in  t h e  a n a ly t ic a l  
m e th o d s  u se d  in  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  s y s te m  
p e r fo rm a n c e .  D e v e lo p m e n t by  th e  r e a c to r  
v e n d o rs , a n d  in d e p e n d e n t ly  by th e  A EC , 
o f  n e w  m e th o d s  o f a n a ly s is — c o m p u te r  
c o d e s— m o re  c o m p le x  a n d  s o p h is t ic a te d  
b y  f a r  t h a n  th o se  fo rm e r ly  in  u se , g av e  
n e w  in s ig h t  in to  th e  p ro c e sse s , a n d  p r o b -  ' 
lem s, in  p r e d ic t in g  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o l­
in g  s y s te m  p e r fo rm a n c e .
T h e  n u c le a r  in d u s t r y  a s  w ell a s  th e  
A E C  h a s  sp o n s o re d  a  g r e a t  d e a l o f c o n ­
f i r m a to ry  e x p e r im e n ta t io n  in  t h i s  field . 
B lo w d o w n  e x p e r im e n ts  p e r fo rm e d  o n  
n o n n u c le a r  s im p lif ie d  m o d e ls  o f  p r e s s u r ­
ize d  s y s te m s  w e re  u se d  to  c h e c k  a n d  c o r ­
r e c t  t h e  n e w  co d es . S o m e  o f  th e s e  
e x p e r im e n ts  in  th e  s m a ll  L O F T  S e m i­
sc a le  B lo w d o w n  S y s te m  a t  th e  N a t io n a l  
R e a c to r  T e s tin g  S ta t io n  in  Id a h o  sh o w e d  
d e v ia t io n s  f ro m  th e  p re d ic t io n s  o f  th e  
co d es  t h e n  in  u se . F o r  e x a m p le , th e  e m e r ­
g e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  w a te r  w as e je c te d  
f r o m  th e  sy s te m  d u r in g  th e  b lo w d o w n . 
A lth o u g h  th e r e  a rc  d if fe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  
th e  s m a ll  L O F T  S e m isc a le  e x p e r im e n ts  
a n d  la rg e  p o w e r  r e a c to r s ,  t ip s  e x p e r i ­
m e n ta l  r e s u l t  h a s  b e e n  ta k e n  in to  a c ­
c o u n t  w h e re  a p p lic a b le  in  th e  e v a lu a t io n  
m o d e ls  o f A p p e n d ix  A b y  in c lu d in g  th e  
c o n se rv a tiv e  a s s u m p tio n  t h a t  a ll  o f th e  
w a te r  in je c te d  by  th e  a c c u m u la to r s  d u r ­
in g  b lo w d o w n  is lo s t.
T h e  p ro c e ss  o f  co d e  d e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  
e x p e r im e n ta t io n  u s in g  m o d e ls  is  e x ­
p e c te d  to  c o n tin u e .  T h e  C o m m iss io n  
p la n s  to  p la c e  th e  n e c e s s a ry  a d d i t io n a l  
e m p h a s is  o n  s u c h  w o rk  in  C o m m iss io n  
p ro g ra m s  a n d  e x p e c ts  th e  n u c le a r  i n d u s ­
t r y  to  a c c e le ra te  i ts  e ffo rts .
I n  view  o f th e  la rg e  a m o u n t  o f n e w  
In fo rm a t io n  a v a ila b le , th e  A E C  h a s  
a g a in  c o n d u c te d  a rev iew  o f th e  p r e s e n t  
s t a t e  o f  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  s y s te m  
te c h n o lo g y , and has reevaluated th e  
basis previously used for accepting sys­
tem designs for current types of light- 
water reactors.
III. EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY CORE 
COOLING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
T h e  c o u rs e  o f  a  lo s s -o f - c o o la n t  a c c i­
d e n t ,  a n d  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  of th e  e m e r ­
g e n c y  c o re  co o lin g  sy s te m , a r e  e v a lu a te d  
w ith  a  se q u e n c e  o f c a lc u la t io n s .  F o r  c a l ­
c u la t io n ,  th e  s y s te m  is d iv id e d  in to  m a n y  
c o n tro l  v o lu m e s ( " n o d e s " ) .  E a c h  v o lu m e  
c o n ta in s  th e  h e a t  so u rc e s  a n d  s in k s  a p ­
p r o p r ia te  to  th e  c o m p o n e n t  b e in g  m o d ­
e led . D u r in g  th e  e n t i r e  c a lc u la t io n ,  
te m p e ra tu r e s  in  th e  c o re  a re  c a lc u la te d  
a s  f u n c t io n  o f  tim e . T h e  co o lin g  p ro c e sse s  
a r e  p r im a r y  c o o la n t  flow  d u r in g  b lo w ­
d o w n  a n d  flow  of e m e rg e n c y  c o re  co o lin g  
w a te r  a s  i t  b e co m es a v a ila b le .
Id e a lly , o n e  w ou ld  h a v e  a v a i la b le  a n ­
a ly t ic a l  m e th o d s  c a p a b le  o f  d e ta i le d  r e ­
a l is t ic  p r e d ic t io n  o f  a ll  p h e n o m e n a  
k n o w n  o r  suspecL ed  to  o c c u r  d u r in g  a  
lo s s -o f - c o o la n t  a c c id e n t ,  s u p p o r te d  in  
ev e ry  a s p e c t  by d e f in it iv e  e x p e r im e n ts  
d ire c tly  a p p lic a b le  to  th e  a c c id e n t .  I n  
th e  a b se n c e  o f  su c li  p e r fe c tio n ,  a d e q u a te  
a s s u ra n c e  o f s a f e ty  c a n  be o b ta in e d  f ro m  
a n  a p p r o p r ia te ly  c o n s e rv a t iv e  a n a ly s is  
b a se d  o n  a v a ila b le  e x p e r im e n ta l  in f o r ­
m a t io n .  In  a r e a s  o f  in c o m p le te  k n o w l­
ed g e, c o n s e rv a t iv e  a s s u m p t io n s  o r  
p ro c e d u re s  m u s t  be  a p p lie d .  W h e n  
f u r t h e r  e x p e r im e n ta l  I n f o r m a t io n  o r  im ­
p ro v e d  c a lc u la t io n a l  te c h n iq u e s  b eco m e  
a v a ila b le , th e  c o n s e rv a t is m s  p re s e n t ly  
im p o se d  w ill be  r e e v a lu a te d  a n d  a  m o re  
re a l is t ic  a p p ro a c l i  w ill be  ta k e n .
D e ta ile d  te c h n ic a l  re v ie w s  h a v e  b e e n  
p e r fo rm e d  by th e  A EC  o f th e  c o m p u te r  
co d es c u r r e n t ly  a v a ila b le  fo r  p r e d ic t in g  
e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  s y s te m  p e r f o r m ­
a n c e . T h e  A EC  h a s  d e v e lo p e d  s e ts  o f 
s u i ta b ly  c o n s e rv a t iv e  a s s u m p t io n s  a n d  
p ro c e d u re s  w h ic h  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  c o m ­
p u te r  co d es  c o m p r ise  th r e e  a p p r o p r ia te ly  
c o n s e rv a t iv e  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  to  u se  fo r  
e v a lu a t io n .  T h e  c o d es  u se d  in  o n e  o f 
th e s e  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  (d e s c r ib e d  in  
P a r t  I o f A p p e n d ix  A) a r e  a v a i la b le  f ro m  
th e  A EC . C o d es u se d  in  t h e  o th e r  tw o  
e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  (d e sc r ib e d  in  P a r t s  2 
a n d  3 o f  A p p e n d ix  A) c o n ta in  p r o p r ie ta r y  
m a te r ia l ,  f o r  w h ic h  s u m m a r ie s  a r e  o r  
so o n  w ill be p u b lic ly  a v a i la b le .  O th e r  
e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  a r e  u n d e r  re v ie w  by  
th e  AEC.
T h e  th r e e  a c c e p ta b le  e v a lu a t io n  m o d ­
e ls p re s e n t ly  in c lu d e d  in  A p p e n d ix  A a r e  
d if fe re n t  in  m a n y  re sp e c ts ,  a n d  th e  se ts  
of c o n se rv a tiv e  a s s u m p tio n s  a n d  p ro c e ­
d u re s  a lso  d if fe r  f ro m  o n e  a n o th e r .  T h e s e  
d if fe re n c e s  a r is e  f ro m  tw o  p r in c ip a l  
c a u se s :  (1) D iffe re n c e s  in  a p p r o a c h  a n d  
c a lc u la t io n a l  m e th o d s  o f th e  d if f e r e n t  
a n a ly se s , le a d in g  to  d if fe re n t  a r e a s  w h e re  
im p e r fe c t  k n o w le d g e  o r  a n a ly s is  re q u ire  
c o n se rv a tiv e  t r e a tm e n ts ,  a n d  (2 ) d if f e r ­
e n c e s  in  h a r d w a r e  a m o n g  th e  v a r io u s  
r e a c to r  d e s ig n s , s u c h  a s  s p r a y  vs. flood 
co o lin g  a n d  h o t  leg  vs. co ld  leg  vs. d i r e c t  
vesse l in je c tio n .
IV. INTERIM ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
T h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  e m e r ­
g e n cy  c o re  co o lin g  sy s te m s  h a v e  been 
d e v e lo p e d  in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  d e fe n se -  
i n - d e p th  c o n c e p t, w i th  th e  p r im a r y  a s -
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s u ra n c e  o f  s a f e ty  b e in g  a c c id e n t  p r e v e n ­
t io n . a c h ie v e d  by c o r re c t  d e s ig n , 
c o n s tru c t io n ,  a n d  o p e ra t io n  a n d  by  a d e ­
q u a te  q u a li ty  a s s u ra n c e .  T h e  lo s s -o f -  
c o o la n t  a c c id e n ts  p o s tu la te d  In  th e  c r i ­
te r ia  th u s  p re su p p o se  a  h ig h ly  u n l ik e ly  
e v e n t  as a  s t a r t i n g  p o in t.
T h e se  c r i t e r i a  a r e  a p p lic a b le  to  a ll 
l ig h t - w a te r  p o w e r r e a c to r s  e x c e p t  a s  
o th e rw is e  p ro v id ed . Im p ro v e m e n ts  a r e  
e x p e c te d  in  a n a ly t ic a l  te c h n iq u e s , a n d  
e x p e r im e n ta l  p ro g ra m s  a r e  e x p e c te d  to  
p ro v id e  in c re a s e d  a n d  im p ro v e d  k n o w l­
ed g e  a b o u t  E C C S  p e r fo rm a n c e .  O n  th e  
b a s is  o f su c h  im p ro v e m e n ts  in  t e c h ­
no lo g y . th e se  c r i t e r i a  w ill be m o d ifie d  
f ro m  tim e  to  tim e .
T iie  C o m m iss io n  be lieves t h a t  th e s e  
c r i t e r i a  fo r  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  s y s ­
te m s  p ro v id e  re a so n a b le  a s s u ra n c e  t h a t  
su c h  sy s te m s  w ill be e ffe c tiv e  in  th e  u n ­
lik e ly  e v e n t of a  lo s s -o f - c o o la n t  a c c id e n t.  
N e v e r th e le s s ,  in  c o n n e c tio n  w ith  w a te r  
p o w e r r e a c to r s  y e t  to  be  d e s ig n e d  a n d  
c o n s tru c te d  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f a c c o m p lis h ­
in g  by c h a n g e s  in  d e s ig n  f u r t h e r  im ­
p ro v e m e n ts  in  th e  c a p a b il i ty  o f e m e r ­
g en cy  co re  co o lin g  sy s te m s  sh o u ld  be 
c o n s id e re d .
A. C rite ria  lo r  a ll lig h t-w a te r pow er 
reactors. T h e s e  g e n e ra l  r e q u ire m e n ts  
h a v e  b e e n  th e  b a s is  o f A EC s a f e ty  r e ­
view  fo r  so m e  tim e . O n  th e  b a s is  o f  
to d a y 's  k n o w le d g e , th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  of 
th e  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  s y s te m  is 
ju d g e d  to  be a c c e p ta b le  if  th e  c a lc u ­
la te d  c o u rse  o f th e  lo s s -o f -c o o la n t  a c ­
c id e n t  ' is l im ite d  a s  fo llo w s:
1. T h e  c a lc u la te d  m a x im u m  fu e l e le ­
m e n t  c la d d in g  te m p e ra tu r e  does n o t  e x ­
ceed  2,300° F . T h is  l im it  h a s  b e e n  c h o se n  
on  th e  b a s is  o f  a v a ila b le  d a t a  o n  e m b r i t ­
t le m e n t  a n d  p o ss ib le  s u b s e q u e n t  s h a t t e r ­
in g  o f  th e  c la d d in g . T h e  r e s u l ts  o f  f u r ­
th e r  d e ta i le d  e x p e r im e n ts  c o u ld  be  th e  
b a s is  fo r  f u tu r e  re v is io n  o f th is  l im it.
2. T h e  a m o u n t  o f fu e l e le m e n t  c la d ­
d in g  t h a t  r e a c ts  c h e m ic a lly  w ith  w a te r  
o r  s te a m  does n o t  ex ce ed  1 p e r c e n t  o f 
th e  to ta l  a m o u n t  o f c la d d in g  in  th e  
r e a c to r .
3. T h e  c la d  te m p e ra tu r e  t r a n s ie n t  is  
t e r m in a te d  a t  a  t im e  w h e n  th e  c o re  
g e o m e try  is  s t i l l  a m e n a b le  to  c o o lin g , a n d  
b e fo re  th e  c la d d in g  is so  e m b r i t t le d  as 
to  fa il d u r in g  o r  a f t e r  q u e n c h in g .
4. T h e  c o re  t e m p e ra tu r e  is r e d u c e d  a n d  
d e c a y  h e a t  is  re m o v e d  fo r  a n  e x te n d e d  
p e r io d  o f tim e , a s  re q u ire d  by tire  lo n g -  
lived  ra d io a c t iv ity  r e m a in in g  in  th e  co re .
B. C riteria  lo r  specific reactors. E a c h  
r e a c to r  sh a l l  be  e v a lu a te d  In  a c c o rd ­
a n c e  w ith  th e  g e n e ra l  c r i t e r i a  o f  s e c tio n  
IV .A , a n d  u s in g  a  s u i ta b le  e v a lu a t io n  
m o d el. E x a m p le s  of a c c e p ta b le  e v a lu a t io n
1 A  loss-of-coolant accident is a postulated 
accident that results from the loss of reactor 
coolant at a rate in excess of tho capability 
of the reactor coolant m a k e u p  system from 
breaks In the reactor coolant pressure b o u n d ­
ary, u p  to and Including a break equivalent 
In size to the double-ended rupture of the 
largest pipe of the reactor coolant system.
m o d e ls  a re  d e sc rib e d  In  A p p e n d ix  A * 
T h e s e  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  a r e  a c c e p ta b le  
to  th e  C o m m iss io n  b u t  th e i r  u se  Ls n o t  
m a n d a to ry .  O th e r  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  m a y  
b e  p ro p o se d  by  a p p l ic a n ts  fo r  re v ie w  In  
in d v id u a l  c a ses .
C. A p p lica tio n  o l  c r ite r ia  to  rea c to r  
licen s ing— 1. A p p lica tio n  to  op era tin g  re ­
actors. (a )  F o r  e a c h  r e a c to r  h o ld in g  a n  
o p e ra t in g  lic e n se  o n  th e  e ffe c tiv e  d a te  o f 
th e s e  c r i t e r i a  a n d  n o t  c o v e re d  by p a r a ­
g r a p h  (b )  below , a n  a n a ly s is  o f th e  p e r ­
fo rm a n c e  o f  t ile  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  co o lin g  
s y s te m  p re s e n t ly  in s ta l le d ,  u s in g  m e th o d s  
e q u iv a le n t  to  th o se  in  A p p e n d ix  A, s h a l l  
be s u b m it te d  to  th e  A EC  a s  so o n  a s  p r a c ­
t ic a b le , b u t  n o t  l a t e r  t h a n  O c to b e r  1, 
1971. E a c h  s u c h  o p e ra t in g  r e a c to r  s h a l l  
b e  sh o w n  by  t h a t  d a te  to  be in  c o m p li­
a n c e  w ith  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f s e c tio n s  IV  A 
a n d  B.
(b )  F o r  r e a c to r s  g r a n te d  o p e r a t in g  l i ­
c e n s e s  o n  o r  b e fo re  J a n u a r y  1, 1968, c o m ­
p l ia n c e  w ith  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f  s e c tio n s  IV  
A a n d  B  w ill n o t  be  r e q u ire d  u n t i l  J u ly  1, 
1974. E a c h  s u c h  r e a c to r ,  to  th e  e x te n t  
t h a t  i t  is  n o t  in  c o m p lia n c e  w ith  th e  
c r i te r ia ,  s h a l l  be  s u b je c t  to  th e  fo llo w in g  
a d d i t io n a l  r e q u ir e m e n ts :
(1) A n  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  
th e  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  c o o lin g  s y s te m  p r e s ­
e n tly  in s ta l le d ,  u s in g  m e th o d s  e q u iv a le n t  
to  th o s e  in  A p p e n d ix  A, s h a l l  bo s u b ­
m it t e d  to  th e  A E C  a s  so o n  a s  p r a c t ic a b le ,  
b u t  in  n o  c a s e  l a t e r  t h a n  J a n u a r y  1, 1972,
12) A p ro g ra m  o f im p ro v e m e n ts ,  a n d  a  
s c h e d u le  fo r  e ffe c tin g  th e m  b e fo re  J u ly  1, 
1974, to g e th e r  w ith  s u p p o r t in g  a n a ly s is  
b a se d  o n  a n  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e l e q u iv a le n t  
to  th o se  in  A p p e n d ix  A, s h a l l  be  s u b ­
m it te d  to  th e  A EC  a s  so o n  a s  p r a c t ic a b le ,  
b u t  in  n o  e a se  l a t e r  t h a n  J u ly  1, 1972.
T h e  lic e n se e  s h a l l  m a k e , a s  so o n  a s  
p r a c t ic a b le ,  s u c h  in te r im  im p ro v e m e n ts  
in  o p e ra t in g  te c h n iq u e s  a s  a r e  p r a c t ic a l  
a n d  w o r th w h ile  in  Im p ro v in g  e m e rg e n c y  
c o re  co o lin g  sy s te m  p e r fo r m a n c e  o r  
r e l ia b i l i ty .
(3) A n a u g m e n te d  in se rv ic e  in s p e c t io n  
p ro g ra m  sh a l l  be  in a u g u r a te d  p ro m p tly  
c o v e r in g  th o se  p o r t io n s  o f th e  s y s te m  p ip ­
in g , p u m p s , a n d  v a lv e s  w i th  a  n o m in a l  
d ia m e te r  o f 4 In c h e s  o r  g r e a t e r  a n d  fo r  
w h o se  p o s tu la te d  f a i lu r e  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  
o f  th e  in s ta l le d  e m e rg e n c y  c o re  co o lin g  
sy s te m  w o u ld  n o t  be  in  c o m p lia n c e  w ith  
th e  c r i te r ia .  T h e  a u g m e n te d  p r o g ra m  
s h a l l  be b a se d  o n  th e  A m e r ic a n  S o c ie ty  
o f  M e c h n n ic a l  E n g in e e r s ’ B o ile r  a n d  
P re s s u re  V essel C ode, s e c tio n  X I , e x c e p t 
t h a t  th e  f re q u e n c y  o f  in s p e c t io n  sh a l l  be 
tr ip le d .
(4) E q u ip m e n t  s h a l l  be  in s ta l le d  a s  
so o n  a s  p r a c t ic a l  if n e e d e d  to  f a c i l i ta te -  
d e te c t io n  o f p r im a ry - s y s te m  le a k a g e  by 
a t  l e a s t  tw o  d if f e r e n t  m e th o d s . T h e  t e c h ­
n ic a l  sp e c if ic a tio n s  r e g a r d in g  a llo w a b le  
r a te s  o f  id e n tif ie d  a n d  u n id e n t i f ie d  l e a k ­
a g e  s h a l l  be re d u c e d  to  t h e  lo w e s t p r a c t i ­
c a l v a lu e s .
2. Variances, (a )  T h e  C o m m iss io n  m a y  
a u th o r iz e  v a r ia n c e s  f ro m  th e s e  c r i t e r i a
J Westinghouse Electric Corp. proposals for 
subatmospherlc a n d  Ice condenser contain­
ments, and proposals from T h e  Babcock and 
Wilcox Co. and Combustion Engineering, 
Inc., are under review by the AEC.
w h e re  t h e i r  a p p l ic a t io n  Is n o t  p ra c t ic a b le  
o r  fo r  o th e r  good  c au se .
ib> T h e  C o m m iss io n  m a y  a lso  a u th o r ­
ize v a r ia n c e s  f ro m  th e s e  c r i t e r i a  fo r  a  
l im ite d  p e r io d  of tim e  to  a llo w  c o m p le ­
t io n  o f  t e s t in g  p ro g ra m s .
(c ) T h e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f th e s e  c r i t e r i a  
is e x p e c te d  to  p e r m i t  n o rm a l  e le c tr ic a l  
p o w e r  o u tp u t  o f a ll. o r  a lm o s t  a ll, p o w e r 
r e a c to r s .  H o w ev e r, if a  l im i ta t io n  sh o u ld  
re s u l t ,  a n d  if  a n  u r g e n t  s h o r t - t e r m  n e e d  
fo r  a d d i t io n a l  p o w e r  o c c u rs  b e c a u se  of 
u n u s u a l  o r  p e a k  d e m a n d , o u ta g e  o f o th e r  
e q u ip m e n t,  o r  o th e r  s im ila r  r e a s o n s  th e  
C o m m iss io n  m a y  a u th o r iz e  fu ll p o w e r 
o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  r e a c to r  fo r  a  l im ite d  
p e r io d .
<d) A n y  v a r ia n c e  a u th o r iz e d  h e r e ­
u n d e r  s h a l l  be  b a se d  u p o n  a  d e te r m in a ­
t io n  o f  r e a s o n a b le  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  th e  
p ro p o se d  a c t io n  w ill n o t  a d v e rse ly  a f fe c t  
th e  h e a l t h  a n d  s a f e ty  o f th e  p u b lic .
A p f e n d i x  A — A c c e p t a d l e  E v a l u a t i o n  M o d e l s
I n c l u d i n g  T h e i r  C o n s e r v a t i v e  A s s u m p ­
t i o n s  a n d  P r o c e d u r e s
PAR T  1— AEC E V A L U A T IO N  M O D EL FOR PR ES­
SU RIZED - W A TE R  REACTORS
Analyses should be performed for the entire 
break spectrum, from 0.6 ft.a u p  to and In­
cluding the double-ended severance of the 
largest pipe of the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary. T h e  combination of systems used 
for analysis should bo derived from a failure 
m o d e  and effects analysis, using the single 
failure criterion.
T h e  following analytical techniques should 
be u sed:
1. Thcrmohydraullc calculation during 
b l o w d o w n — IN-1321. “R E L A P  3— A  C o mputer 
Program for Reactor B l o w d o w n  Analysis.” 
June 1970.
2. A  suitable refill and reflood calculation 
from the end of blo w d o w n  onward.
3. Fuel element heatup calculation— IN- 
1445 . “T H E T A  1 - B. A C o m p u t e r  Code for 
Nuclear Reactor Core Thermal Analysis," 
February 1971. Inputs from 1 and 2 will be 
used for this calculation.
T i e  user of these codes should assure h i m ­
self that he has reviewed available “updated 
m e m o s "  and ls using the correct versions and 
choice of options within the code.
T h e  following assumptions and procedures 
are to be used. A n y  assumptions not specified 
should be fully justified.
1. Core and System Nodlng.
a. R E L A P — at least 3 core nodes, at least 7 
nodes in the primary side of each steam gen­
erator model, and one containment node.
b. T H E T A — at least 4 radial fuel nodes and 
one radial cladding node; at least 7 axial 
fluid nodes.
2. P u m p  Model T h e  p u m p  resistance, K. 
used for analysis should be fully Justified. 
T h e  effect of p u m p  speed u pon K  should be 
considered. T h e  m ore conservative of two 
assumptions (locked or running) should be 
used for the p u m p  during the b lowdown 
calculation.
3. Break Characteristics— For large breaks 
In the range 0.6 to 1 times the total area of 
the double-ended break of the largest cold- 
leg pipe, two break models should be used. 
T h e  first model should be the doublc-cndctf 
severance (guillotine), which assumes that 
there Is break flow from both ends of the 
broken pipe, but no communication between 
the broken ends. T h e  second model should 
Resume discharge from a single node (split).
4. A  break discharge coefficient (Co) of 1 
should be used for all break sis&es.
5. Decay heat— T h e  decay heat curve de­
scribed In the proposed A N S  St&ndard, with
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ft 20 percent allowance for uncertainty, 
should be used. T h e  fraction of cl cony boat 
generated In tho hot rod should bo consid­
ered t-o be 100 percent of this value unless a  
smaller vnluo ls Justified.
0. T i m e  to departure from nucleate boil­
ing--use any calculated option In the code.
7 Heat transfer after departure from n u ­
cleate boiling —  xiso programed transition 
boiling correlation option.
8. Film boiling heat transfer— use Grocne- 
veld correlation (equation 5.7 of AECL-3281, 
December 1969).
9. Metal-worker reaction .rate— use tho 
Baker-Just equation, with a coefficient of 1.
10. Core flow— use 0.8 x R E L A P  smoothed 
flow at the Junction which Is entering core. 
If flows are opposed, use zero flow.
11 Enthalpy and pressure— -use entering 
p l e n u m  conditions.
12. Accumulator Bypass— For cold leg 
breaks, all of the water Injected by the ac­
cumulators prior to end-of-blowdown shall 
be assumed to be lost. In this context the 
end-of-blowdown shall be specified as the 
time at which zero break flow Is first 
computed.
13. Reflood— a calculation for the reflood­
ing heat transfer should be performed. T h e  
contaminant back pressure assumed for the 
analysis should not be higher than the Initial 
pre-break pressure plus 80 percent of the 
Increase in pressure calculated for the acci­
dent. T h e  following items should be con­
straints on the calculation:
a. N o  steam flow should be permitted In  
intact loops during the time period that ac­
cumulators are injecting.
b. Core exit quality should be calculated 
from entering mass flow rate and nominal 
F L E C H T  heat transfer.
c. P u m p  resistance. K , should be calcu­
lated on the basis of a locked rotor.
d. T h e  effects of the nitrogen gas in the 
accumulator, which Is discharged following 
accumulator water discharge, should be 
taken into account In calculating steam flow 
as a function of time.
e. T h e  pressure drop in the steam genera­
tor should be calculated with the exist­
ing fluid conditions and associated loss 
coefficients.
f. All efTects of cold Injection water, In 
cither a hot or cold leg. on steam flow (and 
A  P) should be included In the calculation.
g. T h e  heat transfer coefficient during re- 
flood should be derived from F L E C H T  data.
P A R T  2 —  C E N T R A L  ELECTR IC  E V A L U A T IO N  M ODEL
Analyses should be performed for the e n ­
tire break spectrum, up to and including a 
double-ended severance of the largest, pipe 
of the reactor collant pressure boundary. T h e  
combinations of systems used for analysis 
should bo derived from a failure m o d e  and 
efTects analysis, using the single failure cri­
terion as indicated In Table 2-1 of the topical 
report “Loss-of-Coolant Accident and E m e r ­
gency Core Cooling Models for General Elec­
tric Bolling Water Reactors," N E D O - 10329. 
T h o  analytical techniques described In  
N E D O - 10329 and Its supplement should be 
used with the following exceptions:
1. During the period of flow coastdown 
after the m i n i m u m  critical heat flux ratio ftt 
the hot spot ls less than one and until the 
top of the Jet p u m p s  uncover, the heat trans­
fer coefficient should be calculated using t h e  
D. C. Grocneveld correlation (AECL-3281, 
equation 6.7).
2. D u r in g  t h e  p e r io d  o f  lo w e r  p le n u m  f la s h ­
in g  u n t i l  t h e  c p ro  b e c o m e s  u n c o v e re d ,  t h e  
h e a t  t r a n s f e r  c o e ff ic ie n t s h o u ld  b e  c a lc u la te d  
u s in g  G r o e n e v e ld ’s  c o r r e l a t i o n  a s  I n  1 a b o v e .
3'. T h e  h e a t  t r a n s f e r  c o e ff ic ie n ts  a s s o c ia te d  
w i th  r a t e d  o o re  s p r a y  flow  s h o u ld  c o r r e s p o n d  
t o  t h o s e  d e r iv e d  f r o m  e x p e r im e n ta l  d a t a ,  a s ­
s u m i n g  tho cladding and channel box cmls- 
slvlty Is equal to 0.9.
4. It should bo assumed that channel wet­
ting docs not occur until 00 seconds following 
tho wetting tlmo calculated using the 
Y a m a n o u c h l  analysis.
6. A  rnngo of conservatively calculated 
peaking factors should be studied and the 
combination selected which results In the 
most severe thermal transient for the break 
spectrum and combinations of systems 
analyzed.
6. T h e  decay heat curve described In the 
proposed A N S  Standard, with a 20 percent 
allowance for uncertainty, should be used. 
T h e  fraction of decay heat generated in the 
hot rod should be considered to be 100 per­
cent of this value unlew a smaller value is 
Justified. T h e  effect of voids on reactivity 
during the bl o w d o w n  m a y  be taken into 
account.
PAR T  3 --- W E S T IN G H O U S E  E V A L U A T IO N  MODEL
Analyses should be performed for the e n ­
tire break spectrum, u p  to and Including 
the double-ended severance of the largest 
pipe of the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary. T h e  combination of systems used 
for analyses should be derived from a failure 
m o d e  and effects analysis, using the single- 
failure criterion.
T h e  analytical techniques to be used are 
described in the topical report, ‘ Westing- 
house P W R  Core Behavior Following a Loss- 
of-Coolant Accident” W C A P - 7 4 2 2 - L  J a n ­
uary 1970 (Proprietary), and a s u p plemen­
tary proprietary Westinghouse report, 
“Emergency Core Cooling Performance,” re­
ceived June 1, 1971, and in an appropriate 
nonproprietary report to be furnished by 
Westinghouse, with the following exceptions:
For breaks greater than 0.5 ft.7—
1. T h e  break discharge coefficient. ( C n ) ,  
used with the M o o d y  discharge flow model 
should be equal to 1 for ail break sizes.
2. T h e  decay heat curve described In the 
proposed A N S  Standard, with a 20 percent 
allowance for uncertainty, should be used. 
T h e  fraction of decay heat generated in the 
hot rod m a y  be considered to be 95 percent 
of this value.
3. For large breaks In the range 0.6 to 1 
times the total area of the double-ended 
break of the largest cold-leg pipe, two break 
models should be used. T h e  first model 
should be the double-ended severance (Guil­
lotine) , which assumes that there Is break 
flow from both ends of the broken pipe, but 
no communication between tho broken ends. 
T h e  second model should assume discharge 
from a single node (split).
4. T h e  time after the break for the onset of 
departure from nucleato boiling at the hot 
spot should bo equal to 0.1 second.
5. For cold leg breaks, all of the water In­
jected by the accumulators prior to end-of- 
b lowdown shall be assumed to be lost. In this 
context the end-of-blowdown shall be speci­
fied as the time at which zero break flow Is 
first computed. T h e  containment back pres­
sure assumed for the b l owdown analysis 
should not bo higher than the initial pre- 
break pressure plus 90 percent of the increase 
In pressure calculated for the accident under 
consideration.
6. T h e  p u m p  resistance. K, used for analy­
s is  s h o u ld  be f u l l y  Justified. T h e  effect o f  
p u m p  speed u p o n  K  s h o u ld  b e  considered. 
T h e  m o re  c o n s e r v a t iv e  o f  tw o  a s s u m p t i o n s  
( lo c k e d  o r  r u n n i n g )  s h o u ld  b e  u s e d  fo r  t h e  
p u m p  d u r i n g  t h e  b lo w d o w n  c a lc u la t io n .
7. A c a l c u l a t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e f lo o d in g  h e a t  
t r a n s f e r  s h o u ld  b e  p e r f o r m e d .  T h e  c o n t a i n ­
m e n t  b a c k  p r e s s u r e  a s s u m e d  f o r  t h e  a n a ly s is  
s h o u ld  n o t  b e  h ig h e r  t h a n  t h e  i n i t i a l  p r e -  
break p r e s s u r e  p lu s  80 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  In  e r e  ass
In pressure calculated for the aoddent under
consideration.
T h e  following Items should be constraints
o n  tho calculation:
a. N o  steam flow should be permitted In 
Intact looj>s during tlio time period that ac­
cumulators are Injecting.
b. Core exit quality should be calculated 
from entering mass flow rate a n d  nominal 
F L E C H T  heat transfer.
c. P u m p  resistance should be calculated 
on tho basis of a locked rotor.
d. T h o  effects of tho nitrogen gus in the 
accumulator, which is discharged following 
accumulator water discharge, should bo taken 
into account In calculating steam flow os a 
function of time.
c. T n e  pressure drop In the steam gen­
erator should be calculated with tho exist­
ing fluid conditions and associated loss co­
efficients.
f. All effects of cold Injection water. In 
either a hot or cold leg. on steam flow (and 
A P )  should bo Included In the calculation.
g. T h o  heat transfer coefficient during re- 
flood should be derived from F L E C H T  data.
I r .  v iew  o f t h e  p u b lic  h e a l th  a n d  s a f e ty  
c o n s id e ra t io n s  d isc u sse d  ab o v e , t h e  C o m ­
m is s io n  l ia s  fo u n d  t h a t  th e  In te r im  a c ­
c e p ta n c e  c r i t e i i a  c o n ta in e d  h e r e in  sh o u ld  
b e  p ro m u lg a te d  w i th o u t  d e la y , t h a t  n o ­
t ic e  o f p ro p o se d  is s u a n c e  a n d  p u b lic  p r o ­
c e d u re  th e r e o n  a r e  im p ra c t ic a b le ,  a n d  
t h a t  g o o d  c a u s e  e x is ts  fo r  m a k in g  th e  
s t a te m e n t  o f  p o lic y  e ffe c tiv e  u p o n  p u b l i ­
c a t io n  in  t h e  Federal R ecister. T h e  
C o m m iss io n  in v ite s  a ll  in te r e s te d  p e rso n s  
w h o  d e s ire  to  s u b m it  w r i t te n  c o m m e n ts  
o r  s u g g e s tio n s  fo r  c o n s id e ra t io n  in  c o n ­
n e c t io n  w ith  th e  s t a te m e n t  o f  p o lic y  to  
s e n d  th e m  to  th e  S e c r e ta r y  o f th e  C o m ­
m is s io n , U .S . A to m ic  E n e rg y  C o m m iss io n , 
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 20545, A t te n t io n :  
C h ie f ,  P u b l ic  P ro c e e d in g s  B r a n c h ,  w i th in  
60 d a y s  a f t e r  p u b l ic a tio n  o f  th is  n o t ic e  
in  t h e  Federal R ecister. C o p ies  o f  c o m ­
m e n ts  re c e iv e d  m a y  b e  e x a m in e d  a t  th e  
C o m m is s io n ’s P u b lic  D o c u m e n t  R o o m , 
1717 H  S t r e e t .  N W „ W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 
T h o  C o m m iss io n  w ill c o n s id e r  a ll  s u c h  
c o m m e n ts  a n d  su g g e s tio n s  w ith  t h e  v iew  
to  p o ss ib le  a m e n d m e n ts  a n d  w ill i s su e  a  
r e p o r t .  A d d it io n a lly , th e  C o m m iss io n  w ill 
c o n s id e r  h o ld in g  a n  in f o r m a l  p u b lic  r u le  
m a k in g  h e a r in g  o n  th i s  in te r im  p o lic y  
s ta te m e n t .
(See. 101, C8 Stat. 948, 80 Stat. 383 , 81 8tat. 
64; 42 U.S.C. 2201, 6 U.S.C. 652, 653)
D a te d  a t  W a s h in g to n ,  D .C ., t h i s  2 5 th  
d a y  o f  J u n e  1971.
F o r  th e  A to m ic  E n e rg y  C o m m iss io n .
W . B. M cC o o l ,
Secreta ry  o f th e  Com m ission .
[FR Doc.71-9185 Filed 6-28-71;8:62 am]
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COOLING SYSTEMS FOR LIGHT- 
WATER POWER REACTORS
Interim Acceptance
O n  J u n e  29, 1971, t h e  A to m ic  E n e rg y  
C o m m iss io n  p u b l is h e d  I ts  I n te r im  P o lic y  
S ta te m e n t .  " I n te r im  A c c e p ta n c e  C r i te r ia  
fo r  E m e rg e n c y  C o re  C o o lin g  S y s te m s  fo r  
L ig h t - W a te r  P o w e r  R e a c to r s . ’’ (36  F .R . 
12247.) T h e  S t a te m e n t  In c lu d e d , a s  A p ­
p e n d ix  A, P a r t s  1 -3 , a c c e p ta b le  e v a lu a ­
t io n  m o d e ls , In c lu d in g  c o n s e rv a t iv e  a s ­
su m p tio n s  a n d  p ro c e d u re s . S in c e  that 
t im e , p ro p o s a ls  f o r  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  
m a d e  by The Babcock and W ilc o x  Co.
a n d  b y  C o m b u s tio n  E n g in e e r in g ,  In c .,  
h a v e  b e e n  re v ie w e d  b y  t h e  C o m m iss io n , 
t o g e th e r  w i th  t h e  c o n s e rv a t iv e  a s s u m p ­
t io n s  a n d  p ro c e d u re s  a p p r o p r ia te  to  e a c h  
m o d e l. T h e  a m e n d m e n ts  to  t h e  I n t e r im  
A c c e p ta n c e  C r i te r ia  w h ic h  fo llo w  a d d  
th e s e  a c c e p ta b le  n e w  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  
a s  P a r t s  4 a n d  5 o f  A p p e n d ix  A. C o n ­
f o rm in g  a m e n d m e n ts  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  
in  t h e  b o d y  o f  t h e  I n t e r im  A c c e p ta n c e  
C r i te r ia .
1. T h e  t h i r d  a n d  f o u r th  p a r a g r a p h s  o f  
s e c tio n  I I I  a r e  a m e n d e d  to  r e a d  a s  
fo llo w s:
I I I . EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY CORE COOL­
ING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
© 6 * *  e
D e ta i le d  te c h n ic a l  re v ie w s  h a v e  b e e n  
p e r fo rm e d  b y  th e  A EC  o f t h e  c o m p u te r  
c o d es  c u r r e n t ly  a v a ila b le  f o r  p r e d ic t in g  
e m e rg e n c y  c o re  co o lin g  s y s te m  p e r fo r m ­
a n c e . T h e  A EC  h a s  d e v e lo p e d  se ts  o f 
s u i ta b ly  c o n se rv a tiv e  a s s u m p tio n s  a n d  
p ro c e d u re s  w lilc h  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  c o m ­
p u te r  co d es  c o m p rise  five a p p r o p r ia te ly  
c o n s e rv a t iv e  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  to  u se  
fo r  e v a lu a t io n .  T h e  co d es  u se d  in  o n e  
o f th e s e  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  (d e sc r ib e d  in  
P a r t  1 o f A p p e n d ix  A) a r e  a v a ila b le  f ro m  
th e  A EC . C odes u se d  in  th e  o th e r  fo u r  
e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  (d e sc r ib e d  in  P a r t s  
2 -5  o f A p p e n d ix  A) c o n ta in  p r o p r ie ta r y  
m a te r ia l ,  f o r  w h ic h  s u m m a r ie s  a r e  o r  
so o n  w ill be  p u b lic ly  a v a ila b le . O th e r  
e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  a r e  u n d e r  re v ie w  by 
th e  AEC.
T h e  five a c c e p ta b le  e v a lu a t io n  m o d e ls  
p r e s e n t ly  in c lu d e d  in  A p p e n d ix  A a re  
d if f e r e n t  in  m a n y  re sp e c ts ,  a n d  th e  se ts  
o f  c o n s e rv a t iv e  a s s u m p tio n s  a n d  p ro c e ­
d u re s  a lso  d if fe r  f ro m  o n e  a n o th e r .  T h e se  
d if fe re n c e s  a r is e  f ro m  tw o  p r in c ip a l  
c a u s e s :  (1) D iffe re n c e s  in  a p p r o a c h  a n d  
c a lc u la t io n a l  m e th o d s  o f t h e  d if fe re n t  
a n a ly se s , le a d in g  to  d if fe re n t  a r e a s  w h e re  
im p e r f e c t  k n o w le d g e  o r  a n a ly s is  r e q u ire  
c o n s e rv a t iv e  t r e a tm e n ts ,  a n d  (2) d if f e r ­
e n c e s  in  h a r d w a r e  a m o n g  th e  v a r io u s  r e ­
a c to r  d e s ig n s , s u c h  a s  s p r a y  vs. flood  
c o o lin g  a n d  h o t  leg  vs. c o ld  leg  vs. d i r e c t  
v esse l in je c tio n .
2. N ew  P a r t s  4 a n d  5 a r e  a d d e d  to  A p ­
p e n d ix  A to  r e a d  a s  fo llo w s:
A p p e n d i x  A — A c c e p t a b l e  E v a l u a t i o n  M o d e l s
I n c l u d i n g  T h e i r  C o n s e r v a t i v e  A s s u m p ­
t i o n s  a n d  P r o c e d u r e s
© O O 0 ©
P A R T  4— BABCOCK AN D  W ILC O X  E V A L U A T IO N  
M O D E L 8
Analyses should be performed for the en­
tire break spectrum, from 0.6 ft.a, u p  to and 
Including the double-ended severance of the 
largest pipe of the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary. T h o  combination of systems used 
for analyses should bo derived from a failure 
m o d o  and effects analysis, using the single 
failure criterion.
T h e  analytical techniques to be used, with 
the assumptions and procedures described In 
II 1.1-2.6, are those described in the follow­
ing topical reports:
1. " C R A F T — Description of Model for 
Equilibrium L O C A  Analysis Program"— R e ­
port BAW-10030. October 1971.
2. " R E F L O O D — Description of Model for
• This evaluation model applies to reactors 
containing internal vent valves.
Multinode Coro Reflood A n a ly s is "— Report 
BAW-10031, October 1971.
3. " T H E T A  1-B, A  C o m p u t e r  Code for 
Nuclear Reactor Core Thermal Analysis," 
Idaho Nuclear Corporation Report IN-1446, 
February 1971.
4. "Multlnode Analysis of B & W ’a 2568 
M W t  Nuclear Plants During A  Loss-of-Cool- 
ant Accident”— Report BAW-10034, October 
1971.
B l o w d o w n  P e r i o d
1.1 C o r e  a n d  S y s t e m  N o d i n g .
1.1.1 C R A F T — At least three core nodes 
should be used, and at least four steam gen­
erator nodes (primary side) should be used. 
A  containment node should be used.
1.1.2 T H E T A  1-B— At least six radial fuel 
nodes and t w o  radial clad nodes, In conjunc­
tion with at least 10 axial fuel nodes, should 
be used.
1.2 P u m p  M o d e l .
T h e  p u m p  characteristics, including the 
effect of p u m p  speed, for analyses should be 
fully Justified. T h e  m ore conservative of two 
assumptions (locked or running) should be 
used for the p u m p  during the bl o w d o w n  
calculation.
1.3 B r e a k  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
For large breaks In the range of 0.6-1.0 
times the total area of the double-ended 
break of the largest cold-leg pipe, t w o  break 
models should be used. T h e  first model should 
be the double-ended severance (guillotine) 
which assumes that there ls break flow from 
both ends of the broken pipe, but no c o m ­
munication between the broken ends. T h e  
second model should assume discharge from 
a single node (split).
1.4 D i s c h a r g e  C o e f f i c i e n t .
A  break discharge coefficient C d — 1.0 should 
be used for all break sizes.
1.5 D e c a y  H e a t .
T h o  decay heat curve described In the 
proposed A N S  standard,4 Increased by a 4-20 
percent allowance for uncertainty, should be 
used. T h e  fraction of decay heat generated 
in the hot rod m a y  be considered to be 0.96 
times this value.
1.6 T i m e  t o  D e p a r t u r e  f r o m  N u c l e a t e  B o i l ­
i n g  ( D N B ) .
T h e  time to D N B  should be calculated U6lng 
any one of the p r o g r a m m e d  options of the 
T H E T A  1-B code.
1.7 F i l m  B o i l i n g  H e a t  T r a n s f e r .
T h e  Groeneveld correlation (equation 6.7 
of AECL-3281, D ecember 1969) should be 
used in the T H E T A  1-B code for tho film- 
boll lng heat transfer regime.
1.8 M e t a l - W a t e r  R e a c t i o n  R a t e .
T h e  metal-water reaction rates should be 
calculated using tho Baker-Just equation 
with a coefficient of 1.0.
1.9 C o r e  F l o w  R a t e .
T h e  smoothed coro flow rate at the hot 
spot location, derived from the C R A F T  code 
e n d  multiplied by 0.8, should be used as 
Input to the T H E T A  1-B fuel rod heatup
calculation.
1.10 E n t h a l p y  a n d  P r e s s u r e .
T h e  coro pressure a n d  the entering p l e n u m  
enthalpy, derived from the C R A F T  ©ode, 
should bo used as Input to tho T H E T A  1-B 
calculations.
1.11 C o r e  F l o o d i n g  T a n k  B ypass .
For oold leg breaks, all of the water in­
jected by the core flooding tanks prior to the
8 "Energy Release Rates Following S h u t ­
d o w n  of Uranium-Fuel Thermal Reactors," 
Subcommittee ANS-5, American Nuclear 
Society, October 1971. Copies m a y  be obtained 
from Dr. M. E. Rcmlcy, Chairman, S u b c o m ­
mittee ANS-5, Atomics International, Post 
Office B o x  309, Canoga Park, C A  91305. Copies 
are available for publlo Inspection at th® 
Commission’s Publlo D o c u m e n t  R o o m ,  1717 H  
Street N W „  Washington, DO.
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cnd-of-blowdown Ghoul d bo assumed to b® 
lost. In this context tho end-of-blowdown 
should bo considered to bo tho time at which 
aero break flow la first computed.
R e f l o o d  P e r i o d
? 1 H i e  core reflood performance should bo 
calculated using tho R E F L O O D  codo 
de-crlbcd In D A W - 10031.
2.2 A n  adiabatic heatup of tho core should 
I'o a.uumxl from Uie time of cnd-of-blow- 
d o w u  until the emorcrncy core cooling fluid 
reaches the botl-om of t he core.
2.3 For tho reflood calculation, tho con­
tainment pressure should not exceed tho 
Initial prebrenk pressure plus 80 percent of 
tho lnctvaso In pressure calculated by tho 
methods used for containment design for tho 
iuv.de: it under consideration.
2.4 'Hie n e a m  flow rate from tho coro, as 
It a fleets the R e  flood pressure-drop calcula­
tions, should be calculated o n  tho basis of 
ooro heat transfer coefficients that aro equal 
to or greater than FI cell t heat transfer co­
efficients. T h o  Internals vent valves should be 
tho only flow path from the upper plenum.
2.6 T h o  fuel rod temperature transients 
should bo calculated on the basis of heat 
transfer coefficients derived from flecht.
T A R T  6----C O M B U S T IO N  E N G IN E E R IN G
E V A L U A T IO N  M O D EL
Analyses should be performed for the e n ­
tire break spectrum, from 0.6 ft.*, u p  to and 
lnoludlng tho double-onded severance of tho 
largest pipe of tho reactor coolant pressure 
boundary. T h o  combination of systems used 
for analyses should be derived from a failure 
m o d e  and effects analysis, using the-single 
failure criterion.
T h e  analytical techniques to be used, with 
the assumptions and procedures described In 
§§ 1.1-2.6, are those described In tho following 
topical reports. Suitable nonproprlctary re­
ports arc to be submitted.
1. '‘Description of Loss-of-Coolant Calcu­
lational Procedures,” CENPD-2G, Proprietary 
Combustion Engineering Report, August, 
1971.
2. "Description of Loss-of-Coolant Calcula­
tional Procedures,” Proprietary Combustion - 
Engineering Report, Supplement 1 to C E N -  
PD-26, October, 1971.
3. "Steam Venting Experiments and TheLr 
Application to C E  Evaluation Model," Pro­
prietary Combustion Engineering Report, 
Supplement 2 to C E N PD-20, November, 1971.
4. "Moisture Carry-over During P W R  Post- 
L O C A  Core Refill,” Informal proprietary C o m ­
bustion Engineering submittal, November, 
1971.
B l o w d o w n  Period
1.1 D i s c h a r g e  C o e f f i c i e n t .
T h e  break discharge coefficient, (C d ) used 
with the M o o d y  discharge flow model should 
be equal to 1.0 for all break sizes.
1.2 D e c a y  H e a t .
T h o  decay heat curve described in tho pro­
posed A N S  Standard.4 Increased by a + 2 0  per­
cent nllownnco for uncertainty, should bo 
used. T h o  fraction of decay heat generated 
In the hot rod m a y  bo considered to be 0.94 , 
times this value unless a smaller value 1a 
Justified.
1.3 B r e a k  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
For largo breaks In tho rango 0.6 to 1.0 
times tho total area of tho double-ended 
break of tho largest cold-leg pipe, two break 
models should be ur.cd. T h o  first m o d d  
should bo the double-ended severance (guil­
lotine), which assumes that there la break 
flow from both ends of the broken pipe, but 
no communication between the broken enda. 
T h e  second model should assume discharge 
from a single node (split).
1.4 Safety Injection Tank Bypass.
F o r  c o ld  le g  b r e a k s ,  a l l  o f  t h e  w a te r  I n ­
je c te d  by t h e  s a f e ty  I n j e c t i o n  tanks prior to 
e n d - o f - b lo w d o w n  S h o u ld  b e  a s s u m e d  to be* flee footnote <m page 34082.
lost. In this context the cnd-of-blowdown 
should be considered to be tho time at which 
zero break flow Is first computed.
1.6 P u m p  M o d e l .
T h e  p u m p  characteristics. Including the 
effect of p u m p  speed, for analyses should be 
fully Justified. T h e  more conservative of two 
assumptions (locked or running) should be 
used for the p u m p  during tho blowdown 
calculation.
R e f l o o d  P e r i o d
2.1 T h e  reflood sequence of events should 
be calculated using the analytical methods 
described In C E N P D - 2 0  and its supplements. 
T h e  containment back pressure assumed for 
the analysis should not bo higher than tho 
Initial prebrenk pressure plus 00 percent of 
the Increase In pressure calculated by tho 
methods used for containment design for the 
accident under consideration.
2.2 All effects of cold Injection water. In 
cither a hot or cold log, on steam flow (and 
AP) should be included In the calculation. 
T h e  steam flow In Intact loops during the 
time period that tho safety Injection tanks 
are Injecting should bo calculated aa de­
scribed In Supplement 2 of CENPD-20. The 
steam flow rate from the core as it afTccto 
the pressure-drop calculations should be cal­
culated on tho basis of coro heat transfer 
coefficients that are equal to or greater than 
F L E C H T  heat transfer coefficients.
2.3 P u m p  roslstance, K, should be calcu­
lated on tho basis of a locked rotor.
2.4 T h o  effects of tho nitrogen gas In the 
safety Injection tank which is discharged fol­
lowing water discharge, should bo taken into 
account in calculating steam flow as a func­
tion of time.
2.5 T h e  pressure drop in tho steam genera­
tor should be calculated with the existing 
fluid conditions and associated loss coeffi­
cients.
2.6 T h e  heat transfer coefficient for the fuel 
rod temperature calculations during reflood 
should be derived from F L E C H T  data.
I n  v iew  o f th e  n e c e ss ity , f ro m  th e  s t a n d ­
p o in t  o f  p u b l ic  h e a l th  a n d  s a fe ty  o f  p r o ­
v id in g  in te r im  c r i t e r i a  f o r  e m e rg e n c y  
c o re  c o o lin g  sy s te m s  a p p lic a b le  to  a ll  
n u c le a r  p o w e r r e a c to r s ,  t h e  C o m m iss io n  
h a s  fo u n d  t h a t  th e  a m e n d m e n ts  c o n ­
ta in e d  h e r e in  sh o u ld  b e  p ro m u lg a te d  
w i th o u t  d e la y , t h a t  n o t ic e  o f p ro p o se d  i s ­
s u a n c e  a n d  p r io r  p u b lic  p ro c e d u re  a r e  
Im p ra c tic a b le ,  a n d  t h a t  good  c a u se  e x is ts  
f o r  m a k in g  t h e  a m e n d m e n ts  e ffe c tiv e  
u p o n  p u b l ic a tio n  in  t h e  Federal R ecis­
ter. T h e  C o m m iss io n  h a s  Issu ed  a  n o t ic e  
sc h e d u lin g  a  p u b lic  r u le  m a k in g  h e a r in g  
o n  th e  I n te r im  A c c e p ta n c e  C r i te r ia  f o r  
E m e rg e n c y  C o re  C o o lin g  S y s te m s  fo r  
L ig h t  W a te r  C o o led  N u c le a r  P o w e r  R e ­
a c to r s  (36 F .R . 22774). T h e  a m e n d m e n ts  
h e r e in  w ill be  c o n s id e re d  a t  t h a t  h e a r in g .  
I n te r e s te d  p e rso n s  d e s ir in g  to  p a r t i c ip a te  
In  t h a t  h e a r in g  sh o u ld  r e f e r  to  t h a t  
n o t ic e  fo r  t h e  p ro c e d u re s  a v a ila b le . I n ­
te r e s te d  p e rso n s  w h o  d e s ire  to  s u b m it  
w r i t te n  c o m m e n ts  o r  su g g e s tio n s  fo r  c o n ­
s id e r a t io n  in  c o n n e c tio n  w ith  th e  
a m e n d m e n ts  sh o u ld  s e n d  th e m  to  th e  
S e c r e ta r y  o f  th e  C o m m iss io n , U .S . 
A to m ic  E n e rg y  C o m m iss io n , W a s h in g to n ,
D.C. 20545, Attention Chief, Public Pro­
ceedings B ra n c h ,  w i th in  30 days after 
p u b l ic a tio n  of this notice In the F ederal 
R eg ister . Copies of comments received 
may be examined at the Commission's 
Public Document Room, 1717 H  Street 
N W , Washington, DC.
(Beo. 191, 68 8 t*t, 948, 80 Stat. 883, 81 Stat. 
64; «S Uh.O. 2301, 3 U.S.O. 668, 868)"  FSDSRAL REOISTER, VOL. $&, NO. 344— SATURDAY, DECEMBER
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Dated at Germantown, Md., this 16th 
day of December 1971.
For tho Atomic Energy Commission.
F . T . Honns.
A ctin g  S ecre ta ry  o f  th e  C om m ission . (F R  Doc.71-10045 riled  12-17-71:10:28 am]
I t ,  1971
Revised ECCS Acceptance Criteria
APPEN D IX
On November 50, 1971. lire Alomie Energy Commission published in lire l-eilerul Register 
(3b i . R .  2277-1) ;i notice scheduling a legislative-type public rule making hearing on January 27. 1972, 
helote a hear ing hoanl consisting of N.itItaniel II. ( loorlrielt. Esq . ( hairm.in. Or. I awrenee R. Quarles, and 
Dr. John 11. Buck, concerning ils interim statement ol policy establishing acceptance criteria for emergency 
core cooling systems for light water-cooled nuclear power reactors, published June 2l), 1971
(Ms i . R .  122-17). Amendments to the interim criteria were published in the i'edeivl Register on 
December IX. I ‘) 7 1 (2b i . R .  24082) in a notice that staled that the amendments would also be considered 
at the rule making hearing.
Participation in the rule making hearing was extensive. I he primary participants included the 
Commission Regulatory Staff, four reactor manufacturers, a consolidated group ol electric utility 
companies, and the Consolidated National Intervenors (C NI). a group of about b0 organizations and
individuals. In addition, three states, the Lloyd Harbor Study Group, and several in di vidua ls participated to 
a lesser degree. The hearings lasted a total of I 25 days and generated a record of more than 22,000 pages of 
transcript and thousands of pages of written direct testimony and exhibits. Oral argument from the seven 
principal participants was heard by the Commission on October 9, 1973.
In implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, (ILL. 91-190), a Draft 
Environmental Statement concerning the proposed rule making was forwarded to the Council on 
Environmental Quality on December b, 1972, and circulated for comment to participants in the hearing 
and interested EederaI Agencies on December 7, 1972. Notice ol public availability ol the Statement and an 
invitation for comment was a Iso published in the iederul Register at that time. Comments on the Draft
Statement were received and a Pinal Environmental Statement was published on May 9, 1975.
The Commission noted in the interim Policy Statement:
Protection against a highly unlikely loss-of-coolant accident has long been an essential part of the 
defense-in-depth concept used by the nuclear power industry and the AEC to assure the safety of
nuclear power plants. In this concept, the primary assurance of safety is accident prevention by
correctly designing, constructing, and operating the reactor. Extensive and systematic quality assurance 
practices are required and applied at every step to achieve this primary assurance of safety. 
Nevertheless, deviations from expected behavior are postulated to occur, and protective systems are 
installed to take corrective action as required in such events. Notwithstanding all this, the occurrence of 
serious accidents is postulated, in spite of the fact that they are highly unlikely, and engineered safety 
features are installed to mitigate the consequences of these unlikely events. The loss-of-coolant accident 
is such a postulated improbable accident; the emergency core cooling system is one of the engineered 
safety features installed to mitigate its consequences.
The Commission has adopfed new regulations, set forth below, dealing with the effectiveness of ECCS. 
In a 140 page opinion issued on December 28, 1975, the Commission discussed the changes from the 
interim acceptance criteria and the technical reason lor them. Copies of this opinion are available for 
inspection and copying al the Commission’s Public Document Room, 1717 II. Street, N. W., Washington, 
1). C.
The principal changes from the Interim Policy Statement are as follows. The old criterion number one, 
specifying that the temperature of the Zircaloy cladding should not exceed 2300°E, is replaced by two 
criteria, lowering the allowed peak Zircaloy temperature to 2200°F~ and providing a limit on the maximum 
allowed local oxidation, lhe other three criteria ol the IAC are retained, with some modification of the 
wording. These three criteria limit the hydrogen generation from metal-water reactions, require 
maintenance of a coolable core geometry, and provide for long-term cooling of the quenched core.
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The most important effect of the changes in the required features of the evaluation models is that 
swelling and bursting of the cladding must now be taken into consideration when they are calculated to 
occur, and that the maximum temperature and oxidation criteria must be applied to the region of clad 
swelling or bursting when the maximum temperature and oxidation are calculated to occur there. Another 
important change is the requirement that, in the steady state operation just before the postulated accident, 
the thermal conductance of the gap between the fuel pellets and the cladding should be calculated taking 
into consideration any increase in gap dimensions resulting from such phenomena as fuel densificalion, and 
should also consider the effects of the presence of fission gases. When these effects are taken into 
consideration a higher stored energy may be calculated. Other changes in the evaluation models are mostly 
in the direction of replacing previous broad conservative assumptions with more detailed calculations where 
new experimental information is available or where better calculational methods have been developed.
The wording of the definition of a loss-of-coolant accident has been modified to conform to its 
long-accepted usage, limiting it to breaks in pipes. The new regulations also require a more complete 
documentation of the evaluation models that are used.
The Commission believes that the implementation of the new regulations will ensure an adequate 
margin of performance of the LC’CS should a design basis LOCA ever occur. This margin is provided by 
conservative features of the evaluation models and by the criteria themselves. Some of the major points that 
contribute to the conservative nature of the evaluations and the criteria are as follows:
(1) Stored Heat. The assumption of 102% of maximum power, highest allowed peaking factor, and 
highest estimated thermal resistance between the U02 and the cladding provides a calculated stored heat 
that is possible but unlikely to occur at the time of a hypothetical accident. While not necessarily a margin
over tile extreme condition, it represents at least an assumption that an accident happens at a time wtiicti is 
not typical.
(2) Blow-down. The calculation of the heat transfer during blowdown is made in a very conservative 
manner. There is evidence that more of the stored heat would be removed than calculated, although there is 
not yet an accepted way of calculating the heat transfer more accurately. It is probable that this represents 
a conservatism of several hundred degrees F in stored energy alter blowdown, most ol which can reasonably 
be expected to carry over to a reduction in the calculated peak temperature ol the Zircaloy cladding.
( i)  Rate o f  Heat Generation. It is assumed that the heat generation rate from the decay of fission 
products is 20% greater than the proposed ANS standard. This represents an upper limit to the degree ol 
uncertainty. The assumption that the fission product level is that resulting from operation at 102%of rated 
power for an infinite time represents an improbable situation, with a conservatism that is probably in the 
range of 5 to 15%. The use of the Baker-Just equation for calculating the heat generation lrom the steam 
oxidation of zircaloy should also provide some conservatism, but the factor is uncertain.
(4) The Peak Temperature Criterion. The limitation of the peak calculated temperature of the cladding 
to 2200°F and the stipulation that this criterion be applied to the hottest region of the hottest fuel rod 
provide a substantial degree of conservatism. They ensure tliat the core would sutler very little damage in 
the accident.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the 
United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1, Code ol Federal Regulations, 
Part 50, are published as a document subject to codification to be effective on [30 days after publication in 
the Federal Register ].
1. A new sentence is added to Section 50.34(a)(4) of 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:
§50.34 Contents of applications: technical information
(a) **
(4) *** Analysis and evaluation of FCCS cooling performance following postulated loss-of-coolant 
accidents shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of §50.46 for facilities for which 
construction permits may be issued after December 28, 1974.
2. A new sentence is added to Section 50.34(b)(4) 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:
§50.34 Contents of applications; technical information.
(a) ***
(b) ***
(4 ) *** Analysis and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance following postulated loss-of-coolant 
accidents shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of §50.46 for facilities for which a 
license to operate may be issued after December 28. 1974.
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3. A new §50.46 is added lo 10 Cl-R Hart 50 to read as tollows:
§50.46 Acceptance Cnteiia for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power 
Reactors.
(a )(1 ) Except as provided in subparagraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph, each boiling and pressurized 
Light-water nuclear power reactor fueled with uranium oxide pellets within cylindrical zircaloy cladding 
shall be provided with an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) which shall be designed such that its 
calculated cooling performance following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents conforms to the criteria set 
forth in paragraph (b). ECCS cooling performance shall be calculated in accordance with an acceptable 
evaluation model, and shall be calculated for a number of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents of dillerent 
sizes, locations, and other properties sufficient to provide assurance that the entire spectrum of postulated 
loss-of-coolant accidents is covered. Appendix K, ECCS Evaluation Models, sets forth certain required and 
acceptable features of evaluation models. Conformance with the criteria set forth in paragraph (b). with 
ECCS cooling performance calculated in accordance with an acceptable evaluation model, may require that 
restrictions be imposed on reactor operation.
(2) With respect to reactors for which operating licenses have previously been issued and tor which 
operating licenses may issue on or before December 28, 1974:
(i) The time within which actions required or permitted under this subparagraph (2) must occur shall 
begin to run on [30 days after publication of the rule in the Federal Register) .
(ii) Within six months following the date specified in subparagraph (i) of this subparagraph (2), an 
evaluation in accordance with subparagraph (1) ot tins paragraph (a) shall be submitted to the Director ot 
Regulation. The evaluation stall be accompanied by such proposed changes in technical specifications or 
license amendments as may be necessary to bring reactor operation in conformity with subparagraph (1) of 
this paragraph.
(iii) Any licensee may request an extension of the six-month period referred to in subparagraph (ii) of 
this subparagraph (2) for good cause. Any such request shall be submitted not less than 45 days prior to 
expiration of the six-month period, and shall be accompanied by affidavits showing precisely wtiy the 
evaluation is not complete and the minimum time believed necessary to complete it. The Director of 
Regulation shall cause notice of such a request to be published promptly in the Federal Register: such 
notice shall provide for the submission of comments by interested persons within a time period to be 
established by the Director of Regulation. If, upon reviewing the foregoing submissions, the Director of 
Regulation concludes that good cause has been shown for an extension, he may extend (lie six-month 
period for the shortest additional time which in this judgment will be necessary to enable the licensee to 
furnish the submissions required by subparagraph (ii) of this subparagraph (2). Requests for extensions of 
the six-month period, submitted under this subparagraph, shall be ruled upon by the Director of Regulation 
prior to expiration of that period.
(iv) Upon submission of the evaluation required by subparagraph (ii) of (his subparagraph (2) (or under 
subparagraph (iii), if the six-month period is extended) the facility shall continue or commence operation 
only within the limits of both the proposed technical specifications or license amendments submitted in 
accordance witli this subparagraph (2) and all technical specifications or license conditions previously 
imposed by the Commission, including the requirements of the Interim Policy Statement (June 29, 1971, 
36 F .R . 12248), as amended (December 18, 1971,36 F.R . 24082).
(v) Further restrictions on reactor operation will be imposed by the Director of Regulation if he finds 
that the evaluations submitted under subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of this subparagraph (2) are not consistent 
with subparagraph (1) of this paragrapti (a) and as a result such restrictions are required to protect (lie 
public health and safety.
(vi) Exemptions from the operating requirements of subparagraph (iv) of this subparagraph (2) may be 
granted by the Commission for good cause. Requests for such exemption shall be submitted not less than 
45 days prior to the date upon which the plant would otherwise be required to operate in accordance with 
the procedures of said subparagraph (iv). Any such request shall be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission, who shall cause notice of its receipt lo be published promptly in the Federal Register, such 
notice shall provide for the submission of comments by interested persons within 14 days following Federal 
Register publication. The Director of Regulation shall submit his views as to any requested exemption 
within five days following expiration of the comment period.
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(vii) Any request for an exemption submitted under subparagraph (vi) of this subparagraph (2) must 
show, witli appropriate affidavits and technical submissions, that it would be in the public interest to allow 
the licensee a specified additional period ol time within which to alter the operation o( the facility in the 
manner required by subparagraph (iv) of this subparagraph (2). The request shall also include a discussion 
of the alternatives available for establishing compliance with t he rule.
(?) Construction permits may be issued alter December 28, 197? but before December 28, 1974 
subject to any applicable conditions or restrictions imposed pursuant to other regulations in this chapter 
and the Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems published on June 29, |97l 
(76 F.R . 12248) as amended (December 18, 1971, 26 F .R . 24082): Provided, however, that no operating 
license shall be issued for facilities constructed in accordance with construction permits issued pursuant to 
this subparagraph, unless the Commission determines, among other things, that the proposed facility meets 
the requirements of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph.
(b) ( 1)Peak Cladding Temperature. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature shall 
not exceed 2200°F.
{2) Maximum Cladding Oxidation. The calculated total oxidation of the cladding shall nowhere exceed
0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation. As used in this subparagraph total oxidation 
means the total thickness of cladding metal that would be locally converted to oxide if all the oxygen 
absorbed by and reacted with the cladding locally were converted to stoichiometric zirconium dioxide. II 
cladding rupture is calculated to occur, the inside surfaces of the cladding shall be included in the 
oxidation, beginning al the calculated time of rupture. Cladding thickness before oxidation means the radial 
distance from inside to outside the cladding, after any calculated rupture or swelling has occurred but 
before significant oxidation. Where the calculated conditions of transient pressure and temperature lead to 
a prediction of cladding swelling, with or without cladding rupture, the unoxidized cladding thickness shall 
be defined as the cladding cross-sectional area, taken at a horizontal plane at the elevation of the rupture, if 
it occurs, or at the elevation ol the highest cladding temperature if no rupture is calculated to occur, 
divided by the average circumference al that elevation. l or ruptured cladding the circumference does not 
include the rupture opening.
(3) Maximum Hydrogen Generation. The calculated total amount of hydrogen generated from the 
chemical reaction of the cladding with water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times the hypothetical amount 
that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the 
cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react.
(4) Cooluhle Geometry. Calculated changes in core geometry shall be such that the core remains 
amenable to cooling.
(5)  Long-Term Cooling. Alter any calculated successful initial operation of the ECCS, the calculated 
core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptably low value and decay heal shall be removed for the 
extended period of time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.
(c) As used in this section:
( 1) Loss-of-coolant accidents (LOC'A’s) are hypothetical accidents that would result from the loss of 
reactor coolant, at a rate in excess ol the capability ol the reactor coolant makeup system, from breaks in 
pipes in the reactor coolant pressure boundary up to and including a break equivalent in size to the 
double-ended rupture of the largest pipe in the reactor coolant system.
(2) An evaluation model is the calculational framework for evaluating the behavior of the reactor 
system during a postulated loss-ol-coolant accident (LOCA). It includes one or more computer programs 
and all other information necessary for application of the calculational framework to a specific L.OCA, such 
as mathematical models used, assumptions included in the programs, procedure for treating the program 
input and output information, specification of those portions of analysis not included in computer 
programs, values of parameters, and all other information necessary to specify the calculational procedure.
(d) The requirements of this section are in addition to any other requirements applicable to ECCS set 
forth in this Part. The criteria set forth in paragraph (b), with cooling performance calculated in accordance 
with an acceptable evaluation model, are in implementation of the general requirements with respect to 
ECCS cooling performance design set forth in this Part, including in particular Criterion 35 of Appendix A.
4. A new Appendix K is added to 10 CER Part 50 to read as follows: Appendix K- ECCS Evaluation 
Models.
I. Required and Acceptable Features of Evaluation Models.
II. Required Documentation.
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1. REQUIRED AND ACCEPTABLE FEATURES OF THE EVALUATION MODELS
A. SOURCES OF HEAT DURING THE LOCA
For the heat sources listed in Paragraphs 1 to 4 below it shall be assumed that the reactor lias been 
operating continuously at a power level at least 1.02 times the licensed power level (to allow lor such 
uncertainties as instrumentation error), with the maximum peaking factor allowed by the technical 
specifications. A range of power distribution shapes and peaking factors representing power distributions 
that may occur over the core lifetime shall be studied and the one selected should be that which results in 
the most severe calculated consequences, lor the spectrum ot postulated breaks and single tail it res analyzed.
1. The Initial Stored Fnergy in the Fuel. The steady-state temperature distribution and stored energy in 
the fuel before the hypothetical accident shall be calculated for the burn-up that yields the highest 
calculated cladding temperature (or, optionally, the highest calculated stored energy), l o  accomplish this, 
the thermal conductivity of the U02 shall be evaluated as a function of burn-up and temperature, taking 
into consideration differences in initial density, and the thermal conductance ot the gap between the U02 
and the cladding shall be evaluated as a function of the burn-up, taking into consideration fuel densilication 
and expansion, the composition and pressure ot the gases within the luel rod, the initial cold gap dimension 
with its tolerances, and cladding creep.
2. Fission Heat. Fission heat shall be calculated using reactivity and reactor kinetics. Shutdown 
reactivities resulting from temperatures and voids shall be given their minimum plausible values, including 
allowance for uncertainties, for the range of power distribution shapes and peaking factors indicated to 1: 
studied above. Rod trip and insertion may be assumed if they are calculated to occur.
3. Decay o f  Actinides. The heat from the radioactive decay of actinides, including neptunium an 
plutonium generated during operation, as well as isotopes of uranium, shall be calculated in accordant' 
with fuel cycle calculations and known radioactive properties. The actinide decay heat chosen shall be the: 
appropriate for the time in the fuel cycle that yields the highest calculated fuel temperature during th 
LOCA.
4 .  Fission Product Decay. The heat generation rates from radioactive decay of fission products shall b 
assumed to be equal to 1.2 times the values for infinite operating time in the ANS Standard (Propose' 
American Nuclear Society Standard -“Decay Energy Release Rates Following Shutdown of Uranium 
Fueled Thermal Reactors” . Approved by Subcommittee ANS-5. ANS Standards Committee, Octobe 
1971). The fraction of the locally generated gamma energy that is deposited in the fuel (including tin 
cladding) may be different from 1.0; the value used shall be justified by a suitable calculation.
5. Metal-Water Reaction Rate. The rate of energy release, hydrogen generation, and cladding oxidatioi 
from the metal/water reaction shall be calculated using the Baker-Just equation (Baker. L... Just, L..C. 
“Studies of Metal Water Reactions at High Temperatures, III. Experimental and Theoretical Studies of tlu 
Zirconium-Water Reaction,” ANL-6548, page 7, May 1962). The reaction shall be assumed not to be stean 
limited. For rods whose cladding is calculated to rupture during the L.OCA, the inside of the cladding shal 
also be assumed to react after the rupture. The calculation of the reaction rate on the inside of the cladding 
shall also follow the Baker-Just equation, starting at the time when the cladding is calculated to rupture 
and extending around the cladding inner circumference and axially no less than 1.5 inches each way from 
the location of the rupture, with the reaction assumed not to be steam limited.
6. Reactor Internals Heat Transfer. Ileal transfer from piping, vessel walls, and non-fuel internal 
hardware shall be taken into account.
7. Pressurized Water Reactor Primary-to-Secondarv Heat Transfer. Heat transferred between primary 
and secondary systems through heat exchangers (steam generators) shall be taken into account. (Not 
applicable to Boiling Water Reactois.)
B. SWELLING AND RUPTURE OF THE CLADDING AND FUEL ROD 
THERMAL PARAMETERS
Each evaluation model shall include a provision for predicting cladding swelling and rupture from 
consideration of the axial temperature distribution of the cladding and from the difference in piessure 
between the inside and outside of the cladding, both as functions of time. To be acceptable the swelling and 
rupture calculations shall be based on applicable data in such a way that the degree of swelling and 
incidence of rupture are not underestimated. The degree of swelling and rupture shall be taken into account 
in calculations of gap conductance, cladding oxidation and embrittlement, and hydrogen generation.
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The calculations of fuel and cladding temperatures as a function of time shall use values lor gap 
conductance and other thermal parameters as functions of temperature and other applicable time- 
dependent variables. The gap conductance shall be varied in accordance with changes in gap dimensions and 
any other applicable variables.
C. BLOWDOWN PHENOMENA
1. Break Characteristics and Flow
a. In analyses of hypothetical loss-of-coolant accidents, a spectrum of possible pipe breaks shall be 
considered. This spectrum shall include instantaneous double-ended breaks ranging in cross-sectional area 
up to and including that of the largest pipe in the primary coolant system. The analysis shall also include 
the effects of longitudinal splits in the largest pipes, with the split area equal to the cross-sectional area ol 
the pipe.
b. Discharge M odel For all times after the discharging fluid has been calculated to be two-phase in 
composition, the discharge rate shall be calculated by use of the Moody model (h. J. Moody, “Maximum 
Flow Rate of a Single Component, Two-Phase Mixture,” Journal o f  Heat Transfer, Transactions o f  the 
American Society o f  Mechanical Engineers, 87, No. I , February 1965). The calculation shall be conducted 
with at least three values of a discharge coefficient applied to the postulated break area, these values 
spanning the range fiom 0.6 to 1.0. If the results indicate that the maximum clad temperature for the 
hypothetical accident is it) be found at an even lower value of the discharge coefficient, the range ot 
discharge coefficients shall be extended until the maximum clad temperature calculated by this variation 
has been achieved.
c. End o f  Blowdown. (Applies Only to Pressurized Water Reactors.) For postulated cold leg breaks, all 
emergency cooling water injected into the inlet lines or the reactor vessel during the bypass period shall in 
the calculations be subtracted from the reactor vessel calculated inventory. This may be executed in the 
calculation during the bypass period, or as an alternative the amount ot' emergency core cooling water 
calculated to be injected during the bypass period may be subtracted later in the calculation from the water 
remaining in the inlet lines, downcomer, and reactor vessel lower plenum alter the bypass period. This 
bypassing shall end in the calculation at a time designated as the “end of bypass,” after which the expulsion 
or entrainment mechanisms responsible for the bypassing are calculated not to be effective. The 
end-of-bypass definition used in the calculation shall be justified by a suitable combination of analysis and 
experimental data. Acceptable methods for defining “end of bypass” include, but are not limited to, the 
following: (I) Prediction ol' the blowdown calculation of downward flow in the downcomer tor the 
remainder of the blowdown period; (2) Prediction of a threshold for droplet entrainment in the upward 
velocity, using local fluid conditions and a conservative critical Weber number.
d. Noding Near the Break and the E CC S Injection Points. The noding in the vicinity of and including 
the broken or split sections of pipe and the points of ECCS injection shall be chosen to permit a reliable 
analysis of the thermodynamic history in these regions during blowdown.
2. Frictional Pressure Drops. The frictional losses in pipes and other components including the reactor 
core shall be calculated using models that include realistic variation of friction factor with Reynolds 
number, and realistic two-phase friction multipliers that have been adequately verified by comparison with 
experimental data, or models that prove at least equally conservative with respect to maximum clad 
temperature calculated during the hypothetical accident. The modified Baroc/y correlation (Baroczy, C. J., 
“A Systematic Correlation for Two-Phase Pressure Drop," Client. Enging. Prog. Setup. Series, No. 64. 
Vol. 02, 1905) or a combination ot' the Thom correlation (Thom, J. R. S., “Prediction of Pressure Drop 
During Forced Circulation Boiling of Water,” Int. J . o f  Heat & Mass Transfer. 7, 709-724, 1964) for 
pressures equal to or greater than 250 psia and the Martinelli-Nelson correlation (Martinelli, R. C., Nelson,
D. B., “Prediction of Pressure Drop During Forced Circulation Boiling of Water,” Transactions o f  ASM E, 
695-702, 1948) for pressures lower than 250 psia is acceptable as a basis for calculating realistic two-phase 
friction multipliers.
3. Momentum Equation. The following effects shall be taken into account in the conservation of 
momentum equation: (I) temporal change of momentum, (2) momentum convection, (3) area change 
momentum flux, (4) momentum change due to compressibility, (5) pressure loss resulting from wall 
friction, (6) pressure loss resulting from area change, and (7) gravitational acceleration. Any omission of 
one or more of these terms under stated circumstances shall be justified by comparative analyses or by 
experimental data.
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4. Critical Heat Flux
a. Correlations developed from appropriate steady-state and transient-state experimental data are 
acceptable tor use in predicting the critical heat flux (Cl IF) during LOCA transients. The computer 
programs in which these correlations are used shall contain suitable checks to assure that the physical 
parameters are within the range ol parameters specified lor use ol the correlations by their respective 
authors.
b. Steady-state ( 1IF correlations acceptable lor use in LOCA transients include, but are not limited to, 
the following:
(1 ) IF o. L.. S. long, Prediction of Departure from Nucleate Boiling for an Axially Non-uniform Heat 
Flux Distribution," Journal o f  Nuclear Energy, Vol. 21, 241-248, 1967.
(_) B& IP-2. J. S. Gellerstedt, R. A. Lee, W. J. Oberjohn, R. H. Wilson, L. J. Stanek, “Correlation of 
Critical Heat Flux in a Bundle Cooled by Pressurized Water f  Two-Phase Flow and Heat Transfer in Rod  
Bundles, ASML, New York, 1969.
(3) Hench-Levy. J. M. Ileal/.er, J. E. Ilench. F. Janssen, S. Levy, “ Design Basis for Critical Heat Flux 
Condition in Boiling Water Reactors,” APED-5 186, GE Company Private report, July 1966.
(4) Macbeth. R. V. Macbeth. “An Appraisal of Forced Convection Burnout Data,” Proceedings o f  the 
Institute o f  Mechanical Engineers, 1965-1 966.
(5) Barnett. P. G. Barnett, “A Correlation of Burnout Data for Uniformly Heated Annuli and Its Uses 
for Predicting Burnout in Uniformly Heated Rod Bundles.” AEEW-R 462. 1966.
(6) Hughes. E. D. Hughes. “ A Correlation of Rod Bundle Critical Ileal Flux for Water in the Pressure 
Range I 50 to 725 psia,: IN-141 2. Idaho Nuclear Corporation. July 1970.
c. Correlations of appropriate transient CUE data may be accepted for use in LOCA transient analyses if 
comparisons between the data and the correlations are provided to demonstrate that the correlations 
predict values of CHF which allow for uncertainty in the experimental data throughout the range of 
parameters for which the correlations arc to be used. Where appropriate, the comparisons shall use 
statistical uncertainty analysis of the data to demonstrate the conservatism of the transient correlation.
d. Transient CHF correlations acceptable for use in LOCA transients include, but arc not limited to, the 
following:
(1) (Hi Transient CHI'. B. C. Slil'er, J. L. Ilench, “ Loss-ol-Coolant Accident and Emergency Core 
Cooling Models for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors,” NEDO-10229, General Electric Company, 
Equation C-32, April 1971.
e. After CHF is first ptedicled at an axial fuel rod location during blowdown, the calculation shall not 
use nucleate boiling heat transfer correlations at that location subsequently during the blowdown even if 
the calculated local fluid and surface conditions would apparently justify the reestablishment of nucleate 
boiling. Heat transfer assumptions characteristic of return to nucleate boiling (rewetting) shall be permitted 
when justified by the calculated local fluid and surface conditions during the reflood portion of a LOCA.
5. Post-CHF Heat Transfer Correlations
a. Correlations ol heal I ran si er from the I uel cladding to the surrounding fluid in the post-CHF regimes 
of transition and film boiling shall be compared to applicable steady-state and transient-stale data using 
statistical correlation and uncertainty analyses. Such comparison shall demonstrate that the correlations 
predict values of heat transfer coefficient equal to or less than the mean value of the applicable 
experimental heat transfer data throughout the range of parameters for which the correlations are to be 
used. The comparisons shall quantify the relation of the correlations to the statistical uncertainty of the 
applicable data.
b. The Grocncveld flow film boiling correlation (Equation 5.7 of D.C. Gmeneveld. “An Investigation 
of Heat Transfer in the Liquid Deficient Regime.” AECL-3281, revised December D>69). the 
Dougall-Rohsenow flow film boiling correlation (R. S. Dougall and W. M. Rohscnow. “Film Boiling on the 
Inside of Vertical Tubes with Upward Flow of the Fluid at Low Qualities," MIT Report Number 9079-26. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 1963), and the Westinghouse correlation ol steady-state transition 
boiling (“Proprietary Redirect/Rebuttal Testimony of Westinghouse Electric Corporation,” LLS.A.E.C. 
Docket RM-50-I,pagc 25-1 , October 26, 1972) are acceptable for use in the post-CHF boiling regimes. In 
addition the transition boiling correlation of McDonough, Milich, and Ring (J. B. McDonough. W. Milicli.
E. C. King. “Partial Film Boiling with Water at 2000 psig in a Round Vertical Tube,” MSA Research Corp., 
Technical Report 62 (NP-6976). (1958) is suitable lor use between nucleate and film boiling. Use of all 
these correlations shall be restricted as follows:
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( 1) The Groeneveld correlation shall not be used in the region near its low-pressure singularity.
(2) the first term (nucleate) of the Westinghouse correlation and the entire McDonough. Milich. and 
king correlation shall not he used during the blowdown alter the temperature difference between the clad 
and the saturated fluid lirsi exceeds 100° 1:.
(!) transition boiling heat transfer shall not be reapplied for the remainder of the I.OCA blowdown, 
even if the clad superheat returns below 300°F, except for the reflood portion of the LOCA when justified 
by the calculated local fluid and surface conditions.
6. Pump Modeling. The characteristics of rotating primary system pumps (axial flow, turbine, or 
centrifugal) shall be derived from a dynamic model that includes momentum transfer between the fluid and 
the rotating member, with variable pump speed as a function of time. The pump model resistance used lor 
analysis should be justified. The pump model for the two-phase region shall be verified by applicable
two-phase pump peitormance data. For BWRs alter saturation is calculated at the pump suction, the pump 
head may be assumed to vary linearly with quality, going to zero for one percent quality at the pump 
suction, so long as the analysis shows that core flow stops before the quality at pump suction reaches one 
percent.
7. Core Flow Distribution During Blowdown. (Applies only to pressurized water reactors.)
a. 'flic How rate through the hot region of the core during blowdown shall be calculated as a function ot 
time. For the purpose of these calculations the hot region chosen shall not be greater than the size ol one 
fuel assembly. Calculations of average flow and flow in the hot region shall take into account cross How 
between regions and any flow blockage calculated to occur during blowdown as a result ol cladding swelling 
or rupture. The calculated llow shall be smoothed lo eliminate any calculated rapid oscillations (period less 
than 0 .1 seconds).
b. A method shall be specified for determining the enthalpy to be used as input data to the hot channel 
heatup analysis from quantities calculated in the blowdown analysis, consistent with the flow distribution 
calculations.
D. POST BLOWDOWN PHENOMENA; HEAT REMOVAL BY THE ECCS
1. Single P'ailure Criterion. An analysis of possible failure modes of FCCS equipment and of their 
effects on FCCS performance must be made. In carrying out the accident evaluation the combination of 
FCCS subsystems assumed to be operative shall be those available after the most damaging single failure of 
FCCS equipment has taken place.
2 .  Containment Pressure. The containment pressure used for evaluating cooling effectiveness during 
reflood and spray cooling shall not exceed a pressure calculated conservatively (or this purpose. The 
calculation shall include the effects of operation of all installed pressure-reducing systems and processes.
3. Calculation o f  Reflood Rate for Pressurized Water Reactors. The refilling of the reactor vessel and 
the time and rate of reflooding ol' the core shall be calculated by an acceptable model that takes into 
consideration the thermal and hydraulic characteristics of the core and of the reactor system. The primary 
system coolant pumps shall be assumed to have locked impellers if this assumption leads to the maximum 
calculated cladding temperature; otherwise the pump rotor shall be assumed to be running tree. The ratio of 
the total fluid flow at the core exit plane to the total liquid flow at the core inlet plane (carryover fraction) 
shall be used to determine the core exit flow and shall be determined in accordance with applicable 
experimental data (for example, “PWR FLFC'IIT (Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat Transfer) Final 
Report,” Westinghouse Report WCAP-7o(o, April 1971; "PWR Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat 
Transfer (FLECHT) Group I Test Report,” Westinghouse Report WCAP-7435, January 1970; “PWR 
FLECHT (Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat Transfer) Group II Test Report,” Westinghouse Report 
WCAP-7544, September 1970; "PWR FLECHT Final Report Supplement,” Westinghouse Report 
WCAP-7931, October 1972).
The effects on reflooding rale of the compressed gas in the accumulator which is discharged following 
accumulatoi water discharge shall also be taken into account.
4. Steam Interaction with emergency Core Cooling Water in Pressurized Water Reactors. The 
thermal-hydraulic interaction between steam and all emergency core cooling water shall be taken into 
account in calculating the core reflooding rate. During refill and reflood, the calculated steam flow in 
unbroken reactor coolant pipes shall be taken to be zero during the time that accumulators are discharging 
water into those pipes unless experimental evidence is available regarding the realistic thermal-hydraulic 
interaction between the steam and the liquid. In this case, the experimental data may be used to support an 
alternate assumption.
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5. Refill and Reflood Ileal Transfer J'or Pressurized Water Reactors. For reflood rates ol one inch per 
second or higher, reflood heat transfer coefficients shall be based on applicable experimental data lor 
unblocked cores including FLECIIT results ("l’WR FLFCI1T (Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat 
Transfer) Final Report,” Westinghouse Report WCAE-7665, April 1971 ). The use ol a correlation derived 
from FLECHT data shall be demonstrated to be conservative for the transient to which it is applied; 
presently available FLECHT heat transfer correlations (“l’WR Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat 
Transfer (FLECHT) Group I lest Report,” Westinghouse Report WCAR-7544, September 1970; “PWR 
I L.LCI1T Final Report Supplement,” Westinghouse Report WCAR-7931, October 1972) are not acceptable. 
New correlations ot modifications to the FLECHT heat transfer correlations are acceptable only alter they 
are demonstrated lo be conservative, by comparison with FLECHT data, lor a tange ol parameters 
consistent with the transient to which they are applied.
During refill and during reflood when reflood rates are less than one inch per second, heat iranslet 
calculations shall be based on the assumption that cooling is only by steam, and shall take into account any 
flow blockage calculated to occur as a result of cladding swelling or ruplute as such blockage might ailed 
both local steam flow and heat transfer.
6. Convective llcat Transfer Coefficients for Roiliiif; Water Reactor I'ticl Roils Under Spray Cooling. 
Following the blowdown period, convective heat transfer shall be calculated using cocllicienls based on 
appropriate experimental data. For reactors with jet pumps and having luel rods in a 7 x 7 I tie I assembly 
array, the following convective coefficients are acceptable:
a. During the period following lower plenum Hashing but prior to the core spray reaching rated llow. a 
convective heat transfer coefficient of zero shall be applied to all luel rods.
b. During the period after core spray reaches rated flow but prior to reflooding, convective heat transler 
coefficients of 3.0. 3.5, 1.5, and 1.5 Btu-hr"' -IT2-°F"1 shall be applied to the fuel rods in the outer corners, 
outer row, next to outer row, and to those remaining in the interior, respectively, ol the assembly.
c. After the two-phase rellooding fluid reaches the level under consideration, a convective heat transfer 
coefficient of 25 Btu-hr"1 -ft'2 -°F~' shall be applied to all fuel rods.
7. The Roiling Water Reactor Channel Box Under Spray Cooling. Following the blowdown period, heat 
transfer from, and wetting of, the channel box shall be based on appropriate experimental data. For 
reactors with jet pumps and fuel rods in a 7 x 7 luel assembly array, the following heat transfer cocllicienls 
and wetting time correlation are acceptable.
a. During the period after lower plenum flashing, hut prior to core sptay reaching rated llow, a 
convective coefficient of zero shall he applied to the luel assembly channel box.
b. During the period after core spray reaches rated llow. but prior to wetting ol the channel, a 
convective heat transfer coefficient ol 5 Btu-hr 1 -It 2-°F 1 shall be applied to both sides ol the channel box.
c. Wetting of the channel box shall be assumed lo occur 60 seconds alter the time determined using the 
correlation based on the Yamanouchi analysis (“ Loss-of-Coolant Accident and Emergency (ore Cooling 
Models for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors," General Electric Company Report NF,DO-10329. 
April 1971).
II. REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION
l.a. A description of each evaluation model shall he furnished. The desciiption shall be sufficiently 
complete to permit technical review of the analytical approach including the equations used, their 
approximations in difference form, the assumptions made, and the values of all parameters or the procedure 
tor theii selection, as tor example, in accordance with a specified physical law or empirical correlation.
b- The description shall be sufficiently detailed and specific to require significant changes in the 
evaluation model to he specified in amendments of the description. For this purpose, a significant change is 
a change that would result in a calculated fuel cladding temperature different by more than 20°F from the 
temperature calculated (as a function of time) for a postulated LOCA using the last previously accepted 
model.
c. A complete listing of each computer program, in the same form as used in the evaluation model, shall 
be furnished lo the Atomic Energy Commission.
2-For each computer program, solution convergence shall be demonstrated by studies of system 
modeling or noding and calculational time steps.
3. Appropriate sensitivity studies shall be perlormed for each evaluation model, to evaluate the effect 
on the calculated results of variations in noding, phenomena assumed in the calculation to predominate, 
including pump operation or locking, and values of parameters over their applicable ranges, l or items to 
which results are shown to be sensitive, the choices made shall be justified.
4. To the extent practicable, predictions of the evaluation model, or portions thereof, shall be 
compared with applicable experimental information.
5. General Standards for Acceptability --Elements ot evaluation models reviewed will include technical 
adequacy of the calculational methods, including compliance with required features of Section I of this 
Appendix K and provision of a level of safety and margin of conservatism comparable to other acceptable 
evaluation models, taking into account significant differences in the reactors to which they apply.
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Appendix 4 Ongoing and Planned R & D Related to LOCA-ECC in 
Water Cooled Reactors
T A B L E  II
O N G O I N G  A N D  P L A N N E D  R E S E A R C H  A N D  D E V E L O P M E N T  R E L A T E D  T O  L O C A - E C C  I N  W A T E R  C O O L E D  R E A C T O R S
P R O G R A M  _____  C O D E P U R P O S E E X P E R I M E N T A L  S Y S T E M  S C H E D U L E  REF. R E M A R K S
F u n d a m e n t a l  
S t u d i e s  in B l o w ­
d o w n  a n d  H e a t  
T r a n s f e r
1. PWR b l o w d o w n  
h e a t  t r a n s f e r  
( U S A E C , ORNL)
O R N L / B D H T  O b t a i n  d a t a  on b l o w ­
d o w n  h e a t  t r a n s f e r  
p r i o r  t o  E C C  i n j e c ­
t i o n  a n d  o n  h e a t  
t r a n s f e r  r e l a t e d  t o  
o p e r a t i o n a l  u psets.
7 x 7  e l e c t r i c a l l y  h e a t e d  C o n t i n u i n g  
r o d  a r r a y  1 2 - f t - l o n g ,  p r o -  t o  J u l y  
f i l e d  p o w e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  1 975 
PWR p i n  d i a m e t e r  a n d  pitch.
2. I n v e s t i g a t i o n  U. C i n /
o f  P r e s s u r e  A E C
D r o p s  a n d  H e a t  
T r a n s f e r  C o ­
e f f i c i e n t s  
(USAEC, U n i ­
v e r s i t y  of 
C i n c i n n a t i )
I n v e s t i g a t e  p r e s s u r e  T w o  l a b o r a t o r y  s c a l e  t e s t  
d r o p s  a n d  h e a t  t r a m s -  s ystems: (l) s m a l l  p i p i n g  
f e r  p h e n o m e n a  o f  im- t e s t  s e c t i o n  u s i n g  f r e o n  
p o r t a n c e  d u r i n g  LOCA. t o  o b t a i n  t w o - p h a s e  p r e s ­
s u r e  d r ops a n d  f l o w  p a t ­
t e r n s ,  a n d  (2 ) a  s i n g l e  
t u b e  w i t h  m e r c u r y  o n  t h e  
i n s i d e  t o  o b t a i n  b a s i c  
t r a n s i t i o n  b o i l i n g  a n d  
r e f l o o d i n g  h e a t  t r a n s ­
f e r  data.
C o n t i n u i n g
E m p h a s i z e  s e p a r a t e  
e f f e c t s  t e s t s  on 
b l o w d o w n  h e a t  t r a n s ­
f e r  in w h i c h  r e ­
s p o n s e  o f  t h e  r o d  
a r r a y  t o  s p e c i f i c  
i n i t i a l  a n d  b o u n d ­
a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  (for 
e x a m p l e , r e v e r s e  
a n d  r e - r e v e r s e  flov) 
w i l l  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  
w i t h o u t  i n f l u e n c e  
o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  s y s ­
t e m  loop.
F u n d a m e n t a l  s t u d i e s  
t o  i n c l u d e  c o n d i ­
t i o n s  u n d e r  w h i c h  
n u c l e a t e  b o i l i n g  is 
r e e s t a b l i s h e d .
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TABLE II (Contd.)
ONGOING AND PiLANNED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO LOCA-ECC IN HATER COOLED
P R O G R A M  C O D E  ________ P U R P O S E E X P E R I M E N T A L  S Y S T E M  S C H E D U L E  R E F
3- D e f i c i e n t G E / D C / D e t e r m i n e  C H F  a n d
C o o l i n g  (US­ A E C t e m p e r a t u r e  r e ­
AEC, G e n e r a l g i m e s  o c c u r r i n g
E l e c t r i c  C o m ­ d u e  t o  p o w e r , f l o w
p a n y  , San or p r e s s u r e  t r a n ­
J o s e , C a l i f . ) s i e n t  u p s e t ;  e v a l ­
u a t e  t e m p e r a t u r e  
r e g i m e s  in LOCA; 
e v a l u a t e  c o n s e ­
q u e n c e s  of f uel 
r o d  g e o m e t r y  
c h a n g e s .
U . B l o w d o w n  of U K A E A A c q u i r e  b a s i c  d e ­
L o n g  S t r a i g h t c o m p r e s s i o n  d a t a
P i p e s  (Risley, for m o d e l  d e v e l o p ­
UKAE A ) m e n t  .
S i n g l e - r o d  a n d  9 ( o r  15) C o n t i n u i n g  30 
r o d  a r r a y  t r a n s i e n t  C H F  
t e s t s ;  s i n g l e - r o d  s i m u ­
l a t e d  s w e l l i n g  e f f e c t s  
on s t e a d y  s t a t e  C H F ; 9 -  
r o d  a r r a y  w i t h  g e o m e t r y  
c h a n g e s  on s p a c e r  c o m ­
p o n e n t s  a n d  s i m u l a t e d  
b o w i n g  a n d  s w e l l i n g  t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e  s t e a d y -  
s t a t e  CHF.
L o n g  s t r a i g h t  p i p e s  u p  C o n t i n u i n g  31 
t o  8 in. in d i a m e t e r ,
12 ft in l e n g t h , heavily- 
i n s t r u m e n t e d .
5. R e s e a r c h  o n  R O S A  
S a f e t y  A s ­
ses s m e n t  
(ROSA) (Japan 
A t o m i c  E n e r g y  
R e s e a r c h  In­
sti t u t e ,  T o k a i  
L a b o r a t o r y )
M e a s u r e  p r e s s u r e  R O S A  I: 5 6 - c m - I D  a n d  7 0 & -  C o n t i n u i n g  32
a n d  l e a k  f l o w  t r a n -  c m - l o n g  p r e s s u r e  v e s s e l ,
s i e n t s  d u r i n g  b l o w -  r o d  a r r a y  t y p i c a l  o f  B W R
d o w n ,  o b t a i n  s c o p i n g  f u e l  a s s e m b l y  w i t h  u p  t o
d a t a  o n  D N B  d u r i n g  13 e l e c t r i c a l l y  h e a t e d
b l o w d o w n ,  e v a l u a t e -  r o d s ,  r u p t u r e  d isc unit.
p r e s s u r e  o s c i l l a t i o n s .
6. H e a t  T r a n s -  A B G / G F N  
fer D u r i n g
B l o w d o w n
(AEG-
T e l e f u n k e n ,
G e r m a n  F e d ­
e r a l  M i n ­
istry)
7. D e p r e s s u r i -  I s p r a  
z a t i o n  D y ­
n a m i c s  and 
H e a t i n g  
T r a n s i e n t ,
F u n d a m e n ­
t a l  T wo-
P h a s e  F l o w
S t u d i e s
(EURATOM,
Ispra)
8. I n v e s t i g a t i o n  B M I / G J M  
o f  the P h e n o ­
m e n a  I n v o l v e d
in t h e  D e ­
p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
of W a t e r - 
C o o l e d  R e a c t o r s  
(Batte l l e - 
I n s t i t u t e  
F r a n k f u r t ,  G e r ­
many)
A c q u i r e  d a t a  b a s e  
for h e a t  t r a n s f e r  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  and 
t h e r m a l - h y d r a u l i c  
b e h a v i o r  d u r i n g  
bl o w d o w n .
P a r a m e t r i c  t e s t s  w i t h  a n  C o n t i n u i n g
i n t e r n a l l y  c o o l e d  t u b e  3 m
in length. T e s t  s e c t i o n
U - r o d  b u n d l e  t e s t s  u s i n g
BWR a n d  P W R  p o w e r  p r o f i l e s
a n d  36- r o d  b u n d l e  t e s t s
w i t h  B W R  and P W R  p o w e r
p r o f i l e s .
O b t a i n  d a t a  on h e a t  T e s t  l o o p  c o n s i s t e d  o f  an 
t r a n s f e r  d u r i n g  e l e c t r i c a l l y - h e a t e d  r o u n d -
s y s t e m  d e c o m p r e s s i o n ,  t u b e  t e s t  s e c t i o n  (15- m m  
0D, 1 3 . 8 - m m  ID, a n d  3-m 
l e n g t h ) ,  an u p p e r  p l e n u m ,  
a  l o w e r  p l e n u m ,  a r e c i r ­
c u l a t i o n  l i ne, a  p r e s ­
s u r i z e r  , a n d  a q u i c k  
o p e n i n g  valve.
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3U
Determine loads on
v e s s e l  i n t e r n a l s  
d u r i n g  d e p r e s s u r i ­
z a t i o n ,  i n v e s t i g a t e  
p h e n o m e n a  in the 
i n i t i a l  p h a s e  of 
d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  (in 
p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  d i s ­
c h a r g e  rate).
T e s t s  u t i l i z e  a v e s s e l  of 
0 . 8 - m  ID a n d  1 1 . 2 - m  l e n g t h  
w i t h  s i m p l i f i e d  i n t e r n a l s  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  E xit p i p e 
d i a m e t e r  o f  150 mm.
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REACTORS
R E M A R K S
T r a n s i e n t  C H F  t e s t a  
i n c l u d e  t r a n s i e n t  
f l o w , p o w e r , a n d  
p r e s s u r e  t e s t i n g  a n d  
s t u d y  o f  e f f e c t s  o f  
c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  i n t r a ­
b u n d l e  c l e a r a n c e ,  
p o w e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  
a n d  s p a c e r  c o m p o n e n t s .
S t u d i e s  f o r  d e t e r ­
m i n i n g  b a s i c  b u b b l e  
g r o w t h  p h e n o m e n a  
w h i c h  c a u s e  a n d  c o n ­
t r o l  c r i t i c a l  flow.
BWR v e s s e l  s y s t e m  
b l o w d o w n  a n d  h e a t  
t r a n s f e r  d a t a  as 
p a r t  o f  t h i s  p r o ­
gram. A  R O S A  II 
f a c i l i t y  is b e i n g  
f a b r i c a t e d  a n d  is 
d e s c r i b e d  u n d e r  
s c a l e d  s y s t e m  e f ­
f e c t s  e x p e r i m e n t s .
P a r a m e t r i c  t e s t s  at 
L O C A  c o n d i t i o n s  for 
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  h e a t  
t r a n s f e r  c o r r e l a t i o n s .
O n e  s u b c h a n n e l  s i ­
m u l a t i o n .
Both BWR and PWR
i n i t i a l  f l u i d  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  t o  b e  i n ­
v e s t i g a t e d .
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9. B o t t o m  F l o o d -  E C C / C I S E  
ing E x p e r i ­
m e n t s  (CISE,
M i l a n ,  Italy)
P r e l i m i n a r y  e x p e r i -  T e s t  f a c i l i t y  o f  d i r e c t l y  
m e n t a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  h e a t e d  t u b u l a r  a n d  a n n u -  
o f  c o o l a n t  c h a n n e l  lar t e s t  e l e m e n t s  U m  in 
t h e r m a l  t r a n s i e n t  length,
f o l l o w i n g  b o t t o m  
E C C  i n j e ction.
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10. D r y o u t  E x ­ B D H T / C I S E D e v e l o p  a  m o d e l  o f
p e r i m e n t s l o c a l  a n d  i n s t a n ­
(CISE, t a n e o u s  v a l u e s  of
M i l a n ,  Italy) f l o w  a n d  q u a l i t y  
a l o n g  f u e l  c h a n ­
n e l  , c o m p a r e  
t r a n s i e n t  d r y o u t  
c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h  
s t e a d y - s t a t e  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  .
11. C o o l i n g  of C E G B O b t a i n  d a t a  o n  the
H i g h - d i r e c t  i n j e c t i o n
T e m p e r a t u r e o f  c o o l a n t  o n t o  the
S u r f a c e s h e a t e d  s u r f a c e  for
( C entral d e v e l o p m e n t  of
E lectri c ity 
G e n e r a t i n g
p h y s i c a l  models.
B o a r d ,  U n i t e d  
K i n g d o m )
E x t e r n a l l y  h e a t e d  a n n u l u s , ---- 37
1 . 3 5 - m m  ID, 2 . 1 - c m  O D  a n d  
ItOO-cm l e n g t h ,  w i t h  i n i t i a l  
p r e s s u r e s  t o  50 bars.
P i n  c l u s t e r  t e s t s  w i t h  a  C o n t i n u i n g  38 
c o n c e n t r i c  r i n g  o f  h e a t ­
ers w i t h  a c e n t r a l  spar g e 
tube, s i n g l e  r o d  a n d  t ube 
e x p e r i m e n t s  w i t h  w a t e r  
d i r e c t e d  at t o p  o f  h e a t e d  
l e n g t h ,  a n d  flat p l a t e s  
e x p e r i m e n t s  w i t h  w a t e r  
d i r e c t e d  at s u r f a c e  of 
p l a t e .
P a r a m e t e r s  v a r i e d  
w e r e  p r e s s u r e ,  f l o w  
r a t e ,  c o o l a n t  inl e t  
e n t h a l p y ,  h e a t i n g  
p o w e r ,  a n d  i n i t i a l  
w a l l  t e m p e r a t u r e .
D a t a  a n a l y z e d  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  i n f l u ­
e n c e  o f  t e s t  p a r a ­
m e t e r s  o n  t e m p e r a t u r e  
t u r n a r o u n d  a n d  
q u e n c h i n g  times.
E x p e r i m e n t a l  c o n ­
d i t i o n s :  s t e a d y -  
s t a t e ,  i n l e t  f l o w  
s t o p p a g e  w i t h  p r e s ­
s ure t r a n s i e n t  or 
p o w e r  s u r g e .
S t u d i e s  o n  w a t e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  in a 
h o t  c l u s t e r  and 
c o o l i n g  e f f e c t i v e ­
n e s s  o f  a e r o s o l s  
a r e  in p r o g r e s s .
EMERGENCY CORE 
COOLANT DELIVERY
S e m i s c a l e  - P - S S B D P r o v i d e  an u n d e r ­ P l e x i g l a s s  t e s t  v e s s e l  C o n t i n u i n g
P l e x i g l a s s s t a n d i n g  o f  E C C w i t h  g e o m e t r y  s i m i l a r  t o
V e s s e l d e l i v e r y  p h e n o m e n a , t h e  1 - 1 /2- l o o p  s e m i s c a l e
(U S A E C , i n v e s t i g a t e  a p p l i ­ v e s s e l  a n n u l u s  a n d  d o w n ­
A e r o j e t c a t i o n  of a i r - w a t e r comer.
N u c l e a r c o u n t e r c u r r e n t  f l o w
C o m p a n y , c o r r e l a t i o n s  to
NRTS) d o w n c o m e r  a n n u l u s
g e o m e t r i e s .
W o r k  r e l a t e d  t o  
o t h e r  s e m i s c a l e  
t e s t i n g  t o  u n d e r ­
s t a n d  E C C  d e l i v e r y  
a n d  b y p a s s . E f ­
f e cts o f  d o w n c o m e r  
l e n g t h , a n d  l o w e r  
p l e n u m  g e o m e t r y  
studied.
2. S e m i s c a l e  
V e s s e l  - 
S t e a d y -  
S t a t e  T e s t s  
(USAEC, 
A e r o j e t  
N u c l e a r  C o m ­
p a n y ,  NRTS)
S S - S S B D  S a m e  as f o r  1 2 -ft l o ng, 8.5 i n . - I D  L a s t  q u a r -
S e m i s c a l e - P l e x i g l a s s  p r e s s u r e  v e s s e l ,  1 / 2 - o r  t e r  o f  1 9 7 2  
V e s s e l  w i t h  s t e a m -  1-in. a n n u l u s  w i d t h ,  
w a t e r  c o u n t e r c u r r e n t  o u t l e t  p h a s e  o p e rator, 
f l o w  a n d  in a d d i t i o n ,  
e f f e c t  o f  h e a t  t r a n s ­
f e r  f r o m  f l u i d  b o u n d ­
a r ies at e l e v a t e d  
t e m p e r a t u r e s .
3. 1 - 1 / 2 - L o o p  I - S S B D
S e m i3c a l e  - 
I s o t h e r m a l  
T e s t s  (USAEC,
A e r o j e t  N u c ­
l e a r  C o m p a n y ,
NRTS)
I n v e s t i g a t e  E C C  d e ­
l i v e r y  w i t h  e m p h a s i s  
o n  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
o f  s t e a d y - s t a t e  l o w  
p r e s s u r e  r e s u l t s  t o  
t r a n s i e n t  b l o w d o w n  
condit i o n s .
S e m i s c a l e  v e s s e l ;  v e s s e l  M i d  1 9 7 3  
d o w n c o m e r ;  o p e r a t i n g  l o o p  
w i t h  p u m p ,  s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r ,  
a n d  p r e s s u r i z e r ;  b l o w d o w n  
l o o p  w i t h  s i m u l a t e d  s t e a m  
g e n e r a t o r  a n d  p u mp; a c ­
c u m u l a t o r s  .
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S t e a d y - s t a t e  a i r -  
w a t e r  a n d  s t e a m -  
w a t e r  c o u n t e r -  
c u r r e n t  f l o w  t e s t s  
t o  s t u d y  e f f e c t s  
o f  w a t e r  t e m p e r a ­
t u r e ,  w a l l  s t o r e d  
e n e r g y , d o w n c o m e r  
g a p  w i d t h ,  and 
l o w e r  p l e n u m  g e o ­
metry.
T e s t  c o n d i t i o n s  i n ­
c l u d e  b l o w d o w n  w i t h  
a n d  w i t h o u t  E C C  in­
j e c t i o n ;  v a r i a t i o n  
in E C C  i n j e c t i o n  
p r e s s u r e  a n d  l o c a ­
t i o n ,  l o w e r  p l e n u m  
g e o m e t r y ,  p u m p  s h u t ­
d o w n  t i m e s ,  and s t e a m 
g e n e r a t o r  s e c o n d a r y  
c o n d i t i o n s .
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1*. S t e a m - W a t e r C E / U S A E C  I n v e s t i g a t e  inter-
M i x i n g  T est a c t i o n  o f  t h e  ECC
P r o g r a m f l u i d  w i t h  ste a m
(US A E C  and in t h e  p r i m a r y
C o m b u s t i o n system.
E n g i n e e r i n g ,
Inc. W i n d s o r ,
C o n n e c t i c u t )
R e f l o o d i n g  Heat
T r a n s f e r
S t e a m  g e n e r a t o r ;  c o l d  l e g  C o n t i n u i n g  39 I n v e s t i g a t e  p i p i n g
w i t h  l o o p  s e al, s i m u l a t e d  
p u m p ,  a n d  E C C  i n j e c t i o n  
n o z z l e ;  a n d  r e a c t o r  v e s ­
sel. T e s t  s e c t i o n  is a 
g e o m e t r i c a l l y  s c a l e d  m o ­
del of the p i p i n g  f r o m 
t h e  s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r  to 
the r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  inlet.
h y d r a u l i c  r e s i s t a n c e ,  
i n j e c t i o n  n o z z l e  i n ­
c l i n a t i o n ,  test 
s e c t i o n  size. E q u i ­
l i b r i u m  t e s t s  at 
v a r i o u s  p r e s s u r e s  
t o  o b t a i n  d a t a  on 
w a t e r  r e m a i n i n g ,  a n d  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  r e a c t o r  
v e s s e l  g e o m e t r y  on 
w a t e r  re m a i n i n g .
1. L o w  R a t e  E C C  F I A T  
R e f l o o d i n g  
H e a t  T r a n s ­
fer (FIAT 
N u c l e a r  E n ­
e r g y  Se c t i o n ,
Italy)
2. 1 - 1 / 2 - L o o p  M o d - 1
M o d - 1  (USAEC,
A e r o j e t  N u c ­
l e a r  C o m p a n y ,
NRTS)
3. E C C  R e f l o o d i n g  S i e m e n s /  
E x p e r i m e n t s  G F M  
( S i e m e n s ,
G e r m a n y )
1*. L o s s - o f - F l u i d  L O F T  
T e s t  (USAEC,
A e r o j e t  N u c ­
l e a r  C o m p a n y ,
N R TS)
O b t a i n  r o d  b u n d l e  
h e a t  t r a n s f e r  d a t a  
d u r i n g  re f l o o d i n g .
T w e n t y - o n e  h e a t e r  rod 
a s s e m b l y  w i t h  u p p e r  and 
l o w e r  plenum. H e a t e r  O D  
is 9.8 mm, l e n g t h  is 
118U m m ,  a n d  p i t c h  is 
1 2 . 9  mm. U n i f o r m  p o w e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .
I n c l u d e s  i n v e s t i ­
g a t i o n  o f  b l o w d o w n  
a n d  E C C  i n j e c t i o n  
v a r i a b l e s  a n d  t h e i r  
i n f l u e n c e  o n  c l a d ­
d i n g  t e m p e r a t u r e .
I n v e s t i g a t e  the 
p e r f o r m a n c e  of 
l o w  p r e s s u r e  E C C S  
a n d  o b t a i n  f l u i d  
f l o w  a n d  h e a t  
t r a n s f e r  d a t a  d u r ­
ing r e f l o o d i n g .
O b t a i n  d a t a  on 
t h e r m a l - h y d r a u l i c  
b e h a v i o r  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  c o r e  a n d  on 
c o r e  t h e r m a l  r e ­
s p o n s e  d u r i n g  E C C  
i n j e ction.
A  s i m u l a t e d  P W R  s y s t e m  
w i t h  g e n e r i c  c o m p o n e n t  
e l e v a t i o n ,  e l e c t r i c a l l y  
h e a t e d  cor e ,  o p e r a t i n g  
loop, b l o w d o w n  loop, 
a c c u m u l a t o r ,  H P I S  and 
LPI S . [ a ]  C a p a b i l i t y  for 
5-5- a n d  12- foot h e a t e d  
r o d  lengths.
P r e l i m i n a r y  r e f l o o d i n g  
t e s t s  w i t h  a s i n g l e  in­
t e r n a l l y  c o o l e d  tube. 
A l s o  an e l e c t r i c a l l y  
h e a t e d  3**0-rod arr a y ,  
10.75- m m  r o d  d i a m e t e r ,
3 m  in l e n g t h  w i t h  
c h o p p e d  c o s i n e  p o w e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  B u n d l e  
has t h r e e  r e g i o n s  
w h i c h  can b e  i n d e ­
p e n d e n t l y  h e a t e d  w i t h  
m a x i m u m  p o w e r  input 
o f  1.1* MW. A  16- b a r  
p r e s s u r e  v e s s e l  c o n ­
t a i n s  t h e  b u n d l e .  A 
b y p a s s  s i m u l a t e s  t h e  
a n n u l a r  d o w n c o m e r .
55 M W ( t )  PWR w i t h  an 
o p e r a t i n g  l o op, a 
b l o w d o w n  l o op, a c ­
c u m u l a t o r s ,  LPIS, 
H P I S [ a ] ,  s u p p o r t i n g  
s y s t e m s ,  a n d  i n i t i a l l y  
a  5-5- f t - l o n g  c o r e  o f  
t y p i c a l  P W R  fuel d i ­
m e n s i o n s  w i t h  a b o u t  
1 3 0 0  f u e l  pins. C a p a ­
b i l i t y  f o r  a  12- f t -  
l o n g  c o r e  p r o v i d e d .
1*0 F l o o d i n g  r a t e s  in 
t h e  r a n g e  o f  0.2 
t o  0.6 i n . / s e c , 
p o w e r  v a r i e d  f r o m  
0.1*5 t o  0 . 6 5  
kW/ f t .  A  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p  b e t w e e n  b o t t o m  
f l o o d i n g  a n d  m a x i ­
m u m  a c c e p t a b l e  
p o w e r  w a s  ob t a i n e d .
E m p h a s i z e s  s y s t e m  
a n d  l o o p  c o m p o n e n t  
e f f e c t s  on E C C  d e ­
l i v e r y  t o  c ore 
r e g i o n  d u r i n g  b l o w ­
down.
C o n t i n u i n g  1*1 F l o o d i n g  f r o m  the 
b o t t o m  o n l y  a n d  
s i m u l t a n e o u s  t o p  
a n d  b o t t o m  fl o o d i n g .
C o n t i n u i n g  R e f l o o d i n g  h eat
t r a n s f e r  d a t a  on 
n u c l e a r  f u e l e d  core. 
W i d e  r a n g e  o f  E C C  
i n j e c t i o n  p a r a m e t e r s  
a n d  i n j e c t i o n  l o ­
c a t i o n s  c a n  b e  
se l e c t e d .
A4-4
TABLE II (Contd.)
ONGOING AND PLANNED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO LOCA-ECC IN WATER COOLED REACTORS
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5. P o w e r  B u r s t  
F a c i l i t y  
(USAEC, A e r o ­
jet N u c l e a r  
C o m p a n y , N R T S )
S c a l e d  S y s t e m  
E f f e c t s  E x ­
p e r i m e n t s
1. 1 - 1 / 2 - L o o p  
M o d - 1  (USAEC, 
A e r o j e t  N u c ­
l e a r  C o m p a n y ,  
NRTS)
2. B W R  B l o w d o w n  
H e a t  T r a n s ­
fer ( U S A E C  
a n d  G e n e r a l  
E l e c t r i c  
C o m p a n y , San 
J o s e ,  Cal i f . )
3. R e s e a r c h  of 
S a f e t y  A s ­
s e s s m e n t  
(ROSA), 
( J a p a n  A t o ­
m i c  E n e r g y  
R e s e a r c h  
I n s t i t u t e  
T o k a i  L a ­
b o r a t o r y )
4. F u l l  S c a l e  
S a f e t y  E x ­
p e r i m e n t s  
o f  F U G E N
C O D E  ________P U R P O S E _________  E X P E R I M E N T A L  S Y S T E M  S C H E D U L E  REF.
P B F  D e t e r m i n e  m a x i -  O p e n  t a n k  r e a c t o r  C o n t i n u i n g
m u m  f u e l  c l ad- v e s s e l  h o u s i n g  3-
d i n g  t e m p e r a t u r e  f t - l o n g  d r i v e r  core,
p e r m i t t e d  at t h e  a  c e n t r a l  f l u x  t r a p
t i m e  o f  c o o l a n t  d e -  r e g i o n  c o n t a i n i n g  a n  in- 
l i v e r y  w i t h o u t  loss p i l e  t u b e  in w h i c h  t h e  
o f  c l a d d i n g  i n te- t e s t  f u e l  is l o c a t e d  a n d  
g r i t y ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a  l o o p  c o o l a n t  s y s t e m  for 
b a l l o o n i n g  on m a x i -  p r o v i d i n g  r e q u i r e d  sys- 
m u m  p e r m i s s i b l e  tern- t e m  c o n d i t i o n s  in t h e
p e r a t u r e ,  a n d  t h e  t e s t  section,
e f f e c t  o f  d e g r a d e d  
c o o l a n t  p e r f o r m a n c e  
o n  t h e  m a x i m u m  p e r ­
m i s s i b l e  c l a d d i n g  
t e m p e r a t u r e .
M o d - 1
G E / B D H T /
A E C
R O S A  II
P r o v i d e  L O C A - E C C  
d a t a ;  for a n a l y ­
t i c a l  m o d e l  e v a l ­
u a t i o n  o f  t o t a l  
s y s t e m  code s ,  o n  
e f f e c t s  of p h y ­
s i c a l  s c a l e  in 
r e l a t i o n  t o  L O F T  
sca l e ,  a n d  for 
g u i d a n c e  of L O F T  
t e s t  program.
P r o v i d e  i n f o r m a ­
t i o n  o n  t h e  t r a n ­
s i e n t  h e a t  t r a n s f e r  
f o l l o w i n g  a r u p t u r e  
o f  a s t e a m  l i n e  or 
r e c i r c u l a t i o n  l ine 
in a  BWR.
O b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  
o n  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
s y s t e m  p a r a m e t e r s  
s u c h  as p i p i n g  r e ­
s i s t a n c e ,  pow e r ,  
p r e s s u r e ,  b r e a k  
l o c a t i o n  a n d  size, 
a n d  E C C S  v a r i a t i o n s ,  
for b o t h  BWR a n d  
P W R  c o n d i t i o n s .
A  s i m u l a t e d  P W R  s y s t e m  
w i t h  a n  e l e c t r i c a l l y  
h e a t e d  c o re, a n  o p e r a t ­
ing l o o p ,  a  b l o w d o w n  
loo p ,  a c c u m u l a t o r ,  H P IS, 
a n d  L P IS[a]. C a p a b i l i t y  
for 5 .5- a n d  1 2 - f t - l o n g  
c o r e s  a n d  o t h e r  s y s t e m  
g e o m e t r y  c h anges.
S c a l e d  BWR s y s t e m  c o n ­
s i s t i n g  of a p r e s s u r e  
v e s s e l  w i t h  t w o  e x ­
t e r n a l  d r i v e  p u m p  r e ­
c i r c u l a t i o n  loops.
V e s s e l  c o n t a i n s  a 
f u l l -8ize l*9- r o d  e l e c ­
t r i c a l l y  h e a t e d  b u n d l e ,  
t w o  J e t  p u m p s , a n d  a 
s t e a m  s e p a rator.
R O S A  II f a c i l i t y  c o n ­
s i s t s  o f  a 265- m m - I D  
a n d  5900- m m - l o n g  p r e s ­
s ure v e s s e l  c o n t a i n i n g  
1 0 9  e l e c t r i c a l l y  h e a t e d  
r o d s  1500 m m  in l e n g t h ,  
t w o  l o ops w i t h  p u m p  a n d 
s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r s , one o f  
t h e s e  l o o p s  h a s  a r u p ­
t u r e  u n i t ,  p r e s s u r i z e r ,  
a n d  ECCS.
C o n t i n u i n g  U2
C o n t i n u i n g  32
F U G E N O b t a i n  c l a d d i n g  t e m ­
p e r a t u r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
d u r i n g  b l o w d o w n  a n d  
E C C  i n j e c t i o n ,  d i s ­
c h a r g e  r e a c t i o n  
f o r c e s , a n d  t r a n s i ­
e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  s y s ­
tem.
T h e  f a c i l i t y  c o n s i s t s  o f  C o n t i n u i n g
a s t e a m  d r u m ,  c i r c u l a t i n g
p u m p ,  d o w n c o m e r ,  l o w e r
h e a d e r ,  25 p r e s s u r e  t u b e
a s s e m b l i e s  3 o f  w h i c h
c o n t a i n  e l e c t r i c a l l y
h e a t e d  f u l l - s c a l e  f u e l
a s s e m b l i e s ,  a n d  ECCS. F u e l
a s s e m b l i e s  c o n t a i n  28
h e a t e r s  3.7 m  in length.
1*3
R F M A R K S
T e s t s  w i t h  b o t h  P W R  
a n d  B W R  f u e l  c l u s t e r s  
u p  t o  2U - p i n  array. 
T o p  s p r a y  o r  b o t t o m  
f l o o d i n g  c a p a b i l i t y .  
T e s t s  i n c l u d e  u s e  o f  
i r r a d i a t e d  fuel.
E x t e n s i v e  s y s t e m s  
e f f e c t s  a n d  p a r a ­
m e t e r  v a r i a t i o n s  o n  
s y s t e m  c o m p o n e n t  in­
f l u e n c e  o n  b l o w d o w n ,  
b l o w d o w n  h e a t  t r a n s ­
fer, E C C  d e l i v e r y ,  
a n d  c o r e  r e f l o o d i n g  
c o o l i n g .
T e s t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  
i n c l u d e :  v a r i a t i o n  o f  
i n i t i a l  s y s t e m  c o n ­
d i t i o n s ,  b r e a k  s i z e  
a n d  l o c a t i o n s , a n d  
p o w e r  d e c a y  t r a n sient.
R O S A  II f a c i l i t y  is 
b e i n g  f a b r i c a t e d .  
T e s t i n g  is s c h e d u l e d  
t o  b e g i n  in O c t o b e r  
1973.
E x p e r i m e n t a l  f a c i l i t y  
is a  m o c k u p  o f  t h e  
p r o t o t y p e , h e a v y -  
w a t e r - m o d e r a t e d  , 
b o l l i n g - l i g h t - v a t e r -  
c o o l e d  r e a c t o r ,
FUGEN.
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TABLE II (Contd.)
ONGOING AND PLANNED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO LOCA-ECC IN WATER COOLED REACTORS
PROGRAM CODi: PURPOSE________ EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEM SCHEDULE REF.
5. F u l l  L e n g t h  FLECHT-
E m e r g e n c y  SET
C o o l i n g  Heat 
T r a n s f e r -  
S y s t e m  E f ­
fects Tests
(US A E C  a n d  
Westinghouse 
Electric 
Corporation,
Pittsburgh,
Pa.)
L a r g e - S y s t e m  E f ­
f e cts E x p e r i m e n t s  
v i t h  N u c l e a r  H e a t  
S o u r c e
1. LoBS-of-Fluid LOFT 
Test (USAEC,
Aerojet Nuc­
lear Ccopany,
NRTS)
Provide experimental FLECHT f l o w  h o u s i n g  a n d  a End 1973 29
data on the influ- p o w e r  p r o f i l e d  10 x  10 
ence of system ef- h e a t e r  r o d  t e s t  a s s e m b l y ,  
fects on ECC behavior c o o l a n t  s u p p l y  s y s t e m ,  
during reflooding. d o w n c o m e r ,  p r e s s u r e  c o n ­
t r o l  s y s t e m ,  u p p e r  a n d  
l o w e r  t e s t  s e c t i o n  p l e ­
n u m s ,  a n d  s i n g l e  l o o p  
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  p i p i n g ,  
v a l v e s ,  a n d  o r i f i c e s .
In l a t e r  t e s t s  t h e  s i n g l e  
l o o p  w i l l  b e  r e p l a c e d  
b y  t w o  l o o p s  e a c h  h a v i n g  
a  f u l l  l e n g t h  s t e a m  g e n ­
e r a t o r ,  p u m p  s i m u l a t o r ,  
a n d  p i p i n g  a r r a n g e d  t o  
r e p r e s e n t  elevations and 
f l o w  characteristics in 
t h e  loops.
P r o v i d e  P W R  i n t e ­
g r a l  t e s t  d a t a  on 
a l l  p r i n c i p a l  a s ­
p e c t s  o f  an L O C A  
w i t h  E C C  i n j e c t i o n  
i n c l u d i n g  t r a n s i e n t  
t h e r m a l ,  m e c h a n i c a l ,  
a n d  n u c l e a r  r e s p o n s e  
of t h e  s y s t e m ,  capa­
b i l i t y  of E C C S ,  
margins of safety, 
containment system 
effects, ahd fission 
product behavior.
55 M W ( t )  PWR w i t h  an Continuing
o p e r a t i n g  loo p ,  a b l o w ­
d o w n  l o o p ,  a c c u m u l a t o r s ,
LPIS, HPIS[a], supporting 
s y s t e m s ,  a n d  initially 
a 5-5-ft-long core other­
wise of typical PWR fuel 
dimensions with about 
1300 fuel pins. Capability 
for a 12-ft-long core 
provided.
[a] HPIS —  high pressure injection system; LPIS —  low pressure injection system.
R E M A R K S
T e s t s  e m p h a s i z e  t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  s y s t e m  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  on 
f l o o d i n g  r a t e ,  h e a t
raleaBe from clad-.
d i n g  a n d  f l o w  h o u s i n g ,  
c a r r y o v e r ,  a n d  p r e s ­
s u r e  drop. A d d i t i o n a l  
s y s t e m  f e a t u r e s  and 
testing are beii^g 
considered.
T e s t  d a t a  w i l l  p r o ­
v i d e  u n i q u e  e x p e r i ­
m e n t a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ;  
at l a r g e  s c a l e ,  in 
m o r e  t h a n  o n e  d i m e n ­
s i o n  w i t h i n  c o r e  a n d  
r e a c t o r  v e s s e l ,  w i t h  
g e n e r i c  t i m e  c o n s t a n t s  
o f  n u c l e a r  f u e l ,  w i t h  
i n t e r a c t i n g  e f f e c t s  of 
c l a d d i n g  b a l l o o n i n g ,  
c h a n g i n g  f u e l  g a p  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  a n d  c h a n g i n g  
c o o l a n t  c h a n n e l  g e o ­
m e t r y ,  a n d  at h i g h  
t e m p e r a t u r e  f u e l  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  deter­
m i n i n g  m a r g i n s  of 
emergency c o r e  cool­
ing performance.
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Appendix 5 REACTOR FISSION PRODUCT DECAY HEAT
Fission product decay heat produces one of the primary energy 
inputs for the ECCS. Unlike many of the complicated coupled fluid mechan­
ical thermodynamic-heat transfer problems associated with the overall 
effectiveness of the ECCS, the decay heat, as an energy source function 
for this system, may be evaluated independently of the remainder of the 
problem. Consequently, the analyses leading to a definitive specification 
of the magnitude of the decay heat might rationally be expected to have 
been adequately disposed of long before the preparation of the IAC. 
Regrettably, the magnitude of the decay heat was the subject of substan­
tial controversy during the ECCS Hearings. The principal arguments asso­
ciated with the subject will be reviewed in this appendix.
A5.1 Decay Heat Standards
The IAC specified that the decay heat input utilized for the 
analysis should be defined in accordance with the proposed American 
Nuclear Society (ANS) Standard ANS 5.1, "Decay Energy Release Rates 
Following Shutdown of Uranium-Fueled Thermal Reactor," with an added 
20 percent "allowance for uncertainties."* During the early stages of 
the hearings, the CNI provoked a substantial controversy over the adequacy 
of the ANS Standard 5.1 on the basis of an investigation on the subject 
of decay heat by T. R. England. The CNI suggested, based on England's 
doctoral dissertation results, that the ANS Standard 5.1 might under­
predict decay heat by 20 percent to 50 percent. Subsequent reviews and 
analyses of the decay heat have substantially reduced the controversy 
over the problem (as well as the expected magnitude of ANS Standard 5.1 
underpredictions).
* See appendix 3: Interim Acceptance Criteria, Appendix A: Part 1, 
No, 5; Part 2, No, 6; Part 3, No. 2, etc.
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The technical community's concern over the adequacy of the 
ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent prescription of the IAC has not been com­
pletely eliminated. However, supplemental studies imply that there are 
no major discrepancies in the ANS Standard 5.1 description of decay heat 
(at least of the magnitude initially suggested by England and the CNI).
As a result, the IAC decay heat prescription was adopted in the AC, with­
out change. Subsequent review and analyses of decay heat have substantially 
reduced (but not eliminated) the controversy over the problem.
In an operating reactor, in addition to fission product decay 
heat generation shown in figure A5.1, thermal energy is also supplied 
after shutdown by delayed neutron interactions and heavy isotope (U-239 
and Np-239) decay. Figure A5.2 shows a typical total shutdown power 
generation curve, demonstrating the rapid decrease in the effectiveness 
of delayed neutrons as a power source. As shown in figure A5.2, delayed 
neutron interactions act to maintain heat generation at relatively high 
levels during the first 10 seconds (approximately) after shutdown. At 
the end of this period, the shutdown power has decayed to about 6 percent 
of rated power output for the reactor and is subsequently a function of 
essentially fission product and heavy isotope decay only. At the end of 
100 seconds, the power has decreased to less than 4 percent of rated 
power and continues to decrease thereafter at a rate approximating the
0.2 power of time.
The ANS Standard 5.1 has been based upon a combination of 
numerical and experimental studies. One of the principal problems with 
the analysis upon which the standard is based is the shortage of experi­
mental results for both the critical 0-1000 sec time period following 
shutdown and for fuel exposed in reactors for extended-high flux irradi­
ation periods (10,000-50,000 hours) (4_, p. 22-9). Experimental information 
on decay heating is gathered in two ways: through results of gamma or 
beta energy decay measurements, or by direct calorimetric measurements.
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Figure A5.1 ANS Standard 5.1 Fission - Product Decay Heat Curve 
(For Uranium-Fueled Thermal Reactors)
Figure A5.2
Normalized Reactor Shutdown Power Generation
(After Figure 6-1, 66_, by permission.)
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No direct calorimetric methods have been successfully employed for shut­
down times less than 1000 sec; calorimetric results exist for experiments 
conducted on fuel rod elements exposed to irradiation bursts of short 
time periods which agree "satisfactorily" with numerical studies. All 
of the important analyses of decay heat depend upon experimental results 
of gamma and beta energy measurements during the important 0-1000 sec 
time period following shutdown. Unfortunately, there are only about five 
to six good independent sets of experimental data for each of the gamma 
and beta measurements —  a very small quantity of data for such important 
parameters.
ANS Standard 5.1 also depends on experimental results in the 
time period 0-1000 sec and results of numerical studies for the modeling 
of subsequent time periods. Until recently, numerical analyses were 
considered to be of questionable validity in the 0-1000 sec shutdown period 
because the influence of short half-life fission product nuclides was 
generally neglected in the summation calculations used for the analyses.
A5.2 Comparison of IAC and T. R. England Decay Heat Predictions
An important numerical analysis of reactor shutdown heating 
was recently performed by T. R. England (23). The England study was a 
numerical summation calculation in which an attempt was made to improve 
upon other available short time studies by using more recent data sources 
and theory, including evaluation of short-lived isotopes in the analysis, 
and the improvement of the neutron capture analysis with a more complete 
physical modeling of the coupling of the nuclides of the fission product 
chain. These characteristics tended to improve the short time analysis. 
Consequently, England's study claimed to be valid for time as short as 
60 sec or more after shutdown.
Prior to England's calculation, uncertainty over the physical 
characteristics of the short-lived isotopes (i.e., yields, half-lives, 
capture cross-sections, and beta and gamma decay energies for isotopes
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with half-lives less than one minute) limited estimates of summation 
calculation validity to cooling periods greater than 1000 seconds. The 
earlier analysis (Shure, 1961, 63) upon which ANS Standard 5.1 was based 
used experimental data to provide the basis for decay times less than 
1000 sec. Shure's early study was based (for decay times greater than 
1000 sec) upon summation calculations which included 350 fission product 
nuclides and employed neutron absorption in addition to radioactive decay 
to account for coupling between nuclide decay chains (65, p. 5). Neutron 
coupling was not included in the studies upon which Shure's early work was 
based. Future studies which are to be conducted under AEC sponsorship may 
include as many as 800 nuclides in describing decay energy. Adequate 
descriptions of decay times as short as 10 sec may be possible in summa­
tion calculations using the current nuclide data.
The most notable departure of England's results from the ANS 
Standard 5.1 was associated with an indicated increase in the influence 
of time-dependent neutron flux-irridiation time characteristics on the 
decay heat. England's results, for sufficiently large flux-time intervals 
were considerably larger than predicted by the ANS Standard 5.1 model with 
an infinite irradiation period. To graphically demonstrate the differ­
ences, England's original results for the time-history of decay power are 
shown (normalized against the ANS standards) in figure A5.3. The results 
are plotted in terms of the parameters of multiples of a standardized 
flux, $ , and irradiation times. It should be noted that these resultsii
were based upon calculations which were erroneous. Corrections were made 
in the code and the results were revised as indicated by the dashed curve 
in figure A5.3.
England's base case, with the standardized flux $ , corresponds
13 Eto a thermal neutron flux of 2 x 10 for 10,000 hours. This case was_  ^ 2
calculated with a U-235 density of 5 x 10 at/barn-cm (England's units)3which produces an initial power density of 109 w/cm , for the unit flux $ E
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Figure A5.3
Comparison of England Fission-Product Decay Calculations to ANS Standard 5.1
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Typical BWR and PWR reactors have average U-235 enrichments of 2.7 and
2.15 percent, respectively, corresponding to U-235 densities of 1.8 and_ ^ 2 _
1.2 x 10 at/barn-cm . With power densities for typical W-PWRs and GE-BWRs
3 3of the order of 105 w/cm and 51 w/cm , respectively, the above U-235 den­
sities would lead to average flux levels for the PWR of 2.7$^ and 1.9$g 
for the BWR, in England's nomenclature. For these reactors, an average 
equilibrium burnup of 30,000 MWd/MT* would correspond to three annual 8000 
hour cycles for the PWR and five for the BWR (4_, p. 22-10).
In accordance with the IAC, ECCS analyses are based upon evalua­
tion of a fuel rod exposed not to the average flux, but to the influence 
of the peaking factor resulting in the "most severe thermal transient" 
possible for the accident. To satisfy these requirements, a peaking 
factor of 2.6 is appropriate for DBA analysis. Under these circumstances, 
a flux-time integral of (7<1>^, 24K.hr) for the PWR and (5$j_, 40Khr) for the 
BWR would be representative of limiting conditions (a single rod exposed 
to maximum flux conditions over its entire life span in the reactor) of 
irradiation exposure for the reactor fuel..
England's original dissertation results, shown in figure A5.3, 
imply that flux-time integrals of the above magnitudes would lead to 
shutdown decay energies substantially in excess of those predicted by the 
ANS Standard 5.1. The results (solid lines) indicate the initially pre­
dicted (on the basis of erroneous calculations) effect of increasing 
irradiation time and flux on resultant decay power. The results implied 
that increasing irradiation time by a given factor, generally speaking, 
might produce a greater increase in decay power than the same relative 
increase in flux. The nonlinearity of the results shown (as well as their 
apparent magnitude) in which increasing fluxes and irradiation times led 
to apparently exponentially increasing decay power led the CNI to become 
very concerned over this problem. England's conclusions to his disserta­
tion had stated:
* MWd/MT: megawatt days per metric ton of uranium.
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Because previously recommended heating rates, such as Shure's, 
have relied on a calculational model which ignores neutron 
absorption, several generations of coupled progeny and 
coupling systematics in general, this would explain the 
differences observed here. Prudence in design would require 
an increase of 20-50% in estimated heating rates now in 
use (23).
A5.3 Shure/England Reevaluation of Decay Heat
The substantial apparent differences between England's disserta­
tion results and the ANS proposed standards caused substantial concern 
within the technical community over the validity of the results and the 
sources of the apparent conflicts. In order to investigate the causes of 
the apparent decay heat differences, Shure initiated a reevaluation of 
his original recommendations together with England's calculational methods. 
Though the study was apparently conducted primarily by Shure, he received 
the cooperation of England in analyzing, correcting, and rerunning his 
code (CINDER) which had been developed and applied in England's doctoral 
dissertation.
The CINDER code, which includes "about 350 fission product 
nuclides and employs neutron absorption in addition to radioactive decay 
for coupling purposes between nuclides," was acknowledged by Shure to be 
a "more sophisticated" method than had been employed in his original in­
vestigation (64, p. 5). However, in the course of a careful investigation 
of the code, in comparison with other similar calculational routines, it 
was discovered that a "very subtle programming bug" had been made in one 
of the critical steps of the CINDER code (64, p. 7). After this program­
ming error was corrected by England, further investigations turned up 
"several data errors" which were subsequently revised in CINDER's tabula­
ted data for the physical parameters of some of the critical nuclides (64, 
p. 7). It should be observed that a similar number of "corrections" were 
required in the library of nuclide physical parameters for Shure's own 
current code (FSTAB) (64, p. 7).
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With CINDER's programming errors debugged and the corrections 
to the nuclide physical perameters incorporated, results of the code were 
again compared with the proposed ANS Standard 5.1 decay heat standards. 
Comparative data are shown in table A5.1, based upon Shure's reported 
results (64). It can be seen that while England's dissertation results 
departed from the proposed standard by 10-20 percent in the critical 
period of about the first 1000 sec of LOCA shutdown (figure A5.3), with 
the revisions and corrections the deviation was less than 6 percent for 
the base (or "fiducial") case (1$ , 10K hr).
£j
To evaluate the importance of neutron absorption and coupling
in the nuclide chains, Shure investigated higher flux variations for the
10K hr fiducial case (flux levels of 5<I> and 10$ ). Results are shownE E
in table A5.3, in comparison with the revised CINDER results of table A5.1 
and England's dissertation results. With the corrections and adjustments 
to CINDER made, the higher flux results (5$E and 10$ ) can be seen to be 
much more in line with ANS Standard 5.1 than the original dissertation 
results (figure A5.3 and column 4). With corrections, increases can be 
observed of 1-3 percent above the fiducial CINDER case, rather than the 
factors of nearly 2 which were observed in the original dissertation.
Review of the results indicated that the principal cause of 
the apparent reduction in relative energies was associated with the 
fission rate history of England's original dissertation. Comparison of 
the results indicated that the constant flux assumptions of England's 
dissertation led to unrealistically low fission rates (number of fissions/ 
sec) near the end of the irradiation period (~10K hr) as a result of 
uranium depletion. Low fission rates imply relatively low power output 
for the fuel. In practice, the average fission rate for the reactor is 
held nearly constant —  for a case of constant reactor power output —  
requiring a relatively increasing flux density rather than a constant flux 
history. As a result of England's constant flux assumption, the apparent 
relative power output near the end of the problem from the fuel (in Mev/fis- 
sion) was overpredicted, due to extremely low relative fission rates
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Table A5.1
Comparison of ANS 5.1 Standard Decay Energy with England Dissertation
and Revised CINDER Results
("Fiducial" Case—  1 3*^ , 10,000 Hours Irradiation)
t ANS England CINDER Revised Revised CINDF7
(sec) Standard 5.1 Dissertation
CINDER
ANS Standard 
5.1
CINDER ANS Standard 
5.1
(Mev/fiss) (Mev/fiss) (Mev/fiss)
0 13.88 11.68 .841 11.51 .829
101 9.874 9.825 .995 9.317 .943
io2 6.632 7.160 1.080 6.639 1.001
103 3.729 4.381 1.175 3.943 1.057
io4 1.836 2.205 1.201 1.853 1.009
io5 0.8428 1.130 1.341 0.8724 1.035
io6 0.4197 0.5453 1.299 0.4369 1.041
io7 0.1171 0.1571 1.342 0.1163 .993
h-» o 0
0
0.006620 0.007877 1.190 0.007621 1.151
Table A5.2
235Effect of Neutron Absorption of U Fission Product Decay 
Energy for the 10,000 Hour Fiducial Case
(Interim Revised Physical Parameters Used as Well as Revised CINDER Program)
t
(sec)
(1)
Reduced 3>
(2)
5 3>
(3) 
10 3>
(4)
103>*
Rev. CINDER Rev. CINDER Rev. CINDER Rev. CINDER
0 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.18
io1 — — 1.01 1.21
io2 — — 1.02 1.27
io3 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.43
io4 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.84
io5 0.98 1.02 1.05 2.61
H* O i 
o> 0.98 1.02 1.05 3.60
10 7 0.98 1.05 1.10 5.42
io8 0.92 1.30 1.60 10.01
* Fission rate history is comparable to case 12 (10 $ , 10K hr - England's 
dissertation). All other fission rate histories are comparable to the 
fiducial case (case 1) of ref. 23.
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(Mev/fission = Mev/sec 1- fission/sec). The results shown in table A5.2 
reflect calculations in which fission rates have been arbitrarily main­
tained at the same relative rates as the fiducial case, for all flux 
variations considered.
A5.4 ORNL Review of Empirical Decay Heat Results
Under AEC support, Perry, Maienshein, and Vondy of ORNL investi­
gated the empirical data supporting the proposed ANS Standard 5.1 standard 
(65). The results of the study are summarized in figure A5.4 reproduced 
from Perry, et al. (65). In the figure, results of various analyses of 
fission-product decay heat have been compared, on a normalized basis, with 
the ANS Standard 5.1 (curve (1)). Curve (2) represents the "best estimate" 
of the experimentally derived results of Perry et al. for fuel which has 
been irradiated in the reactor for an "infinite" time. It can be seen that 
in the critical period from 100 to 10,000 sec, the results depart from the 
ANS Standards 5.1 by a maximum of about 6 percent (occurring at 1000 sec). 
Other results shown in the figure include results of a recent Shure (FSTAB) 
calculation (curve (3)) of infinitely irradiated fuel (64). The FSTAB 
results demonstrate the characteristic inability of summation calculations 
to adequately predict short time results (especially for those calculations 
which include a relatively small number of nuclides - 201 - in their analy­
sis). As a result, Shure's analyses (e.g., 603) customarily described the 
first 1000 seconds after shutdown in terms of experimental results (curve 
(5)).
Curve (4) presents a graphical comparison of CINDER results 
(similar to those shown in table A5.1) for the so-called fiducial case 
(1$„, 10K hr irradiation) of Shure and England's studies. Shure's FSTAB 
results for a similar calculation have been shown in curve (5). The most 
significant observation to be drawn from the comparison is that all of 
the studies presented show a consistent departure, on the order of 5-8 per­
cent, in the period of about 1000 seconds (and later) after LOCA shutdown.
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The 6 percent deviation predicted by England at 1000 seconds after shutdown 
appears to be wholly consistent with, and thoroughly supported by, all 
the latest results.
Perry, et al. conducted an independent numerical investigation 
of the effects of neutron coupling using the ORNL-ORIGEN code in a summa­
tion calculation. England has attributed the dominant role in the in­
creases in decay energy predicted by his dissertation study to neutron 
coupling in the fission-product nuclide chains. Using the ORIGEN code, 
Perry observed an increase in decay heat attributable to neutron coupling
of no more than 2 percent for cooling times less than 1000 sec, a 4 per-
4 5cent increase at 10 sec, and a 7 percent increase at 10 sec (65, p. 53)
for fuel irradiated at average power levels within the reactor (approxi­
mately 2-3$ in England's nomenclature) for 30,000 MWD/MT. Though this E
does not correspond to infinite irradiation time periods, it does repre­
sent approximately 50,000 hours of irradiation at the average power levels 
of the calculation. Exposure times of this magnitude for fuel should 
furnish an adequate check on the validity of England's assertion of im­
portant long irradiation time effects to be expected due to neutron cou­
pling. Though the results do indicate a potential 2-4 percent increase, 
Perry's data do not support the kind of results for long irradiation 
periods suggested by England.
As further evidence of the validity of Perry's results, he
conducted an investigation of coupling effects for a case approximately
the fiducial exposure period of 10,000 hours (at the same flux levels of
2-3$ ). Perry's results for this case agree well with the results of E
Shure (table A5.2). Increases in decay energy for this case were less 
than 2 percent for all shutdown times .less than 10^ sec in Perry's 
"fiducial" study (65, p. 53).
Thus it appears that the combined effects of high fluxes asso­
ciated with the hottest rods of the reactor (5-7$„) and long irradiationE
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Figure A5. 4 Relative Integral Afterheat, F(t,T), from Various Sources (Relative to ANS Standard 5.1)
(After Figure 22,34  , by permission.)
times (up to 50,000 hours) should not increase decay power more than
4- 7 percent above the best estimates of decay energy for "fiducial" flux 
levels and irradiation times in the critical period of about 1000 sec after 
LOCA shutdown. However, this evidently is in addition to an expected
5- 8 percent positive deviation from the ANS Standard 5.1 in this same 
time period for the fiducial case. Thus the total expected deviation from 
the ANS Standard 5.1 at about 1000 sec after shutdown for the hot rod con­
ditions could well be an increase of from 10-15 percent.
A5.4.1 Experimental uncertainty in decay heat estimates
These estimates of deviations from the fiducial case must be 
coupled with consideration of the experimental uncertainty associated 
with the empirical data of Perry, et al. With respect to their "best 
estimate" values of figure A5.4, they have stated:
...we believe that there remains in the composite 
afterheat function, F(t,°° ), and error (roughly in the 
sense of one standard deviation) of about 10-15 percent 
(65, p. 19).
The composite afterheat function, F(t,°°), is simply the resultant decay 
heat associated with both beta and gamma ray decay energies of the fission 
product nuclides. After a statistical evaluation of the data from which 
they derived their best estimate fit to the experimental data, Perry, et 
al. concluded:
The assertion that the standard error in the afterheat function 
F(t, 00 ) is as small as +7% seems a bit surprising, when the 
results of individual experiments are as discrepant as they 
are shown to be in Figs. 11 and 14. In Fig. 11, for example, 
it may be seen that over much of the time range covered all 
the [8 decay energy] measurements lie outside of barely 
within the error band (+7-8%) deduced for fg (t) . The 
pattern for gammas is somewhat similar though less clear 
cut. It is our feeling, on the basis of many years of 
experience with nuclear physics measurements, including
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those of the type being evaluated, that the uncertainty 
in F(t,°°) would more conservatively be placed at +15%
(65, p. 44) (emphasis added).
To further define the limits of uncertainty for the data, the upper bounds 
of the empirical data were developed. Figure A5.5 shows the upper bounds 
for the partial composite after heat function, F+ (t,co), normalized 
against Shure's functional expression for the decay energy used in ANS 
Standard 5.1. For the limited experimental data examined by Perry et al., 
the results are bounded at the 1000 sec shutdown time by a + 28 percent 
increment. Over most of the remaining period of interest, the bounding 
value averages approximately 25 percent above the ANS Standard 5.1 values.
It must be emphasized that the bounding limits for the data 
are based upon a relatively sparse collection of independent experimental 
results. The composite afterheat function was formed on the basis of four 
independent experiments for g-energy release rates and five experiments 
for y-rays. Though more experiments were included for the y-ray energy 
spectral measurements, it was the conclusion of Perry et al. that:
The situation with respect to gamma energy-release measure­
ments is somewhat less satisfactory than for betas (65, p. 28).
It seems unlikely that the bounding values would be as low as 25-30 per­
cent above the ANS Standard 5.1 if a more exhaustive set of experimental 
data had been included.
A5.4.2 ANS estimates of ANS Standard 5.1 uncertainty
The ANS-5.1 Standards Committee also evaluated the uncertainty 
in the estimate of decay energy which they were proposing. Without 
expressly stating how their uncertainty results were related to a statis­
tical standard deviation, the ANS-5.1 subcommittee expressed their esti­
mate of the uncertainty of the results about the recommended curve to be
of the order of +20-40 percent for the first 1000 sec after shutdown.
3 7For the shutdown period between 10 and 10 sec, they stated that an
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Figure A5.5 "Upper bound" for integral afterheat, relative to Shure (1961) 
(From 65)
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uncertainty of +10-20 percent existed. Beyond 10^ sec (approximately one 
year, a period of relatively lesser concern for LOCA analyses) an uncertain­
ty of +25 percent to -50 percent was noted. Thus the ANS Standard 5.1 +20 
percent prescription of the IAC (and AC) does not represent a clear factor 
of safety, but apparently only covers one standard deviation of the recog­
nized uncertainty in the evaluation of the proposed standards validity.
A5.5 Evaluation of Decay Heat Controversy
The Consolidated National Intervenor (CNI) group challenged the 
AEC's use of the ANS Standard 5.1 decay heat standard +20 percent as a con­
servative estimate of LOCA decay heat on two bases (5). They challenged 
it first on the philosophical basis that using the upper limit of the ANS 
standards uncertainty factor of +20-40 percent does not satisfy the need 
for application of a "safety factor" to the decay heat input conditions 
for the ECCS heat removal analysis problem. Second, they challenged the 
validity and conservatism of the ANS Standard 5.1 itself, claiming that 
England's work (23) made its adequacy uncertain.
A5.5.1 The semantics of "safety factors"
As far as the philosophical question relating uncertainty 
allowances and safety factors is concerned, the AEC has acknowledged that 
utilizing ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent for the decay heat specification 
of the AC does not allow a "factor of safety" for this input factor. The 
Commission has stated:
...it appears to us that the 20% on top of the ANS decay 
heat formula fairly represents the uncertainty and does 
not provide any margin above that uncertainty (60, p. 1103) 
(emphasis added).
It may be argued that the decay heat is a parameter of such 
importance to the ECCS that a safety factor is a necessary requirement. 
However, it is not without precedent for safety factors of nearly unitary 
value to be applied in current engineering design practice. For complex
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systems such as large aircraft or major military systems, it is considered 
both good and common engineering practice to use safety factors in a very 
restricted manner. The arbitrary application of even a relatively small 
safety factor to each design parameter in these complex systems could re­
sult in an overwhelming pyramiding of the factors as they were individually 
applied. Where careful attention to quality control is utilized and ade­
quate research conducted to resolve uncertainties in the magnitudes of 
design parameters, it is accepted engineering practice to use bounding 
factors for statistically significant uncertainty limits for the parameters 
themselves, as opposed to formally specified safety factors which attempt 
to account for ignorance of such limits. This seems to have been the in­
tent of the AEC treatment of the decay heat parameter.
A5.5.2 Decay heat prediction conservatism
The second question concerning the validity of the ANS standard 
itself and the adequacy of its uncertainty limits is a more significant 
problem. The CNI (5_) used England's thesis result to support their posi­
tion that the ANS Standard 5.1 decay heat estimates were too low. From 
our previous analyses, it is clear that England's initial dissertation 
results (fig. A5.3) have been shown to be invalid. The revised CINDER 
results of table A5.1 are representative of more accurate output from 
England's analysis when coding and input data errors have been corrected.
The revised results indicate a positive deviation of no more than 
6 percent from the proposed ANS Standard 5.1, for the fiducial case ($£,
10K hr). When required corrections are made to the fiducial case to ac­
count for the higher neutron fluxes and longer irradiation times specified 
for "hot rod" calculations under the AC, deviations must be revised upward 
by an additional 4-7 percent. (Under AC specifications, expected neutron 
flux levels might correspond to 5-7®„, while irradiation periods wouldhi
range from about 20K hr to 40K hr for total fuel irradiation levels of 
the order of 30,000 MWD/MT.) Thus the results of current sophisticated
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summation calculations indicate the need for upward corrections to the 
ANS Standards 5.1 of the order of 10-15 percent in the critical 1000 sec 
cooldown period when operationally consistent high neutron fluxes and long 
irradiation periods are considered.
However, it is generally acknowledged that summation calculations 
have tended to be unreliable, particularly for short shutdown times of the 
order of 1000 sec or less (e.g., 65_, p. 47; 6h_, p. 10). The unreliability 
is caused by inadequacies in information concerning yields, half-lives, 
and decay energies for the short-lived fission product nuclides far from 
the line of nuclear stability. Though there is reason to believe that 
substantial progress will be made in the near future, as a result of AEC 
sponsored research programs at ORNL, Battelle NW, and other locations, the 
reliability of summation calculations will continue to be uncertain in the 
immediate future.
Consequently, we must look to empirically based results for 
support to the quantitative results of the summation calculation. In this 
case, we observe (as shown in figure A5.4) that there is good general 
agreement between the results of CINDER calculations and empirical results 
for cooldown times greater than 100 seconds. The "best estimates" of 
Perry et al. give direct quantitative support to an upward deviation from 
the ANS Standard 5.1 of 6 percent or better at shutdown times of the order 
of 1000 seconds. Moreover, Perry, et al. have estimated a one-standard 
deviation uncertainty of the order of +15 percent in the empirical results.
Therefore, it appears that in the critical LOCA shutdown period 
of about 1000 sec, that ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent will correspond to 
an equivalent deviation uncertainty of about one-standard deviation from 
the expected mean decay heat values. It is legitimate to ask whether 
confidence limits are adequately and conservatively bounded at one standard 
deviation. Since ANS Standard 5,1 +20 percent is equivalent to a one 
standard deviation uncertainty, the probability that higher decay energies
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will be experienced above the AC prescribed limits is above 30 percent. 
Increasing the decay energy limits to ANS Standard 5.1 +30 percent would 
reduce the probability of experiencing decay heats above the criteria 
limits to about 11 percent. On the other hand, if the criteria limits 
were raised to ANS Standard 5.1 +35 percent, the probability is less than 
5 percent that the criteria limits would be exceeded. A 30 percent proba­
bility of exceeding the AC (ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent) limits seems 
excessive. Consequently, it would seem desirable to increase the bounding 
criteria values to either ANS Standard 5.1 +30 percent or ANS Standard 5.1 
+35 percent.
In their opinion to the AC, the Commissioners have defended 
their selection of ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent as follows:
Although no new experimental work was presented during 
the hearings, new computer calculations from the doctoral 
thesis of T. R. England were brought up and emphasized by 
the Consolidated National Intervenors (Exhibit 1152, pp.
2.2-2.6). England's work was essentially a computer 
calculation and summation of the contributions of indivi­
dual nuclides, including for the first time the effect of 
neutron capture in the fission product chains. As origi­
nally presented, England's results indicated large deviations 
above the ANS prescription, particularly for high neutron 
fluxes and fuel burn-ups. (See, for example, Exhibit 1113, 
p. 22-5). However a series of errors in both input data 
and the calculational program were found both by England 
(Exh. 1178, p. 7) and in the course of a review by Shure 
(Exhibit 1178), which markedly reduced the deviations 
found by England's approach. With the corrections made, 
the positive deviations found by the England approach from 
the ANS standard are nowhere greater than 10%, and are 
generally much less (1113, at 22-15). In addition, there 
is the possibility that the selection of input data (fission 
product yields and decay energies) may not have been the 
best (1113, 22-8 and 22-9).
While England's approach is a valuable contribution, 
it is only one piece of work out of many cited in the record;
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furthermore it presents no new experimental determinations.
On the basis of the record of these proceedings, however, 
one is led to believe that the ANS standard curve may be 
about 5% low in the time region of principal interest, 
namely, zero to five minutes after shutdown. England's 
revised values are well within the previously expressed 
limits of uncertainty, and to the extent of the credence 
given the new calculations, they tend to narrow those limits 
of uncertainty. At present.it appears to us that the 20% 
on top of the ANS decay heat formula fairly represents the 
uncertainty and does not provide any margin above that 
uncertainty. It is still conservative.
There is some margin provided, however, in the prescrip­
tion requiring that the reactor shall have been considered 
to have operated continuously at 1.02 times rated power, 
with the maximum allowed peaking factor, for an infinite 
length of time. The exact amount of margin is uncertain, 
and it will vary with time, but it is probably in the range 
of 5 to 15% (Exhibit 1137, pp. 11-3 to 5; and Staff Con­
cluding Statement, p. 114).
Considering all of the above, the Commission believes 
that the prescription of ANS + 20% for the fission product 
decay heat is reasonable and should be continued (60, pp.
1102, 1103) (emphasis added).
As discussed above, the arguments suggesting a 5-15 percent 
margin existing within the ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent criterion appear 
to be tenous. The deviations indicated by England's revised and updated 
CINDER code analyses seem to be well supported by the empirical data 
within a period of about 1000 sec after shutdown (a somewhat longer period 
than that favored by the AEC). The empirical data also suggest that ANS 
Standard 5.1 +20 percent represents only one-standard deviation from the 
mean decay heat results in this shutdown period. It is the opinion of 
the author that the probability of experiencing shutdown decay heats 
greater than the criteria specifications should be reduced to no more 
than 5-10 percent. On this basis, the criteria limits should be increased 
to ANS Standard 5.1 +(30 to 35) percent.
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Appendix 6 INITIAL STORED FUEL ENERGY AND FUEL ROD GAS GAP 
CONDUCTANCE
Obviously any uncertainties which might exist over the 
magnitude of the initial stored energy in the fuel would raise prob­
lems with predictions of ECCS response in the event of a LOCA. The 
problem is more complicated when uncertainties in the release rates 
of the stored energy are considered.
A6.1 The Physical Parameters of Initial Stored Fuel Energy
A typical idealized picture of the physical relations of 
elements influencing heat exchanged between fuel, fuel rod cladding 
and reactor coolant/working fluid is shown in figure A6.1. The stored 
energy is defined as the energy that would be released by the fuel 
if its temperature were reduced to that of the zircaloy cladding.
Thus, the initial stored energy and its subsequent redistribution to 
cladding and coolant is a function of the parameters of fuel specific 
heat, its thermal conductivity, the thermal conductance of the gas 
gap and the heat transfer characteristics of the cladding and coolant.
Following an accidental reactor shutdown, the stored sensible 
heat, associated with the heat capacity of the fuel and its high normal 
operating temperatures, represents a large heat source which must be 
dissipated by the ECCS —  in addition to the dissipation of the energy 
associated with the decay heat and other external heat sources such 
as exothermal metal-water reactions. A typical, schematic, representa­
tion of the temperature distribution within a fuel rod as a function 
of time is shown in figure A6.2. Initially the radial temperature 
gradient in the fuel rod is very steep. Centerline temperatures for 
the fuel approach the melting point (in excess of 4000°F) as a result
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Figure A6.1
Idealized Fuel—Cladding Representation
(After Figure D-2, _53, by permission.)
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Figure A6.2
Schematic Temperature Distribution
(After Figure 2-11, 53.)
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of the high power output associated with normal operations, while clad 
temperatures are approximately 600°F. As soon as shutdown occurs, the 
temperature redistributes rapidly within the fuel, as shown in figure 
A6.2. The rod temperature history and the amount of heat transferred 
to the decompressing coolant depend strongly upon the thermal properties 
of the fuel and the physical configurations of fuel, cladding and associ­
ated gas gap (the gap geometry resulting from the previous history of 
fuel fabrication, irradiation exposure history, and consequent fuel 
densification during normal operation, and possible swelling and rupture 
of cladding during the thermal excursion of the accident) as well as the 
heat transfer conditions at the cladding surface induced by the flow 
of coolant during the accident. Although the importance of the stored 
energy was recognized at the time the IAC were issued, no general rule 
was formulated or specified for its evaluation (60, p. 1101). Uncertainty 
in the conservatism of the method of specification of these parameters, 
especially fuel and gas gap thermal properties, apparently caused the 
ACRS to include the initial stored energy of the fuel in their list of 
items of uncertain conservations given in response to the CNI questions 
(chapter 2). The new AC have attempted to rectify this oversight 
and make this an area of assured conservatism. In these efforts, the 
Commission appears to have been largely successful in achieving the 
degree of conservatism needed.
After initiation of a major LOCA, within approximately 30 
seconds the temperature distribution across the fuel and cladding is 
nearly flat, as indicated in figure A6.2. This is a result of the 
relatively low power generation associated with fission product decay 
heat and the relatively poor heat transfer characteristics associated 
with reactor decompression (blowdown) and the initial period of emer­
gency coolant application after blowdown when compared with the character­
istics of normal power generation periods.
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Of the above parameters, the dominant ones influencing fuel 
rod temperature distribution histories are gas gap thermal conductance 
(customarily an empirically based parameter including gas conductivity, 
and convective and radiative heat transfer coefficients within the gap) 
and fuel thermal conductivity. Both parameters have been historically 
obtained from experimental data and are not easily amenable to analytical 
quantification. Moreover, experimental observations frequently measure 
both quantities together —  so that their combined effect on heat 
transfer is easier to evaluate than their individual contributions 
(4, p. 10-1). However, the new AC require the calculation of gap con­
ductance in accordance with the new requirements for evaluation models 
for each of the reactor manufacturers (60, p. 1104). The vendor's IAC 
approved evaluation models did not have the capability of calculating 
changes in fuel-clad geometry (i.e., swelling) during the LOCA, nor 
of evaluating the effect of thermal radiation across the gap during the 
same period. The new AC require that approved models incorporate these 
capabilities greatly enhancing the complexity of the calculation, but 
also improving its conservatism (at least in theory).
Ideally, for steady-state or accident conditions without fuel 
rod geometry changes, designers would prefer high values for both fuel 
thermal conductivity and gas gap conductance. Since the heat transferred 
from the fuel element is essentially directly proportional to the fuel 
conductivity and gap conductance, high values minimize stored heat, or, 
similarly, result in lower temperatures and gradients across the fuel 
rod for a given decay power output.
A6.1.1 Uranium oxide conductivity
Uranium oxide fuel does not have particularly high intrinsic
thermal conductivity in comparison to other minerals. At normal
operating temperatures, estimates of UCU thermal conductivities range
2 ^from approximately 3 to 4 B-ft/hr-ft -°F. Conductivities of this order
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of magnitude are about the same as would be expected for relatively low 
density sedimentary rods such as sandstones. Fine grained igneous rocks 
(such as granite) may have conductivities as high as 20-30 B-ft/hr-ft -°F, 
while relatively high conductivity metals (such as silver or gold) may 
have conductivities as much as two orders of magnitude greater than that 
of uranium oxide. The relatively low UO^ conductivity contributes to the 
steepness of the steady state —  or zero time —  temperature profile of 
figure A6.2. The low conductivity also tends to retard the release of 
the stored initial energy during early periods when coolant heat transfer 
properties are relatively good, until later in the LOCA when poor fluid 
heat transfer exacerbates clad heating.
A6.1.2 Fuel-cladding gas gap conductance
Gas gap conductance is strongly influenced by the dimensions 
of the gap between fuel and cladding and the physical composition of the 
gases filling the gap as well as the history of the operating power levels 
for the fuel. There is some uncertainty about the gap dimensions under 
normal operating and accident conditions. Initial cold gap overall dimen­
sions are governed primarily by fabrication considerations on the part of 
the manufacturers and range from 7 to 12 mils (1 mil = .001 in). Most 
analyses of fuel heat transfer assume that the gap is uniformly distributed 
about the fuel elements, as indicated schematically in figure A6.1. Large 
gaps, on the order of the initial fabricated dimensions, and uniform gap
distribution have been observed to produce relatively low gap conductances,
2on the order of 500-600 B/hr-ft -°F when filled with the fission product 
gases associated with fuel rod end-of-life conditions (41). In practice, 
physical contact between fuel and cladding at many (or conceivably all) 
points along the rod is probable from the time of fabrication throughout 
the life of the fuel rod element. Fuel contact conditions are probably 
due to fabrication methods initially and fuel cracking, densification, 
and internal readjustment and cladding creepdown during operation (42).
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Contact would raise gap conductance to values on the order of 1000 B/hr- 2 0ft - F. As a result of the mechanisms described above, gap closure has 
been observed by the vendors to occur relatively early in the fuel life­
time and to generally induce higher values of conductance throughout the 
normal operational lifetime of the fuel rods (36).
The physical composition of gases filling the fuel-clad gap 
also has a pronounced effect on the gap conductance. During fuel rod 
fabrication, relatively high conductivity gases such as helium are 
frequently used by manufacturers to provide initial fill and pressuri­
zation. The helium increases the start-of-life gas gap conductivity. 
After extensive neutron bombardment fission product gases dominate 
the gas composition with the rod. These gases have much lower conduc­
tivities, more on the order of argon than helium. Consequently, many 
experiments, conducted for short exposure periods, have used argon 
to simulate end-of-life conditions. Thus test results must be analyzed 
with care to assure that start-of-life gap dimensions are not combined 
with end-of-life gas conductivity so that applicability of results is 
obscured. After exposures of 30,000 MWd/MT, fuel cladding/steady state 
gap dimensions may be expected to be much smaller than at start-of-life, 
if in fact the gap has not been completely closed. The closing of the 
gap with extended exposure introduces a mechanism which tends to equal­
ize gas gap conductivity over the lifetime of the fuel element, thus 
compensating for changes in the gas composition of the gap which tend 
to induce lower conductivities.
Averaged data from GE for gap conductances of BWR fuels are 
shown in figure A6.3 (42) . Results shown are representative of measured 
conductances for fuel elements exposed in reactors for periods ranging 
from a few minutes to approximately 60,000 MWd/MT. The data is presented 
in terms of the parameter g/D, the ratio of the total gas gap dimension, 
g, to the cold fuel element diameter, D. As indicated by the error bars
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Figure A6.3
BWR CLAD-GAP CONDUCTANCES
(After Figure 16, 42.) 
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in the figure, substantial scatter is observed in the data. But it 
should be noted that the greatest statistical variations occur for 
fuels with large initial gaps and low exposure times (42). It is to 
be expected that fuel contact variations for such fuel elements would 
be more pronounced than for elements with smaller g/D ratios or those 
exposed for longer periods where gap closing mechanisms would be more 
effective or have longer to operate.
The influence of the linear heat generation rate of normal 
operating conditions in shown very clearly in figure A6.3. Stored 
heat and decay power output are essentially proportional to the linear 
heat generation rate for the fuel rods. As the fuel is driven to 
higher linear power output (increased KW/ft), the gap conductance in­
creases as the temperatures, heat output and stored energy increase.
In the event of a LOCA, this mechanism for improved heat transfer with 
increasing power output from the fuel rods would help to assure that 
for the required DBA analysis conditions of high power output higher 
conductances would provide a feedback mechanism which would help to 
carry away the stored heat more rapidly than would be required under 
low power conditions.
The curve labeled GAPCON in figure A6.3 represents the results 
of application of the relatively untested numerical code GAPCON, favored 
by the AEC (4, p. 10-9) for prediction of the gap conductances. It can 
be seen that the results calculated by this method appear to be sub­
stantially lower (approximately a factor of two) than the average 
measured values for conductances.
A6.1.3 LOCA phenomena influencing fuel cladding heat transfer
Under blowdown conditions, with rapidly decreasing external 
core pressures on the fuel rods and rapidly increasing internal fuel 
rod pressures as gap filling gases increase in temperature, ballooning 
and rupture of the clad are probable. In fact, the Commission has
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stated that,
. . . when the course of the LOCA is calculated according 
to the conservative prescription of an approved evaluation 
model, swelling and bursting of the cladding will be esti­
mated to occur, in abundance (60, p. 1105).
Ballooning is expected to be a localized phenomena, with expan­
sion occurring at rod hot spots. Individual fuel rod ballooning has been 
observed to occur over an axial length of only about one to two inches of 
the typical 12 ft axial length of the rod. Whether such a localized pheno­
mena is significant when compared to heat transfer over the entire length 
of the fuel rod has not been seriously addressed in the literature. Though 
heat transfer locally would be inhibited substantially by reduction in gas
gap conductances through gap expansion during ballooning (estimates indi-
2cate that gas gap conductance on the order of 10-100 B/hr-ft -°F might be 
expected in the vicinity of the ballooned rod section (4^, p. 10-21)), it 
is conceivable that axial heat transfer not presently included in calcula­
tional methods might contribute in an important manner to removing heat 
from the hot spot and preventing catastrophic local heat-up.
The AEC in its final proposals for resolution of the gas gap 
conductance problem seems intent on imposing demonstrably conservative 
calculation procedures. Under their new criteria, the influence of clad 
swelling and rupture and "any other applicable variables" would have to 
be accounted for in calculating gas gap conductance and consequently fuel 
rod heat transfer during a LOCA (60, p. 1104; appendix 3). Apparently, 
the locally reduced gap conductance due to clad ballooning would have to 
be used in calculating heat transfer to the hot rod in the reactor core 
(without regard to whether axial heat transfer was a significant contri­
butor to local thermal conditions) in estimating whether the peak tempera­
ture criterion for the reactor has been exceeded.
To demonstrate the significance of the fuel rod thermal character­
istics in influencing heat transfer during a LOCA, the AEC has reported the
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results of a parametric investigation of the influence of gas gap conduct­
ance and external reflood and blowdown heat transfer coefficients on fuel 
rod thermal response (4, pp. 10-15 to 10-23). The results indicate that 
when ballooning occurs early in the transient, before blowdown is complete, 
gas gap conductance variation (over approximately an order of magnitude) 
can produce temperature increases of frequently as much as 100°F to 200°F.
Gap conductances for these early ballooning cases were relatively low,
2ranging from about 10 to 100 B/hr-ft -°F. If gap expansion occurs later
in the LOCA, following blowdown, the results indicate that relatively high
2initial gap conductance coefficients (500-1000 B/hr-ft -°F) result in 
lower stored energy in the fuel rod. Consequently, when ballooning occurs 
during reflood, producing lower gap coefficients over the same range of 
approximately an order of magnitude results in temperature decreases on 
the order of 100°F as conductances decrease. This rather surprising re­
sult demonstrates the importance of the gap conductance in storing thermal 
energy in the rod. If ballooning occurs early, low initial conductances 
result in the retention of high fuel temperatures and stored energy which, 
when released later during reflood, exacerbates the rod temperature history. 
If, on the other hand, the gap conductance is large during blowdown, fuel 
temperature and consequently stored fuel rod energy is reduced. Subsequent 
low gap conductances are then beneficial in reducing heat flow to the clad­
ding at late times.
This example serves to demonstrate the difficulty in predetermi­
nation of what constitutes appropriate prescription of conservative values 
for fuel rod thermal property parameters. A simple statement that "low" 
or "high" values of gas gap conductance are always conservative from a 
safety standpoint cannot be supported. As a consequence, the AEC has 
concluded that pertinent fuel rod thermal parameters, presumably including 
conductivity and heat capacity as well as gap conductance, must be included 
or evaluated in the calculational models as function of time and temperature 
(60, p. 1104). Moreover, they have "required" that stored energy and gap
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conductance must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as a part of indivi 
dual plant licensing procedures (60, p. 1101).
A6.2 Evaluation of Stored Fuel Energy and Gas Gap Conductance
Arguments
In the CNI concluding statements, the intervenors have pointed 
to the hearing record to provide confirmation for their claim that gaps 
exist in the understanding of the mechanisms of initial fuel energy stor­
age and release and that uncertainties over the quantitative and qualita­
tive effects of gas gap conductance and other fuel rod thermal parameters 
have contributed to a general lack of understanding of the ECCS problem.
It is claimed that the neglect of the influence of clad ballooning on gap 
conductance in the Interim Acceptance Criteria prevented adequate computa­
tion of gap conductance and stored heat in any of the manufacturer's evalu 
ation models. The hearing testimony of Morris Rosen, currently Technical 
Advisor to the Director of Reactor Licensing, is cited as evidence that 
specification of gap conductance and its influence on stored energy was 
neglected by the AEC until after the IAC were promulgated. CNI asserts 
that quantification of both the gap conductance and the conservatism of 
the calculation methods in which the conductances are applied (as well as 
other aspects of the problem) must be demonstrated before the conservatism 
of ECCS performance can be demonstrated (7, p. 4, 33-4. 34).
In the face of this criticism, the AEC appeared to progressively 
reevaluate the importance of the initial stored thermal energy problem 
and the physical parameters affecting it. In the AEC's initial direct 
testimony it was claimed that "peak cladding temperature has been shown 
to be relatively insensitive to changes in gap conductance during an 
accident" (8^, p. 4.26). Consequently, gap conductance values recommended 
by the manufacturers were accepted apparently without sufficient exami­
nation. In the AEC's revised criteria, to become a modification of the 
Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR Part 50), the sections of Appendix K
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have been greatly strengthened which deal with subjects related to fuel 
rod initial stored energy and the influence of fuel rod swelling and rup­
ture on gas gap conductance and other thermal parameters.
To indicate the extent of the AEC change in attitude, the verbatim 
text of the proposed changes to Appendix K, Sections IAl and IB should 
be reviewed (appendix 3).
Though the AC modifications do not meet with the intervenors 
desired goals of quantifying specifically the thermal parameters of the 
fuel rod and/or the stored energy in the fuel, they have apparently been 
written to insure that conservatism in the calculation of the influence 
of stored energy and thermal parameters will be achieved. For example, 
Section IB requires the calculations of gap conductance take swelling and 
rupture into account so that they "are not underestimated." To this extent, 
the procedure provides a demonstrable area of conservatism.
Though no quantitative specificaions for thermal parameters are 
given in the revised sections, the AEC argues that variations, even with­
in a single vendor's reactors (especially in terms of gas gap conductance), 
are too great to permit specification of quantitative values within a 
general statement such as the proposed rules especially when new fuel 
designs have been recently introduced. Consequently they have argued that 
manufacturers' designs will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
to assure that the general criteria are being complied with and conserva­
tism has been achieved in each case (60, p. 1102). Though this procedure 
may be considered undesirably ill-defined in the eyes of some critics, it 
does seem reasonable for criteria which might be expected to endure longer 
than a single reactor design without revisions.
Though the AEC may be faulted for having made a poor start in 
specifying the methods of treating fuel rod energy storage and release 
rates, generally speaking they seem to have made a strong attempt to in­
corporate intervenor (or perhaps ACRS) criticisms into the final AC so
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that assured conservatism in energy storage calculations will be achieved. 
Final assurance of the ultimate conservatism of these calculations by 
manufacturers will now depend upon the capability of the AEC to maintain 
strict vigilance in reactor design review, on a case-by-case basis. The 
increased scope and depth of the criteria specifications will require 
corresponding increases in specialized investigatory expertise on the part 
of regulatory licensing personnel, and strengthened determination by the 
AEC to insist on total compliance on the part of the manufacturers.
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Appendix 7 METAL-WATER REACTIONS, ENERGY RELEASE AND FUEL ROD 
EMBRITTLEMENT
In the Interim Acceptance Criteria (see appendix 3), the first 
two general requirements were related to limitation of metal-water reactions 
between the zirconium alloy clad fuel rods and the high temperature steam 
produced during the LOCA. These requirements, limiting maximum calculated 
clad temperatures to less than 2300°F and overall clad-steam chemical 
reactions to less than 1 percent of total reactor cladding, had three im­
plicit purposes: restricting energy release from the exothermic zirconium- 
steam reaction; limiting oxidation of the cladding to levels at which fuel 
rod embrittlement was not serious; and restricting the production of 
gaseous hydrogen from the reaction to safe levels. Hydrogen limitation 
was necessary in order to avoid potentially damaging explosive mixtures 
with air being developed when reaction products were swept through the 
coolant line break into the containment vessel. The simple 2300°F tem­
perature limit of the cladding, without explicit exposure time at tempera­
ture limits, was the subject of much controversy for the AEC. In fact, 
the IAC's prescription on oxidation had little support from either industry 
or the AEC's laboratory associates.
As a direct result, the revised AC's most easily detectable changes 
are the replacement of the simple 2300°F temperature limit with two cri­
teria. The first criterion reduced the allowed peak zircaloy temperature 
to 2200°F while the second provided a limit to the equivalent stoichiometric 
oxidation of the cladding to less than 17 percent of the total cladding 
thickness before oxidation (60, p. 1095; appendix 3). The criteria con­
tinue to retain the earlier 1 percent limit on overall chemical reaction 
with the total metal content of the cladding (excluding the plenum volumes) 
as a limit on hydrogen generation. The end result is a more definitive
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Table A7.1 Potential Energy that Could Be Released in an Accident of 
the Indian Point-2 (PWR) or the Brown Ferry (BWP.) Reactors
2758-MW(t)
Indian Point-2 Reactor
3293-MW(t)
Browns Ferry Reactor
Btu MWhr Btu MWhr
The zirconium-water and hydrogen-oxygen reaction values for the 
Browns Ferry reactor are based on zircaloy both in the cladding and in 
the fuel-element shrouds.
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8 8Primary coolant internal 3.00 x 10 87.9 3.30 x 10 96.7
energy 3Hot reactor coolant system 0.18 x 10 5.3
metal
O
Core-stored heat 0.20 x 10 5.9
8 8Core decay heat integrated 1.50 x 10' 44.0 1.55 x 10 45.4
for first 1/2 hr of acci­
dent 8 8100% Zr-H^O reaction 1.13 x 10 33.1 3.80 x 10 111.3
100% H2~02 reaction 0.88 x IQ8 26.0 3.10 x 108 90.8
1% Zr-H20 reaction 0.01 x 108 0.3 0.04 x 10“ 1.1
1% H2-02 reaction 0.01 x 108 0.4 0.03 x 108 0.9
set of criteria. However, as we shall show subsequently, their conserva­
tism is not yet completely assured.
A7.1 Physics of the Zirconium-Water Reactions
The energy release, embrittlement hazard, and the hydrogen pro­
duction all result from the following heat-producing (exothermic) reaction 
between the zirconium cladding and steam:
Zr + 2H20 -s- Zro2 + 2H2 + A Q (Eq. 7.1)
where
Q = 2912 - .0585T (B/lbm)
T = Reaction temperature (°F) at the oxide-unreacted 
Zr interface
Equation 7.1 indicates that the products of the zirconium (Zr) and steam 
(H20) reaction are zirconium oxide (Zr02), elemental hydrogen (H2) and 
heat (A Q).
As will be discussed in more detail later, it is possible for 
the local heat release rate to be of the same order of magnitude as the 
decay heat generation rate while the fuel rod cladding remains within the 
criteria temperature limits. It is instructive, however, to consider 
initially the time-oxidation reaction. Table A7.1 (43) is a representa­
tive of estimates which have been made to show that the heat release from 
the metal-water reaction is relatively small compared with other possible 
energy sources in the reactor for both PWRs and BWRs. Note that only if 
100 percent of the Zr is reacted is the total heat release by the metal- 
water reaction, or a possible hydrogen-oxygen combustion process, compa­
rable to either the primary coolant internal energy or the core decay heat 
released during the first half hour of the LOCA. Restricting the overall 
oxidation reaction to 1 percent or less of the total core cladding reduces 
the total energy release to values of the order of 1 percent of the decay 
heat for the same initial half hour period. The misleading part of the
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Fig. 2.1. Zircaloy-4 After Heating at 3.0°C/sec to 1600°C in Steam. 
(From Ref. 17)
Fig. 2.2. Zircaloy-4 After Heating at 0.3°C/sec to 1300°C in Steam. 
(From Ref. 16)
Figure A 7.1 Photomicrographs of Zr oxidation forms.
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presentation in table A7.1 is that it compares time-integrated total energy 
release for all reaction products for the LOCA with the resulting implication 
that the metal-water energy release under IAC limits was essentially negli­
gible. More appropriately, comparisons should be made between transient 
energy release rates for the oxidation reaction and decay heat at the hot 
spots of the reactor core.
The embrittlement of the zircaloy cladding is produced as a 
result of crystalline transformation in the metallic structure of the 
cladding associated with the zirconium oxidation process. The clad 
oxidation takes place by a diffusion process in which several identifi­
able crystalline transformations occur as the zirconium progresses 
from pure metal to ZrC^ • In a typical clad oxidation process, an out­
side layer of pure, stoichiometrically complete ZrO^ is formed. At 
greater clad depths, beneath the zone where the chemical oxidation 
reaction has gone to completion, ZrC^ crystals are formed. This 
customarily clearly defined, but incompletely oxidized, layer is refer­
red to as alpha zirconium. Beneath the oxygen stabilized alpha phase 
material, a layer of zirconium is customarily found in which the oxygen 
concentration is low and the crystalline form essentially unchanged 
from the unoxidized state (beta phase). Because the ZrC^ and the 
a-phase zirconium are characteristically brittle at low temperatures, 
the oxygen content of the ductile 8-phase zirconium and its relative 
thickness compared to the initial thickness of the cladding are appar­
ently the controlling factors in fuel rod embrittlement.
A reproduction of photographs of two typical sections of oxi­
dized cladding is shown in figure A7.1 (43). As implied in equation 7.1, 
upon complete oxidation to ZrO^ zirconium experiences a weight gain of 
approximately 35 percent. When combined with a density decrease of 14 
percent (from 6.49 g/cc for Zr to 5.68 G/cc for ZrO^), the end result 
of the transformation from Zr to ZrO^ is a physical volumetric growth 
of approximately 54 percent. This volumetric growth combined with a 
natural tendency for a-phase Zr to separate along crystal boudaries,
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as indicated in figure A7.1, induces severe embrittlement in the 
outermost layers of oxidized cladding.
At elevated temperatures, a relatively small amount of oxygen 
(from 5 to 10 percent atomic) can be absorbed in the 8-phase zirconium 
before the material becomes oxygen saturated without substantial crys­
talline alteration and consequent reduction in ductility. As saturation 
is approached, precipitation of a-zirconium in the grain boundaries and 
solid-solution hardening of the g-phase zirconium can apparently take 
place over a rather critical temperature range (on the order of 2200°F 
to 2300°F) the degree of precipitation and/or solid-solution hardening 
is apparently exacerbated by high temperatures attained during oxidation 
and/or slow cooldown. Both of these processes are extremely important 
to g-phase ductility.
Apparently, the degree of oxygen saturation of the g-phase 
zirconium is the controlling factor in fuel cladding embrittlement. 
However, the exact mechanisms by which it takes place, and the adequacy 
of theoretical and empirical models of oxygen uptake in the zirconium 
and the relative embrittlement induced thereby, are not felt to be 
thoroughly quantified or understood. As indicated in their Concluding 
Statement, the AEC staff did not believe that the state-of-the-art would 
permit adequate assessment of oxygen uptake in the g-phase (6^, p. 86).
In the absence of adequate models, the AEC has attempted to prescribe 
a low enough limit on the maximum cladding temperature to assure that 
oxygen uptake was maintained below embrittlement limits.
Concern over embrittlement was thus the principal reason 
behind the current revision of the maximum temperature criterion to 
2200°F. As stated by the Commission in their technical discussion of 
the new AC, "Our selection of the 2200°F limit results primarily from 
our belief that retention of ductility in the zircaloy is the best 
guarantee of its remaining intact during the hypothetical LOCA" (60, p. 
1098). The adequacy of this limit will be discussed subsequently.
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A7.2 Reaction Rates
The zirconium oxidation rate is controlled by the solid state 
diffusion of the ionic reaction products through the oxide layer. 
Generally the chemical reaction rate is of parabolic form (25, p. 2-7), 
i.e.,
2where w = K^(T)t
where w = weight of metal reached (converted to equivalent quanti­
ties of Z rO y), mg/cm of surface area
t = exposure time, (sec)
K (T) = parabolic rate constant, a function of temperature (T), 
(mg/cm )/sec
Based upon experimental results, a number of expressions for the para­
bolic rate constant, K , have been derived. One of the most widely usedP
relationships was derived by Baker and Just (44). Their fit was based 
upon experimental data for molten zirconium droplets reacting with water. 
Their derived rate constant relationship is given by:
where
(F.q. 7 . 3 )
K = a
R = 
T =
activation energy, = 45,000 cal/mole 
gas constant = 1.987 cal/mole-°K 
metal temperature, °K
The Baker-Just relationship, Eq. 7.3, with its single temperature inde­
pendent expression for the activation energy, Ka, and the rate constant, 
Kp, is consequently best fit to reaction rates near the zirconium 
melting point.
Based upon empirical observations of changes in zirconium 
oxide crystalline form during temperature excursions, a better fit to
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the temperature-reaction rate data with three separate activation 
energies was derived by H. H. Klepfer (45). The fit of the Klepfer 
equations is given by:
(Eq. 7.4)
for 'v, 20°C < T <_890°C;
= 3.58 x 105 exp(-33,500/RT) 
from 890°C < T£l577°C;
= 1.04 x 1011 exp(-79,800/RT)
from 1577°C< T< 1852°C (Zr melting point).
The Klepfer fit to the reaction rate-temperature data is compared with 
the Baker-Just equation results in figure A7.2. Note that in the Klepfer 
equations the changes in activation energy, Ka, are associated with phase 
changes in the crystalline structure of the zirconium oxide at the indica 
ted temperatures.
It should be observed that for most of the temperature range 
of interest, T<_2300°F, the Baker-Just relationship gives a reaction 
rate which is conservatively higher (from a safety design standpoint) 
than the Klepfer fit. Only for temperatures less than 1900°F, where the 
reaction rate is approximately an order of magnitude below its value at 
2300°F, does the Baker-Just relationship depart from conservatism.
Differentiating equation 7.2 and substituting the Baker-Just 
relationship for the reaction rate constant (equation 7.3) and the energy 
mass relationship of equation 7.1, yields equations relating the reaction 
rate as a function of the local energy released by the reaction to the 
thickness of zirconium oxidized in the reaction. These relationships 
are:
(Eq 7.5)
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Figure A7. 2 Reaction Rate of Zirconium as a Function of Temperature 
(After Figure 2-7 , 25, by permission.)
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where:
6 = equivalent thickness of metal reacted (inches) 
t = time (sec)
T = temperature of the metal (°R)
and
where
(Eq. 7.6)
q = reaction energy release rate
These equations demonstrate the negative feedback - self limiting effect 
of oxide thickness on the rates of energy release and growth rate of 
oxidized zirconium. That is, for a given temperature, the growth rate 
of oxidized material and the reaction energy release rate decrease with 
increasing thickness of the oxidized layer (or equivalently with increas­
ing time). This effect is an important factor in energy release rates 
in the metal-water reaction and embrittlement induced in the course 
of a LOCA.
A7.3 Energy Releases
Based upon equation 7.6, a comparison of local energy release 
rates with fission product decay power output is shown in figure A7.3. 
The curves are shown for highly idealized cases of assumed constant 
temperature reactions (over all times) as a function of the initial 
oxidized thickness at the beginning of the temperature excursions.
It may be observed that a more realistic LOCA temperature history 
would have a more gradual increase in temperature to its maximum value, 
rather than the assumed constant temperature cases shown here. However, 
the curves can be used to evaluate a more realistic excursion when it 
is recognized that they indicate relative values of reaction power to 
decay power which would be attained when the temperature reaches the 
levels shown for the equivalent oxidized thicknesses of zirconium shown.
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Figure A 7 . 3 Comparison of Local M etal-W ater Energy Release Rates with Fuel Rod Fission Product 
Decay Power Output as a Function of Equivalent Oxidized Thickness.
A
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For example, if the development of a peak 2300°F temperature is delayed 
for approximately ten seconds for cladding with an equivalent oxidized 
thickness of .02 mils, the equivalent energy output rate would be identical 
to that at the initial times shown in figure A7.3 (.01 sec). Under these 
circumstances, the local metal-water reaction power output would exceed 
the fission product decay power output of the fuel rod at ten seconds after 
LOCA initiation by nearly a factor of ten.
The message of the figure is clear. At a maximum permissible 
temperature of 2300°F, the relative energy flux from the zirconium-water 
reaction is not negligible in comparison with energy release rates from 
the fission product decay power input of the fuel rod. However, from the 
beginning of the hearings, the AEC regularly downgraded the significance 
of the zirconium-water reaction energy release rate. In their initial 
direct testimony they stated,
For calculated LOCA temperature transients limited 
to 2300°F, the rate of energy release from Zircaloy-water 
reactions is always substantially less than the decay heat 
rate. However, if the cladding temperature could reach 
2800°F, the Zircaloy-water energy release rate would ex­
ceed the decay heat rate except for the longest transients.
If the cladding temperature could reach 2500°F, the cladding 
water energy release rate would equal the decay heat rate 
only during unrealistically rapid transients. The cladding 
temperatures calculated by the evaluation models take into 
account the contribution of the cladding-water reaction 
energy (8, p. 2-6).
It can be seen from figure A7.3 that the original AEC conclu­
sions were not easily defendable. To assure that reaction energy release 
rates are approximately an order of magnitude below the decay heat rate, 
maximum temperatures would have to be limited to about 1800°F or less, 
or initial oxide thicknesses would have to be of the order of one mil 
(3 to 4 percent of the unoxidized clad thickness).
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For long transients, the equivalent oxide thickness term (5 ) 
in the denominator of Eq. 7.6 causes the reaction energy rate to decay 
like t~-^ /2. For such extended transients, the rate of decrease in the 
energy release rate from the zirconium-water reaction (for a fixed tem­
perature reaction) is substantially more rapid than the decrease in the 
fission product decay heat rate, as can be seen in figure A7.3. 
Consequently, after periods on the order of an hour, assuming tempera­
tures are controlled within IAC standards, the relative energy release 
from metal-water reactions is low enough to be essentially insignificant. 
However, the first several minutes of elevated temperatures (in excess 
of about 2000°F), will induce energy releases comparable to the decay 
heat rate during the transient period. If the time to peak temperature 
(2200°F) is retarded, peak metal-water energy release rates may even 
exceed decay heat output temporarily, as discussed in the earlier 
example.
It should be noted, however, that all calculations of the 
energy release based upon the Baker-Just reaction rate relationships 
will conservatively predict metal-water reaction energy release rate. 
Though early AEC statements appeared to minimize the significance of 
metal-water reactions as an energy source, the IAC approved vendor 
evaluation models required the use of the conservative Baker-Just 
rate relationships. Consequently, energy release rates calculated 
under the IAC were adequate. In the new AC, the Commission has expli­
citly recognized the metal-water reaction rate as a significant source 
of heat which must be evaluated in a conservative fashion. The new 
AC go beyond the IAC specifications, requiring that the reaction cannot 
be assumed to be steam limited and must be evaluated for internal clad 
reactions, if the cladding is calculated to swell and burst. Under 
these circumstances, it appears that calculated energy release rates 
from metal-water reactors should be conservatively accounted for under 
the AC.
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A7.4 Embrittlement
The AEC's primary concern in establishing maximum temperature 
limits (and finally quantitative limits on the extent of the Zr-steam 
reaction) has been over the embrittlement aspects of the effects of 
oxidation. This has been the AEC position since the publication of 
the IAC. Modifications in AEC embrittlement assessment have resulted 
primarily from problems associated with defining the physical mechanism 
for embrittlement and selecting a method for quantifying the criterion 
for limiting the oxidation to levels which would give conservative 
assurances of ductile fuel rod behavior throughout the LOCA.
Over the period of time of the ECCS hearings, the criteria 
defining acceptable embrittlement limits have changed as new experi­
mental data became available. In the AEC's initial direct testimony, 
the defense of the simple 2300°F limit was based on a relatively thinly 
defended argument. Embrittlement was "classified" as occurring if the 
Zr02 layer reached 16-18 percent of the total original clad thickness. 
This, it was simply stated, corresponded "to a thickness of Zr02 plus 
aZr of about 40% of the clad thickness" (£$, p. 2-3).
It was also recognized that clad ductility was a function of 
not only the peak temperature experienced, but also the reduced tem­
peratures after the thermal excursion had been limited. Studies at 
ORNL (46) were cited as evidence that zero ductility temperatures (ZDT) 
(the temperature below which cladding has no remaining ductility and 
will suffer brittle failure under relatively light loads) would be 
below 1000°F as long as the equivalent clad temperature transient were 
held to less than: "6 minutes at 2400°F, 10 minutes at 2300°F, approx­
imately 15 minutes at 2200°F, and about 27 minutes at 2200°F" (8 ,^ p. 2-4). 
No substantial discussion was given to the adequacy of a ZDT of 1000°F.
It was implied, however, that since none of the then currently accepted 
evaluation models indicated temperatures exceeding 2300°F, or excursions
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above 2300 F for more than 3 minutes, "reasonable assurance" was pro­
vided that "significant cladding failure should not occur as a result 
of oxygen uptake" (8  ^ p. 2-5).
The failure of the simple 2300°F maximum clad temperature 
limit alone to explicitly limit oxidation was, however, recognized by 
the AEC in its initial direct testimony. It was stated:
While the criterion does not specifically include a 
time-at-temperature limitation, this limitation is implicit 
in that the evaluation models used for calculating the 
temperature history are also specified. We have not ob­
served, from the results of calculations performed by the 
reactor manufacturers or from the results of our own cal­
culations, prolonged temperature transients that approach 
those x^herein the clad may enter non-ductile state 
(8 , p. 2-5).
The need for an explicit limit on exposure duration as well 
as peak temperature was emphasized by the intervenors in their initial 
direct testimony, and acknowledged by all of the manufacturers and 
utility participants as a desirable change in the criteria (4, pp. 18-3 
to 18-5).
Several methods were proposed for relating the moving boundary 
between the relatively highly oxidized a-phase zirconium and slightly 
oxidized g-phase to embrittlement characteristics of the fuel rods.
One of the methods, which is typical of several others, is that of 
Meservey and Herzel (47). They exposed zircaloy tubing to steam for 
various temperature histories and arrived at the results shown in 
figure A7.4 (25) . After simplification, the theoretically based re­
lationship fitting their data analysis reduced to:
? = 1.6 x IO" 3 /Dt~ + 0.001 (Eq. 7.7)
5 = measured thickness of ZrO + aZr layer (cm)
fi j . zr  • m  • • . r\ ni /■ r —41,000 + 1500 1D = diffusion coefficient, = 0.916 exp L --- 1--^ ------ JRT
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Figure A7.4
Oxide Layer Thickness vs. /Dt
(After Figure 2-12, 25 by permission.)
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t = time (sec)
R = universal gas constant, 1.987 cal/mole - °K 
T = sample temperature, (°K)
The upper bound of the data, a more conservative basis for estimating 
the extent of oxidation, is given by:
5 = 2.19 x IO" 3 /Dt + 0.0028 (cm) (Eq. 7.7a)
Several concepts were advanced by the AEC as methods of 
quantifying the extent of embrittlement as a function of the degree 
of fuel rod oxidation. In the AEC's Supplemental Testimony, a quanti­
tative method for relating ZDT to the thickness of oxidized material 
was suggested (4_, p. 18-16). The depth of fully and partially oxidized 
material (the total thickness of ZrO^ and a-phase Zr including both 
inside and outside cladding surfaces) and conversely the relative thick­
ness (F ) of "unoxidized" 6-phase Zr were related to the ZDT in the AEC w
model as:
ZDT = 2727 - 3636 F (°F)w
where,
F = W - gt = 1 - .874 V Wo
W W 1 + .126 St/wo
W = "as oxidized" clad thickness
w = initial unoxidized clad thickness o
(Eq. 7.8)
Assuming oxidation was limited to 16 percent conversion to equivalent 
ZrC^ (relating a and 6-phase material to ZrC^ through atomic oxygen 
content by means of zirconium oxidation phase diagrams — e.g., 25 
figure 2.4) the AEC has stated that ^t^Wo = .56, approximately, for 
these conditions. Under these assumptions, equation 7.8 indicates that 
the ZDT for 16 percent conversion to equivalent ZrO^ is about 1000°F. 
Sixteen percent equivalent oxidation was still stated to be sufficiently
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The question of the relevance of quench loadings, as opposed
to other loading mechanisms which might be more closely related to fuel
rod loads during other LOCA periods (as well as experimental problems
associated with definition of physical parameters during quench), led
to investigation of other ways of relating embrittlement to oxidation.
The results of an ORNL investigation of the effects of deformation
temperature for impact and compression load tests on oxidized zircaloy
cladding are shown in figure A7.5 (48). The results are shown as a
function of the fractional wall thickness (F ) of transformed 3-phasew
zirconium. The results indicate that as F decreases, or as more ofw
the cladding is oxidized to ZrO^ and a-phase zirconium, the ZDT, or 
temperature of departure from ductility, increases. When F^ is of the 
order of 0 .2 , the temperatures at which non-ductile failures occurred 
(approximately 2000°F) are almost the same as the limiting maximum 
allowable temperatures of the IAC (2300°F). At these oxidation levels, 
brittle failure could occur shortly after temperature turnaround —  long 
before the fuel rods were cooled to steady-state or safe conditions.
Figure A7.5, however, does not relate the results of the tests 
to maximum exposure temperatures for the fuel rod test specimen nor the 
length of exposure time. Figure A7.6 presents the same test results 
in terms of maximum exposure temperatures and exposure times. The 
results generally indicate the parabolic temperature relationships 
implied by equation 7.2. Though there is a fairly substantial scatter 
in the data, the results indicate a general trend of decreasing ductil­
ity with increasing exposure time. The straight-line, constant tempera­
ture-time curves have been "eyeballed" through the data only to show
the general indication of the trend of F with time. The relativelyw
poor correlation between F and exposure time at a given temperaturew
indicated by the scatter in the data is indicative of the problems of
using parameters such as F or £ /w to relate oxidation to interfacew t o
small to survive quench loads under these circumstances.
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Figure A7.5
Ductility vs. Deformation Temperature
(After Figure 3-8, "Specimen Ductility as a Function of Deformation Temperature and Fraction of Wall 
Thickness (F ) Consisting of Transformed 8-phase Zirconium," 25_, by permission.)
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Figure a 7.6 Beta Phase Wall Thickness (F w) as a Function of Z ircaloy - Water Reaction 
Time For Constant Temperature Exposure
thickness of affected regions in the fuel rod. In spite of the scatter 
in the data, the results indicate that ductility is not assured for values 
of F^ much less than 0.8. In preparing its Concluding Statement, the AEC 
reviewed the methods which were recommended by the hearing participants 
for evaluating oxidation limits for embrittlement criteria. The results, 
presented in table A7.2, indicate the principal features of the recommen­
dations (6 ,^ p. 8 8). After reviewing the proposed methods for evaluating 
the location of the moving a-phase zirconium boundary through methods re­
lating F^ or 5 to temperature and time, the AEC concluded that the multi­
plicity of methods for calculating these parameters could not be correlated 
with high confidence. They compared the results for the various methods 
proposed and concluded, that using an equivalent 17 percent clad reacted 
criteria (using the Baker-Just equations for total oxidation of material) 
bounded the results of other methods with satisfactory conservatism. 
Comparison of the recommendations indicates that the 17 percent limit 
permits more oxidation than the equivalent oxygen uptake implied by the 
methods recommended by Combustion Engineering, Westinghouse, and the
Utility Group. The C. E. proposed limit (F > .65) corresponds to a limitw
of about 10 to 14 percent equivalent Zr02 oxidation. As indicated in 
table A7.2, Westinghouse recommended an oxidation limit equivalent to a 
16 percent clad reaction. In their Concluding Statement, the Utility 
Group recommended,
. . . a limit on the calculated . . . equivalent oxi­
dation of 12 mole percent would prevent clad embrittlement 
and failure and should conservatively bound conditions which 
could be experienced during a design basis LOCA (22. p. 39).
Moreover, it should be observed that the 17 percent clad reaction limit 
corresponds to an Fw of about 0.5. As shown in figures A7.5 and A7.6, 
oxidations of this extent generally result in relatively high ZDT values, 
and reduce the fuel rod to partially ductile to non-ductile conditions 
during cooling periods.
A7.5 Commentary
As indicated in the foregoing sections, the AEC position with 
respect to the metal-water reaction has evolved steadily during the
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EMBRITTLEMENT CRITERIA AND METHODS
Table A7.2
Participant Source Temperature Limit °F
Oxidation
Limit
Inside
Reaction
Clad Thinning 
Percent Expansion
Zirc-Water 
Reaction Equation
Utilities Conclusions 2500 12-17% clad 0-75% of 0-40% Klepfer
reacted outside
B & W Conclusions 2400 19% clad 
reacted 0 0 Klepfer
G.E. Conclusions 2300* None* 0 0 Baker-Just
C.E. Conclusions 2500 Fw > 0.65 2/3 of 
outside
50% C.E.
Westinghouse Conclusions 2700 £t/wo < 0.47** 0 0 Westinghouse
Staff Rebuttal 2200 £t/wo < 0.44 100% Baker- 
Just after 
rupture***
Calculate Baker-Just
Staff Conclusions 2200 17% clad 
reacted
100% Baker- 
Just after 
rupture***
Calculate Baker-Just
* G.E. believes; 2700°F and 17 percent reaction are better limits but does not recommend any change from
Interim Acceptance Criteria.
** Westinghouse states that this is equivalent to 16 percent clad reaction.
*** Within 1.5 inches of the center of the rupture.
the hearings. Under pressure from the intervenors, ACRS, and manu­
facturers, the AEC finally acknowledged the necessity of providing a 
specific limit to the reaction in addition to peak temperature. Using 
the Baker-Just oxidation relationship, the newly prescribed 17 percent 
equivalent clad reaction criterion now allows the designer to uniquely 
specify the limiting metal-water reaction for his reactor. The AEC's 
original position, that the time history of the reaction was implicit 
in the calculational models of the reactors, overlooked the principal 
problem that the oxidation was not explicitly limited by a peak tempera 
ture criterion alone (8 ,^ p. 2-5).
Initially the intervenors argued that the 2300°F peak tempera 
ture limit alone was simply nonconservative. In addition to pointing 
up the need to rectify the criteria's failure to specify explicit tem­
perature-time relationships, the CNI proposed that the following addi­
tional criteria changes should be incorporated relative to metal-water 
oxidation reactions to increase conservatism.
(1) A minimum ZDT of 200°F or less should be required.
(2) Based upon calculated outside oxidation thicknesses, 
equal oxidation should be assumed on interior rod 
surfaces to allow for metal-water reactions on sur­
faces which had ballooned and ruptured during blow­
down .
(3) Moreover, to account further for the effect of fuel 
rod swelling, the calculated excursion should assume 
that cladding walls were thinned to one-half the 
original thickness during the expansion.
The CNI concluding arguments were tempered somewhat. Their 
call for the above proposed criteria changes was not repeated, perhaps 
because they felt that the AEC was moving to incorporate explicit
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changes which were close to their initial criticisms. They did state, 
however, that the single peak temperature limit without some form of 
explicit time restriction had been "totally discredited." They also 
stated that before meaningful criterion could be established, it would 
be necessary to conduct more experimental work —  especially in areas 
of thinned and ruptured tubing and the verification of calculated LOCA 
forces on the fuel rods (7, p. 5-49).
More experimental work in fuel rod oxidation and embrittle­
ment would seem to be desirable. The basis for most of our current 
embrittlement limits seems to rest upon less than 100 individual experi­
mental measurements. This is not a particularly large set of data upon 
which to base an extremely important criterion, especially considering 
the rather large scatter in the data. However, it does seem that the 
data should be adequate to permit conservative oxidation limits to be 
established. Consequently, though additional tests may be desirable, 
the available information appears sufficient for establishing criterion 
limits.
From the perspective of energy release (e.g., figure A7.3), 
the AEC's revised 2200°F peak temperature limit appears to potentially 
permit non-negligible zirconium-water reaction energy release rates 
when compared to local fission product decay heat release. Depending 
upon the time the peak temperature for the rod is reached, the Baker- 
Just relationship would predict energy release rates which are nearly 
equal to (and possibly greater than) the fission product decay power. 
Though the total energy release is small when the temperature excursion 
is held within the criteria limits (table A7.1) —  on the order of 
1 percent of the decay heat release —  the local transient heat release 
rate is substantial and could adversely effect the thermal history at 
the core hot spot. If this energy source were neglected in the ECCS 
thermal analysis, the resulting positive feedback energy input mechanism
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could conceivably spread the hot spot over broader core regions with 
potentially disastrous consequences. Reduction of this problem to 
metal-water energy release rate levels of essentially inconsequential 
magnitudes, e.g., about an order of magnitude below critical decay 
heat power levels, would require a corresponding reduction of peak 
temperatures to approximately 1800°F. Alternatively, consideration of 
intentional utilization of an initial oxide thickness of about 0.5 to 
1 mil (or equivalently, an initial equivalent 2 percent to 4 percent 
cladding oxidation) would also reduce the peak metal-water reaction 
power levels to approximately an order of magnitude below decay heat 
levels with the current 2200°F limit. A reduction in permissible metal- 
water reaction to power levels of this magnitude would effectively 
eliminate this contribution as a significant energy source. There is 
no reason to believe, however, that the energy associated with the metal- 
water reaction is not adequately predicted in all of the evaluation 
models meeting the new AC. The Baker-Just reaction rate equations 
prescribed by the criteria appear to be adequately conservative in 
specifying energy released and oxidation occurring as a result of the 
reaction. Calculations based upon the Baker-Just relationships, and 
which satisfy the other AC prescribed metal-water criteria, should ade­
quately include this energy source in their analyses. If the resulting 
calculations indicate that the cladding thermal response remains with 
the 2200°F AC limit, there should be no basis for concern that the 
metal-water reactions have not been conservatively treated from an 
energy source standpoint.
From an embrittlement point of view, the proposed 17 percent 
equivalent oxidation limit, based upon analyses using the Baker-Just 
reaction rate method, appears to be of borderline conservatism (e.g., 
figures A7.5 and A7.6). The 17 percent equivalent oxidation, as pre­
viously noted, corresponds approximately to F^ = 0.5. Under these 
circumstances, oxidized rods could be only partially ductile and at
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temperatures of less than about 900°F could be below the ZDT. With the 
scatter in oxidation depths indicated by the data of figure A7.6, and 
consequent uncertainty in relating embrittlement to equivalent percent 
oxidation or to actual measured oxidation penetration, a 17 percent oxi­
dation limit appears to provide only borderline conservatism. The C. E.
recommendations of F > 0.65, corresponding approximately to an equivalentw
10 to 14 percent cladding reaction limit, with an estimated ZDT of approxi­
mately 400°F, would appear to be a considerably more conservative (and 
comfortable) operating limit. The consolidated Utilities Group has also 
recognized the need for a more conservative 12 percent limit, as previously 
cited.
With respect to oxidation limits on the inside and outside 
surfaces of the fuel rod, the AEC's ultimate resolution of this criteria 
omission in the IAC appears to be reasonable. According to the new AC, 
if in the course of the LOCA cladding rupture is calculated to occur, 
the inside tube surfaces shall be included in the oxidation calculation, 
beginning at the time of calculated rupture. Moreover, the criteria 
require that all evaluation models shall include a model for predicting 
clad swelling rupture, which is based on "applicable data in such a way 
that the degree of swelling and incidence of rupture are not underestima­
ted" (60, p. 1104). Adequate application of these criteria should meet 
the requirement of most reasonable men for conservative treatment of the 
metal-water reaction due to clad rupture.
Rather than incorporating a specific quantitative statement of 
required fractional clad thinning in sections where swelling and rupture 
have occurred, as proposed by CNI, the final AC require that the evalua­
tion model provide for calculation of the ballooned clad thickness at 
the elevation of the rupture. The criteria require that the equivalent 
unoxidized clad thickness be based upon the initial cladding cross-sec­
tional area,
taken at a horizontal plane at the elevation of the 
rupture, if it occurs, or at the elevation of the highest
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cladding temperature if no rupture is calculated to occur, 
divided by the average circumference at that elevation.
For ruptured cladding the circumference does not include 
the rupture opening (60, p. 1095).
Though classical rupture experiments do not demonstrate such idealized 
thinning conditions for swelling and rupture, the assumption of an "aver­
age" distribution of material, in accordance with the revised criterion 
specifications, appears reasonably conservative.
Generally speaking, though absolute conservatism of the metal- 
water reaction criteria may not be assured within the AEC's Concluding 
Statement, the revised criteria have gone a long way towards eliminating 
most of the principal initial objections of the intervenors (but at the 
same time implicitly acknowledging that many of the objections were 
fundamentally legitimate). Though clad ductility may not conservatively 
be assured by the criteria, the most pertinent data on oxidation reactions 
appear to have been considered. The AEC attempts to arrive at a consensus 
appear to have been unsuccessful, and vendor recommendations have appar­
ently been misinterpreted. Combustion Engineering's recommendation of a 
minimum Fw of 0.65 was interpreted as being equivalent to a brittle layer 
thickness ratio of K /w = .47 (60, p. 1097). This stated equivalency
is incorrect. The ratio F = .65 corresponds to 5/wo = .37, which corres-w
ponds to a fractional equivalent oxidation of 10 to 14 percent, as previ­
ously discussed. Thus the "uniformity of opinion" which the Commission 
has sought to establish is not particularly evident, nor does it strongly 
support the 17 percent oxidation limit of the AC.
Assuming assured conservatism is desirable, a reduction in the 
limiting equivalent oxidation to 12 percent of the initial clad thickness 
would appear to be needed to achieve this goal.
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Appendix 8 FLECHT TEST PROGRAMS
The conservatism of the modeling of heat transfer physical 
processes for reactor core reflooding and core spray emergency coolant 
mechanisms, as they were defined by the IAC, has been questioned by 
both the ACRS and the CNI. Because the physical processes occurring 
during coolant application are quite complex, the principal means of 
developing modeling tools for their evaluation has been through empiri­
cal methods. Attempts have been made to isolate and examine many of 
the elements of the LOCA physical processes through a number of experi­
ments. To evaluate the phenomena of reflooding and core spray, the 
Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat Transfer (FLECHT) test programs 
were conducted. The FLECHT programs have formed the basis for the post 
blowdown heat transfer models prescribed in all of the AEC criteria 
to date. Though there have been some modifications in interpretation 
of the program results over the course of the hearings, the basic evalu 
ation model methodology is still fundamentally dependent upon the 
validity and adequacy of the FLECHT data. This appendix will review 
the several criticisms which have been raised by the intervenors with 
respect to these aspects of the FLECHT tests.
A8 .1 General FLECHT Test Description
Two separate test programs were conducted, one for boiling 
water reactors (BWR-FLECHT) and another for pressurized water reactors 
(PWR-FLECHT). The two test programs, conducted by GE and Westinghouse 
respectively, under subcontract to the Idaho Nuclear Corporation, 
though different in procedural detail were similar in many general 
ways. For uncertain reasons, GE's BWR-FLECHT program was singled out 
for more extensive criticism by CNI than the PWR-FLECHT. Consequently, 
in order to evaluate the CNI criticisms, much of the material in this 
chapter has been directed toward review of the BWR-FLECHT program.
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Figure A8.1 is a schematic diagram (49) of the BWR-FLECHT 
test setup. As indicated in the figure, full length fuel rods were 
tested in a 7 x 7 rod bundle configuration closely approximating BWR 
reactor bundles which were contemporary to the test period. For the 
tests, the fuel rod cladding material was fabricated of either stainless 
steel or zircaloy. The rods were heated by electrical resistance heaters 
designed to mock up operation rod axial power distribution (a chopped 
cosine power distribution along the axial length of the rod) . Typical 
heater construction for Westinghouse PWR-FLECHT rods (50) is shown in 
figure A8.2. Though heater materials and construction details differed 
somewhat between the BWR and PWR programs, general elements of rod and 
heater designs were similar for both programs. The time history for 
the electrical power supplied to the rod bundles was programmed to simu­
late bundle decay heat in an operating reactor with reactor operating 
power at LOCA shutdown as a parameter.
The tests were conducted in a parametric fashion. Analyses 
of calculated values of specific coolant application rates, initial 
temperatures, peak operating power, and time sequences of coolant appli­
cation were the basis for determination of the ranges for each of these 
parameters. Table 8.1 (49) represents a summary of the BWR-FLECHT test 
program indicating the number of tests, rod materials and parameter 
ranges utilized in the program. A similar number of tests was conducted 
in the PWR-FLECHT program.
A8 .2 FLECHT Test Program, Analysis
Three principal criticisms have been made of the BWR-FLECHT 
tests. The first complaint was that although all BWR fuel rods are 
manufactured of a zirconium (Zr) alloy, zircaloy, only 5 of the 143 
FLECHT tests utilized Zr rods. The remaining 138 tests were conducted 
with stainless steel (SS) rods. Since, as discussed in appendix 7, Zr 
reacts exothermically with water at elevated temperatures, contributing
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Figure A8.1 BWR-FLECHT Test Setup
(After Figure 1, 49.)
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A8-4 1 .  TUBE 0 . 4 2 2 "  OD BY 0.024" WALL TYPE 347 
STAINLESS OR ZIRCALOY-4
2. NICKEL CONDUCTOR 
0.132" DIA x 36" LONG
3. NICHROME OR KANTHAL RESISTANCE WIRE 
0.036" DIA x 420" LONG COILS 0.15" OD 
(COSINE DISTRIBUTION ALONG LENGTH)
4. BORON NITRIDE INSULATION SWAGED 
DENSITY 2 g m / c m 3
5. CHROMEL ALUMEL THERMOCOUPLES WITHIN 
0.040" STAINLESS SHEATH
Figure A8.2 FLECHT Heater Rod Schematic Design 
(After Figure 2 . 4 , 50 , by permission.)
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Table A8.1
BWR-FLECHT Testing Summary
Bundle Type of Peak Power Coolant Initial
Testing Date Tests Tests (kW) Rate Temperature (°F) Reference
SS1N 5 Steady State 20-235 To Hold Level __ GEAP-10117
July 68 Flooding 16 Transient 240-390 0.6-3.7 ips 1328-2150
SS2M 4 Steady State 200-250 2 .1-2.6 gpm — GEAP-10092
Aug-Sept 68 Spray 15 Transient 120-390 1.1-3.35 gpm 1120-2050
SS3M 4 Steady State 200 0 .6-2.1 gpm — GEAP-10092
Sept-Dec 68 Spray 38 Transient 120-390 0.4-6.5 gpm 810-1450
ZrlM
May 69 Spray 1 Transient 200 2.45 gpm 1790 GEAP-10092
SS2N
Aug-Oct 69 Spray 3 Steady State 150 1.0-2.45 gpm — GEAP-13088
24 Transient 100-250 2.45-5.0 gpm 865-1850
8 Combined 250-235 2.0-3.5 gpm 1335-1870
Spray & 2 .0--6.0 ips
Zr2K
Flooding
NEDG-13064
Dec 69 Spray 1 Transient 195 2.45 gpm 1920 GEAP-13112
Zr3M 
Mar 90 Spray 1 Transient 240 2.45 gpm 2345 GEAP-13174
Zr4M 
May 70 Spray 1 Transient 240 2.45 gpm 2298 GEAP-13174
Zr5M 
June 70
Spray with 
Flooding 1 Transient 300 3.25 gpm 6.0 ips 2325 GEAP-13174
SS4N Spray 10 Transient 250 2.45 gpm 1076-1718 GEAP-13190
Sept-Oct 70 Flooding 11 Transient 250 1 .5-6.0 ips 1300-1600
5 Zircaloy-Clad Bundle Spray Transient Tests 
11 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Steady State Spray Tests 
95 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Spray Transient Tests 
5 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Steady State Flooding Tests 
27 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Flooding Transient Tests
additional energy to that of the decaying fission products, the applica­
tion of water to the core has the potential of increasing the heat input 
to the fuel rods rather than cooling them, as desired. The small number 
of Zr tests in comparison with the total test program was seriously faulted 
by the CNI.
There are two basic explanations which have been proffered for 
the relatively large numer of SS rod bundles used in the programs. The 
first deals with test repeatability and economics and the second with 
simplification of the analysis of the physical processes of the bundle 
cooling mechanisms. The repeatability and economics explanation is the 
reason most emphasized by the AEC and GE (6 ,^ p. 166; 60_, p. 1123).
The FLECHT program was conducted as a parametric test series 
which strongly affected the economics issue. Because rod heaters are 
hand wound, their individual response characteristics are relatively 
unique. The SS rods were apparently chosen primarily for their durability. 
They could be used repeatedly in testing (for 30 or 40 individual tests) 
without substantial changes in response over the series. Thus, differences 
in heater characteristics would not influence the test series results.
On the other hand, as a result of metal-water reactions, Zr 
rods could be used only once and then had to be subjected to a destruc­
tive post-mortem examination after the test. Since metal-water (M-W) 
reaction rates are inversely proportional to the oxidation thickness, 
repeated tests on used rods could not be expected to be reproducible 
with respect to M-W reactions as the oxidized depth would increase with 
each test. Moreover, destructive testing of the rods was felt to be the 
only "absolute" method of evaluating the extent of the M-W reaction 
which took place in the test. Consequently, to improve test reliability 
and to reduce cost of rod fabrication, SS rods were used most extensively 
in the test program.
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The second reason for using more SS than Zr rods involves the 
problems of simplifying heat transfer analyses by separating the 
M-W reaction from the physical processes of cooling rods which were 
not undergoing an A-W reaction. It was assumed that the M-W reaction 
was an independent heat input mechanism to the fuel rods, separable 
from the basic heat transfer processes of cooling. On this basis, the 
SS rods permitted direct determination of the applicable heat transfer 
coefficients for the cooling mechanisms without supplementary heat 
input complications. The validity of this concept of separability of 
the two heat transfer mechanisms rests on the assumption that the 
radiative and convective heat transfer processes for heat transmission 
between fuel rods and the coolant fluid are essentially independent of 
the fuel rod materials, and thus are functions primarily only of tem­
perature and fluid flow conditions. Thus, it was felt to be possible 
to evaluate heat transfer coefficients from SS tests where the results 
would not be affected by M-W reactions. The purpose of the Zr tests 
was then to evaluate the validity of these assumptions by using SS 
derived heat transfer coefficients to evaluate (or provide post-test 
predictions) of the thermal response of Zr bundles.
The weakness of these arguments for rod material selection 
is that because of the small number of Zr tests and the poor quality of 
the Zr results, questions remain concerning the validity of the assump­
tions of the equivalence of non-reactive heat transfer characteristics 
for the two materials and the legitimacy of decoupling the metal-water 
reaction from the clad heat transfer mechanisms. Thus the AEC in its 
Concluding Statement argued that,
...the stainless steel bundle tests were performed 
so as to obtain parametric heat transfer information, 
whereas the Zircaloy-clad bundles were used to deter­
mine whether any significant anomaly existed in the 
transient heat transfer behavior of Zircaloy (6 , p. 166).
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The Commission concluded in their discussion of the AC that,
Stainless steel was used instead of zircaloy as the 
cladding material for nearly all of the FLECHT tests be­
cause it is more durable under the test conditions. Al­
though it is not usual to expect significant differences 
in convective heat transfer coefficients from different 
solid material surfaces, the possibility of such differ­
ences was considered, perhaps resulting from such factors 
as differences in thermal conductivity and differences 
in wetting properties. The reasonable conclusion was 
reached that the effect of the difference between zirca­
loy and stainless steel, if any, would be small. There 
is a difference, of course, in the rate of heat gener­
ation from steam oxidation, but this is deposited within 
the metal under the surface of the oxide film. The 
presence of this heat source should not affect the heat 
transfer coefficients, which depend on conditions in 
the coolant outside the rod.
The few FLECHT runs made with zircaloy clad rods 
provide uncertain and conflicting evidence. Westing­
house pointed out that all of the zircaloy runs except 
one (run 9573) yield higher heat transfer coefficients 
than were obtained with steel (Westinghouse Concluding 
Statement, pp C-74 to C-76; Exhibit 150, pp 3-98 & ff). 
Consolidated National Intervenors pointed out that most 
of these runs were made at unreasonable high flooding 
rates, and that a different result was obtained from 
run 9573 where the flooding rate was about one inch per 
second. In the first 18 seconds of this run, before 
multiple heater rod failures occurred, the zircaloy clad 
rods heated up faster than predicted from the stainless 
steel based correlations (Exhibit 1041, pp 6.7 & ff).
This anomalous result has been attributed to experimen­
tal error, or possibly to an unusually skewed initial 
temperature distribution along the length of the rod 
(Exhibit 1113, pp 17-6-17-7).
On balance, the Commission sees no basis for con­
cluding that the heat transfer mechanism is different 
for zircaloy and stainless steel, and believes, that 
the heat transfer correlations derived from stainless 
steel clad heater rods are suitable for use with zircaloy 
clad fuels rods. It is apparent, however, that more 
experiments with zircaloy cladding are needed to over­
come the impression left from run 9573 (60, pp. 1123,
1124).
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These conclusions appear to be basically valid. Non-reactive 
heat transfer mechanisms have been studied in great detail for heat 
exchanger applications in many industries. These studies have shown 
that convective heat transfer mechanisms are fundamentally related to 
the fluid properties in the heat exchanger —  and only in a second 
order manner to the properties of the metallic surfaces of the heat 
exchanger itself, assuming equivalent surface roughness, etc. The de­
coupling of the reactive and convective heat transfer mechanisms is a 
less clear cut proposition. The evidence for this assumption appears 
to be somewhat uncertain, under the circumstances. However, the assump­
tion of decoupling itself appears to have been legitimate at least 
initially. In view of the uncertainty and conflicts in the Zr test 
results, the AEC position that more Zr tests are needed appears entirely 
valid.
The second major criticism of the BWR-FLECHT tests concerns 
the excessive use of molybdenum heating elements to power the rods 
during reactor LOCA transient simulation. As a resistance heater 
material, molybdenum (Mo) has a very large temperature coefficient of 
resistivity which induced substantial amounts of power shifting in 
the rods as a result of the "chopped cosine" axial power distribution 
designed for simulation of in-core heat distribution in the tests and 
from rod-to-rod as a result of inter-rod thermal interactions. The 
net result was that pre-test predictions of power distribution for the 
rods were poorly correlated with measured values for tests utilizing 
Mo heaters.
Fortunately for ECCS designers, some of the FLECHT tests 
were conducted using other heater materials. Chief among the alternates 
was Nichrome V. The temperature coefficient of resistivity for Nichrome 
V is nearly constant. However, only a limited number of tests were 
conducted using this heater material because of its low failure tem­
perature (2500°F). Consequently, according to GE, the heaters could
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not be used in tests requiring extended operating periods at temperatures 
greater than 2000°F (51, p. 6). Consequently Mo heaters were favored, 
particularly in the SS tests, where the same rod bundle was repeatedly 
used for evaluation of different test parameters.
Examination of the GE test documents does not seem to demon­
strate that the substantial Mo induced power shifting observed in the 
FLECHT tests was initially expected. Mechanisms for controlling the 
positive feedback from the Mo resistivity characteristics do not appear 
to have been incorporated into the test apparatus until the last 3 Zr 
tests were conducted, nearly two years after the program began (52, p. 4). 
Moreover, no clear evidence can be seen that individual rod power deter­
minations were (or perhaps could be) made to allow for systematic analy­
sis of test results. Consequently, the Mo heaters seem to have contri­
buted painfully complicating factors and little useful information to 
the FLECHT tests.
As a consequence of the complications associated with inter­
pretation of Mo heater test results, GE has leaned heavily upon results 
obtained with Nichrome V heaters in evaluation of heat transfer coeffi­
cients for their transient analysis methods (52, p. 5). Results obtained 
with Mo heaters are only rarely referenced and then primarily for the 
limited number of Zr test results in which they were used. For example, 
the heat transfer coefficients utilized in the GE core spray and reflood 
calculation model (54, p. 58), were derived on the basis of the SS2N 
test series (53, p. 26), in which Nichrome heating elements were used 
for the rod bundles —  as indicated by the N in the descriptive number 
scheme (SS2N) for the test series. Thus, tests conducted with heater 
materials with low temperature coefficients of resistivity have had a 
disproportionately large influence on assessment of heat transfer mech­
anisms when compared to the actual number of tests conducted in the 
FLECHT program.
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The third principal criticism of the BWR-FLECHT program con­
cerns the non-reproducibility of the tests. CNI presented (9, p. 5.26) 
results from tests conducted with SS2N and SS4N-49 rod bundles which 
showed that for selected cases, peak temperatures for the SS4N tests 
were approximately 15 percent greater than reported SS2N results for 
similar test conditions. In their BWR-FLECHT Final Report, GE used heat 
transfer coefficients derived from SS2N results to compare with tempera­
ture-time histories obtained in tests of zircaloy-clad bundles (52, ap­
pendix A). As shown in figure A8.3 using SS4N test results, the CNI 
derived heat transfer coefficients which when applied to the limited 
number of Zr test results shown in the CNI direct testimony, showed 
"better" correspondence with the measured values presented than the 
results shown for GE's SS2N derived heat transfer coefficients.
It should be noted, however, that only four time histories 
were shown by the CNI in which the correlations were presented. In 
every case, data reported by the CNI shows GE predicted peak tempera­
tures which fall short of the measured data. These results are obviously 
biased towards support of the CNI contention that the GE heat transfer 
coefficients are inadequate. In actuality, using the methods recommended 
for design purposes by GE (using 100 percent of the predicted M-W reac­
tion) , predicted temperatures were greater than the measured temperatures 
for 37 of 44 measurements for tests Zr2K, Zr3M, Zr4M (52, appendix A). 
Needless to say, comparison of CNI derived heat transfer results would 
not have been as convincing for these 37 other sets of results, if they 
had been shown.
A comparison of the test and predicted results is shown in 
the graphs, figures A8.4 to A8 .6 , prepared by GE showing analytical 
predictions for all the Zr tests based upon a 50 percent Baker-Just 
M-W reaction energy input to the heat transfer calculation compared 
to measured peak temperatures and turnaround times 052, pp. 73-75).
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Figure A 8 . 3  CNI Correlation of S S 2 N  and S S 4 N  Results  
(A fte r  F igure A - 2 5 ,  5 2 ,  by permission.)
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Prediction Map for Rod Temperatures
Figure A8.4
(After Figure A-48, 52.)
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Figure A8.5
Prediction Map for Rod Temperatures
ERROR IN TIME OF MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE l-min) 
(After Figure A-49, 52, by permission)
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Prediction Map for Rod Temperatures
Figure A8.6
(After Figure A-50, 52.)
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Peak temperatures calculated on the basis of a 50 percent Baker-Just 
M-W reaction energy input to the system will tend to be lower than pre­
dictions using a 100 percent Baker-Just input (figure A8.3). However, 
comparisons with the FLECHT measured data, for 50 percent Baker-Just inputs, 
would tend to accentuate indications of underpredictions, which could make 
the calculational results tend to appear unconservative. This aspect 
should be considered when the reader analyzes the results shown in figures 
A8.4 to A8 .6 . The curves show the differences in maximum predicted and 
measured temperatures as a function of the error in prediction of the time 
of the recorded temperature maxima. It should be noted that although 
there is a substantial amount of scatter in plotted data, predicted tem­
peratures are generally in excess of measured values using SS2N derived 
heat transfer coefficients, even using a 50 percent M-W reactions estimate. 
The disturbing aspects of the results shown are the apparent randomness
of the results and the wide limits of the errors in the data. (-4<A,_.time
<+ 3 minutes; - 150°F<A <+300°F). The scatter in the results does nottemp
tend to encourage great confidence in the reliability of the calculational 
capability for the design methods. It does, on the other hand, support 
GE's statement that the "mechanisms of spray cooling are somewhat random" 
(26) and provide some basis for the CNI concern over non-reproducibility 
of the tests. The implied uncertainty of +15 percent/-7 percent in pre­
dicted temperature maxima seems unpleasantly large. (Note however that 
the maximum non-conservative difference shown in the above GE figures is 
the -7 percent). However, the range of errors in predicting maximum tem­
peratures lends support to the concept that maximizing the credibility 
for the heat transfer methodology would require use of a greater margin 
of safety in estimating heat transfer coefficients for design purposes.
The results shown (described as having been derived with the 
current GE design model) (52, appendix A) indicate the application of 
common design practices but show only uncertain conservatism.
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However, note that if a 100 percent Baker-Just M-W reaction is used in 
the calculation, in accordance with stated IAC requirements, predicted 
temperature maxima exceed measured values more than 85 percent of the 
time. A discouraging aspect of the results shown in figures A8.4 to 
A8.6 is that in one test, Zr3M, temperatures were overpredicted for less 
than 30 percent of the rods. Even using a 100 percent Baker-Just M-W 
reaction energy input, overpredictions were achieved on less than 50 per­
cent of the measurements. Predictions of time histories were also poor.
It is also discomforting to note that central rod prediction, 
figure A8.6, had the poorest record for overprediction of all the test 
results. Fifty percent of the results were underpredicted for these rods, 
which are the hottest in the bundle. Thus the temperatures of the hottest 
rods were most regularly underpredicted —  an observation which weakens 
confidence in the conservatism of the analysis methods even more.
A8.3 Zr Test Review
The largest portion of the CNI direct testimony (_9) was parti­
cularly directed at discrediting the FLECHT Zr2K test (a zircaloy bundle 
with internally pressurized rods). The Zr2K test results are very impor­
tant to both the AEC and the CNI, for opposite reasons. The AEC uses the 
test results extensively to defend the validity of their recommended BWR 
analysis methods. The CNI try to show the inadequacy of the test in order 
to weaken the AEC defense.
Fortunately, the Zr2K utilized constant resistance (Kanthal) 
heater elements which minimized power shifting (52, p. 12). Unfortu­
nately, 10 of the 49 heaters failed, losing power before the test was 
concluded. Fortunately, all the rods with failures were instrumented 
with thermocouples and ammeters. Unfortunately, the individual rod 
circuits were fused for 40 amps while the ammeters were designed for 
maximum currents of 25 amps and were "pegged" for varying lengths of 
time on all "failed" rods. Also unfortunately, no ammeter time histories
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are shown for the test (perhaps because estimates of the resistance of 
rod current paths during "failure" periods are highly speculative and 
hence power estimates based upon current measurement would be equally 
uncertain).
Fortunately, the Zr2K rods were internally pressurized to 
simulate the results of swelling and rupture produced by fission pro­
duct gases in an operating reactor. Unfortunately, the heater failures 
complicated the responses of the rods. Maximum expansion, flow blockage, 
and temperatures occurred in the vicinity of the "failed" rods. GE re­
ported 60 percent blockage for the central 9 rod portion of the bundle 
only. CNI estimates that blockage of 90-94 percent occurred in the off- 
center portion of the bundle containing the "failed" rods. The CNI 
implied that the extensive off-center swelling occurred in spite of 
heater failures (which were inferred by the CNI to be unpowered sinks 
for thermal energy from neighboring rods). Examination of the rod ther­
mal histories indicates it is more likely that the swelling was induced 
because of excessive power supplied to the rods during their "failure" 
periods, producing local hot spots with consequent synergistic expan­
sion and rupture of adjacent rods.
The CNI claimed that the test showed that near "thermal run­
away" conditions resulted from M-W reactions, in spite of the "failed" 
heater rods. They compared test results for SS2N with Zr2K, showing 
satisfactory correlation during approximately the first five minutes 
of the test with substantial deviations (Zr2K temperatures greater than 
SS2N) during the subsequent periods of substantial heater failures. 
Attempts by GE to show that M-W reactions were insignificant in the 
thermal response of the rods were not overly convincing since they did 
not evaluate actual dynamic heat rate inputs but depended instead upon 
arbitrarily time averaged heat inputs over arbitrary time intervals (54, 
appendix A). Gross estimates were made of the total energy contributed 
to the thermal transient through the M-W reaction of 1/4 B/inch of
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cladding length (based upon the maximum observed depth of ZrO^ penetra­
tion for the Zr2K experiment of 1.8 mils). This was compared with a 
design total delivered decay power to the center of the maximum peaked 
rod over the 24 minute spray cooling transient of 29.7 B/inch (14.5 
B/inch over the first 10 minutes). Thus, GE inferred the total M-W 
reaction to be 5-10 percent of the decay energy depending upon which of 
the two time periods was used in the estimation. They acknowledge that 
the rate of M-W energy addition is more significant than the comparisons 
with total energy shown above, but state that rate information cannot 
be obtained from the Zr2K data. Irrespective of the validity of this 
observation, it seems that comparisons with rod input energy increments 
taken over 10 to 24 minute intervals are too insensitive to be adequate 
indications of the significance of the M-W energy contribution. No feel­
ing of confidence is gained that M-W reactions were unimportant as a 
result of this GE analysis. However, the case for M-W induced thermal 
runaway in the Zr2K test is equally weak.
One of the more difficult aspects of evaluation of Zr2K test 
results is associated with the fundamental data for the tests, the re­
corded thermocouple (TC) responses. GE has been very liberal with their 
accreditation of observed TC responses as erratic. However, several 
proffered examples of erratic response seem to show well defined inter­
rod correlations. Under such circumstances, "unexplained" might be a 
better description for the observed TC behavior than "erratic."
Figure A8.7 (based on material from reference 54) presents 
an envelope of the thermocouple response histories for the rods which 
experienced the peak temperatures during the Zr2K thermal excursion.
It is interesting to observe the correlation between the rods with maxi­
mum temperatures, their periods of maximum temperature, and their re­
lationship to rods in which the currents were "pegged" at levels between 
25 amps (the maximum range of the ammeter) and 40 amps (the fused current 
limit for each rod), and the periods of excessive current prior to rod
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Figure A8.7
Envelope of Thermocouple Response Histories for Peak Temperature Rods of FLECHT Zr2K Test
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"failure." A schematic diagram of the rod bundle layout is shown in 
figure A8.8. Using figures A8.7 and A8.8, it is interesting to compare 
the order and location of electrical "failures" and the development of 
peak temperatures.
A rigorously thorough analysis of the Zr2K thermal response mea­
surements is beyond the scope of this report. It should be noted, however, 
that the recorded temperatures of rod 16, which developed the first 
electrical anomaly after the official start of the test, were almost 
identical to those of rod 24, which was given credit for the maximum 
temperature measurement. The intra- and inter-rod temperature measure­
ments for rod 16 and its neighbors show consistent correlations over the 
first two minutes of the transient, in spite of the current anomaly 
being experienced by the rod (which started essentially at the beginning 
of the thermal transient test period and lasted for nearly six minutes). 
Between 2 and 3 minutes after transient initiation, however, thermo­
couples (TC) on rod 16 indicate an apparent sharp temperature rise.
Because of the anomalous electrical activity of rod 16 at this time, 
experimental analysts have been inclined to discount this TC response 
as anomalous also. However, it is interesting to note that the extreme 
temperature excursion shown in figure A8.7 for rod 23 (adjacent to rod 16) 
occurred at the same time the rod 16 TC excursion occurred and is matched 
by nearly identical temperature excursion in rod 9, the other rod dia­
metrically adjacent to rod 16. Moreover, it seems entirely too coinci­
dental that temperature turnaround should be achieved in rod 24 at 
essentially the same time that the actual failure (rod current going to 
zero) for both rods 16 and 24 occurred. Under those circumstances, it 
does not seem surprising that rod 17, still being driven by "normal" 
electric current and in direct view of the three hottest rods in the 
test (rods 16, 23, and 24) should then become the highest temperature 
rod for most of remaining significant portion of the temperature tran­
sient. During this period, rods 17 and 23 both underwent electrical
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Figure A 8 .  8  Z r2 K  Rod Bundle Schem atic Showing Rod F a ilu re  Sequence 
(A fte r F igure 6 , 5 4 ,  by p erm iss ion .)
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anomalies in which excessive currents were delivered to them. It was 
not until the current to both of these rods actually went to zero, ap­
proximately 12 minutes after the thermal transient began, that rod 17 
relinquished its role as the highest temperature rod for the test.
The relationships described above seem to indicate a systematic 
correlation between the electrical anomalies of the "failed" rods and 
temperature extremes for the bundle. It would appear that a convincing 
argument could be made that the driving functions for the highest tem­
perature rods was probably excessive power anomalously delivered to the 
rods during these periods rather than any of the normal physical pro­
cesses contributing to rod heat up for a reactor bundle under LOCA con­
ditions. Accordingly, it is regrettable that the test report failed to 
provide any significant evaluation of the relationship of electrical 
anomalies to measured maximum temperatures, except to imply that the 
"failures" resulted in lower temperatures for the test than would have 
been experienced had the "failures" not occurred. The report states:
The effect of rod failures later in the transient 
(e.g., rods 16, 24, and 30 between transient initiation 
and maximum temperature and rods 17, 23, 31, and 37 after 
maximum temperature) was not considered in the detail 
described above. The effect of these rod failures must 
be small, since they were at relatively high tempera­
tures at the time of failure, and less radiation from 
the powered rods to the later failing rods can be ex­
pected. In addition, the rods which failed after the 
bundle maximum temperature had occurred could not have 
affected that maximum temperature. Consequently, the 
effect of the later seven rod failures is estimated to 
have had a smaller effect on the bundle maximum tem­
perature than did the first three failures; that is, 
less than 30°F.
It is therefore estimated that, had no heater 
rod electrical failure occurred, the maximum recorded 
cladding temperature would have been no more than 60°F 
higher than the 2250°F actually recorded (5.4, p. 67).
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The possibility that electrical anomalies may have acted as high tem­
perature sources rather than energy sinks does not appear to have been 
considered.
Is there a possible relationship between the anomalous TC 
readings and M-W reactions? Figure A8.9 is representative of the cor­
relation which GE has made between calculated and measured thermal 
response for some of the Zr2K rods where TC anomalies have been re­
corded. CNI has implied that the test was on the verge of "thermal 
runaway" and was saved only as a "consequence of the extensive heater 
failures that occurred" (9_, p. 5.63). GE authors naturally downgrade 
this possibility. From the limited data submitted in the test reports, 
it is difficult to draw any more satisfying explanations for the erratic 
TC behavior than those given by GE investigators. It is significant, 
however, that most of the so-called erratic behavior occurs during the 
periods of heater failures. Figure A8.10, taken from the Zr2K final 
report, shows the correlation between the rod 24 (the absolute highest 
temperature rod for the test) electrical anomaly and its TC response (54). 
A similar relationship could be shown for rod 31 of figure A9.9. Based 
upon examples such as figure A8.10, the proffered GE explanation that 
heater short circuits to the rod surfaces could have contributed to 
some of the unusual TC responses seems acceptable. It is unfortunate 
that no records of individual rod electrical current or voltage measure­
ments were shown in any of the GE test reports to permit independent 
evaluation of this source of variance (the individual rod power histo­
ries) with the TC responses.
Some of the "erratic" TC readings even GE cannot explain 
through correlation with electrical short circuits of the heater ele­
ments. They note that the majority of these unexplained changes were 
in the direction of decreasing temperatures or at such low initial tem­
peratures (1800°F to 1900°F) that association of the TC irregularities 
with M-W reactions is discounted. The GE conclusion is that the "erratic
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Figure A 8 .9 Comparison of Predicted and Measured Thermal Histories forZr2K Rods with TC Anomalies 
(After Figures A - l l  and A-12 from 52 by permission.)
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Analysis of Zr2K Thermal Response
Figure A8.10
(After Figure 12, 54_, by permission.)
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thermocouple outputs do not represent actual cladding temperatures, but 
are the result of equipment malfunctions" associated with the Zr2K test 
(54, appendix D, p. 107).
Based upon analysis of the material presented, it appears un­
questionable that the TC response was badly affected by short circuits 
and equipment malfunction. The net result is that it is not possible 
to certify that M-W reactions were insignificant in the measured thermal 
transient, but the case for near "thermal runaway" proposed by the CNI 
is also unconvincing. It is probable that most of the dramatic TC slope 
changes, as well as several of the other RC aberrations associated with 
the test, were short-circuit induced rather than M-W reactions. However, 
more results seem to be systematically correlatable between rods that the 
GE test analysis is willing to concede. This leads to uncertainty over 
the proper interpretation of results. A more thorough analysis and inter­
pretation of the Zr2K-TC data would have been desirable.
The CNI have also observed that the GE analyses regularly 
predicted that thermal turnaround (the beginning of the temperature re­
duction for the transient) would occur sooner than was actually experi­
enced in Zr2K. The CNI claim that the retardation of turnaround was caused 
by flow diversion from the local hot spots to cooler locations in the 
bundle induced by locally increased flow resistance from smaller rods.
GE on the other hand sees the earlier prediction of peak temperatures, 
with usually higher predicted peaks, as a conservative design tool.
It seems probable that the difference between test and theory 
results from rigid adherence by GE to a time-dependent model of heat 
transfer coefficients which were derived from their SS2N tests and 
adopted as their "design model" (52, p. 26). The design analysis method, 
based on the SS2N time history, apparently did not permit accommodation 
of the idiosyncrasies of the Zr2K test experience with its rod heater 
failures and TC equipment malfunctions. Consequently, the predicted
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results might not reasonably be expected to correspond well with the 
reality of the Zr2K test. Whether or not design basis prediction of 
LOCA thermal histories would agree well with an actual transient also 
remains to be shown. Results imply that the GE thermal analysis method 
may be a weak predictive tool and more effort appears to be needed in 
model development. However, it does appear that with sufficient analy­
sis, FLECHT results would be adequate to form a basis for demonstrating 
the development of conservative analytical design methods.
A8.4 PWR-FLECHT
The CNI criticism of the PWR-FLECHT program was relatively 
mild when compared with the challenge to the BWR-FLECHT test series 
results. Their conclusion that the tests established that reflood in 
a PWR-ECCS is at best marginally capable of controlling a LOCA is sub­
stantially less severe than the attack on the BWR. The motivation 
behind this difference in critical intensity is not immediately appar­
ent, but perhaps it may be the result of a general feeling on the part 
of the CNI that the PWR-ECCS had more obvious problems than the BWR 
and was consequently more vulnerable to attack at other points. There­
fore, it may not have been felt necessary to challenge PWR-FLECHT re­
sults as severely as the BWR-FLECHT program.
Criticisms were made by the CNI concerning a number of prob­
lems. The experimental design was faulted (especially the use of SS 
rods in 84 of the 88 tests vs Zr rods in only 4 of the 88). The range 
of test parameters investigated was criticized as being too limited.
The principal objections concerned limiting the test initial tempera­
tures to 2300°F or less and including reflood rates of less than 1 inch/ 
second which are below design practice. Both objections are basically 
invalid. The 2300°F upper temperature limit is understandable, although 
perhaps a poor choice for a limit, because it does represent the upper 
temperature limit of the criteria. The objection to the investigation
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of low reflood rates is hard to understand. The low rates tested 
represent extreme cases for LOCAs, since limiting values of low flow 
rates for termination of temperature excursions were observed, (i.e., 
temperature turnaround apparently could not be achieved at flow rates 
less than 0.8 in/sec for reflood initial temperatures of 1600°F or 
greater). The results are useful for establishing the conservatism 
of design values of reflood rates. If, as CNI claims, current PWR 
reactors are designed for reflood rates of around one inch per second, 
then the PWR-FLECHT tests show that PWR-ECCS designs may be uncomfort­
ably close to having no margin for error (appendix 9).
The heat transfer coefficients derived from the tests were 
also challenged on the grounds that no energy balance was performed 
(or perhaps could be), that local saturation temperature for the con­
vection steam was assumed as a boundary condition, and that the "cold" 
boundary walls of the test configuration contributed a radiation heat 
transfer sink which was neglected and would not be present in the open 
lattice construction of a typical PWR. The issue of radiation to the 
housing was subsequently reviewed by ANC and found to contribute no 
more than a ± 5 percent uncertainty to the data (4-, p. 17.3).
Perhaps the most valid of all the CNI objections to PWR-FLECHT 
concerned the alleged failure to adequately investigate the consequences 
of rod swelling with resulting blockage of core sections. This type of 
potential flow blockage was simulated in the tests by introducing per­
forated planar steel orifice plates at the midplane of the bundle so 
that the resulting fluid flow in the bundle, though reduced below normal 
delivery rates, was still constrained to be one dimensional. The orifice 
plates apparently caused the fluid to become more finely divided (and 
perhaps better distributed) behind the plates, resulting in unsuspected 
improvements (increases) in heat transfer rates in the immediate vicinity 
of the plates. As a result of this test, W has claimed that swelling
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and rupture may improve heat transfer, a point which seems highly 
debatable when the one dimensional limitations of the test are considered. 
The most discomforting aspect of this problem is that it appears that 
PWR computational methods may have included this "improved" heat transfer 
mechanism in their design procedures (J3, p. 3-50 and 6_, p. 198). This 
practice, if true, would have been totally at odds with any reasonable 
interpretation of conservatism. The Commission in their discussion of 
the new AC appear to have recognized this problem. They summarized the 
AEC position on the influence of blockage on reflood heat transfer, as 
follows:
The FLECHT tests simulated flow blockage in a number 
of runs by the insertion of perforated horizontal plates. 
With reflood rates of one inch per second or higher, im­
provement was found in the rate of heat transfer as far 
as two feet upstream and four feet downstream of the 
blockage. The improved heat transfer was shown to be 
caused by break-up of the entrained droplets and increased 
turbulence (Exhibit 1006a). The blockage in these tests 
ranged up to complete blockage over several channels with 
75% blockage in other channels. For the flow blockage 
tests at a reflood rate of 0.6 inches per second, heat 
transfer was degraded by blockage. Presumably the poor 
results at the low reflood rate were the result of a 
lack of entrained water droplets, leaving only single 
phase steam cooling (Exhibit 1113, p. 17-5).
The FLECHT flow blockage tests were criticized on 
the basis that the flat plates were not typical of bulging 
of the cladding. However, Davis tried blockage with 
sleeves versus plates and found little difference.
As a result of these tests it appears that heat 
transfer coefficients based on undistorted rod geometry 
would provide a reasonable approach to estimating core 
temperature behavior during reflood, for reflood rates 
above one in/sec. For lower reflood rates blockage 
would have a deleterious effect and one must resort to 
calculation with single phase steam cooling, taking 
into consideration the effects of blockage on core 
flow distribution (60, pp. 1124,1125) (emphasis added).
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Thus the potential practice of taking credit for the uncertain benefits 
of flow blockage in PWR reflood heat transfer is specifically precluded 
by the new AC.
A8.5 Evaluation of FLECHT Results
In summary, the CNI feel that:
The program [FLECHT] was characterized by narrow 
scope, limited range of parameters investigated (many 
inappropriate to the tasks at hand), the use of incorrect 
materials, crude and incompetent instrumentation and opera­
ting techniques (with consequent major equipment malfunctions), 
and, as a culminating weakness, expansive and overgenerous 
interpretations [of test results] (7, p. 5.37).
In the AEC's Supplemental and Concluding Testimony, they have 
attempted to answer most of the CNI objections (]_, chapter 5) on a point 
by point basis (4^  chapters 16 and 17; 6_, pp. 163-177, 194-198). Consider­
ing the test program from the standpoint of bundle design materials and 
test conditions, they have attempted to address the program scope and 
range of parameters for all parameters investigated. The AEC review of 
the engineering basis for selection of the ranges of parameters tested 
is reasonably convincing. In only one area, that of peak power delivered 
to the test bundle, is the range of the program (especially BWR-FLECHT) 
acknowledged to be weak. The AEC acknowledges that none of the BWR-FLECHT 
tests were conducted at full reactor bundle power (6, pp. 195, 196).
Though the AEC attempted to show that heat transfer coefficients derived 
from the tests are only weak functions of power, the relatively low powered 
test results were sufficiently inconclusive that they do not satisfy even 
the AEC itself. The AEC claimed that the tests were adequate, since the 
heat transfer coefficients are functions of temperature and the peak tem­
peratures for the test exceeded the criteria limits. They acknowledged, 
however, that "one or more" zircaloy tests at power levels representative 
of current design "would reduce the uncertainties in the evaluation model" 
(/+, p. 16-41).
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In general, however, they state:
The ultimate usefulness of the BWR-FLECHT test data 
is not a plotting of peak clad temperatures as a function 
of test parameters, but is the development of a quantita­
tive description of the basic heat transfer mechanisms 
operative during spray cooling and flooding (4^  p. 16-27).
Though the statement is specifically directed at BWR-FLECHT, 
its principal conclusion about the ultimate usefulness of the data being 
not for development of quantitative relationships for peak temperatures 
against various parameters but for development of general descriptions of 
heat transfer mechanisms is equally valid for both PWR- and BWR-FLECHT 
programs.
The AEC has acknowledged that, even in its own labs, there is a 
divergence of opinion as to whether core heat-up models based on the re­
sults of tests with SS rods can predict the thermal response of zircaloy 
rods "within the accuracy of the experimental measurements." The Supple­
mental Testimony notes that "ORNL has commented that the poor quality of 
the test data makes these conclusions uncertain" (4, pp. 16-39). Though it 
acknowledged that "the quality of the test data is poor," the AEC contends 
that the poor data affects only "the accuracy with which the core heat-up 
[model] can predict temperatures and has not prevented cooling mechanisms 
from being understood and described" 04, p. 16-21). The major uncertain­
ties in modeling the cooling mechanisms are stated to occur in the "values 
of the convective heat transfer coefficients and the time of channel quench" 
(4^, p. 16-41). It is argued that conservatively low values of convective 
heat transfer coefficients have been assured by requiring the radiative 
heat transfer for the SS2N tests (from which the model heat transfer 
coefficients have been derived) be evaluated at a conservatively large 
value for the tests. Assuming basic adequacy of the SS2N experimental 
data, this should lead to underestimations (in the direction of conserva­
tism) of the derived convective heat transfer coefficients. This concept 
seemed intuitively satisfying. However, to demonstrate how intuition, 
and poor preliminary analysis, can adversely affect judgement, the new
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AC have revised the AEC evaluation of the influence of cladding emis- 
sivity and radiative heat transfer. In their discussion of the new AC, 
the Commission has noted that:
The values of the calculated convective heat transfer 
coefficients depend to some extent upon the value used for 
the thermal emissivity of the stainless steel, since the 
convective heat transfer is obtained after subtracting the 
radiative heat transfer from the total. Theoretically a 
high value of the emissivity leads to a low calculated 
convective heat transfer coefficient. Values of the emis­
sivity measured after the tests ranged from 0.6 to 0.9 
(Exhibit 461, p. 81 and Exhibit 1113, p. 16-14), and to 
add conservatism to the calculation, the Interim Policy 
Statement required the use of the highest measured emis­
sivity, 0.9, for the calculation of the convective heat 
transfer coefficients. However it turned out that this 
resulted in a higher coefficient (less conservative) for 
the critical inner rods, with a higher estimated standard 
error. (Exhibit 461, Table 2.) After reviewing the deri­
vation of the coefficients as given in Exhibit 461, we 
believe that those originally listed as best estimates by 
General Electric are the most credible and should be used.
The effect of this change on the peak cladding tempera­
ture will be small, about five degrees according to 
Exhibit 461 (60, P. 1125) (emphasis added).
The SS2N test was run at a pressure of one atmosphere.
In practice, the blowdown of the reactor steam supply system into an 
intact containment vessel will induce equilibrium pressures greater 
than one atmosphere within the reactor core during spray cooling or 
reflood. (A pressure of approximately two atmospheres is expected.) 
Under these conditions, the SS4N test results (figure A8.ll) indicate 
a general improvement would be expected in heat transfer characteristics 
with increasing pressure. These factors support the contention that 
convective heat transfer coefficients (based on SS2N results) should be 
conservatively modeled.
To help ensure conservatism in channel quench times for the 
evaluation model, the criterion require that calculated quench times
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Figure A8 .11 BWR-FLECHT (SS4N) Test Results for Evaluation of Effects of System Pressure
(After Figure 6 ,52  , by permission.)
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for BWR channel box walls be augmented by an additional 60 seconds in 
applying the model to calculate results for a LOCA.
As a general conclusion, it appears that the FLECHT tests 
have had many problems and weaknesses. Critical zircaloy tests, such as 
Zr2K for BWR-FLECHT and 9573 for PWR-FLECHT have been marred by problems 
with malfunctioning test equipment, indeterminate and poorly evaluated 
data, and inadequacies in the analysis of results. According to the CNI, 
the "demonstrated defects" in the BWR-FLECHT program were so extensive 
that virtually no credence could be put in them. It must be acknowledged 
that the shortcomings of the test program are sufficiently numerous 
that they provide a potential source of almost unending controversy in 
evaluating the test results. The ORNL comment, previously cited, that 
the quality of the tests was poor and conclusions relative to the adequacy 
of core heating models derived from SS test results are uncertain appears 
to be understandable, if somewhat extreme, when compared with the re­
ported results. However, the broader conclusions of CNI that the tests 
are totally inadequate to support development of conservative core spray/ 
reflood heat transfer analysis methods seem too extreme. The tests do 
demonstrate that the existing coolant application methods are capable of 
inducing temperature turnaround under adverse conditions, substantially 
in excess of criteria temperature limits. Even when temperatures exceeded 
criteria limits and energy may have been delivered to rod bundles at 
rates in excess of DBA design conditions, the core spray and reflood 
mechanisms were adequate to achieve temperature turnaround. Furthermore, 
little substantial evidence was shown for "runaway" energy input to the 
fuel rods from M-W reaction in excess of the capability of the coolant 
modes —  as long as criteria temperature limits to the thermal excursions 
were reasonably well maintained.
However, as indicated in figures A8.4 to A8.6, the current 
BWR numerical analysis method did not provide completely conservative
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analyses of the temperature extremes for the zircaloy tests. Although 
predicted peaks were generally greater than measured values, they were 
not consistently higher. In fact, on the basis of evaluations using 
100 percent Baker-Just M-W reaction rates, approximately 15 percent of 
the predicted peak temperatures for tests Zr2K, Zr3M and Zr4M were 
lower than their measured values. This number appears too high for an 
adequately conservative evaluation model. Moreover, there is substantial 
uncertainty with respect to estimation of the time of temperature turn­
around. Though the weaknesses in calculational time histories may have 
resulted from too rigid a dependence upon the details of the SS2N heat 
transfer coefficient-time histories in application to the zircaloy tests, 
the uncertainty in prediction of peak temperatures and turnaround times 
for these tests does not create great confidence in the evaluation 
model's adequacy.
Consequently, though it would appear that conservative core 
spray and reflood heat transfer analysis methods may be derived from 
FLECHT test results, the evidence is weak that current models will give 
completely conservative results. In fact, the Commission's AC opinion 
states that:
The accuracy of the FLECHT-determined heat transfer 
coefficients has been examined several times. (Cf, the re­
view in the Babcock and Wilcox Concluding Statement, pp. 
202-204.) Westinghouse estimated a possible uncertainty 
of 12% in the coefficients. (Trans, page 6878.) The 
Aerojet Nuclear Company concluded "that the FLECHT data 
currently represent a best estimate of the heat transfer 
that will occur in a large undistorted core." They also 
concluded that an allowance of up to 20% may be needed 
"to bound the data due to experimental and inferential 
errors." (Exhibit 1113, p. 17-14.) The Commission ap­
proves of the use of the FLECHT data for calculating PWR 
reflood heat transfer, but notes that these will be more 
nearly "best estimate" calculations than bounding cal­
culations (60, p. 1124) (emphasis added).
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Thus the questionable conservatism associated with BWR-FLECHT calculated 
reflood heat transfer results is acknowledged. Similar difficulties are 
acknowledged with BWR-FLECHT heat transfer coefficients. The Commission's 
AC opinion states:
The BWR-FLECHT convective heat transfer coefficients 
were determined from the residue of a thermal balance 
after all of the known inputs and outputs were calculated.
The factors considered were the electrical heat input, the 
rate of change of the heat content of the rods as calculated 
from the temperature history, and the calculated radiation 
from the rods to each other and to the channel walls. The 
residue from these inputs and outputs was ascribed to con­
vective heat transfer. The convective heat transfer coef­
ficients so determined could not be very accurate because 
their calculation involved taking the difference between 
two large numbers. The coefficients so obtained are 
small and are about what one would expect from the mecha­
nisms of natural convection and radiation to steam (Exhibit 
1113, p. 16-14).
There has been a great deal of criticism of the 
BWR-FLECHT tests, particularly by the Consolidated 
National Intervenors (Exhibit 1041, Chapter 5), and both 
General Electric and Regulatory Staff have defended them 
(Closing Statements). However, for the purpose of calcu­
lating the maximum cladding temperature, only the derived 
heat transfer coefficients are of any great importance.
The values obtained have always been known to have a high 
statistical error; furthermore the values are low and 
reasonable, and there seems little to be gained by re­
newing the controversy over the manner of conducting and 
interpreting all features of the tests.
The high but inevitable statistical error of the 
coefficients for the inner rods (1.5 + 1.0 BTU/hr-ft2-°F) 
is bothersome and leads to an estimated error band of as 
much as +200°F in the calculated peak temperature in some 
circumstances (Exhibit 1113, p. 16-36). The test bundle 
SS2N was used to derive the heat transfer coefficients; 
another test bundle SS4N, resulted in cladding tempera­
tures 200°F higher than those of the bundle used as a 
standard; one half of this discrepancy could be explained 
by test differences, with the other half left to be attri­
buted to statistical variations (Exhibit 1113, p. 16-38).
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The. problem of these large statistical errors in the 
convective heat transfer coefficients is compensated 
to some extent by the fact that the coefficients were 
determined at atmospheric pressure, whereas the reactor 
would be at some elevated pressure at which the heat 
transfer would be improved (Exhibit 111, p. 16-26)
(60, pp. 1126, 1126) (emphasis added).
A large degree of uncertainty is therefore acknowledged to 
be associated with the use of FLECHT derived heat transfer parameters 
in estimating LOCA temperature histories. Some additional work on 
the analysis of the FLECHT data with respect to the application of 
the data to the evaluation models would appear to be appropriate in 
order to achieve greater conservatism. Additionally, as recommended 
by the AEC, some additional testing of current bundle designs under 
design power level temperature excursions would be desirable as well 
as more tests utilizing zircaloy rods and improved blockage simulation. 
With these additional actions, it should be possible to demonstrate 
conservatism of the core spray/reflood heat transfer evaluation models 
sufficiently to satisfy the requirement of "reasonable men."
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Appendix 9 OBSERVATIONS ON SELECTIONS FROM THE ACRS LIST OF ITEMS
OF UNPROVEN CONSERVATISM
Detailed evaluation of all of the elements of the ACRS list 
of items "considered not proven to be conservative" is beyond the scope 
of this presentation. However, selected observations on some of the 
more critical elements of the ACRS list, not discussed in previous appen­
dixes, will be given below.
A9.1 Analytical Models and Numerical Methods
The AEC Water Reactor Safety Program Agumentation Plan (16), 
at the time of its submission (November, 1971), was particularly em­
phatic in its conclusions regarding the adequacy of the reliability of 
the evaluation models as licensing tools. It stated:
To date, evolution of codes has not kept pace with 
the development of emergency core cooling systems. As 
reactor designs and their operating characteristics changed, 
the analysis methods were 'patched up' rather than redevel­
oped, with the net result that overall, existing methods are 
inefficient, inflexible and do not adequately represent the 
physical phenomena intended (16, p. 8).
In conclusion it noted:
...the codes are unable to describe important physical 
phenomena and therefore are unable to confidently define 
safety margins, their treatment of common phenomena is 
inconsistent, and they overemphasize the use of empirical 
correlations (16, p. 27) (emphasis added).
Though somewhat dated, this criticism appears to be largely valid when 
applied to the current description of the state-of-the-art of numerical 
methods for ECCS analysis.
The CNI has objected to "the failure of GE to have made avail­
able sufficient description of their LOCA transient analysis methods 
to permit a full independent analysis" (7, p. 4-16). Essentially, the 
sole description of the GE-ECCS evaluation model is provided by NEDO- 
10329 (53). Though it is possible to determine a large number of the
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model's basic features from the document, it is the contention of the 
CNI that the report does not adequately describe "the necessary justifi­
cations for the assumptions and simplifications" in the code (7, p. 4-17). 
Moreover, the CNI claim that no valid evaluation of the GE code has been 
made by the AEC since no independent BWR evaluation codes have been de­
rived by ANC or any other of the independent AEC labs.
The AEC, on the other hand, in their initial Direct Testimony 
indicated that at least a partial independent analysis has been con­
ducted of the GE model. Their testimony stated:
To assist us in our evaluation of the core heatup 
model we requested the Aerojet Nuclear Company (ANC) to 
perform an independent analysis of the fuel cladding 
thermal transient following the LOCA. This analysis was 
performed using the computer code MOXY. Although the 
analytical model incorporated into MOXY is similar to the 
model used by GE, the formulation and development of the 
ANC code were done independently. As part of the ANC 
analysis an attempt was made to duplicate the fuel rod 
cladding temperature response calculated with the GE 
heatup standard input assumptions for the analysis...
As can be seen by [the] results the agreement between 
the two analytical models is good (8^, p. 4-23).
The statement was accompanied by curves showing good agreement between 
the ANC and GE code elements for a sample problem on which both had 
been exercised.
While it appears that some evaluation of the GE models may 
have been initiated, it also seems evident that not as much effort has 
been put into the development of independent methods for evaluation of 
BWR codes as has been put into PWR code evaluation by ANC. This is 
probably due to the intense involvement of ANC in the development of 
the LOFT test reactor (a small scale multi-loop PWR) at the AEC Idaho 
test facilities.
To resolve this problem (now, and in the future), the AEC has 
incorporated a requirement into its revised criteria for documentation
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of all vendor evaluation models (60, pp. 1126, 1127). The proposed 
standards specify requirements on acceptable documentation and set 
general standards for model acceptability. While the AEC's proposed 
rule gave detailed specification of vendor models in terms of approved 
codes and parameters (6_, pp. 57-73), the AC gives no specific approval 
to any elements of the current vendor analysis methods. On the contrary, 
it calls for demonstrations of the adequacy of vendor computer programs 
through demonstrations of numerical convergence and performance of 
sensitivity studies to evaluate the importance of parameters. Compari­
sons of model calculational results with applicable experimental infor­
mation, where available, are also required (60. p. 1127). The clear 
implication of the Commission's changes between the PR and the final 
AC is that more evaluation of the analytical models is required before 
they are to be found acceptable. In their discussion of the AC, the 
Commission noted:
The need for noding and sensitivity studies for the 
computer programs is clearly reflected by the hearing 
record....
The need for comparisons of the calculations of 
analytical models with experimental data is discussed 
and the value is recognized in the written testimony of 
nearly all of the participants, including the Regulatory 
Staff....
In their comments, Babcock and Wilcox suggested 
omission of the technical review of the evaluation models.
It is the Commission's opinion that, with the changes 
being made by this rule, it is necessary that a technical 
review of the evaluation models be made by the Commission; 
this review is the responsibility of the Regulatory Staff 
(60, p. 1127) (emphasis added).
Perhaps the fundamental concern of all who have dealt with 
large scale numerical calculational methods was summarized by Alvin 
Weinberg, then Director of ORNL. In a February 9, 1972 letter to 
James Schlesinger then AEC Chairman, Weinberg wrote:
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With respect to the criteria themselves, I have only one 
point to make. As an old-timer who grew up in this business 
before the computing machine dominated it so completely, I 
have a basic distrust of very elaborate calculations of com­
plex situations, especially where the calculations have not 
been checked by full-scale experiments. As you know, much 
of our trust in the ECCS depends on the reliability of com­
plex codes. It seems to me— when the consequences of 
failure are serious— then the ability of the codes to ar­
rive at a conservative prediction must be veriried in ex­
periments of complexity and scale approaching those of the 
system being calculated. I therefore believe that serious 
consideration should be given first to cross-checking dif­
ferent codes and then to verifying ECCS computations by 
experiments on a large scale and, if necessary, on full 
scale. This is expensive, but there is precedent for such 
experimentation— for example, in the full scale tests on 
COMET and nuclear weapons (29).
While it may be true that a great deal of effort has been 
expended to evaluate elements of the numerical codes against corres­
ponding experimental pieces of the LOCA, the need for code verification 
against system test of the magnitude and complexity described by Weinberg 
is very real. Subsystem or component tests are a poor substitute, 
acceptable only on a temporary basis in place of a large scale ECC 
system test.
A9.2 Treatment of Break Flows
The ACRS contention of lack of proven conservatism for the 
treatment of break flows of reactor coolant from the DBA double-ended 
pipe break for both PWRs and BWRs lent support to the CNI claim of 
"incorrect prediction of blowdown rates" for the reactor. That major 
variations in the break flow and consequent blowdown rate could poten­
tially seriously affect the thermal history of the reactor is clear. 
Higher blowdown rates imply shorter blowdown periods which could lead 
to higher containment pressures and conceivably higher rod temperatures 
prior to emergency coolant injection.
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The AEC has prescribed the use of the Moody fluid discharge 
model (55) both in their Concluding Statement (6^  p. 105) and the final 
AC (60, p. 1108) as well as in their initial Direct Testimony (8^  pp. 2-41 
& 4-15) and in the IAC themselves. Moody's analysis method was developed 
for flow of a two-phase (liquid-steam) mixture through pipes based upon 
an idealized isentropic equilibrium model of the flow. CNI attempted 
to show that for relatively short pipes, where the length-to-diameter 
ratio was short (less than 10), two-phase equilibrium would not exist 
and metastable liquid flow (flow of pure liquid at temperatures and 
pressures where vaporization would be expected under equilibrium con­
ditions) would take place (9, chapter 8). Under these conditions, based 
upon experimental results of Fauske (56), greatly increased break flow 
rates could be obtained ("1.7 times greater than the rate predicted by 
the designers for two-phase flow")(9^  p. 8.1).
A rather complete summary of the current investigations of 
blowdown break flow is given in GE's Redirect-Rebuttal Testimony (27, 
Section I). The GE study, prepared by Moody et al., has a comparison 
of calculational models and Fauske's experimental work in terms of 
flow rate as a function of pipe length. Figure A9.1 has been reproduced 
from it. The argument is presented by GE that although flow rates for 
very short pipes (less than 2 inches in length and 0.25 in diameter) 
are substantially higher than rates for long pipes, choked-equilibrium 
flow is established for pipes longer than 2 to 4 inches. The curves in 
figure A9.1 are very dramatic in showing the significant difference 
between the high rates of metastable flow, found in pipes of very short 
length, and the equilibrium flow rates. The highest metastable flow 
rates are approximately a factor of 3 greater than the equilibrium- 
choked flow conditions for relatively long pipes. It is apparently 
this potential for flow rates truly dramatically different than those 
predicted for equilibrium flow that caused the concern of the ACRS 
and CNI.
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Comparison of Results of Blowdown Break 
Flow Rate Experiments and Calculational Models
Figure A9.1
(After Figure 1-1, 27)
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The GE rebuttal argument attempts to show that the length of 
the pipe is the only controlling factor in the change from metastable 
pure liquid flow to equilibrium-choked flow. This argument, contrary to 
Fauske's contention that length-to-diameter ratio is the controlling 
parameter, is only weakly established by GE. In fact, some of the re­
sults presented in the GE report (but not discussed therein) indicate a 
rather pronounced influence of pipe diameter on the flow transition 
point in pipe length. A general trend towards increasing lengths for 
transition flow with increasing pipe diameter can be seen, giving some 
support to Fauske's and CNI's claims.
GE's stated position is that "the primary determinant of 
whether the flow is essentially equilibrium two-phase, rather than meta­
stable super-saturated pure liquid, is the length of travel from the 
pressure vessel." Consequently, the GE report contends, "the design- 
basis GE recirculation line break, with 35 inch (890 mm) nozzle length 
and 26 inch (660 mm) diameter, falls in the range accurately predicted 
by homogeneous equilibrium models" (27). Moreover, it is claimed that 
the Moody method (a "conservatively" based homogeneous, equilibrium 
model) will predict larger flow rates (conservatively) from the break 
than would logically be expected from a "more realistic" homogeneous 
equilibrium model (see figure A9.1).
The problems with the GE position are two-fold. First, as 
indicated in figure A9.2, the majority of the testing which has been 
performed (shown inside the cross-hatched regions) has been done with 
relatively small diameter pipes, mostly on the order of 4 inches in 
diameter or less. For these tests, when characteristic length-to- 
diameter values are constrained within reasonable reactor DBA limits 
U/D)< 10), nonequilibrium effects have been important. As indicated 
by the figure, only a few tests have been performed for large diameter 
pipes. (Essentially only the three limited sets of data shown exist.)
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Figure A9.2
Map of Blow-down Flow Regimes
(After Figure 1-3, 2_7 by permission.)
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The second problem is that the &/D ratio for the GE-DBA 
conditions is disturbingly close to unity. Figure A9.2 indicates that 
the vast majority of the data taken for pipes with 2,/D valnes of approxi­
mately one have shown non-equilibrium results. If the GE physical argu­
ments about the length being the controlling factor are not valid, then 
flow rates for such relatively "short" pipes could be much higher than 
equilibrium models would suggest even when the "conservatism" of the 
Moody model is considered.
The regulatory staff tried to overcome this problem in their 
Concluding Statement by calling for more than one model of blowdown 
break flow to be used in analyzing critical flow in accordance with the 
revised criteria of their Proposed Rule (6, pp. 105-108). Thus the staff 
concluded that,
The critical flow model of Moody is appropriate for 
use in break spectrum analysis of blowdown transients in 
BWRs and PWRs on the basis that it overpredicts blowdown 
flow...whenever the break exit plane quality is greater 
than about two percent... However, for the blowdown period 
during which subcooled liquid, saturated liquid or low 
quality two-phase fluid exists at the break exit plane, 
the Moody model underpredicts experimental discharge 
data...Therefore, the Proposed Rule requires the use of 
a model which is more appropriate to these fluid condi­
tions. One such model contained in the evidence of this 
proceeding is the modified Zaloudek model of Westinghouse 
(Exhibit 1151, (57) Section III). The Moody model may 
also be applicable for early times during blowdown be­
fore the exit plane quality reaches two percent if it is 
used with a Moody multiplier of greater than unity...
The staff concludes on the basis of this evidence that 
models appropriate to those flow regimes do exist. How­
ever, additional information describing how those models 
are incorporated in the computer programs should be evalu­
ated in accordance with the proposed Section III.A of 
Appendix K (j3, p. 105) (emphasis added).
In its revised AC, the Commission has downgraded the impor­
tance of the early blowdown stages where the need for a Moody multiplier
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of greater than unity had been recognized. The AC now require that:
For all times after the discharging fluid has been 
calculated to be two-phase in composition, the discharge 
rate shall be calculated by use of the Moody Model...
The calculation shall be conducted with at least three 
values of a discharge coefficient applied to the postu­
lated break area, these values spanning the range from 
0.6 to 1.0 (60, p. 1108).
Though the Commission acknowledged that recommendations for 
discharge coefficients greater than one were widespread, their discus­
sion of the AC implies that the Moody model is always conservative and 
that the metastable flow period (if any) is adequately covered by 
Moody model results. They acknowledge that:
There was widespread agreement that a variable discharge 
coefficient provides a better fit to the data than a constant
one....Ybarrando (Transcript p. 6362) reported the result
of an ANC calculation with a discharge coefficient initially 
2.0, and later in blowdown 0.6, where the first peak in the 
clad temperature exceeded by about 100°F the value obtained 
with a fixed discharge coefficient of 1.0 (60, pp. 1111,
1112) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the Commission concluded:
We agree with the Staff position as to correctness of 
use of the model based on critical flow, since the length 
of time available during blowdown far exceeds the amount 
needed for nucleation and build-up of two-phase discharge. 
Furthermore, the evidence is strong that use of the Moody 
correlation does not underestimate observed experimental 
discharge rates, as would be the case if discharge were 
really metastable, but in fact it definitely overestimates 
the discharge rates (60, p. 1112).
The question of the adequacy of the experimental data was not addressed 
in any significant manner in the AC discussion.
In summary, it appears tha.t the Moody break flow model may 
underpredict nonequilibrium flow by nearly a factor of two as indicated 
by the CNI. To compensate for this, the regulatory staff in the PR
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suggested using a different (but only vaguely identified) model which 
would estimate flow rates greater than those given by the Moody Model 
when the quantity of the exit fluid was 2 percent or less. In the final 
AC, the Commission downgraded the staff recommendation, implying that 
the Moody model (with discharge coefficients < 1) was always conservative.
In view of the limited experimental basis for models which 
may be applied to the large diameter pipes associated with the DBA for 
large operational reactors, it would appear desirable to perform addi­
tional break flow tests with more representatively sized equipment.
In the absence of experimental data which clearly supports the Moody 
model or indicates the requirement for a model of nonequilibrium flow 
in large pipes, more conservative and definitive specifications should 
be given in the criteria (e.g., quantified Moody multiplier's greater 
than one, with their period of application definitively specified) to 
attempt to assure that conservatism is attained for break flow specifi­
cations .
A9.3 Transient Critical Heat Flux and Heat Transfer
At the beginning of the LOCA transient, heat is transferred 
from the fuel rods to the coolant water in a continuation of the highly 
efficient nucleate boiling heat transfer mode of normal reactor oper­
ations. Heat transfer coefficients under nucleate boiling conditions 
are immensely higher (approximately a factor of 10,000) than those which 
occur during the core spray or initial reflood portions of the cooling 
process. During the rapid system decompression accompanying blowdown, 
a transition in the boiling process takes place from pinpoint nucleate 
boiling to film boiling and two-phase (liquid-vapor) convective cooling 
which greatly reduces the system cooling capability. Figure A9.3, re­
produced from reference 33, schematically depicts the various boiling 
flow regimes for steady vertical up-flow of coolant.
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Figure A9.3
Flow and Heat Transfer Regimes in Rods with Vertical Upflow 
(After Figure III-l, 27.)
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In describing the LOCA transient, analysis methods depend 
upon the development of the concept of time periods during which a 
given boiling transitional condition occurs (e.g., time to critical 
heat flux (CHF), or similarly, time to departure from nucleate boiling 
(DNB), or duration of stable film boiling). The important transition 
in the blowdown period is the first departure from nucleate boiling.
This transition achieves its importance because the rapid rod dryout 
accompanying the transition makes reestablishment of the high heat 
transfer, nucleate boiling conditions for the rod very difficult. 
Moreover, the conditions for reestablishment are uncertain. As a re­
sult of the uncertainty over conditions leading to reestablishment of 
nucleate boiling (rewetting), the revised criterion conservatively re­
quire that clad rewetting phenomena during blowdown be neglected immedi­
ately after CHF is first predicted. The revised AC state:
After CHF is first predicted at an axial fuel rod 
location during blowdown, the calculation shall not use 
nucleate boiling heat transfer correlations at that loca­
tion subsequently during the blowdown even if the calculated 
local fluid and surface conditions would apparently justify 
the reestablishment of nucleate boiling. Heat transfer 
assumptions characteristic of return to nuclear boiling 
(rewetting) shall be permitted when justified by the cal­
culated local fluid and surface conditions during the 
reflood portion of a LOCA (60, p. 1109).
Neglect of rewetting during blowdown after DNB, was apparently also 
practiced under the IAC and precludes redevelopment of nucleate boiling 
conditions before reflooding begins.
Figure A9.4 (a composite of two figures, 14 and 15, from 10) 
shows typical assumptions for heat transfer coefficients (HTC) for a 
BWR throughout the LOCA thermal transient as well as the calculated 
thermal time history for the assumed values of the coefficients. The 
indicated heat transfer coefficients are very similar to the values 
prescribed by the IAC.
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Time after Break (sec)
Calculated BWR transient temperature response for two case assumptions o f  L O C A  heat transfer.
( A f t e r  F ig u r e s  14 a n d  1 5 ,  1 0 )
A 9 -1 4
F ig u r e  A 9 .4
BWR HTCs v s .  T im e  a n d  T h e r m a l R e s p o n s e
In reviewing the time phasing of the LOCA process from 
figure A9.4, the very high initial HTCs associated with nucleate boiling 
may be seen as a continuation of essentially normal heat transfer imme­
diately following LOCA initiation. When DNB occurs, the HTC is conserva­
tively assumed to go to zero, even though some transitional period with 
intermediate HTC prior to dry-out might be physically expected. The 
time for initial DNB is very critical. If the energy stored within the 
fuel followed predictions, but no blowdown heat transfer were to occur, 
rod temperatures would reach about 2000°F in 4 or 5 seconds as a result 
of internal temperature redistribution. After this time period, in the 
continued absence of blowdown heat transfer, a relatively slow tempera­
ture increase would occur, with an adiabatic heatup rate of about 20°F/ 
sec to be expected in the high-power density regions of the reactor core 
at about 30 seconds after rupture (10, p. 310). In an alternative way 
of looking at the consequences of DNB, if the DNB transition can be 
avoided the high heat rates associated with nucleate boiling cause a 
reduction in the stored energy of the fuel (and hence of the potential 
for heating the cladding) corresponding to an average temperature de­
cline of about 150°F/sec. Each additional second of nucleate boiling 
during depressurization can permit a delay of about 10 sec in core cool­
ant (ECC) injection (34).
Comparing the HTCs and thermal response of the a) and b) por­
tions of figure A9.4 respectively, it can be seen that as long as 
nucleate boiling is maintained during the blowdown there is essentially 
no change in temperature from that of normal operating conditions.
DNB in a BWR is probably delayed several seconds beyond that which 
might normally occur in a PWR, until the rapidly falling coolant level 
in the downcomers uncovers the tops of the jet pumps. However, as soon 
as the transition through CHF occurs, the rod temperatures rise very 
rapidly as the stored energy in fuel causes the rod temperature re­
distribution to occur in the assumed absence (HTC = 0) of any convective 
heat transfer contribution.
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When the fluid in the core falls to the level where the break 
in the recirculation drive pump line is finally exposed (conditions for 
the DBA), the reactor vessel depressurization takes place much more rapidly. 
The rapidly falling pressures cause the remaining water in the plenum 
chamber beneath the core to experience flash boiling. The strong flashing 
action forces the remaining water through the core at a rate initially 
equivalent to about 60 percent of normal core flow. The flash boiling 
induced flow continues, at a gradually decreasing rate, until the fluid 
in the lower plenum is essentially all expended. During this period of 
lower plenum flashing, calculations show the CHF is exceeded and theo­
retically the. rods would be rewetted and nucleate boiling reestablished 
in the core. Uncertainty over the validity of this recurrence causes a
degraded heat transfer coefficient, more representative of lower quality,
2film boiling HTCs (100-1000 B/hr-ft -°F), to be used for estimating thermal 
response during the lower plenum flashing period.
Figure A9.4(b) depicts the thermal response for two possible 
cases, one without benefit from lower plenum flashing and the other 
assuming essentially standard film boiling HTC conditions during the 
period, as indicated in figure A9.4(a). The effect of the assumed film 
boiling conditions on the thermal response is very profound. As flash­
ing occurs, a sharp temperature turnaround is induced for the brief 
flashing period (reducing the rod temperatures by 300-400°F to near 
normal operating conditions). As the core flow decreases with approach­
ing lower plenum exhaustion, the heat flux again exceeds CHF levels and 
complete loss of benefit from any form of boiling is assumed again (i.e., 
HTC = 0). This condition remains until core spray action is achieved 
(in figure A9.4, in 40 sec). Note that in the case assuming lower plenum 
flashing, a large thermal readjustment occurs again when CHF is exceeded 
and the HTC goes to zero. However, sufficient heat has been transferred 
in the brief period of lower plenum flashing (20 seconds) to reduce the 
maximum rod temperatures, as the rod thermal gradients begin to stabilize, 
to values approximately 400°F below the case where no benefit was attained
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from flashing. Thus figure A9.4 demonstrated the very significant in­
fluence of boiling heat transfer coefficients on the thermal response 
of the fuel rods. The concept of CHF values and the times at which 
heat flux transitions through CHF occur have important effects upon the 
thermal response of the reactor.
The importance of the heat transfer occurring after CHF or 
departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) has been recognized by all those 
who have investigated the LOCA. In its discussion of the AC, the Com­
mission stated:
The rate at which heat is transferred from the clad 
to the water after departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) 
is vital to estimation of the course of a hypothetical 
loss-of-coolant accident for a PWR. DNB is calculated to 
occur within about a tenth of a second after a postulated 
instantaneous double-ended break of a large pipe, or a 
large split. The heat transfer after this time would 
primarily determine the temperature history of the clad 
during blowdown and the possibility that clad damage 
would occur during this phase. It would also determine 
the effectiveness of removal of heat from the oxide fuel 
itself and thus the stored energy in the fuel at the time 
refill of the plenum by ECCS fluid starts (60, p. 1117) 
(emphasis added).
Though a significant body of experimental work has been done 
on CHF investigations, the most reliable material is based upon steady- 
state fluid conditions. Consequently, the AEC's new AC has authorized 
"conservative" application of steady-state data to transient LOCA condi­
tions (60, p. 1118).
The use of steady state correlations for defining stable film 
boiling after CHF has been questioned. However, in its discussion of 
the AC, the Commission has strongly supported the conservatism of use 
of steady-state correlations. They stated:
Transient Heat Transfer: Some criticism was expressed 
as to the use of steady state correlations during the fast
A9-17
transients analyzed for a large LOCA. These views were 
stated by Lawson (Transcript, pp. 5766-7), Ybarrondo 
(Transcript, pp. 6069, 10282, 10890, 10906-7), and 
Brockett (pp. 7480, 7588). The tenor of the criticism 
was that evidence was not conclusive that steady state 
correlations overpredicted the transient coefficients 
or predicted them accurately.
Considerable evidence was provided nonetheless to 
the effect that during depressurization the use of steady 
state correlations for stable film boiling was a conserva­
tive course....In our view the evidence is near over­
whelming that the use of steady state correlations for 
stable film boiling after CHF will provide a conservative 
estimate of heat transfer during blowdown (60, p. 1118)
(emphasis added).
In spite of the Commission's assertions of "overwhelming" 
evidence of conservatism, not all of those who criticized the use of 
these coefficients are entirely convinced. In hearings before the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (22-24 January 1974), Ybarrondo, 
manager of the LOFT tests for ANC, stated:
In Section III C, 5 of the Opinion of the Commission, 
transient heat transfer is discussed. An experimental pro­
gram directed at providing data relevant to quantifying 
the margins resulting from using steady state correla­
tions during post-critical-heat-flux heat transfer would 
be very valuable. This is especially true in view of 
the commission's statement on page 99, "The rate at which 
heat is transferred from the clad to the water after de­
parture from nucleate boiling (DNB) is vital to estima­
tion of the course of a hypothetical loss-of-coolant 
accident for a PWR," in which I concur (59, p. 5501)
(emphasis added).
However, even under steady state conditions, data for full length
(12 ft.) large arrays (7 x 7 or greater) of PWR rod diameters "are
not now available for multirod bundles of this size and geometry..." (34).
Although the GE transient CHF correlation (53, p. C-9) was 
approved for LOCA analyses, the AEC qualified their acceptance for the 
method by requiring demonstrated conservatism through submission by the
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vendor of a "statistical uncertainty analysis" of the data and its 
application in the transient correlation. In the words of the AEC staff:
These procedures can be characterized as requiring 
conservatism in the treatment of transient CHF data. The 
reason for requiring this conservatism is related to the 
sources of uncertainty in the realistic prediction of 
transient CHF (6^, p. 133).
Freely translated, this statement seems to imply that the 
existing transient CHF data sources are of uncertain validity. The CNI 
have observed that experiments to
precisely predict heat transfer coefficients for 
parallel pin arrays that extend over the range of fuel- 
pin geometries and coolant conditions that exist during 
blowdowns....[have not] been completed by the AEC and 
none yet appears to be forthcoming. One major research 
program on blowdown heat transfer that the Commission 
is presently funding is a joint program with General 
Electric Company. However a review of that program by 
ANC stated that it does not relate to the problems that 
need to be solved and that the program is not, in ANC's 
opinion, relevant to the needs of the AEC and the nuclear 
industry (HAI -16-71, Jan. 26, 1971) (6^, p. 4.15).
The problems with the transient CHF correlations are felt to 
exist primarily because current models for their application are highly 
empirical. Serious attempts to correlate the experimental data with 
theoretical or analytical methods have apparently not been made. Conse­
quently, substantial uncertainties exist with regard to application and 
scalability of the experimental results to the conditions of the fluid 
in a reactor core during a LOCA. The current ORNL combined experimental 
and analytical program on large bundles of full scale fuel rods (described 
in 34) may help to resolve the heavy dependence upon pure empiricism.
One of the stated objectives of the program is
to obtain data on the thermal response of the heater 
surfaces in the above multirod bundle during the first 
few seconds of a blowdown transient comparable with the
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LOCA transient associated with a double-ended inlet-pipe 
break in a PWR. These experiments will establish the time 
to reach CHF, the magnitude of CHF, and heat transfer rates 
in the immediate post-CHF period; the results will quantify 
both the sequence and magnitude of thermal-hydraulic events 
during a LOCA-type depressurization and, through comparison, 
the conservatism associated with existing calculational 
models for estimating CHF and post-CHF heat transfer (34).
Such data, when combined and correlated with other current experimental 
and analytical programs and the results of applications of the revised 
AEC criteria requirements may help to resolve some of the remaining 
uncertainty in CHF related reactor thermal response.
A9.4 Reflood Heat Transfer Parameter Evaluation
The reflood heat transfer mechanisms, for both PWRs and BWRs, 
appear to be the dominating factors with respect to the reliability of 
the ECCS. If sufficient cooling water can be supplied to the core,
FLECHT tests have demonstrated core coolability for initial reflood 
temperatures ranging to near the AC limits of 2200°F. The adequacy of 
reflooding rates depends critically upon questions of flow resistance 
in the reactor primary loops for PWRs. Local heat transfer during re­
flood is also strongly influenced by local and general blockage of the 
core induced by fuel rod swelling and rupture. In the PWR, steam gener­
ator tube failure (ruled outside the scope of the ECCS hearings) may 
also strongly increase primary loop resistances with consequent substan­
tial reductions in reflood rates. This section will review the signifi­
cance of these parameters.
A9.4.1 Empirical estimates of reflood heat transfer (FLECHT)
Figures A9.5 and A9.6, reproduced from the PWR-FLECHT Final 
Report (50), summarize FLECHT results in terms of temperature rise, 
turnaround time, and quench time as functions of flooding rate and peak 
rod decay power respectively. The strong dependency of the results on 
flooding rate is shown clearly in figure A9.5, At flooding rates greater
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Figure A9.5
Summary of PWR-FLECHT Results as a Function of Flooding Rate
(After Figure 3-13, J50, by permission)
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Figure A9.6
Summary of PWR-FLECHT Results as a Function of Rod Decay Power
(After Figure 3-20, _50^, by permission)
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than 4 in/sec, temperature rise, turnaround time, and quench time were 
all minimal. At flooding rates less than 4 in/sec, a clear transition 
in all parameters can be observed. At rates on the order of 2 in/sec 
or less, temperature rise and times to turnaround and quench increase 
strongly with decreasing flood rate. The results imply that for flood 
rates of 2 in/sec or less controllability problems are greatly exacer­
bated. The results clearly indicate a great advantage in attaining 
flooding rates in excess of 4 in/sec.
At high flooding rates (on the order of 6 in/sec), temperature 
rise, turnaround time, and quench time as shown in figure A9.6 are weak 
functions of initial rod decay power. However, as flooding rates decrease, 
the influence of initial rod power becomes increasingly important. Again 
the message of the figure is clear; if rod decay power is uncertain, 
flooding rates of the order of 6 in/sec are desirable to minimize the 
effects of uncertainties in this parameter. Extrapolation of the results 
to low flooding rates (2 in/sec or lower) implies that uncertainties in 
rod decay power may be dramatically amplified and a 10-15 percent un­
certainty in initial rod power could result in a peak temperature in­
crease of approximately 100°F, assuming no synergistic effects from 
other variables produced even higher temperatures.
The time histories of convective heat transfer coefficients 
(HTC) derived from the tests are shown in figure A9.7 for a variety of 
parameters, including initial temperature, flooding rate, and initial 
rod decay power. Comparison of figures A9.5 and A9.6 with figure A9.7 
indicates that temperature turnaround was achieved when rod HTCs of
o15-20 B/hr-ft -°F were obtained. Similarly the rods were quenched at 
HTCs of about 40-50 B/hr-ft^-°F. The dramatic increases in heat trans­
fer coefficients, towards nucleate boiling values, are apparent at the 
transition to rod quenching for each of the tests. When this transition 
occurred, the temperature transient for the rods was essentially termi­
nated, almost at once.
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Figure A9.7
Summary of PWR-FLECHT Heat Transfer Coefficient Results
(After Figure 3-12, _50, by permission.)
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Analysis of the results shown in figure A9.7 indicates that 
after the fluid in the reactor plenum reaches the bottom of the fuel 
rods, a typical HTC-time history shows a rapid increase to a relatively 
stable (but gradually increasing) value which is maintained until the 
transition to quenching occurs. This relatively stable plateau HTC, 
hereafter referred to as the nominal initial reflood HTC, can be seen 
to increase strongly with increasing flood rate. At a flood rate of 
1 in/sec, the nominal HTC is about 10 B/hr-ft^-°F, while at 4 in/sec
o
it increased to approximately 30 B/hr-ft -°F, and at 6 in/sec reaches 
a nominal value of 40 B/hr-ft^-°F in its initial rapid rise. At a 
nominal value of 40 B/hr-ft^-°F, temperature turnaround occurs almost 
at once, and rod quenching takes place in approximately one minute. 
Conversely, as implied by figure A9.7, at a flooding rate of 0.6 in/sec 
temperature turnaround could not be achieved at the nominal HTC of
O3-4 B/hr-ft -°F indicated, even though the initial rod temperature was 
a relatively low 1600°F. These low flooding rate results demonstrate 
the difficulty of thermal excursion control at rates less than 1 in/sec.
It should be observed that HTCs are not identical at all 
points on a given rod. As indicated in figure A9.7, results have been 
shown for the rod midplane (6 ft) values. At lower rod elevations, HTCs 
are greater than those shown, while at higher levels they tend to de­
crease. However, thermal hot spots and peak rod powers generally occur 
at the midplane location and the results shown are representative of 
typical values for the rods.
The principal observation to be made from the FLECHT results 
is that an important transition occurs in reflood thermal transient 
control at flood rates in excess of approximately 4 in/sec. At flood 
rates above this value, temperature rise, turnaround time, and quench 
time are minimized. Conversely, at flood rates on the order of 1 in/sec, 
thermal transient controllability problems are substantially magnified.
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A9.4.2 Reflooding rate predictions
The AEC estimate of nominal reflood rates for a typical four 
loop PWR is shown in figure A9.8, reproduced from the AEC Supplemental 
Testimony (4, p. 14-12). The results shown indicate an initial flood 
rate of about 3 in/sec falling in approximately 5 sec to a low of about 
1/2 in/sec resulting from line plugging. The mechanism of line plugging 
is associated with ECC fluid filling inlet pipes which is assumed to 
block the passage of steam in the unbroken steam generator loops during 
ECCS accumulator injection into the unbroken cold leg pipes. The mini­
mum reflood rate lasts until about 16 sec after the bottom of the core 
is first recovered by the entering ECC fluid (defined to be the begin­
ning of core reflooding). After that 16 sec period of core reflooding, 
the ECCS accumulator injection is essentially completed. This minimal 
flood rate is followed by an increase to a pseudo steady state, slowly 
decaying flooding rate which is commonly called the nominal flooding 
rate for the reactor. For the case shown in figure A9.8, the nominal 
flood rate varies from about 1.4 in/sec at 20 sec to approximately 1.1 
in/sec at 220 sec.
The results shown in figure A9.8 were obtained by the AEC 
using a calculational method (the Flood 1 computer code) developed by 
ANC, with which "the Regulatory Staff intends to evaluate plants" in 
the future (4, p. 14-10). The analysis was based upon "...a set of 
realistically calculated resistance(s), for system components, using 
assumptions set forth in the Interim Policy Statement (IAC)" (4^, p. 14-6). 
Estimates of flooding rates for several other types of PWR nuclear 
steam systems were also made, based upon similar assumptions. Predicted 
values range from less than 1 in/sec (0.9 in/sec) for a Westinghouse 
four loop system with an ice condenser type containment (4, p. 14-7) to 
values as high as 2 in/sec for B & W vent-valve plants (4, p. 14-9).
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Figure A9.8
AEC Estimates of Nominal Reflood Rates for Typical Four Loop PWR
EFFECT OF VARIATION OF 2 FEET IN THE DOWNCOMER HEIGHT
ON THE FLOODING RATES
Thus the range of "realistically" predicted reflooding rates, 
however conservative the IAC specifications may be felt to be, is narrow, 
running from less than 1 in/sec to only 2 in/sec with nominal rates 
typically about 1.3 in/sec for PWRs. Clearly these reflood rates are 
on the low side of desirable flooding rates, where uncertainties in 
flooding rates magnify potential problems with thermal excursions, as 
discussed in the previous section.
BWR reflood rates are apparently substantially higher than 
PWR rates, typically as high as 3.7 inches per second (60, p. 1125). 
Reflood HTCs of 25 B/hr-ft^-°F have been specified by the Commission 
(60, p. 1126). When compared with equivalent HTCs for PWRs, the BWR- 
HTCs correspond to flood rates of about 2-3 in/sec (e.g., figure A9.7), 
and are probably somewhat conservative for the indicated flood rates. 
Though BWR reflood rates appear somewhat higher than typical PWR rates, 
they are still slightly below the apparent critical transition points 
of desirable reflood heat transfer conditions.
The relatively low PWR reflood rates are generally attributed 
to problems with steam binding. In the discussion of the AC, the Com­
mission suggests:
The reflooding rate for pressurized water reactors 
would be controlled to a large extent by steam binding, 
the phenomenon by which the resistance to flow through 
the reactor system (steam generators, pumps, etc.) of 
the effluent from the reactor core limits the rate of 
reflood and, indirectly, the rate of heat removal from 
the fuel rods. The pumps in their locked rotor condition 
would typically provide more than half of this resistance 
to flow so that the stipulation of their being locked is 
a serious limitation. If the pump rotors were not locked, 
their resistance to flow would be reduced by 60% (Exhibit 
1113, p. 14-10). In their Concluding Statement, Combus­
tion Engineering states that if the pumps were free run­
ning during reflood the calculated maximum temperature 
of the zircaloy cladding would be reduced by 75°F (CE 
Concluding Statement, p. 3-61).
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The stipulation of locked pumps during reflood is 
unchanged from the Interim Policy Statement, and no new 
experimental information was provided during the hearing 
justifying a change in this part of the rule (60, p. 1122) 
(emphasis added).
The steam binding problem is exacerbated by the ECCS accumu­
lator injection design. Only the accumulated head associated with the 
differential height of the fluid in the downcomer relative to the height 
in the core is available to drive the ECC fluid. It is opposed by the 
flow resistance developed in the unbroken legs of the ruptured nuclear 
steam supply systems. Reduced flood rates due to normal LOCA flow 
resistance for the system are additionally perturbed by such problems 
as fluid oscillations in the downcomer, density decreased in ECC fluid 
within the downcomer, and line plugging during accumulator injection.
As a consequence, obtaining higher flooding rates with current PWR ECCS 
designs is probably not possible. System redesign might be needed to 
achieve flooding rates as high as the 4-6 in/sec which would appear to 
be desirable.
For BWRs there do not appear to be any inherent reactor 
design problems which would preclude obtaining higher flooding rates, 
if they were desired. Direct injection of the BWR-ECC reflooding fluid 
through the pressure vessel head above the core apparently minimizes 
flow resistance constraints to increasing reflood rates. Simplistically 
speaking, increased reflood rates would appear attainable through simply 
increasing the pump capacity for the BWR core flooding injection system.
Estimates of reflood rates are clouded by two major problems: 
inadequacies of current flood rate computational methods and lack of 
experimental evidence to support the predicted results. In the words 
of the AEC:
All three PWR vendor codes, as well as the FLOOD 1 
code (the current AEC recommended model), are incomplete 
in their modeling to differing degrees, and all codes lack
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experimental verification....In view of the present 
status of reflood codes and experimental programs, the 
need to develop or improve reflood computer codes is 
indicated and the staff considers this development can 
be accomplished relatively soon (4_, p. 14-17).
The Commission, in their discussion of the AC, also acknow­
ledged the need for reflood model improvement. They stated:
The Regulatory Staff in their Concluding Statement 
proposed the development of more sophisticated refill- 
reflood computer programs, including those capable of 
predicting the expected oscillatory flow of wake into 
the reactor core....(The AEC anticipates that the "ex­
pected" oscillatory flow during reflood will improve re­
flood HTC.)....The Commission believes with the Staff 
that improved and more realistic models are desirable, 
but realizes that the full benefit of sophisticated 
models that predict oscillatory flow cannot be obtained 
until there are more suitable experiments with which they 
can be compared (60, p. 1122, 1123) (emphasis added).
Though the AEC staff and the Commission apparently feel such improve­
ments would permit reduction in current levels of conservatism in the 
codes, with possible consequent increases in predicted reflood rates, 
the lack of experimental evidence to support such assumptions will make 
future implementation of reductions in conservatism difficult to support 
until the needed evidence is available.
A9.4.3 Flow blockage and core flow distribution
Swelling and rupture of fuel rods during the LOCA can perturb 
flow distribution of the ECC fluid away from local hot spots with conse­
quent decreases in cooling and hence increases in local rod temperatures. 
The potential for core blockage has been a source of serious concern to 
the CNI. In their concluding statement they said,
Clad ductility for some pressure-temperature regimes 
is clearly sufficient to allow complete or nearly complete 
coolant channel closure....The results [of CNI calculations] 
establish that in the present state of knowledge flow block­
age effects may well hopelessly compromise ECCS effectiveness 
(]_, p. 5.3).
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The AEC has acknowledged that their consultants have indicated that 
extensive core blockage could be expected. During the hearings,
Rittenhouse testified "that (local) blockages of 90% embedded in (general
core blockages of) 80%, ’90% in 70%, 90% in 50% and 80% in 50% could 
be inferred by examination of the ORNL multi-rod burst tests" (4^  p. 20-8).
Estimates of expected core blockage were given by the Commis­
sion in their discussion of the AC. They recognized that:
In the postulated LOCA the reactor system pressure 
would drop rapidly and would soon fall below the pressure of 
the helium and fission gases within the fuel rod. The result­
ing differential pressure would exert an expansive force on 
the cladding. At the same time, as the cooling effective­
ness dropped, the temperature of the cladding would increase 
rapidly, decreasing the yield strength of the cladding. At 
some time during the LOCA the yield strength of the zircaloy 
might become less than the tensile stresses exerted by the 
differential pressure, and the cladding would then swell 
and perhaps burst.
For example, Babcock and Wilcox, using the evaluation 
model of the Interim Policy Statement, estimated that, for 
pressurized fuel, rupture of the cladding would be predicted 
over 7Q% of the core 1.3 seconds after the maximum size 
cold leg break. (Exhibit 1059, p. 6-4.) This corresponds 
to the time when the differential pressure would be about 
200 psi and the cladding temperature about 1800°F. Westing­
house in a similar calculation, conservatively estimated 
that 25% of the fuel rods would burst sometime during blow­
down, and that, by the end of the reflood period, 70% of 
the rods would burst. (Exhibit 1078, pp. D-48 and D-49.) 
Combustion Engineering calculated the degree of flow block­
age resulting from rod swelling for each fuel assembly in 
the core for both unpressurized and pressurized fuel. In 
both cases, as judged from the blockage, they were calculated 
to be perforated or swollen rods in nearly every fuel assem­
bly. The major difference between the pressurized and un­
pressurized fuel was that the unpressurized fuel was estimated 
to undergo less swelling and perforation during blowdown, 
as of course might be expected. (Exhibit 1144, sec. 5, 
using material from Exhibit 1066, sec. 2.)
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For the Boiling Water Reactor the situation seems to 
be somewhat different. The blowdown would provide a longer 
period of assured effective cooling of the fuel elements, 
and the initial calculated rise in temperature of the cladding 
in not so great. Furthermore, the pressure within the fuel 
rods is said to be low, so that ballooning of the cladding 
would not be expected to occur during the blowdown (Exhibit 
1001), p. 2-24). General Electric offered one calculation 
for a 1967 product line BWR for which the peak cladding tem­
perature was 2105°F (Exhibit 1148, sec. P). Using some 
of the assumptions made by CNI (Exhibit 1041, sec. 7.2), 
but using a constant internal fuel rod pressure, they calcu­
lated that 13% of the rods in the hottest bundle would per­
forate . CNI, using the probably erroneous assumption that 
there was no communication between the hot spot and the 
fission gas plenum at the top of the fuel rod, estimated 
that 22% of all the fuel rods in the whole reactor would 
rupture. They said that this compares with 21% estimated 
by General Electric for the Pilgrim reactor (Exhibit 1041, 
p. 7.9). In Exhibit 1032, Page II.8.2-1, reference is made 
to a calculation for a Boiling Water Reactor in which 60% 
of the fuel pins were expected to rupture by the time the 
ECCS core sprays came on, with 75% of the pins expected to 
rupture ultimately....
From the above it is obvious that, when the course of 
the LOCA is calculated according to the conservative pres­
criptions of an approved evaluation model, swelling and 
bursting of the cladding will be estimated to occur in abun­
dance (60, pp. 1104, 1105) (emphasis added).
The location of swelling on the rods and relative inter-rod 
relationship of swollen segments is as important to blockage as the 
overall extent of swollen and ruptured rods. This aspect of the core 
blockage question has been a subject of substantial controversy. It 
apparently will be a continuing center of uncertainty and debate, as 
we will discuss below. In their AC discussion the Commission noted:
The data from the rod burst tests show a great deal 
of scatter, particularly in the degree of swelling experi­
enced. (See, for example, fig 2.5 of Exhibit 1066.) The 
greatest controversy, however, has been with respect to 
interpretations and predictions of the resulting blockage 
to coolant flow....It is expected that variations in
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cladding thickness, fuel pellet properties, gap thickness 
and eccentricity, and the texture of the zircaloy because 
of its anisotropic character would go into the determination 
of just where along the length of a fuel rod the perforation 
would occur (Transcript 11, 515-18).
The swollen and perforated region is expected to be 
about 1-1/2 to 3 inches long, and to occur at random as 
determined by the above variables over a length of relatively 
uniform temperature of from 7 inches to 27 inches. (Trans.
12, 701; Exhibit 1066, fig. 2.7; Exhibit 1144, p. 5.2).
Thus it is not expected that a large number of adjacent rods 
would have their maximum swelling in the same plane. The 
maximum blockage observed to date in any multirod experiment 
containing 16 channels or more has been approximately 70% 
on any horizontal plane (Trans, pp. 9166-7).
All in all, the record still supports the Regulatory 
Staff position in Exhibit 1001, pp. 2-12, namely, that the 
core-wide flow area reduction in the plane of greatest 
blockage would not exceed 60% and that local flow channel 
reductions, over perhaps a 4 x 4 array of fuel rods, would 
not exceed 90%. As shown by calculation of blowdown and 
ECCS heat transfer considered elsewhere, these reductions 
of flow area, while necessary to be considered, would not 
be disastrous. In other words, the Commission concludes 
that estimated fuel rod swelling and rupture would not 
render the geometry of the core to be uncoolable (60, pp.
1105, 1106) (emphasis added).
That the question of the extent of blockage may not have been 
resolved with adequate conservatism is demonstrated by the testimony of 
William B. Cottrell, Director of the Nuclear Safety Information Center, 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Two statements in the Commission's discussion of the
criteria....> if not clarified, could result in a lack
of conservatisms in applying the criteria...
The question of core flow blockage as results from fuel 
pin swelling is addressed only indirectly in new criterion 
No. 4 but is adequately covered later in the criteria in 
the discussion of evaluation models (Section IB). There 
it is stated that clad swelling and rupture must be considered, 
and "shall be based upon applicable data in such a way 
that... (the effects) are not underestimated."
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It should be realized that only little applicable 
data exists in this area and that which is available is 
open to question. In this regard there are two statements 
in Section IIIB of the Opinion of the Commission which are 
of concern: specifically, (1) it is assumed that clad 
swelling and perforations occur at random over a length of 
from 7 to 27 inches. I should point out the shorter the 
length, the more compact the blockage and, therefore, the 
greater difficulty in cooling the reactor and secondly, 
undue significance is given to the maximum observed block­
age of 70 percent to support the Regulatory Staff position 
that local flow reductions would not exceed 90 percent.
The available information could equally well, if not 
better, .justify a random failure distribution over less 
than seven inches in length and local flow blockages in 
excess of 90 percent. These are both important matters, 
which should be resolved by additional experiments.
Furthermore, until such time as definitive informa­
tion on rod swelling behavior is available, I would recom­
mend that highly conservative blockage values be used in 
the calculation models (59, pp. 323-325).
Cottrell's position on the need for utilization of more 
conservative blockage values was further amplified by the testimony of 
his associate at ORNL, Phillip Rittenhouse. Rittenhouse cautioned with 
regard to the AC requirement for predicting clad swelling and rupture:
I have one caution in this regard. The Commission 
also states these calculations should be based on applicable 
data in such a way that the swelling and rupture are not 
underestimated.
I have some concern that we presently have inadequate 
data to do this. I would caution that in the use of that 
applicable data that these evaluation models be defined as 
that presently available and giving the most conservative 
result.
The Commission also discusses blockages resulting from 
swelling and rupture, prescribes how the effects of the 
blockage should be considered during blowdown and on heat 
transfer during re-fill and re-flood period.
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I agree with the AEC's stated position that core­
wide flow area reduction will not exceed 60 percent.
However, I do not believe that the 90 percent limit 
on local flow channel reduction, four by four array 
of rods defined by the Commission has been satisfacto­
rily demonstrated.
I suggest that this is a subject that needs addi­
tional study to determine the magnitude of flow block­
age and for the present we assume no less than 95 per­
cent local flow blockage (59, pp. 340, 342) (emphasis 
added).
The effects of such extensive channel blockage and the result­
ant flow redistribution have been variously estimated for PWRs. With 
evaluation models approved under the IAC, vendors were allowed to esti­
mate hot channel flow as 80 percent of the "smoothed" calculated aver­
age flow for the core. Under the PR, it was proposed that flow diversion 
for a "hot region" no larger than the "size of one fuel assembly" be 
calculated, allowing for blockage induced crossflow resulting from clad 
swelling or rupture. Somewhat similarly to the IAC prescription, the PR 
recommended that the hot region flow, during blowdown, be "multiplied" 
by a flow reduction factor of 0.8 "to allow for the effects of clad 
swelling or rupture" (6^, p. 51).
The 80 percent of average core flow factor applied in the IAC 
to estimate hot channel flow was acknowledged by the AEC to be "an 
arbitrary, interim factor intended to compensate for uncertainties in 
core flow distribution" (4^  p. 7-7). More sophisticated calculations of 
hot channel flow were said to indicate flow reductions ranging from a 
factor of 0.9 times average flow for single phase steam flow to complete 
stagnation for two phase (steam-liquid) flow under certain conditions 
04, p. 7-6). Parametric studies of the effect of flow diversion on the 
hot channel temperature excursion have indicated a temperature increase 
of approximately 470°F as flow decreased from 100 percent to 40 percent 
average (4^, p. 7-11). Though the sensitivity of the thermal excursion 
due to blockage was minimized by the regulatory staff (the change was
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only "about 8°F per one percent change in core flow" (4), the large 
uncertainty in predicted factors for flow diversion (including total 
flow stagnation) must make this parameter non-negligible in estimating 
the effects of core blockage on blowdown heat transfer.
An extensive discussion of blowdown effect induced by core 
blockage was included in the discussion of the AC. The Commission 
stated:
The analytical models used in reviewing the course 
of a hypothetical loss of coolant accident under the 
Interim Policy Statement have all been one-dimensional, 
with no direct treatment of flow redistribution in the 
core. The detailed flow in the reactor core following 
initiation of the hypothetical loss-of-coolant would be 
complex, and would be different depending on the kind of 
reactor and fuel and the specific time during the LOCA.
The nature and degree of flow redistribution were discussed 
at length during the hearing.
Flow redistribution between channels is a phenomenon 
primarily affecting Pressurized Water Reactors, because they 
have no channel walls to restrict cross-flow. The principal 
forces affecting cross-flow are friction, acceleration, 
drag in channels, drag through spacer grids and fittings, 
and buoyancy (Morgan, Transcript pp. 12678-9). The presence 
of a two-phase fluid affects buoyancy and frictional drag 
(through the two-phase multipliers). In upflow the buoy­
ancy effects tend to produce higher hot channel flow than 
average channel flow (though frictional effects act in the 
opposite direction). In downflow the buoyance and the 
friction act together to reduce hot channel flow relative 
to average channel flow (Morgan, Transcript 12679).
The Interim Acceptance Criteria models have accounted 
for these effects by a requirement that the average channel 
flow during blowdown of a PWR be multiplied by a factor of 
0.8 to obtain the flow in the hot channel calculation. 
Westinghouse Testimony stated that calculations made using 
the THINC code are the basis for this choice of factor.
The calculation assumed parallel channels, and zero cross- 
flow resistance between channels, so that the pressure was 
constant in every horizontal plane. These calculations 
did not unambiguously lead to flow reductions bounded by 
the factor 0.8.
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Although the vendors' discussions of the effect of flow 
redistribution generally tended to support choice of the 
factor 0.8, there was little sympathy elsewhere for it.
Its conservatism was questioned by Rosen (Testimony), Lawson 
(Transcript 5755), and Ybarrondo (Transcript 6076, 6270,
10255), and its continued use has not been proposed by the 
Staff.
It appears that consideration of flow redistribution 
prior to the hearing comprised only circumstances in which 
the clad is not deformed. Questioning during the hearing 
also dealt with effects of clad swelling, fuel deformation, 
and partial blockage on flow redistribution. It was less 
apparent that the factor 0.8 would be adequate if partial 
channel blockage occurred than if channels were undeformed.
The Staff's Supplementary Testimony recognized this 
point, and proposed that models be developed and used that 
explicitly calculate the effect of flow redistribution during 
both the upflow and downflow phases of blowdown. The view 
included use of models that calculate the flow redistribution 
resulting from flow blockage if that should be calculated 
to take place.
We believe this is the correct course to follow. We 
believe the wording in the Staff's proposed rule adequately 
expressed the position supported by the record, with one 
exception. There is no basis in the record for continued 
use of the flow reduction factor of 0.8 after flow redistri­
bution effects have been calculated for the hot channel.
We have not included this requirement in the Rule (60^ , p.
1120).
With respect to reflooding, core blockage is not expected to 
produce a significant reduction in reflood rates. A uniform core block­
age of 75 percent was calculated to produce a pressure drop increment 
of "no greater than 0.3 psi." The resulting change in the reflood rate 
was calculated to be "less than 3 percent" (4, p. 20-5).
However, the relatively small overall effect on reflood rates 
does not necessarily indicate that local effects due to flow diversion 
from hot spots may not be significant. W. R. Gambrill of ORNL was 
reported to have made calculations which "indicated that clad tempera­
ture increases between 500°F and 2000°F" could occur as a consequence 
of blockage Q4, p. 20-8).
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Although FLECHT experimental results must be recognized as 
poorly simulating the open lattice core of the PWR, it should be noted 
thay they have been frequently cited as indicating that core blockage 
may actually improve local HTC with consequent reductions on local tem­
peratures. Tests of 10 x 10 rod arrays with up to 100 percent central 
blockage in a field of 75 percent blockage (using flat plates to achieve 
midplane orifice channel blockage) showed reductions in midplane tem­
peratures of about 200-250°F as a result of blockage. (The unblocked 
temperature increase during reflood was 465°F; restricted flow tempera­
ture increases, 193-245°F.)
Westinghouse has observed the evident limitations on FLECHT 
simulation of flow diversion. They have stated:
It should be noted that no attempt was made to simulate 
core wide radial flow effects in the PWR FLECHT tests.
Typical reactor loss-of-coolant accident calculations indi­
cate that the coolant flow at the midplane of the "hot" assem­
bly with 50% flow blockage would be approximately 75% of 
the core average. Therefore it is important to recognize 
the need to take the radial flow distribution into account 
in using FLECHT data for reactor loss-of-coolant accident 
analyses (50, p. 4-5).
As a consequence of the lack of apparent correlation between 
experiments and analyses, the effect of potential PWR core blockage on 
reflood heat transfer is uncertain. As the AEC has observed:
Vendor estimates of the effects of flow blockage on 
peak cladding temperature range from 76° (CE) to 90°F 
(Westinghouse) to 159°F (B&W). Suggestions for an allow­
ance to be applied to account for blockage range from 100°F 
(Gambrill, ORNL) to "more appropriate power/flow ratios"
(BNWL)* to general agreement with the Regulatory Staff 
discussion of this section (ANC) to a 500°F penalty (Colmar) 
(4, p. 20-18).
The regulatory staff acknowledges that their overall review "suggests 
that there could be a temperature increase due to blockage as a result 
of degraded heat transfer (extended period of low steam flow) at early
* Battelle Northwest Laboratories
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times..." Moreover, with low flow, calculations "indicate a flow re­
duction could occur for specific blockage configurations" (4, p. 20-18).
Flow blockage effects in a BWR are somewhat less of a problem 
than in a PWR. BWR fuel rod internal gas pressure differences during a 
LOCA are expected to be less than 55 psi when compared with pressures 
in the reactor core. Test data indicate that rupture of a rod at these 
pressure differences requires temperatures above 2200°F (4, p. 20-19). 
Although, as previously discussed, a large amount of individual rod 
swelling may take place, swelling of the outer rods next to the cooler 
channel walls is unlikely and no rod swelling is expected during blow­
down. Though ballooning of interior rods in the 7 x 7 or 8 x 8 indivi­
dual rod bundles may take place, they are expected to rupture towards 
the relatively hot center of the bundle. At least 90 percent overall 
assembly blockage is required before bottom flooding is impaired, the 
AEC has reported (4^  p. 20-21). Since the area between the outer rods 
and bounding metal channel for each bundle is nearly 30 percent of total 
fuel bundle cross-sectional flow area, ballooning of the inner rods is 
not expected to affect core flooding capability. Moreover, each indivi­
dual 7 x 7 or 8 x 8 BWR fuel bundle is a self-contained unit with its 
own separate zircaloy channel bounding the bundle. Consequently, radial 
cross-flow out of the bundle (away from the hot spot) is restricted.
The AEC has estimated that BWR flow blockage will induce peak temperature 
increases of less than 60°F. However, extreme estimates, with complete 
restriction of radiation view factors to other than adjacent rods and a 
zero convective HTC for interior rods, have indicated peak clad tempera­
tures might increase 520°F before termination of the temperature tran­
sient 04, p. 20-22). In spite of this extreme example, flow blockage does 
not appear to be as serious a problem for the BWR as it does for PWR.
A9.4.4 Steam generator tube failure effects
One of the primary concerns of the CNI with respect to treat­
ment of loop resistances in fluid flow through the PWR reactor heat
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transfer loops is related to the problem of PWR steam generator tube 
failures. In the event of failure of a tube in the steam generator during 
the LOCA, the high pressure-high temperature fluid in the secondary steam 
system providing steam to the power plants' turbine-generator could poten­
tially feed back large quantities of steam into the primary loop of the 
reactor steam system. The concern of CNI is that the steam added to the 
primary system from the large secondary loop supply could effectively 
choke the flow of the escaping gases in the system during reflood, re­
ducing reflood rates below their already precariously, hazardously low 
values.
The CNI concern is perhaps best summarized by these statements:
Steam generator tube failures in a PWR give every 
appearance of being the Achilles heel of PWR ECCS. Dr.
Morris Rosen and Mr. Robert Colmar in their June 1, 1971 
memo [to the ECCS Task Force] wrote:
"Although arguments are being made that we can conser­
vatively predict performance during the reflooding period, 
recent experience indicates that problems in this area are 
first coming to light, e.g., plugging of lines and locations 
of safety injection systems. Notwithstanding all the assur­
ances that one can obtain upper bounds on two-phase and 
superheated steam pressure drops, very little is known 
about these types of flow at high velocity through turning 
pipes, steam generators and pumps.
Of paramount concern in this area, however, is the 
possible effect of steam generator tube failures on the 
ECCS. We have been told that as few as [Censored] steam 
generator tube failures could prevent reflooding. It seems 
clear that the area of steam generator integrity during 
blowdown requires an immediate and thorough evaluation."
The Regulatory Staff apparently treated the Rosen- 
Colmar concern in a quite superficial manner. Thus, Dr.
Hanauer testified that there were some general discussions 
on the subject within the Regulatory Staff, but that no 
one was assigned to study the question (TR. 2335) (7_, p.
3.22).
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In their concluding arguments the CNI summarized their concern as:
(6) Steam Binding: Steam binding is the name given 
to the counter-active force from steam generation in PWR 
reflood that acts to defeat or reduce the emergency coolant 
reflood rate during injection and vaporization of emergency 
coolant. It is the phenomenon recognized late in the 
reactor program which is the source of the great reduction 
in reflooding rates. Steam binding can be greatly aggra­
vated by steam injected as a result of steam generator 
tube failures.
(7) Steam Generator Tube Rupture: It has been esta­
blished that the rupture or failure of only a very few,
a handful, of the steam generator tubes in a PWR under 
LOCA conditions can inject sufficient steam to stall totally 
the reflood capability and so to insure clad melting. It 
appears likely, if not certain, in view of the known aggra­
vated corrosion of and wall thinning in steam generator 
tubes in several operating reactors, that the forces 
developed by a cold-leg pipe break would rupture sufficient 
tubes to cause this stalling. The matter is discussed 
elsewhere in our findings. The subject, although of 
obvious importance, was not considered in this proceeding 
(7, pp. 5.48, 5.49).
Some added quantitative feel for the magnitude of the problem 
is given by Brockett, et al. They described the steam generator tube 
leakage problem as follows:
During core reflooding the fluid from the secondary side 
of the steam generator has the potential to transfer energy, 
and in the event of a tube leakage also mass, to the primary 
system. Transfer of either mass or energy can add signifi­
cantly to the pressure drop from the upper plenum to the 
downcomer annulus. Unless the secondary side has depressur­
ized before reflooding is initiated, significant errors in 
reflooding rates would occur if energy transfer processes 
are not properly taken into account. Current predictions, 
which are based on the secondary side of the steam generator 
being at normal operating temperatures at reflooding initia­
tion, are considered to account for all energy transfer pro­
cesses. If only a few tubes leak, mass transfer processes 
can also significantly add to the error in the calculated 
reflooding rates. To provide a 17% reduction in reflooding
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rates (at 1.5 in/sec) a tube break area of about 0.003 ft 
would be required. Present predictions are based on the 
assumptions that none of the tubes fail (10, p. 320) (emphasis 
added).
In rebuttal, the AEC has simply sidestepped the issue, stating 
in their Concluding Statement:
3. Steam generator tube failures.*
6. Pressure vessel failures.**
7. Fuel densification.***
In its Order of February 23, 1972 the Commission 
observed with respect to scope rulings that 'the technology 
and the issues may not present clear-cut answers to questions 
of inclusion [of matters in the hearing record].' Some 
cases are clearer than others, however. Thus, where the 
integrity of steam generator tubes and reactor pressure 
vessels are covered by other Commission regulations,**** 
such matters are properly excluded from the scope of the 
present proceeding which is concerned with emergency core 
cooling systems' ability to control the consequences of 
a large pipe rupture, not a break in a pressure vessel or 
cracks in steam generator tubes, which problems are dealt 
with elsewhere.
Similarly, the question of fuel densification— a pheno­
menon which came to light wholly outside the ECCS hearing 
but while it was still going on— is treated on an ad hoc, 
case-by-case basis. The staff chapter on this subject in 
its Supplemental Testimony— included for information 
purposes— made just this point and was stricken on that 
basis as beyond the scope of the proceeding. In all events, 
since the question is not within the scope of this rule 
making, it is properly a subject for consideration and has 
been so considered in individual cases that have arisen.
* CNI Statement, pages 2.7, 3.1
** CNI Statement, pages 2.8, 3.1
*** CNI Statement, pages 2.8, 3.26-3.41
**** 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design
Criteria (6^, p. 16).
In an earlier portion of the AEC Concluding Statement 
they amplified on the concept of giving out-of-scope subjects further 
subsequent consideration. They stated specifically:
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An issue or subject ruled beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking proceeding is not proper within the scope of 
any rule that ultimately eventuates. Thus, rulings that 
have the effect of narrowing or expanding the scope of the 
rule making merely result in a narrowing or expansion of 
the potential coverage of any ultimate rule. And the 
breadth of the rule —  be it narrow or broad —  cannot be 
the source of "prejudice" to anyone, since matters ruled 
within the scope of the proceeding are proper for consider­
ation here, while matters ruled beyond the scope of the 
present rule making are subject to consideration either 
in individual licensing proceedings or in the context of 
a petition for further rule making (6^, p. 13).
While the subject of the contribution of steam generator 
tube failures to steam binding and fluid flow restriction within the 
primary reactor coolant loop may have been deemed beyond the scope of 
the present hearings, it appears unlikely that it will be the last time 
the AEC will be required to deal with this problem. Though the infor­
mation developed in the hearings with respect to the problem is inadequate 
to permit a reasonable evaluation of the subject, as a result of the 
AEC ruling, the problem appears to be of sufficient magnitude that a 
ruling will ultimately have to be made on it.
A9.5 Summary
In analyzing the subjects reviewed in this appendix, including 
analytical models and numerical methods; treatment of break flows; 
transient critical heat flux and heat transfer; reflood rates and heat 
transfer; and effects associated with flow blockage, it seems that the 
ACRS concern that the preceding representative items "are considered 
not proven to be conservative" (19) is still justified. The regulatory 
staff made serious attempts to demonstrate that adequate conservatism 
had been shown for each of the items of ACRS concern (AEC Concluding 
Statement, 6_). Nevertheless, it appears that as far as the above items 
are concerned, there are still unresolved questions of conservatism.
This judgement should not be considered to imply that nothing is known 
about the subject items. On the contrary, in most cases a great deal
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of information has been gathered. Generally speaking, however, addi­
tional testing accompanied by appropriate analysis is still required to 
develop confidence that models of all items and their treatment under 
the revised acceptance criteria are adequately conservative.
The problems associated with reflood heat transfer are espe­
cially critical. If current estimates of low flooding rates (of the order 
of 1 to 2 in/sec) remain valid, blockage induced flow reduction to the 
hot channel could be a very serious problem. Under these conditions, 
the uncertainties associated with heat transfer coefficients, flooding 
rates and flow distribution make core coolability during a LOCA uncertain. 
More conservative estimates of critical parameters in these areas would 
certainly raise predicted peak local temperatures, perhaps in excess of 
500°F.
In the revised AC, the Commission attempted to introduce more 
conservative restrictions on methods of dealing with low flooding rates 
and their associated problems. As examples of requirements intended to 
increase conservatism, the AC requires: the prediction of swelling and 
rupture for cladding whenever they occur during the course of the LOCA; 
and the assumption that PWR cooling takes place by steam only, if re­
flood rates are less than one inch per second (taking into account any 
blockage effects on steam flow induced by clad swelling and rupture). 
Though the assumption of steam cooling for the flow rates indicated was 
intended to increase conservatism, there is some question about whether 
it is a viable requirement. James 0. Zane, Manager of Experimental 
Projects for the Aerojet Nuclear Company of Idaho Falls testified at the 
hearings before the JCAE (22-24 January 1974) concerning the questionable 
conservatism of this assumption:
Mr. Zane. I am trying to make my point that the new rule 
is likely to have some problem. I think in this particular 
area, flooding rates below one inch per second have been a 
concern because of the limitations of FLECHT data. Someone 
has specified that we will make a calculation in the future
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assuming only steam cooling. My point here is that if you 
were to do that you would find yourself in a very inconsistent 
situation. The codes I think may exist today for doing this, 
but in a previous section of the rules dealing with reflood­
ing rate it has been specifically stated they will not be 
used, you will simply use experimental data.
It seems to me to be a contradiction or conflict here 
in sections of it. I use this as an example to point out 
that I think as our regulatory and the applicants live 
with some of these decisions that they are going to have 
minor problems working out some of the technical aspects 
of this.
Chairman Price. Are you suggesting that the Commission 
change its position?
Mr. Zane. In this particular case I would suggest 
that the Commission would take a little different approach.
I think in other areas a similar thing. If I were to take 
a position on this particular matter, instead of the rule 
as it is written I might simply say that for reflooding 
rates less than one inch per second that additional safety 
systems —  I wouldn't accept a reflooding rate below one 
inch per second if I were in this situation.
Chairman Price. Which position is more conservative, 
your position or the Commission's opinion?
Mr. Zane. Mine would be. Here they are going to give 
them some credit but they are suggesting that they calculate 
it in a way that seems to me is not within the state of the 
art at the moment to do a very reasonable calculation (59).
It seems apparent that the strong implication of all of the 
above is that a criteria specification should be made for higher flood 
rates (as high as 6 in/sec or greater), or equivalently higher reflood 
heat transfer coefficients (in excess of 40 B/hr-ft^-°F). These values 
seem large enough to achieve desired levels of conservatism. If imple­
mented, reflood would achieve not only rapid temperature turnaround, 
but rapid rod quenching as well. Currently it appears that only a 
narrow margin of coolability, if any, exists. In light of uncertainties 
in ECCS performance parameters, cooling by only narrow margins appears 
unacceptable. In fact, the Commission itself has stated (in the Opinion 
to the AC) that:
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The Commission believes that the calculated reflood 
rate should have a substantial margin over the rate which 
is .just sufficient to turn the temperature around in a 
short time....Steam binding would severely limit the rate 
of reflooding the core, reducing it from an intended 6 to 
11 inches per second to from 1.0 to 2.5 inches per second, 
depending on reactor design....The Commission urges the 
pressurized water reactor manufacturers to seek out design 
changes that would overcome steam binding (60, p. 1092)
(emphasis added).
As discussed above, such low reflood rates do not appear to 
represent the "substantial margin" required to assure adequate cooling.
The higher flooding rates proposed as a criterion (approximately 6 in/sec) 
would appear to be adequate to overcome the current narrow margins and 
provide acceptable levels of conservatism in reflood heat transfer.
The author strongly supports the Commission in urging reactor manufac­
turers to "seek out design changes that would overcome steam binding" 
which could provide the higher recommended reflooding rates.
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Appendix 10 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PARAMETERS AFFECTING THERMAL RESPONSE
Many statements have been made by the AEC and vendors concern­
ing conservatism, or even excessive conservatism, of the IAC and the PR. 
These statements are based upon a number of "realistic" LOCA analyses 
with associated estimates of model parameter importance which have been 
made by vendors and the AEC. This section will summarize and attempt to 
put into perspective some of these analyses and their implications with 
respect to the relative importance of the parameters investigated.
A10.1 Vendor Conceptions of Model Conservatism
A number of examples of vendor "realistic" or "best estimate" 
calculations of LOCA thermal response could be cited. Two typical graphi­
cal examples of comparisons between analyses conducted in accordance 
with IAC requirements and those made with assumptions felt to be "more 
realistic" by the vendors are shown in figures A10.1 and A10.2. Figure 
A10.1 (reproduced from 31) shows the comparison of a Westinghouse "best 
estimate" calculation with the IAC-imposed design method calculation.
Note that the peak temperature calculated under the IAC, designated 
"design" in the figure, approaches the 2300°F limit, and is attained 
during reflood. In the "best estimate" calculation, the peak temperature 
is only about 1200°F, approximately one-half the 2300°F IAC limit, and 
occurs during blowdown.
Figure A10.2 (reproduced from 32) presents a similar compari­
son of a General Electric prediction with the analysis based upon IAC 
requirements. Note that the peak temperature of the GE calculation 
(~1800°F), even under IAC assumptions, falls substantially short of the 
IAC 2300°F limit. With the "realistic" prediction, the maximum tempera­
ture occurs during blowdown and does not exceed 800°F.
Before considering the assumptions used in such "realistic" 
calculations, it is well to consider the comments of the AEC with respect
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Figure A10.1
Westinghouse Comparison of "Best Estimate" and IAC 
Design Requirement LOCA Calculations
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(After Figure 7, 31.)
Figure A 1 0 .  2 Basis and Comparison of GE "R e a lis tic "  and IAC Constrained  
C alculations of LOCA Thermal Response
(A fte r F igure 1 5 ,  3 2  , by perm ission .)
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to them. In the AEC Supplemental Testimony, they commented:
The vendors in their direct testimony reported the 
results of "expected" or "realistic" analyses of the design- 
basis LOCA for their respective reactor designs. They claimed 
that these calculations provide an estimate of the conserva­
tism of the analysis methods prescribed in the Interim Policy 
Statement. These are not the first calculations which esti­
mate that conservatism; sensitivity studies have previously 
been performed (see Regulatory staff direct testimony) which 
establish the influence of certain LOCA parameters.
A shortcoming of the vendors' "realistic" calculation 
is that they are not "best estimate" in a statistical sense.
In the strict statistical sense, all input parameters and 
their associated uncertainties would be taken into consider­
ation in performing best estimate calculations. Such analy­
ses would account for propagation of uncertainties and would 
provide confidence bands for the final calculated results.
The Regulatory staff is developing methods at ANC to per­
form such calculations. Several vendors have also indicated 
analytical development efforts in this area (TR. 15,432 and 
14,432) (4, p. 2.1).
In fact, the actual statistical basis is very weak for the "realistic" 
or "best estimate" calculations. The experimental basis for statistically 
accurate estimates of many of the LOCA phenomena is weak or non-existent 
(especially for overall integrated system operational results). Conse­
quently, most "realistic" calculations (even those having an apparent 
statistical formulation) depend heavily upon "engineering judgement" for 
parameter probability specification in lieu of an adequate empirical 
base for a statistical analysis.
It should also be observed that the presentations in figures 
A10.1 and A10.2 have a pronounced bias towards an "optimistic" picture 
of ECCS control of a LOCA. That is, in estimating critical thermal 
parameters for the "best estimate" calculation, the "optimistic" side 
of "confidence bands" for the ranges of uncertainty for the parameters 
has been chosen. The discussions of parameter uncertainties in chapter 3 
attempted to express the alternative view, i.e., the "worst case" or
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pessimistic side of the confidence bands for parameter uncertainty.
The vendors have based their "best estimate" calculations on the observa­
tion that the IAC parameter requirements are biased heavily (in their 
opinions) towards the "pessimistic", or conservative, view of parameter 
uncertainty. However, the AEC's comment that vendor calculations do not 
"account for uncertainties" or "provide confidence bands for the final 
calculated results" (4, p. 2.1) is indicative of a more objective view 
of these so-called best estimate calculations. If the calculations fol­
lowed the AEC recommendations, and limiting values for confidence bands of 
parameter uncertainty were utilized for both optimistic and pessimistic 
views of the parameters, then the optimistic side of the results would 
probably look much like the vendor presentations while the pessimistic 
view might more nearly reflect the LOCA thermal history for conditions 
portrayed by the analysis of chapter 3.
An example of the basis for decisions concerning parameters 
for which "unrealistic" assumptions are considered to be required in 
the IAC is given by GE in table A10.1 (reproduced from 32). This table 
lists the parameters for which GE feels that the IAC imposes assumptions 
which are "excessively conservative". Figures A10.3 and A10.4 present 
a graphic comparison of the heat transfer coefficients (HTC) associated 
with the LOCA calculations based upon IAC requirements and "realistic 
predictions" respectively. The HTCs assumed in figure A10.4 were used 
to calculate the thermal response of figure A10.2. Table A10.2 (27, sec. 
G) shows the results of separately (and individually) varying selected 
parameters from table A10.1 to values felt to be more "realistic" by GE. 
Note that in the results presented in table A10.2 the durations of criti­
cal periods for parameters and assumed HTCs associated with them are 
probably similar to those shown in figure A10.4. Comparing the assump­
tions of figure A10.3 and A10.4 shows that the assumed rod rewetting 
(figure A10.4) during low plenum flashing results in much higher HTCs 
(by a factor of approximately 100) than the IAC allows for the same
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Figure A 1 0 . 3  Heat T ransfer C oeffic ien ts  for D e s ig n -B as is  BWR LO CA (Interim
C rite ria  Assumptions Used)
(A fte r  F igure F - 3 , 2 7  , by p erm iss ion .)
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Figure A 1 0 . 4  Rod Heat Transfer Coefficients for GE "R ealistic" Prediction
of LOCA Thermal Response
(A fter Figure 1 4 , 3 2 ,  by permission.)
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Table A10.1
General Electric Listing of IAC Required "Conservative" Assumptions 
CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS REQUIRED FOR BWR LOCA LICENSING EVALUATION
Parameter
BLOWDOWN PHASE
1 Break critical flowrate
2 Feedwater flow
3 Duration of nucleate 
boiling heat transfer
4 Heat transfer during 
lower plenum flashing
CORE HEATUP PHASE
5 Fuel assembly axial 
and radial power factor
6 Local power distribution
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING PHASE
8 System initiation signal
9 Normal auxiliary power
10 Containment backpressure
11 Cooling system operable
12 Time when fuel bundle 
channels are wetted
Effects of Assumption
Required Assumption on Accident Analysis
Use Moody Model Maximizes flowrate 
and break severity
Ignore feedwater Does not account for 
feedwater replacing 
water lost through 
break
Assumed nucleate boiling 
continues only until jet 
pumps uncover
Minimizes removal of 
stored energy during 
blowdown
Use Groeneveld film boiling 
equation (2,4)
Minimizes removal of 
stored energy during 
blowdown
Use maximum design values Maximizes stored energy 
and heatup rate
Use worst case operating 
peaking
Does not account for 
power flattening due 
to gamma redistribution
Use latest occurring signal Delays ECC initiation
Assume not available Delays ECC for diesel 
generator starting
Ignore backpressure Reduces effective ECC 
pump head
Use systems available after 
worst single failure
Reduces total ECC 
flowrate, delays 
core reflooding
Use Yamanouchi analysis 
plus 60 seconds
Delays radiation to 
channel cooling
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Sensitivity of Peak Clad Temperature During 
Core Spray Operation to Specified Variables 
Decrease in Peak Clad
Item from Appendix III Temperature ( F) From Discussion
of Exhibit 1069 Base Case
(3) Duration of Approx. 120
Nucleate Boiling
(3) Heat Transfer During Approx. 800
Lower Plenum Flashing
(5) Critical Flow Rate Approx. 300
for Liquid
(6) Cooling Systems Approx. 150
Operable
A previous sensitivity study on this item showed 
that the peak clad temperature decreased 40 F for 
each second of delay of CHF. It is more important 
to note that for the expected duration of nucleate 
boiling the rods will rewet.
Rewetting of the rods would decrease the cladding 
temperature to nearly saturation temperature by the 
time the fuel uncovers. The peak cladding tempera­
ture during core spray operation in this case is 
merely the heatup during the time of fuel uncovery.* 
This item renders insignificant all items that per­
tain to the portion of the accident prior to unco- 
very.
The sensitivity of this item has been investigated 
using the models of NEDO-10329. Changing the criti­
cal flow rate essentially changes the time-scale of 
blowdown without affecting the decay power signifi­
cantly. Essentially the same rate of energy removal 
results with a decreased lower plenum flashing in­
ventory loss.
Analyses have been made using the models of NEDO- 
10329 for the case in which all cooling systems 
are operable, as well as for cases with single 
failure of an active component.
Q
The peak clad temperature over the entire transient for this case is about 1300 F, and occurs at the start 
of lower plenum flashing. Since core heatup after lower plenum flashing begins at only about 500°F, the 
clad temperature at core reflood will be only about 1100 F. It is this latter figure— the peak clad tempera 
ture during core spray operation— that is compared with the base case in the above table.
Table A10.2
Sensitivity Analysis of Critical G.E. LOCA Assumptions for "Realistic" Evaluations of Parameters (Ref. 27)
phenomena, and the high HTCs of both the initial blowdown prior to DNB 
and lower plenum flashing periods are retained for much longer than the 
IAC allows. The net result is that, as indicated in figure A10.2, the 
heat transfer during lower plenum flashing more than compensates for 
the decay heat released during that period (from approximately 20 to 
45 sec) together with the remaining stored energy of the fuel so that 
the temperature during this period actually is predicted to fall below 
normal operating temperatures. Even though the HTCs during core spray, 
prior to reflood, are very low, the decay heat remaining during the 
core spray period is calculated to be insufficient to raise the rod tem­
peratures as high as the blowdown peak reflood occurs. Moreover, the 
"realistic" calculation assumes reflood occurs substantially before it 
is allowed under the IAC requirements. In addition, the resulting re­
flood HTC, with assumed rewetting of the rods in the "realistic" case, 
is much higher (by approximately a factor of 40) than permitted under 
the IAC.
Under these conditions, as described in table A10.2, the 
critical parameters are shown to be:
(1) The duration of nucleate boiling (associated with CHF 
predictions) producing a 120°F decrease in peak clad 
temperature, based upon an apparent increase in time 
to CHF of approximately 3 seconds.
(2) Heat transfer during lower plenum flashing (the most 
(overall) influential factor affecting thermal response) 
producing a reduction in the late time temperature of 
approximately 800°F. In the GE realistic picture, heat 
transfer during lower plenum flashing also depends 
heavily on the CHF correlations. The large HTC asso­
ciated with rod rewetting are assumed based upon calcula­
tion of reduced rod heat flux well below CHF during the
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flashing period so that rod rewetting is assumed to 
be assured and nucleate boiling reestablished.
(3) The critical flow rate for liquids under the IAC was 
based upon the Moody model which has been previously 
discussed as possibly underpredicting break flow during 
at least a portion of the blowdown period. Analyses of 
experiments conducted for fairly large scale pipes are 
cited as evidence that predicted flow rates will be 
approximately 0.8 of the Moody predicted values. On 
this basis, the blowdown period is extended with a 
consequent effective increase in the duration of the 
period of nucleate boiling, similar to (1) above but 
apparently longer so that peak temperatures during core 
spray operation are reduced by approximately 300°F.
(4) Failure to keep the cooling systems operable is the 
"worst single failure" assumption of the IAC and requires 
the assumption of the loss of auxiliary power at the 
same time the LOCA occurs. GE feels that the "high qual­
ity and high reliability" requirements imposed on ECCS 
design realistically prevent this type of outage from 
occurring. If, in opposition to IAC requirements, 
auxiliary power is maintained, the ECC pumps will oper­
ate on schedule and core reflooding can be accelerated. 
Core reflooding generally results in almost instantaneous 
temperature turnaround. Earlier functioning was found
to reduce peak temperatures by 150°F. It is interesting 
to observe that of all the dominant parameters, only 
this one is significant in the period following core 
dryout. All other critical parameters are associated 
with blowdown.
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Figure A10.5 (27, sec. G) shows the GE assignment of the 
probabilistic interrelationships between branch elements of several of 
the critical LOCA paths. Probabilities of event occurrence have been 
assigned to each branch of the LOCA event tree by the GE authors. On 
the basis of the assigned branch probabilities, the joint probability 
of each branch could be calculated. Within this framework, the LOCA 
thermal response corresponding to the combination of events for any 
branch can be calculated and the probability associated with the corres­
ponding peak temperature "derived" from the joint probability of the 
branch.
Calculations of the peak temperatures associated with the 
several branches were made and a curve, figure A10.6, of the probability 
of achieving any given maximum temperature was obtained from the proba­
bilistic relationships of figure A10.5. In the description of the 
authors:
It would be presumptuous to suggest that all the 
realistic assumptions are without significant levels of 
uncertainty. In fact, the uncertainties in the various 
assumptions as well as in the cladding temperature pre­
diction have been assessed [as shown in figure A10.5] 
...Figure 16 [A10.6] shows the final result in the form 
of a complementary cumulative distribution function of peak 
cladding temperature. Note that the realistic prediction 
of 800°F is actually a best estimate or most probable re­
sult and there is an equal probability that temperatures 
will be higher or lower than this value. The probabilities 
in Figure 16 [A10.6] do not include the probability of 
occurrence of a LOCA. Thus, for example, the figure 
indicates that given one hundred BWR LOCAs only 1 of these 
would result in a cladding temperature exceeding 1200°F.
The real importance of this result is in the illustration 
that even with significant levels of uncertainty on indivi­
dual parameters, the probability that many of the parameters 
will combine in a worst case manner is very low. In any 
event, it is clear that temperatures predicted with the 
IAC evaluation assumptions applied to the BWR represent 
a highly unlikely outer bound (32).
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Figure A 1 0 .  5  GE Estim ates of P ro bab ility  D istribution  o f Param eters
(From 2 7  by pem iiss ion .)
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Figure A10.6
Probability Distribution for Peak Cladding Temperature
(BWR)
PROBABILITY THAT PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS T FOR A 
BWR LOCA, BASED ON REALISTIC-ESTIMATE PARAMETERS
(After Figure G-2,27, by permission)
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Though the analysis behind figures A10.5 and A10.6 is certainly 
a valuable and enlightening exercise, a word of caution should be given 
in connection with the conclusions presented above. Figure A10.5 has 
the appearance of giving quantitative probabilistic estimates of the 
events on each of the branches. Although it has evidently been worked 
out with substantial thought and care, the authors have made the follow­
ing comment about the values associated with the events.
The probabilities [figure A10.5] assigned to the various 
paths of the tree were derived considering the interactions 
of the variables. Thus, for example, the probability that 
rewetting will occur increases as the break flow rate de­
creases and as the duration of nucleate boiling increases.
In those cases where specific data could not be applied to 
establish the probabilities, subjective probabilities were 
established based on expert technical judgement (27, p. G-4) 
(emphasis added).
In this probabilistic discussion, it is well to bear in mind 
that the probability is high that most of the specific values assigned 
to events of figure A10.5 were "based on expert technical judgement."
If this is true, then it must be recognized that the curve of figure 
A10.6, though interesting and qualitatively informative, may be quanti­
tatively fictional. These qualifiers have not been intended to negate 
the value of the material in figures A10.5 and A10.6. On the contrary, 
the results indicated by the figures should be recognized as a valuable 
contribution towards a preliminary estimate of the probabilistic distri­
bution of LOCA events in terms of the maximum temperatures which might 
occur from them.
10.1.1 ANC parametric investigation
An independent series of parametric calculations conducted by 
ANC has been designed to provide estimates of the importance of various 
LOCA events and parameters (10, pp. 322-331).
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Numerical calculations were made of fuel rod heat up based 
upon selected parameters for initial and decay power generation rates, 
physical properties of the fuel and zircaloy, an assumed gap conductance 
of 500 B/hr-ft^-°F, metal-water reaction rates, initial clad and fluid 
temperatures and surface heat transfer coefficients. For PWRs, the 
surface heat transfer coefficients were based upon PWR-FLECHT results 
as a function of reflooding rate. The results of the calculation show­
ing representative peak clad temperatures for a PWR as a function of 
flooding rate and temperature at the initiation of flooding are shown 
in figure A10.7. Also calculated in the analysis, and shown in the 
figure, is the so-called "embrittlement" factor —  a calculated relative 
oxidation depth of Zr02+ aZr. The embrittlement factor was obtained by 
applying a factor of 2.2 to the calculated (Baker-Just) equivalent ZrC^ 
depth for the problem. The 2.2 conversion factor was derived on the 
basis of an empirically based evaluation of the relative depth ratio of 
the combined oxide and a-layers compared to the Baker-Just calculated 
oxide depth. On this basis, a 40 percent embrittlement factor is equiva­
lent to a Baker-Just calculated relative oxidation depth of ZrC^ of 18 
percent of the original clad thickness.
Figure A10.7 shows, for example, that if the ECCS delivers 
coolant to the core at 1 in/sec, and if the core midplane temperature at 
the time of reflooding is 1500°F, then the maximum rod temperature will 
be 2200°F and the cladding will be 19 percent "embrittled". Similarly, 
the results imply that at the same flooding rate (1 in/sec) the predicted 
rod thermal response cannot be controlled if blowdown temperatures at 
the time of flooding exceed approximately 1800°F.
The. lines of constant embrittlement of figure A10.7 have an 
interesting characteristic —  they are essentially horizontal. Thus, 
for the transients investigated, embrittlement was almost wholly a 
function of the maximum temperature. Since the time at temperature is
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Figure A10.7 
PWR-ECC Performance Map
Reprinted, by permission, from Brockett, G.F., R.W. Griebe,
R.W. Shumway, and J.O. Zane, "Loss of coolant: Control of 
Consequences by Emergency Core Cooling", Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Nuclear Solutions to World Energy 
Problems, Joint ANS/AIF Conference, November 13-17, 1972, 
Washington, D.C.
(10 and the American Nuclear Society)
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an important factor in embrittlement, the results imply that the time 
histories of thermal excursions are essentially identical for all corres­
ponding combinations of flooding rate and temperature at flooding initia­
tion which result in a given peak temperature.
The relative importance of variations in some of the other 
parameters of the problem is shown in table A10.3. As described by 
the authors:
As an aid in estimating the effect of several other 
parameters, results from other sensitivity studies are 
presented in Table I [Table A10.3]. This table shows the 
percent change in the cladding temperature rise and em­
brittlement for two points in Figure 12. These points 
are for 2000 and 1600°F initial temperatures for a flood­
ing rate of 6 in/sec for 4 seconds followed by a flooding 
rate of 1 in/sec. By utilizing the information in Table I 
and the curves of Figure 12 [Figure A10.7], new performance 
maps could be constructed.
The largest changes occur in the 2000°F column because 
the metal-water reaction energy is more significant at this 
temperature than for the 1600°F temperature at reflood 
initiation. The parameter which caused the greatest effect 
was the initial power. Next, in the order of importance, 
are: (a) metal-water reaction energy multiplying factor;
(b) the time at which reflooding begins; and (c) ZrO ,^ 
thickness.
Another important parameter affecting the relationship 
between the temperature at the time of reflooding initia­
tion and the maximum temperature for a given reflooding 
rate is containment pressure. The containment pressure 
affects the flooding rate as well as the heat transfer 
for a specific flooding rate. As an example of this effect, 
if the core pressure is 25 psia instead of 60 psia and the 
reflooding rate is 1 in/sec, a 1500°F temperature at re­
flood initiation would result in a maximum temperature 
500°F above the value obtained from Figure 12 [figure A10.7] 
(emphasis added) (10, pp. 325, 326).
The differences observed in the relative importance of various 
factors between the ANC results and the GE investigation are worth reviewing.
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Table A10.3 ANS Sensitivity Study 
TABLE I
SENSITIVITY STUDY SHOWING EFFECT OF PARAMETER CHANGES ON RESULTS IN FIGURE 12
Temperature 
at time of
s of 2000°F 
reflooding
Temperature 
at time of
of 1600°F 
reflooding
Parameter Value Temperature
Rise
(% Change)
Cladding 
Embrittlement 
(% Change)
Temperature
Rise
(% Change)
Cladding 
Embrittlement 
(% Change)
Baker-Just multiplication factor
= 0.5 -21 -21 - 6 - 9
= 1.0 55 75 9 12
Initial power (kw/ft) = 1.0 -56 -50 -45 -61
= 1.4 106 170 53 101
Zr02 thickness (in.) = 0.001 -13 - 9 - 9 - 8
= 0.00001 1 2 2 2
7-sec delay in time to initiate
reflooding(a) -16 -16 -10 -15
{a} Delays in flooding initiation result in a reduced temperature rise at any given temperature at reflooding 
initiation because the decay power is decreased.
Reprinted by permission from Brockett, G.F., R.W. Griebe, R. W. Shumway, and J.O. Zane, "Loss of Coolant: 
Control of Consequences by Emergency Core Cooling," Proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear 
Solutions to World Energy Problems, Joint ANS/AIF Conference, November 13-17, 1972, Washington, D.C. ,(10 
and the American Nuclear Society.)
Note that the ANC study was restricted to investigation of factors 
affecting thermal response following blowdown (during the reflood phase) 
while the GE study considered the entire LOCA event. Essentially all 
of the GE factors of importance were related to blowdown factors and 
consequently could not appear in the ANC study, since blowdown related 
elements of the LOCA were not investigated. In analyzing the ANC re­
sults, it should also be noted that of the cited important parameters, 
both the metal-water reaction energy multiplying factor and ZrO^ thick­
ness are parameters influencing the metal-water energy input to the rod. 
This feature serves to support the earlier observation (appendix 7) of 
the importance of the metal-water reaction energy input to the thermal 
response of the system, as opposed to the AEC's view of the relative 
unimportance of this source of energy input to the system. However, it 
should also be noted that the AC (as well as the IAC) require the use 
of a Baker-Just multiplier of 1.0 —  a conservative estimate as 
indicated.
Results of a similar investigation by ANC of the BWR are shown 
in figure A10.8. The results give support to the critical role which 
GE has claimed for the single failure criterion. If auxiliary power is 
not lost and the delay time between spray initiation and core reflooding 
minimized, then the temperature rise is also reduced. As long as peak 
temperature remains below 2200°F, lines of constant delay between spray 
initiation and reflood are almost parallel. This implies that flooding 
temperature turnaround is almost instantaneous. This can be confirmed 
by comparison of constant delay curves with the zero second delay curve, 
which shows no temperature increase regardless of the initial cladding 
temperature at the time of ECC injection. The effects of the metal- 
water reaction are not particularly significant (less than 10 percent) 
for the transients with peak temperatures below 2200°F limits.
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Figure A10.8
BWR Performance Map
(Reprinted by permission from 10 and the American Nuclear Society)
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10.1.2 AEC parametric investigation
A third parametric investigation of particular importance was 
conducted by the AEC and presented in their Supplemental Testimony (4_). 
Table A10.4 (Table 10.6 (revised) of 40 shows the results of this study 
in which the effects of variations in reflood heat transfer coefficients, 
blowdown heat transfer coefficients and gas gap conductances (Helium 
Conductivity Multiplier) were investigated. There is a great deal of 
interesting information to be deduced from this table on a variety of 
subj ects.
Perhaps the most obvious result of the study was that rod 
temperatures reaching approximately 2100°F could not be controlled and 
were observed to reach melting under the influence of the metal-water 
reaction occurring when the fuel rods became swollen and ruptured, 
allowing oxidation on both inside and outside surfaces. The results 
indicate a pronounced metal-water reaction induced temperature instabil­
ity at values lower than the criteria limits of either the IAC or PR.
This result is shown by the large number of hash marks on the table which 
indicates that for cases marked in this fashion the "clad temperature 
reached melting."
The study investigated variations about a reference base case 
calculation which hypothesized a situation where fuel rods did not swell 
or rupture regardless of their limits of exposure. Variations about the 
base case were considered for three parametric rupture times: two occur­
ring during blowdown (at 3 and 7 sec respectively) and a third variation 
which occurred after blowdown was completed, at 22.5 sec, at the begin­
ning of the heatup period when the core was assumed to be uncovered and 
drying out. No convective film heat transfer was considered to take 
place during this period until reflood began, at approximately 34 sec.
It is interesting to observe that, except for a few variations 
involving post-blowdown swelling and rupture, melting occurred for
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Table A10.4 AEC Sensitivity Study
Table 10.6 
Study No. 2
Peak Cladding Temperature
Linear Power 
Density (kw/ft)
11.1 11.1 i—1rHl—1 14.1 14.1 14.1 17.1 17.1 17.1
Rupture Time 
Seconds 22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0
fhr*
.6
fhb**
.5
fkh***
.125 1577.1 1925.7 2012.0 •kirkk
.6 .5 .25 1587.8 1913.4 1975.7 - - - - - -
.6 .5 .5 1605.0 1894.6 1931.9 - - - -
. 6 .5 1.0 1628.5 1869.7 1886.1 - - - - - —
.6 1.0 .125 1577.1 1857.7 1912.5 - - - —
.6 1.0 .25 1587.8 1838.1 1878.2 - - - — — -
.6 1.0 .5 1605.0 1807.8 1831.8 - - - - -
• 6 1.0 1.0 1628.5 1766.0 1775.8 - - - — - -
.8 .5 .125 1362.2 1664.3 1699.2 1681.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 .25 1381.1 1664.2 1693.3 1698.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 .5 1409.2 1662.2 1682.8 1725.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 1.0 1443.8 1657.1 1668.4 1765.2 - - - -
.8 1.0 .125 1362.2 1625.6 1657.4 1681.1 - - - - —
.8 1.0 .25 1381.1 1617.7 1664.0 1698.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .5 1409.2 1602.4 1620.5 1725.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 1.0 1443.8 1576.2 1584.3 1762.0 2039.1 2074.8 - - -
1.0 .5 .125 1262.9 1574.6 1593.4 1522.4 2091.4 - 1925.0 - -
1.0 .5 .25 1283.0 1572.7 1593.5 1541.1 2051.5 2355.3 1950.2 - -
1.0 .5 .5 1316.3 1563.7 1584.3 1570.3 2004.2 2083.2 1993.7 - -
1.0 .5 1.0 1356.4 1563.8 1556.8 1609.1 1955.9 1986.8 2060.2 - -
1.0 1.0 .125 1262.9 1531.2 1540.8 1522.4 1919.5 2008.8 1925.0 - -
1.0 1.0 .25 1282.9 1522.4 1535.1 1541.1 1889.0 1949.6 1950.2 - -
1.0 1.0 .5 1316.3 1502.4 1514.9 1570.3 1844.8 1879.0 1993.7 - -
1.0 1.0 1.0 1356.4 1489.4 1466.9 1609.1 1788.2 1801.6 2060.2 - -
1.2 .5 .125 1262.9 1559.6 1593.4 1430.3 1874.3 1962.6 1722.2 - -
1.2 .5 .25 1270.6 1565.3 1593.5 1442.7 1858.2 1924.6 1743.6 - -
1.2 .5 .5 1282.6 1564.0 1584.3 1476.7 1836.3 1879.0 1778.2 - -
1.2 .5 1.0 1297.7 1546.1 1556.8 1519.8 1815.6 1836.7 1826.4 - -
1.2 1.0 .125 1262.9 1513.0 1540.8 1430.3 1775.3 1831.9 1722.2 - -
1.2 1.0 .25 1270.6 1507.9 1535.1 1442.7 1752.9 1796.6 1743.6 - -
1.2 1.0 .5 1282.6 1495.7 1514.9 1476.7 1721.4 1748.6 1778.2 - -
1.2 1.0 1.0 1297.7 1457.5 1466.9 1519.8 1681.6 1692.9 1826.4 2256.4 2423.9
fhr* - Reflood Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only 
after rupture.
fhb**_ Blowdown Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only 
after rupture.
fkh*** - Helium Conductivity Multiplier, applies to calculation only after rupture. 
**** - Means Clad Temperature reached melting.
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essentially all cases investigated where the initial power density was 
greater than 17.1 Kw/ft. For those cases where the effective reflood 
rates were less than one inch per second (i.e., reflood heat transfer 
coefficients less than those of the base case), when the initial linear 
power density was as low as 14.1 Kw/ft, melting also occurred for essen­
tially all cases investigated. This is particularly significant since 
peak design linear power densities, for DBA estimation purposes, custom­
arily are about 18-19 Kw/ft. These results imply that rather severe 
restrictions might have to be placed upon reactor operating powers to 
prevent excessive temperature excursions in the event of a LOCA —  assum­
ing the validity of the AC required models for gap conductance in the 
presence of clad ballooning and rupture and the current low reflood rate 
predictions.
Considering the effects of gap conductance on blowdown and re­
flood heat transfer, the verification of some of the results discussed 
under the gap conductance discussion can be observed. When swelling 
and rupture occurred during blowdown, temperatures increased (the magni­
tude depending primarily upon the initial power density) as the gap con­
ductances decreased. For such cases, gap conductances "ranged from 20- 
80 B/hr-ft^-°F" (4_, p. 10-21). On the other hand, when swelling and 
rupture took place during reflood following blowdown (initial blowdown
Ogap conductances were assumed to be high, on the order of 1000 B/hr-ft -°F), 
peak temperatures were calculated to decrease on the order of 100°F with 
decreasing gap conductance (with a parametric variation over the same 
equivalent conductance range as the blowdown cases) in a manner exactly 
opposite to the cases where swelling and rupture occurred during blowdown.
This observation demonstrates the problem of defining what 
constitutes a conservative assumption with respect to the gap conductance 
parameter. For the cases where rupture occurred during blowdown, the 
low gap conductance restricted energy flow from the fuel elements resulting
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in higher fuel temperatures. These higher temperatures were ultimately 
transferred to the cladding during reflood, a period of very poor con­
vective heat transfer, with resulting increasing peak temperatures asso­
ciated with decreasing gap conductances. In the post-blowdown swelling 
and rupture cases, apparently the higher gap conductances during blow­
down permitted sufficient energy transfer during this early period so 
that fuel temperatures during the blowdown period were substantially 
lower than for those cases where swelling and rupture occurred early 
during blowdown. Thus, for these cases, when clad ballooning occurred 
during reflood, it resulted in a beneficial restriction of subsequent 
heat flow producing decreasing peak cladding temperatures as gap conduct­
ance decreased.
The influence of gap conductance is further demonstrated by an 
examination of the effects of rupture time changes. The principal heat 
transfer effect on the change in rupture time is associated with the gap
conductance. As previously noted, the ballooned gap had a heat transfer
2coefficient of 20-80 B/hr-ft -°F, while the non-ballooned cases had gap
2coefficients on the order of 500-1000 B/hr-ft -°F. The results clearly 
indicated that such a reduction in gap HTCs had a profound effect on 
blowdown heat transfer. For the low power cases (11.1 Kw/ft), tempera­
ture increases of from approximately 100°F to 400°F are associated with 
early ballooning (3 or 7 sec) when compared with temperatures of those 
cases where rupture was delayed until after blowdown was complete (the 
22.5 sec cases). At low power, the effect of reflood rate upon rupture 
time induced incremental peak temperature changes was not significant.
As long as peak temperatures were kept within reasonable limits, less 
than 2000°F, results were reasonably consistent —  even though peak tem­
peratures increased over 500°F, while the reflood rate was reduced by a 
factor of two.
However, for the relatively higher powered cases (14.1 and
17.1 Kw/ft), nonlinearities appeared in the incremental peak temperatures
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induced by reducing rupture times. For these cases, melting occurred 
for all cases where the flooding rate HTC was less than nominal (1 inch 
per sec). At the high power levels (17.1 Kw/ft), even at the highest 
simulated reflood rates, no reduction in rupture time was feasible with­
out melting. For these cases, if meltdown was to be avoided at all, the 
high initial gap conductances were necessary to avoid disaster. But even 
with high gap conductances, meltdown occurred for all cases where reflood 
rates were less than nominal.
Considering the effect of reflood rates on peak temperatures, 
table A10.4 also indicates that at low power (11.1 Kw/ft) the effects 
were reasonably uniform irrespective of the conditions of the rods (i.e., 
whether they had undergone early ballooning or not). For example, a 20 
percent reduction in reflood HTC (from nominal to 0.8 nominal) produced 
incremental changes in peak temperature of about 100°F (a fractional 
increment on the order of 6%) regardless of ballooning conditions, de­
creased gap conductance, or reduced blowdown heat transfer.
The borderline nature of the nominal reflood HTC (associated 
with 1 in/sec reflooding rates) to control the temperature excursion, 
is exemplified in the results of an additional 20 percent decrease in 
reflood HTC (from 0.8 to 0.6 nominal). Under these circumstances, peak 
temperatures increased incrementally about 200 to 300°F (a change of 
approximately 15 percent). For these cases, the peak temperatures were 
barely held beneath the critical 2000°F levels at the lowest power levels 
investigated (11.1 Kw/ft).
Comparing the two sets of cases (i.e., the transitions from 
1.0 to 0.8 nominal with that from 0.8 to 0.6 nominal), nonlinearities 
in peak temperature increments are evident. The nonlinearities in incre­
mental peak temperatures indicate problems associated with control of 
peak temperature as the temperature increases toward 2000°F. As peak 
temperatures approach the critical 2000°F level, incremental changes
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in temperature in excess of 300°F can be observed in comparison to the 
100°F increments at the lower temperature levels. Such nonlinearities 
are characteristics of the influences of each of the pertinent variables 
as peak temperatures approach the 2000°F level.
As previously observed, the effectiveness of reflooding heat 
transfer is sharply reduced as linear rod power is increased. At the 
intermediate power levels (14.1 Kw/ft) reflooding effectiveness is severely 
compromised by small perturbations in blowdown heat transfer and gap con­
ductance. For the early rupture cases (at 3 or 7 sec), temperatures in­
crease from about 1700°F to nearly 2000°F as blowdown heat transfer and 
gap conductance are reduced, at even the highest reflood heat transfer 
conditions investigated (i.e., 1.2 nominal).
Generally speaking, at low power levels, blowdown heat transfer 
was the least sensitive parameter investigated. Reducing blowdown HTC by 
50 percent produced 50 to 100°F increases in peak temperatures (a 2 to 6 
percent temperature increase). At these low power levels, the effect of 
changes in blowdown HTC were relatively insensitive to variations in other 
parameters, including temperature. However, when linear rod power levels 
were raised to 14.1 Kw/ft, or higher, blowdown HTC became as important 
a parameter as any of the others investigated. Temperature increases of 
from 100 to 400°F (6-10 percent) were observed for 50 percent reductions 
in blowdown HTC at the 14.1 Kw/ft power level.
In summary, the AEC parametric study shows that at low power 
levels, relatively minor perturbations in any of the parameters were 
shown to be tolerable, producing about 50 to 100°F changes in peak tem­
peratures.
However, large perturbations in parameters, such as (1) major 
gap conductance decreases produced through early rupture time, or (2) 
changes in linear rod power levels, produced important changes in peak 
temperatures (from 100 to 500°F). Such changes were barely tolerable
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under the most ideal conditions, and were fundamentally intolerable 
under essentially all conditions investigated which were off 
normal (or were otherwise non-ideal). At rod power density levels 
greater than 11.1 Kw/ft (considerably below current design peak linear 
rod power densities of 18-19 Kw/ft), meltdown occurred at essentially all 
off-normal operating conditions investigated. Moreover, the results 
presented indicate that the thermal response of the rods is a strongly 
non-linear function of temperature. As peak temperatures approach 2000°F, 
normally minor perturbations in heat transfer related variables induce 
temperature excursions which are increasingly difficult to control.
This appears to be directly related to energy input to the system from 
metal-water reactions at about 2000°F and above. Under such circumstances, 
the nominal reflood heat transfer rates (one inch per second) are stressed 
to their limits. In fact, it appears that under design basis accident 
power conditions currently anticipated (18-19 Kw/ft), rates will be in­
adequate to assure that meltdown will not occur over a relatively large 
fraction of the core, assuming the basic accuracy of the AEC's parametric 
study.
Vendors have objected to using the AEC analysis methods judged 
to be unrepresentative of the thermal excursion over the entire core.
They point out that swelling and rupture are very localized phenomena —  
an inch or two on a 12 ft rod —  as are the maximum DBA peaking factors 
associated with the 18-19 Kw/ft linear rod power densities. Consequently 
they feel that applying the results of such a single "hot rod" calcula­
tion to the entire core is very conservative.
This is probably true. However, the AEC does not currently 
recognize the adequacy of any of the statistical models which are used 
to estimate the distribution of peak linear power density or swelling 
and rupture over the core. Consequently they feel that there is no way 
of accurately predicting how extensive the melting might be. Thus,
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though the results may be very conservative and damage resulting to the 
core from this mechanism relatively small, in actual practice the AEC 
has prescribed that this conservative method be applied in the AC.
10.1.3 Ranking critical parameters
The most significant observation to be deduced from the pre­
viously cited investigations is that ranking critical parameters is not 
easy. The ranking of the parameters depends, to a large extent, on the 
limits of the range of parameter variations which were selected as 
"realistic" in the various studies conducted. To the extent that they 
may have been selected unrealistically, especially if they were chosen 
to support the position that the IAC was excessively conservative, we 
are currently at the mercy of those who have conducted the investigations.
Recognizing these limitations, the results seem to imply that 
blowdown heat transfer parameters are very important. Critical heat 
flux (CHF) parameters are especially important. This parameter affects 
the initial duration of nucleate boiling and the potential reestablish­
ment of high heat transfer boiling conditions throughout blowdown (evi­
dently an especially important period) and reflood periods. In a related 
manner, the critical break flow rate has been shown to be significant 
in its influence on the time to DNB and the time history of fluid availa­
bility for cooling during blowdown.
Obviously, the initial power and the decay heat release are 
important driving functions of the system. As shown in table A10.3 
from the ANC study, a 20 percent increase in power resulted in a corres­
ponding increase in temperature of 53 percent or more, even when re­
flooding started at the relatively cool blowdown temperature of 1600°F. 
This observation serves to highlight the critical nature of the question 
of the validity of the ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent decay heat criterion 
as well as the potential results of limiting (or reducing) peak opera­
tional power for the facilities.
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The ANC study also highlights the importance of the metal-water 
reaction energy release rate. Though the energy release from metal-water 
reactions may not have been given proper recognition as a significant 
LOCA energy source in the AEC publications defending the ECCS criteria, 
it has been treated conservatively in both the IAC and the revised AC.
The use of the full Baker-Just relationships for the energy release rate 
in calculations should conservatively predict this energy source.
This LOCA parameter evaluation has, of necessity, been rather 
qualitative. Development of a valid statistical basis for probabilistic 
evaluation of thermal excursions of the type conducted by GE would be a 
valuable contribution to the resolution of ECCS uncertainties. It would 
also be enlightening to have the results of peak temperature differences 
associated with observations for thermal excursions corresponding to 
pessimistic branches of a LOCA fault tree as well as the optimistic branches 
selected by GE (e.g., figure A10.3).
Though vendors, in general, have all indicated that they felt 
the IAC requirements led to excessive conservatisms in design, the AEC 
parametric results shown in table A10.4 do not appear to support this 
contention. The results shown indicate that reflood rates of one inch 
per second are of borderline adequacy in controlling thermal excursions 
where swelling and rupture of rods takes place early in the blowdown.
They also indicate that for large portions of the core, where linear 
power densitites are greater than 11.1 Kw/ft, small adverse perturbations 
to current estimates of projected ECCS operating conditions may result 
in meltdown. All variables including reflood and blowdown heat transfer, 
gap conductivity, rupture time and operational power densitites were 
shown to be important contributors to thermal excursions. However, 
major changes in gap conductance through early rupture time and pertur­
bations in linear power density as well as reflood heat transfer were 
shown to dominate the heat transfer mechanisms.
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